Trusts of Land

What is a trust?

An obligation to use your right for someone else’s benefit

What is the distinction between a trust in equity vs common law? (2)

• Can only have up to 4 owners at law VS in equity, you can have unlimited number of owners in trust. 

• Need to distinguish between who has legal title (trustees) and who has beneficial interest in equity (beneficiary).  

What is a joint tenancy? (3)

1. No shares, both together have 100%.

2. So if one dies, remaining joint tenant still owns everything. 

3. Nothing passes to the estate of person who died = right of survivorship.  

What is a tenancy in common? (4)

1. Parties have undivided shares in land.

2. Each tenant in common has a proportion of the beneficial interests, which can be unequal.

3. So when one person dies, the estate inherits their share.

4. Physically undivided, but each has 50% (or other) of the benefit of the estate.

What did Stack v Dowden say about joint legal owners?

“All joint legal owners must hold the land on trust”

What does s1(6) LPA 1925 provide? (2)

• At law, you will always get a joint tenancy.

• “A legal estate is not capable of subsisting or of being created in an undivided share in land, or being held by an infant.”

What are 3 consequences of s1(6) LPA 1925?

1. Legal estates cannot be held by infants or as undivided shares.

2. A legal estate cannot be held as a tenancy in common.

3. Co-ownership at law is always a joint tenancy.

What is the effect of s34 LPA 1925 generally? (5)

1. Legally, land can only be held by up to 4 joint tenants (s34(2)), and the legal joint tenancy cannot be severed.

2. Prevents fragmentation of legal title BUT allows beneficial ownership in any proportions.

3. Statutory trust is automatic and does not require express declaration.

4. Beneficial interests may be joint or in common depending on intention.

5. Survivorship preserved at law, but not necessarily in equity.

What does s34(1) LPA 1925 provide?

An undivided share in land (i.e. a legal tenancy in common) cannot be created except as allowed by the Settled Land Act 1925 or otherwise provided by the LPA.

What does s34(3A) LPA 1925 define?

“Persons interested in the land” includes trustees, personal representatives, and anyone beneficially interested.

What is the general effect of s36 LPA 1925?

What does s36(1) LPA 1925 provide?

Where a legal estate is held in trust for joint tenants, it must be held on trust as though the beneficial owners were tenants in common, BUT this does not sever the equitable joint tenancy.

What does s36(2) LPA 1925 provide? (2)

• Legal joint tenancy cannot be severed to create a tenancy in common by law or otherwise.

• Exceptions:

  • A joint tenant may release their interest to others.

  • An equitable joint tenancy may be severed by written notice or an act that would sever a joint tenancy in personalty.

  • After severance, land is held on trust to reflect the new beneficial interests.

  • If one joint tenant becomes sole beneficial owner by survivorship, they may deal with the legal estate freely.

What does s36(3) LPA 1925 provide?

Apart from release, there can be no severance of a mortgage term or trust estate to create a tenancy in common.

What does s36(2) LPA govern?

Governs legal mechanism for severing a joint tenancy in EQUITY. 

What intention is required for severance under s36(2) LPA 1925? (2)

• Intention must be immediate and unequivocal.

• Must communicate an intention to sever now, not in the future — Harris v Goddard

What are 3 formal requirements for notice under s36(2) LPA 1935?

1. Notice “In writing”, but courts look to substance over form. 

2. Notice must be clear, unconditional, and separate from unfinished negotiations. 

3. Document must be intended to operate as a notice of severance, and not merely form part of ongoing negotiations or proposals. 

What is the effect of a valid severance under s36(2) LPA? (3)

• Severance is effective immediately.

• Converts the beneficial joint tenancy into a tenancy in common.

• Shares are usually equal unless clearly agreed otherwise — Goodman v Gallant

What does s36(4) Settled Land Act 1925 provide? (2)

• An undivided share in land can only be created under a trust instrument or LPA 1925.

• Only takes effect behind a trust of land.

What are the 3 key points in Goodman v Gallant?

1. Doctrine of constructive trusts cannot be used to contradict an expressly declared trust that comprehensively defines the parties’ beneficial interests. → The declaration is conclusive. 

2. No scope for the application of resulting, implied or constructive trusts unless and until the document is rectified or rescinded for fraud or mistake. 

3. Declaration that parties hold property “upon trust of themselves as joint tenants” means that, upon severance, each will hold an equal share. 

What are the facts and decision in Goodman v Gallant? (4)

1. C and her husband were joint beneficial tenants in their home.

2. C and D together purchased husband’s interest. → Conveyance declared property held “upon trust to sell.. until sale upon trust for themselves as joint tenants”.

3. C served notice to sever and claimed a 3/4 share. → D argued equal shares.

4. HELD = Parties were joint tenants. → Sale proceeds held in equal shares.

In Goodman v Gallant, what did Slade LJ say about express trusts? (3)

1. Firm rule of conclusiveness = once an express declaration of beneficial ownership exists, it determines the parties’ interests absolutely, unless the instrument is successfully challenged for fraud or mistake.

2. Even without an express trust, s34–36 LPA 1925 would impose a trust for sale, but these provisions do not affect beneficial ownership.

3. s34-36 LPA 1925 merely simplify conveyancing. → They do not alter equitable ownership. 

In Goodman v Gallant, what did Slade LJ say about the severance of a joint tenancy?

Upon severance of a joint tenancy, equal shares result unless the trust expressly provides otherwise.

What are the 2 key points in Nilsson v Cynberg?

1. Express declaration of trust is NOT conclusive of the parties’ beneficial interests IF it is:

• Rectified or rescinded,

• Varied by subsequent agreement, or

• Affected by priority/estoppel (Stack v Dowden).

2. “Subsequent agreement” can include a later informal CICT and is not confined to a formal written agreement under LP(MP)A 1989.

What are the facts and decision in Nilsson v Cynberg? (4)

1. Property bought in joint names, executing a TR1 declaring joint tenancy.

2. After separation, husband told wife the house was hers. → She paid all mortgage instalments.

3. Husband became bankrupt. → Trustees argued express declaration was final.

4. HELD = Express declaration of trust in the TR1 could be overridden by a later informal common intention constructive trust. 

In Nilsson v Cynberg, how does Pickering KC explain the law? (5)

1. Express declarations are conclusive unless varied by subsequent agreement or estoppel.

2. In Stack v Dowden, Baroness Hale did not require formalities for subsequent agreement.

3. Clarke v Meadus supports later constructive trusts displacing earlier declarations.

4. Pankhania v Chandegra distinguished because there, understanding arose at time purchase, not later.

5. Limiting “subsequent agreement” only to written agreements would produce an arbitrary distinction: 

What is the significance of Rosset? (2)

• Shows the narrow approach to deducing common intention that focuses solely on financial contributions prior to Stack v Dowden. 

• Note that post Stack v Dowden, non-financial contributions are relevant to inferring common intention. 

What are the facts and decision in Rosset? (5)

1. Man bought house in his sole name for purpose of cohabitation with partner D.

2. Mortgage with C bank.

3. Partner D made no financial contribution to either purchase or refurbishment.

4. Bank sought possession. → Partner D claimed beneficial interest.

5. HELD = Wife did not have an overriding beneficial interest in the property. -

• Activities in relation to refurbishment were insufficient to justify the inference of common intention.

• Monetary value of her work expressed as a contribution to a property worth £70k was trifling.

In Rosset, what did Lord Bridge say about establishing common intention? (3)

1. Can be inferred from an express agreement, arrangement, or understanding prior to acquisition or exceptionally at some later date that property is to be shared beneficially (even imprecise) plus detrimental reliance; OR

2. Absent agreement, inferred from conduct — rarely satisfied without direct contributions to purchase price or mortgage.

3. Refurbishment work and “joint venture” arguments = insufficient.

What is Law Commission’s criticism of Rosset?

Lord Bridge set the hurdle too high for proving a common intention that there was beneficial interest. 

What doctrine was established in Stack v Dowden?

Modern doctrine of common intention constructive trust (CICT) for unmarried couples in joint names, with distribution of beneficial interest determined by inferred common intention.

What are the facts and decision in Stack v Dowden? (4)

1. Unmarried couple had home in joint names, living with their children in the home.

2. Unequal contribution to purchase price of home (D 65%).

3. Separation and C left. → C sought an order for sale of house and equal division of proceeds. → Also sought order for compensation for occupation rent.

4. HOL HELD = Property was held beneficially in unequal shares. → Presumption that where there is a joint tenancy in law, there is a joint tenancy in equity = rebutted by the fact that the couple kept their finances “rigidly separate”.

In Stack v Dowden, what presumption did Baroness Hale articulate? (2)

• Presumption that equity follows the law.

• In the domestic consumer context, a conveyance into joint names indicates both legal and beneficial tenancy, unless and until the contrary is proved. 

In Stack v Dowden, what are 8 factors that are relevant to inferring common intention [69]?

1. Advice or discussions at the time of the transfer. 

2. Reasons why the home was acquired in their joint names.

3. Reasons why (if it be the case) the survivor was authorised to give a receipt for the capital money. 

4. Purpose for which the home was acquired; the nature of the parties’ relationship. 

5. Whether they had children for whom they both had responsibility to provide a home. 

6. How the purchase was financed, both initially and subsequently. 

7. How the parties arranged their finances, whether separately or together or a bit of both. 

8. How they discharged the outgoings on the property and the other household expenses.

What was established in Stack v Dowden regarding occupation rent?

s12–15 TLATA replace old doctrine of equitable accounting, BUT both will often have the same results. 

In Stack v Dowden, what was Lord Neuberger’s dissenting judgment? (3)

• Presumed resulting trust is the answer which equity has always favoured historically and recently in the family home context. 

• CICT leads to greater inconsistency because a presumed resulting trust applies where there is unequal contribution in sole name cases. 

• Court is increasingly enthusiastic about the presumption, even in relationships where it does not apply. 

How did Jones v Kernott rebut Lord Neuberger’s concerns of inconsistency in joint names and sole names?

Clarified that the presumed resulting trust will NOT apply in sole name cases where there is an unequal contribution of funds. 

What is the key principle in Jones v Kernott?

Under a CICT, if it is impossible to infer any actual intention as to shares => Court will impute intention based on fairness and the whole course of dealing.

What are the facts and decision in Jones v Kernott? (5)

1. Unmarried couple cohabiting a property they bought in joint names.

2. Separation. → Women remained with children. → Life insurance proceeds split. → Man bought another home.

3. Woman sought declaration that she owned entire beneficial interest in the property, while Man sought to sever the joint tenancy.

4. Accepted they held property in equal shares (50/50) at time of separation.

5. SC HELD = Beneficial ownership with unequal shares, with 90% (Woman) and 10% (Man). → Their intentions had changed since they separated.

In Jones v Kernott, what rationale did Lord Walker and Baroness Hale give? (5)

1. Presumption of joint tenancy can be displaced by:

• (a) Different common intention at time of acquisition,

• (b) Later formed a common intention that their respective share would change.

2. Common intention is to be decided objectively from words and conduct, examples of relevant evidence is given in Stack v Dowden. 

3. In intimate relationships, joint mortgage liability strongly indicates emotional and economic commitment to a joint enterprise.

4. In a trusting personal relationships, parties do not hold each other to account financially. → Gardner describes this as "materially communal relationships” where parties pool their resources.

5. Where intention cannot be inferred, the Court imputes what is fair having regard to the whole course of dealings.

What are the 3 key points in Hudson v Hathaway?

1. Where joint owners in a personal relationship agree that one party will take the whole beneficial interest, that agreement is legally effective if in writing and signed under s53(1)(a) or (c) LPA 1925.

2. Emails containing parties’ names and a clear intention to divest an interest immediately can satisfy s53(1)(a) or (c) LPA.

3. Detrimental reliance remains required for altering beneficial shares in a CICT.

What are the facts and decision in Hudson v Hathaway? (4)

1. Unmarried cohabitants. → Joint names. → No express trust.

2. Separation. → D left, while C stayed with kids. → Emails stated D had “no interest whatsoever in the house”.

3. C paid mortgage and expenses. → C claimed sole ownership via CICT or statutory disposition.

4. HELD = Emails effected a valid release of D’s equitable interest to C. → Detrimental reliance was proved.

In Hudson v Hathaway, what did Lewison LJ say about constructive trusts? (2)

1. Mere common intention is insufficient.

2. Detrimental reliance remains essential for CICT. → Rosset reaffirmed. → Stack v Dowden & Jones v Kernott were not authority to the contrary. → Both assumed detriment. 

What is Sloan’s critique of post-Jones v Kernott CICT? (3)

• Courts accept Jones v Kernott as relevant to sole-owner cases, but rarely move beyond Rosset. → “Liberal principles, orthodox results”.

• Conservative application disadvantages cohabitants who make indirect or non-financial contributions, leaving them without effective protection.

• Uncertainty persists. → Need a clear SC ruling explicitly overruling Rosset.

Where does Sloan trace the origin of the common intention constructive trust?

Gissing v Gissing, with roots in Pettit v Pettit

How did Rosset restrict proof of common intention?

By limiting it to either:

1. Express discussions about sharing ownership; or

2. Direct financial contributions to purchase price or mortgage.

According to Sloan, what policy purpose did CICT originally serve?

A policy-driven “familiarisation” of property law, bridging the gap caused by the absence of statutory remedies for unmarried partners.

What did Stack v Dowden change according to Sloan?

Created a presumption that legal and equitable ownership coincide, BUT allowed that presumption to be displaced by examining a wide range of contextual factors.

What 2-stage analysis did Jones v Kernott confirm?

1. Whether any beneficial interest was intended.

2. If so, what its extent is.

What is Law Commission’s recommendation?

Introduce a statutory scheme providing financial relief for cohabiting couples on separation.

Law Comm — Who qualifies as a cohabitant under the proposed scheme?

2 people living as a couple in a joint household who are neither married nor civil partners.

Law Comm — How are parents treated under the scheme?

Parents of a child born before, during, or after cohabitation automatically qualify.

Law Comm — What is the minimum duration requirement? (3)

• 2–5 years set by statute.

• If longer than 2 years => Court may dispense with requirement.

• Continuous cohabitation required.

What is Gardner’s core critique of CICT? (3)

• Imputed intention is a fiction.

• Courts should replace it with transparent principles based on relationship type and contribution.

• Genuine unwritten intentions should not automatically create property rights.

What is Gardner’s “materially communal” thesis? (2)

• Materially communal relationships => Equal shares

• Non-communal relationships => Shares reflect contributions

What is Briggs’ “equitable non sequitur” argument? (2)

• Equity cannot “follow the law” into joint tenancy because legal joint tenancy is compulsory under s1(6) LPA and reveals no intention.

• Equity should instead presume tenancy in common unless expressly stated otherwise.

What logical omission does Briggs identify in Jones v Kernott?

No discussion of severance despite movement from joint tenancy to tenancy in common.

What is Gregson’s critique of CICT? (3)

• Courts fall into “fallacy of necessary implication”, and wrongly assume parties always have an intention.

• Many couples never discuss ownership shares. → CICT wrongly fills silence with fictional intention.

• Equity should justify adjustments beyond intention alone.

What inconsistency does Gregson identify in Jones v Kernott?

Courts presume intention at the establishment stage but accept silence at quantification.

What are the 4 key points in Laskar v Laskar?

1. Where a family property is purchased primarily as an investment, the presumption of equal beneficial ownership under Stack v Dowden does not apply.

2. Instead, the presumed resulting trust applied, so that beneficial shares reflect each party’s financial contribution to the purchase.

3. Discounts under Housing Act 1985 belong solely to the tenant.

4. Joint mortgage is treated as an equal contribution by both borrowers.

What are the facts and decision in Laskar v Laskar? (5)

1. Mother used right-to-buy. → Daughter joined as purchaser.

2. Purchase price included a statutory discount due to mother’s tenacity. → Funded mainly by a joint mortgage.

3. Daughter contributed £3.4k and mother £3.6k towards balance. → Property was purchased as an investment and immediately let to tenants, and rents serviced the mortgage.

4. After dispute, mother severed legal joint tenancy. → Daughter claimed a beneficial share and an account of rent.

5. HELD = Daughter’s beneficial share increased to 33%. → No account or rent ordered.

What are the 3 key points in Marr v Collie?

1. A CICT can apply beyond family homes to investment property bought jointly by a cohabiting couple.

2. Whether CICT or a resulting trust applies depends on the parties’ intentions.

3. If the parties intended joint beneficial ownership despite unequal contributions => CICT applies. → If there is no such intention => resulting trust applies.

What are the facts and decision in Marr v Collie? (4)

1. Unmarried couple bought several properties as investment in joint legal names.

2. Marr contributed almost all of the purchase money, while Collie contributed labour/renovation.

3. Relationship ended. → Marr claimed sole beneficial ownership under a resulting trust.

4. HELD = Lower judge had not sufficiently examined parties’ intentions. → Case remitted for determination of actual intentions.

What did Lord Kerr say about the scope of CICT in Marr v Collie? (3)

• CICT is not confined to the “domestic consumer context”.

• Partners may buy investment property in joint names intending equal beneficial ownership despite unequal contributions.

• Would be illogical to impose a resulting trust where evidence supports such intention.

What 2 presumptions appear to conflict in Marr v Collie?

1. Jiont names indicate beneficial joint tenancy (CICT starting point).

2. Resulting trust presumes shares follow financial contributions.

According to Lord Kerr in Marr v Collie, how should courts resolve this clash of presumptions?

By determining the parties’ actual intention.

• If the mutual wish was that beneficial ownership mirror legal ownership, CICT applies.

• If not, or if no intention was formed, the resulting trust applies.

Why was post-purchase conduct important in Marr v Collie? (2)

• Intention can change after purchase.

• Courts must examine why property continued to be bought in joint names even when expected contributions had not materialised.

What are Georgiou’s 3 core critiques of Marr v Collie?

1. Privy Council’s decision greatly expands CICT without firm authority.

2. Redraws the boundary between CICT and resulting trusts.

3. Rests on weak conceptual foundations.

What are the 3 key doctrinal expansions in Marr v Collie identified by Georgiou?

1. Removes the requirement that property be for domestic use.

2. Extends CICT to personal property (chattels).

3. Gives primacy to common intention over resulting trust analysis.

How did Marr v Collie change the “purpose” requirement for CICT? (5)

• Before Marr, CICT largely applied to domestic homes (Stack v Dowden ; Jones v Kernott).

• Courts still required domestic habitation — Laskar.

• Lord Kerr rejected this limitation, stating CICT is not confined to domestic contexts.

• Laskar was re-characterised as a purely commercial case turning on lack of intention.

• Result = CICT applies whenever property is bought within a close relationship, regardless of purpose.

How did Marr v Collie extend CICT beyond land? (5)

• Applied CICT to chattels (trucks and boat).

• No authority cited.

• Previous cases limited CICT to land/home ownership.

• De Bruyne v De Bruyne refused to apply Stack to shares.

• Georgiou calls this extension “remarkable” and unjustified.

How did Marr v Collie alter the relationship between CICT and resulting trusts? (5)

• Rejected the traditional division (habitation = CICT ; investment = resulting trust).

• Lord Kerr = unless no evidence exists, courts should not choose between presumptions.

• If any common intention exists, CICT applies.

• Resulting trusts are confined to rare “no-intention” cases.

• Georgiou argues this inevitably favours CICT and erodes certainty.

What are 4 practical concerns Georgiou raises about Marr v Collie?

1. Fact-intensive CICT undermines predictability.

2. Encourages litigation.

3. Increases costs and inconsistent outcomes.

4. Stack itself warned about disproportionate factual inquiries.

How does Marr v Collie undermine trust law safeguards according to Georgiou? (3)

1. Allows intention-based trusts without formalities. → Undermines s53(1)(b) LPA

2. Enables trusts based on “loose conversations”.

3. Creates arbitrary distinction between close relationships and commercial parties.

What conceptual flaw does Georgiou identify in CICT after Marr v Collie? (3)

1. Built on Baroness Hale’s assertion that joint equitable owners must hold on trust.

2. This has no statutory or historical basis. → s34-36 LPA do not impose such a trust.

3. Without that assumption, Courts should not infer a trust where none exists.

What has been the judicial impact of Marr v Collie? (3)

1. Few later cases cite it.

2. Many ignore it even when relevant. → One case acknowledged it but confined its scope.

3. Georgiou predicts courts will eventually confront its implications.

What are Georgiou’s 5 conclusions on Marr v Collie?

1. Dramatically widens CICT to all property acquired within close relationships.

2. Lacks principled or statutory foundation.

3. Undermines certainty and evidential safeguards.

4. Risks incoherence in intention-based trusts.

5. Calls for SC restraint before the doctrine “balloons out of control”.

What are the facts and decision in Kahrmann? (4)

1. Business partners expressly orally agreed to share ownership 50-50. → One of them lived at the property. 

2. HELD = 2005 Agreement had been varied. → Parties no longer held equal beneficial interests. → Agreed to share sale profits 50-50.

3. Lloyds v Rossett applied, not resulting trust analysis. → Don’t apply Stack constructive trust, apply more restrictive Rosset constructive trust. 

What are the facts and decision in Williams v Williams? (4)

1. Parents and son entered partnership and bought a farm in their names. → No express declaration of beneficial ownership.

2. Mother died. → Her estate passed to Father. → Father believed he was a joint tenant and served notices of severance.

3. Dispute arose about whether co-owners held as joint tenants (survivorship) or as tenants in common.

4. HELD = Tenants in common in equity. → Where it’s for business venture, equity has a presumption against joint tenancy. 

In Williams v Williams, why did Nugee LJ reject the application of Stack v Dowden? Give 5 reasons

1. Property was acquired in a commercial context.

2. Partnership obligations required meticulous accounting.

3. Mortgage payments came from the business.

4. The purchase replaced rent with predictable mortgage payments.

5. Commercial context displaces any presumption of survivorship.

In Williams v Williams, what long-standing equitable presumption did the court rely on? (2)

• Equity assumes no survivorship in business property.

Partners are presumed to hold as tenants in common.

What is the summary principle from Williams v Williams? (2)

• For business property, joint names raise a weak inference of beneficial joint tenancy.

• Easily displaced by the presumption against survivorship, leading to tenancy in common.

What is the formality for express trusts?

s53(1)(b) LPA 1925 – “Manifested and proved by some writing signed by some person he is able to declare such trust or by his will". 

Can the common intention of parties regarding their beneficial shares in a property change over time? (2)

YES — Baroness Hale in Stack v Dowden — Parties’ common intention can change over the course of their relationship.

• Gives rise to the concept of an ‘ambulatory constructive trust’, where the beneficial shares may be altered after the initial acquisition.

How can the presumption of a beneficial joint tenancy in a family home be rebutted? (3)

• By the party seeking to claim a different share.

• Must prove that parties had different common intention at the time of acquisition, OR that their intentions changed over time.

• Baroness Hale in Stack v Dowden — Court cannot simply impose what it considers a fair result.

In the context of a family home purchased in joint names, what is the 'starting point' for determining the beneficial interests of the co-owners? (2)

• When property is acquired in joint legal names, the presumption or ‘starting point’ = parties also intend to hold the beneficial interest as joint tenants, meaning they own it equally.

• Affirmed in Stack v Dowden

Is the application of the common intention constructive trust limited to family homes?

NO — Privy Council in Marr v Collie — CICT is not confined to the ‘domestic consumer context’ and can apply to investment properties purchased jointly by a cohabiting couple.

What are 6 factors might a court consider when determining the 'true intentions' of cohabitants regarding their beneficial interests in a property?

Stack v Dowden — Baroness Hale gave a non-exhaustive list of factors, including:

1. Advice or discussions at the time of the transfer.

2. The reasons the home was acquired in joint names.

3. The purpose for which the home was acquired.

4. The nature of the parties’ relationship and whether they had children.

5. How purchase was financed initially and subsequently.

6. How parties arranged their finances and paid for household expenses.

What were 3 purposes of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996?

1. Simplify and modernise the law relating to trusts of land. → Replaced old regime for trust for sale with a trust of land.

2. Significantly expanded powers of trustees — s13

3. Gave courts wide discretion to resolve disputes concerning land, especially under s14 and s15.

How does s1(1)(a) TLATA define a “trust of land”?

Any trust involving property that includes land.

Who are “trustees of land” under s1(1)(b) TLATA?

Persons appointed to manage trusts of land.

What types of trusts does TLATA apply to under s1(2)?

ALL trusts — express, implied, resulting, or constructive — including trusts for sale and bare trusts, including trusts created before TLATA commenced.

Which 2 types of land are excluded from TLATA under s1(3)?

1. Settled land — still governed by Settled Land Act 1925

2. Land governed by the Universities and College Estates Act 1925

What is the effect of s2 TLATA on settlements under the Settled Land Act 1925?

Abolishes the creation of new settlements under the SLA 1925 and replaces them with trusts of land.

What does s2(1) TLATA provide?

After TLATA came into force, no new settlements can be created under the SLA 1925, and no trust may be deemed to arise under that Act.

What doctrine is abolished by s3(1) TLATA?

Doctrine of conversion

What are 2 effects of s3(1) TLATA?

1. Land held on a trust for sale is no longer regarded as personal property (money).

2. Personal property held on a trust to purchase land is no longer regarded as land.

What was the Trust for Sale regime that was replaced by TLATA?

Trusts for sale required trustees to sell the land and distribute the proceeds, unless ALL beneficiaries agreed otherwise.

What are 4 criticisms of the Trust for Sale regime that was replaced by TLATA?

1. Rigid approach that often failed to reflect the realities of co-ownership, particularly in family and domestic contexts.

2. Dual system produced overlapping functions but conflicting rules.

3. Bare trusts and residence rights were left unregulated.

4. Preference for settlements meant accidental creation of SLA trusts. 

What is the general effect of s6 TLATA?

Trustees of land have the same powers as an absolute owner, subject to duties owed to beneficiaries and compliance with law.