Meta Ethics

what is Ethical Naturalism

the view that goodness is something within the natural world, typically a natural property. this means that naturalism is cognitive

what does cognitivism mean

the view that ethical language expresses beliefs about reality which can therefore be true or false

what does non-cognitivism mean

the belief that ethical language expresses some non-cognition, such as emotion. does not attempt to describe reality and therefore cannot be true or false

what is moral realism

the view that moral properties like good, bad, right and wrong exist in reality

what is moral anti realism

the view that moral properties like good, bad, right and wrong, do not exist in reality

what is Aristotelian Naturalism

the claim that goodness is eudemonia- (flourishing). flourishing is a factual feature of natural organisms

who defends Aristotelian naturalism by giving the example of flourishing plants

Phillipa Foot

How could you respond to Phillipa Foots support of Aristotelian naturalism

flourishing can be observed in bad people

eudemonia is merely an outcome of goodness, expressed in a natural way, this does not provide a basis to say that goodness is natural in itself.

what is Utilitarian naturalism

Bentham claims that goodness = pleasure

pleasure is a natural property of creatures

what is one strength of Naturalism

it is a part of our nature to seek pleasure and avoid pain, so this inescapably determines out morality

mill proposes the broader term happiness, which means both Bentham and Mill try to capture the psychological essence of pleasure

it does seem intrinsic to seek pleasure and avoid pain

who proposed the ‘is-ought gap’

David Hume

What is the ‘is-ought gap’

David Hume's is ought gap argues that you cannot logically derive a moral judgement (what it ought to be) solely from factual statements (what is)

just because something is a certain way doesn't mean it ought to be that way. Moral conclusions require a moral premise.

is Humes ‘is-ought gap’ cognitive or non-cognitive

non cognitive- since our moral judgements cannot be derived from facts, they must have a different origin. Hume proposes that ethical language comes from ‘the heart’ and not ‘true understanding’

who criticises Humes ‘is-ought gap’

Patricia Churchland- proposes that Humes argument only targets deductive reasoning from ‘is’ to ‘ought’

Mill especially seems to accept that he is making an indictive argument when he accepts that his proof of utilitarianism is the ‘only proof’ possible

pleasure being our natural end doesnt deductively mean that is is good, but it is strong evidence, meaning humes critique does not apply, as utilitarianism is arguably inductive

what is an inductive argument

An inductive argument is a type of reasoning that involves drawing general conclusions based on specific observations or instances. Unlike deductive reasoning, the conclusions derived from inductive arguments are not guaranteed to be true but are supported by the strength of the evidence presented.

what is a deductive argument

A deductive argument is a type of reasoning where the conclusion logically follows from the premises provided, ensuring that if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true. It is characterized by a definitive relationship between premises and conclusion, unlike inductive reasoning.

what is Moores Meta ethical stance

Non-naturalist Intuitionism - cognitive realism

what is non-naturalist intuitionism

moore developed humes criticism of naturalism, however, once he thought naturalism to be false, he did not abandon objective morality like Hume did

morality is real in the same way that numbers are real, real in some way but clearly not as a property of natural objects

we know what is good/bad or right/wrong intuitively, without any process of reasoning

what is Moores open question argument

if: goodness= pleasure

then: (goodness=pleasure) = (pleasure= pleasure)

but: goodness=pleasure is informative- it tells us something about the world

yet: pleasure=pleasure is not informative

therefore this is a tautology

it will always be an open question to ask “is goodness really x natural property”

what is the difference between an open and closed question

• Closed question: The answer is built into the meaning of the terms.
  → Example: "Is a triangle three-sided?" (Answer: Yes—by definition.)

• Open question: The terms don’t give you the answer automatically, so it’s a genuine question.
  → Example: "Is pleasure good?" (Answer: Not obvious—worth discussing.)

who proposed the naturalistic fallacy

G.E Moore

what is the naturalistic fallacy

a development of Hume’s ‘is-ought- gap

says that it is a fallacy to assume that something being natural means it is good

attacks divine command theory too

it seems impossible to acctualy have a reason to define things as ‘good’, these definitions are just assumptions

Moore concludes that we cannot say what goodness is because it is sui generis- (unique)

this explains why goodness cannot be equated to anything else

what is sui generis

(unique) good is a simple and indefinable quality

it cannot be explained in terms of anything else

what analogy does Moore use in order to demonstrate that good is sui generis

goodness is like the colour yellow, you cannot define it

you just know it intuitively when you apprehend it

similarly, we just know whether an action is right or wrong through intuition,

without figuring it out through a process of reasoning

what is Moores non-naturalism

goodness is a non-natural property.

this goes back to Plato’s form of the good- a non-natural thing

goodness is real and yet non-natural

goodness is real in the same sense that numbers are real. they are clearly not natural qualities of physical objects

so there must be more to reality then just the natural

although naturalism is false, moral realism can still be true

what is Moores intuitionism theory

argues that when we observe or reflect on a moral action and its consequences, we intuitively know whether it is right or wrong.

This is a cognitive, non naturalist and moral realist theory

what is a strength of Moore’s intuitionism

cross cultural moral agreement- there are core moral principles similar in all societies, such as prohibitions on stealing and murder. this shows that there may be some absolutists moral truth that all humans somehow apprehend

analysis of the argument that cross cultural moral agreement proves intuitionism

• there is also moral disagreement, although Moore argues that this is due to people not clearly articulating their moral views

• Pritchard- further adds that disagreement is caused by people having different levels of practical knowledge about the world and levels of personal moral development

who proposes the argument from relativity

Mackie- attacks moral realism with an abductive argument- he notes that there is cross cultural disagreement, and this does not prove that there are no objective moral properties and more than disagreement about the earth proves that there is no objective shape of the earth.

the reason for moral disagreement is due to adherence to different forms of life- social conditioning

we cant prove that there is no non-natural moral property influencing out decisions, but we have no reason to think that there is when we have the explanation of social conditioning

what is a strength of Mackie’s argument from relativity

we can explain the moral agreement found cross-culturally through evolution and the universal practical requirements for a society to exist

so, a core set of moral cross-cultural views exist due to practical necessity, not some absolutist objective moral truth

who proposed the non-cognitive theory of motivation

Hume

what is Hume’s non-cognitive theory of motivation

aims to show how moral judgements (thinking “x is right/wrong”) cannot be caused by reason

moral judgements involve motivation to action- motivation must involve desire- mental states which attract or repel behaviour

moral judgements always come after and are joined with emotional approval or disapproval

we have emotional- positive or negative- reaction towards an action and then judge it good or bad

how did Hume illustrate that moral judgements cannot involve reason

“reason can never be a motive to any act of the will”

reason is “the slave of passions”

p1- moral judgements are motivating

p2- reason and belief are not motivating

c1- reason cannot create moral judgements

c2- moral judgements express non-cognitive states

what is the role of reason according to Hume

reason can only create beliefs about how to satisfy/ achieve our desired ends

we have particular emotional associations and feelings due to out socially conditioned preferences and bias's

reason then provides ad hoc rationalisations for our prejudices

desire is the foundational motivator of moral judgements, not reason.

who provides a weakness of non cognitivism

Johnathan Haidt

What is Haidt’s criticism of non-cognitivism- Humes

creates an illustration to show Hume went too far to call reason a “slave”

emotions are like an elephant, and reason is the rider.

the elephant often will go wherever it wants, dragging the rider along with it, but over the long term, the rider can control the general direction of the elephant

similarly, a humans reason can control their general behaviours despite emotions

How is Aristotelian virtue ethics used to criticise Hume’s theory of motivation

Aristotle also accepts that our emotions are not under direct control of reason, but they are under indirect control.

over the long term we can cultivate habits which control emotion

when a person says “x is wrong” they are partially expressing how they feel, and they feel that way due to social conditioning.

people can rationally cultivate emotional reactions and habits towards flourishing.

our moral judgements also express cognitions regarding flourishing or what a virtuous person would do

How does Haidt’s criticism of Hume fail

fails to consider that our rational cultivation of our emotional reactions could be driven by desire.

Hume could accept that our reason can sometimes cultivate a control over emotions

however we can still question why reason chose to cultivate the emotional habits that it did.

the ultimate root must still be desire

we desire to control out behaviours, desire it the root of all human behaviours

who develops a point that belief cultivates desires

Virtue ethicist McDowell develops the point that beliefs can cause desires which motivate action

this critique, along with Haidt’s are successful because in virtuous people, beliefs motivate ethical desires

McDowell’s point explores why the same belief could cause desires in some (virtuous people) and not others, because they lack virtue

What does Ayers Emotivism suggest

• moral judgements are not caused by reason

• the origin of moral judgements is feelings

• when we call something good/bad we are expressing a personal opinion of it

• we express non-cognitions like emotional approval/disapproval

• Ayer says that goodness being a natural property is unverifiable and thus meaningless

How does Ayer respond to Hume’s is ought gap

Ayer accepts the fact-value distinction implied by Hume’s theory of motivation and is-ought gap

Ayer thinks that we are therefore left with anti-realism. we cannot assert that there are either natural or non-natural moral properties, so anti-realism is true

ethical language expresses emotion, and is non-cognitive

Who proposes the boo-hurrah theory

A.J Ayer

What is the boo-hurrah theory

A.J Ayers idea that when we say ‘x is wrong’ we are just saying ‘boo to x’ or just saying ‘x’ with a disgusted tone of voice.

when we sat something is good/bad right/wrong, we are really just having an emotional outburst.

saying ‘x’ is good is just saying hurrah to ‘x’

this fits with the reality of human psychology.

when people engage in moral debates, it does seem that they are having an emotional conflict, thats why moral debates are often described as heated

Hume’s fork

meta ethics asks “what does ethical language mean” and Hume’s fork states that there is no meaning in ethical language as meaningful statements are either analytic or synthetic.

analytic statements can be known through the meaning of the words, there is no logical contradiction in sating that “stealing is not wrong” and so “stealing is wrong is not an analytic statement

synthetic statements are statements which are verified empirically, but ethical statements cannot be seen in the world

what is Ayers verification principle

expanded on Hume’s fork to become the criteria of meaningful cognitive language.

a statement is only meaningful if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable through experience

ethical statements are not analytic, e,g if i den “stealing is wrong” there is no apparent contradiction

ethical statements are not synthetic, nor empirically verifiable through experience. they are not observable in a supposedly ‘moral’ action we could list the facts about it which we could experience, and the so called ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ could not be found on the list

what is a counter to Hume’s fork and the verification principle

neither arguments themselves seem to be analytic and so can be denied without contradiction, and it is hard to see how either could be synthetically verified. both arguments fail their own tests.

Hume’s fork is not a judgement of reason, and verification principle is meaningless

however, it is key to note that Ayer did not really think that his emotivism needed verificationism, although, even if verificationism proved it false, he could still rely on Hume’s motivation argument for non-cognitivsm

what is Mackie’s anti realist argument

Stronger than both Humes and Ayers due to the fact that they do not rely on empiricist doctrines

Mackie thinks that the linguistic approach to meta ethics was flawed- verificationism, the naturalistic fallacy, and the open question argument all rely too much on the linguistic analysis of moral concepts

mackie thinks instead that objective values are ‘queer’ and thus incomprehensible

• It's more reasonable to believe they don’t exist.

• Our moral judgments pretend there are such objective values, but they're systematically false—hence, moral error theory.

what does metaphysical queerness mean

As Hume points out, there is a correlation between moral judgements and motivation.

if moral realism where true and moral judgements were somehow reflective of reality, then there would need to be objective moral properties which motivate us

Mackie sums this up as that ‘not-to-be-doneness’ would be somehow present in reality. It’s impossible to conceive of what that would involve. This is grounds for thinking there are no objective moral properties.

what does metaphysical queerness mean

Even if there were objective moral properties, how could we know them? Moore’s answer that we just have a mysterious faculty of intuition is arguably not an answer because it doesn’t explain how that faculty works.

evaluation defending moral realism

Mackie’s queerness arguments really only work against non-naturalism, not naturalism.

If we could prove that goodness is pleasure or flourishing, then there would be nothing incomprehensible about moral properties existing, motivating us nor how we come to have knowledge of them. It’s not strange at all that we would be motivated to flourish.

Utilitarians can respond similarly regarding pleasure/happiness.