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The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens (1884, UK)
Necessity is not a defense to murder; survival cannot justify killing the innocent.
Commonwealth v. Mochan (Pa. 1955)
Uncodified common law crimes may be prosecuted if they harm public morality.
Keeler v. Superior Court (Cal. 1970)
Courts cannot expand criminal statutes; killing a fetus is not murder unless the legislature defines it.
Desertrain v. City of L.A. (9th Cir. 2014)
A law is void for vagueness if ordinary people lack notice of what's prohibited and police have unbridled discretion.
Owens v. State (Md. 1992)
Circumstantial evidence is enough if it permits a rational inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not speculation.
In re Banks (N.C. 1978)
A criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague if a person of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited.
Muscarello v. United States (U.S. 1998)
The statutory term 'carry' includes transporting a gun in a vehicle.
Rex v. Chisser (1664, England)
If possession is obtained fraudulently but the title does not pass, it is larceny.
State v. Jones (N.C. Ct. App 2017)
Keeping funds one knows were mistakenly received constitutes theft because the intent to deprive permanently arises when the mistake is discovered.
Lee v. State (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
Larceny occurs once dominion and control are taken with the intent to steal, even if the thief has not left the premises.
United States v. Mafinas (9th Cir. 1983)
A bailee who misappropriates property entrusted to him can be guilty of larceny because title and ultimate possession remain with the owner.
Topolewski v. State (Wis. 1906)
Larceny requires trespassory taking; if the owner consents, no larceny occurs.
Rex v. Pear (1779, England)
Fraudulent taking, intending to deprive permanently, constitutes larceny, even if property was obtained under a pretense.
Brooks v. State (Ohio 1878)
If only possession passes through fraud, it is larceny; if both title and possession pass, it is pretenses.
Lund v. Commonwealth (Va. 1984)
Larceny applies to tangible property, not intangible services or unauthorized computer use.
People v. Brown (Cal. 1894)
Larceny requires intent to deprive permanently; mere borrowing is not enough.
People v. Davis (Cal. 1998)
Larceny exists if property is taken intending to convert it into a financial benefit, even if it is physically returned.
Rex v. Bazeley (Central Criminal Ct.. 1799)
Common law larceny required a trespassory taking. Because the teller had lawful possession, it was not larceny — leading to the creation of statutory embezzlement.
People v. Ingram (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1998)
Burglary requires intent to commit theft or a felony at the time of entry; intent formed after entry is insufficient.
People v. Whight (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1995)
Theft by false pretenses requires (1) a false representation, (2) intent to defraud, and (3) reliance by the victim. Using false identification to induce reliance satisfies the elements.
Martin v. State (Ala. Crim. App. 1944)
Criminal liability may be imposed only if the unlawful conduct is committed voluntarily
State v. Utter (Wash. App. 1971)
There is insufficient evidence to prove that there was a conditioned response that occurred at the time of the stabbing
People v. Beardsley (Mich. 1907)
There is no such legal obligation as one would have with a wife, so while he had a moral obligation, it wasn't legal; a lack of action was required for conviction
Barber v. Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1983)
A physical has no legal duty to continue treatment once it has been proven ineffective and/or futile
United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie (U.S. E.D. N.Y. 1993)
If the defense introduces a sentencing their mistake, then it's up to the jury to prove the defendant's mens rea
Regina v. Cunningham (Ct. Crim. App. 1957)
Malicious for this purpose means that even if he didnt intend to, the removal of the gas meter might cause injury to someone, but given we dont know if he knew that
People v. Conley (IL App. Ct. 1989)
Intent is inferred by the words utilized, the weapon of choice, and the force of blow
State v. Nations (M.O. Ct. App. E.D. 1984)
Defendant's refusal to know the child's age simply proves that they were acting recklessly, but not knowingly.
Flores-Figueroa v. United States (U.S. 2009)
Couldn't prove that they KNOWINGLY stole someone's identity, as it wasn't anyone's 6 years previously when they first used it
Morissette v. United States (U.S. 1952)
In order to prove one engaged in criminal intent, one must be conscious of the wrongdoing; he didnt intend to commit a crime
Staples v. United States (U.S 1994)
Dangerous objects are available to the common man; it's unfair to charge someone with imprisonment if they genuinely believed that they had a regulated, approved gun when they didnt
Garnett v. State (Ct. App. MD. 1993)
The statute within the state doesn't explicitly discuss an element of mens rea and as a result strict liability for statutory rape is the only answer
People v. Navarro (App. Dep't. LA Super. Ct. 1979)
The defendant was entitled to be given the chance to show that they weren't intentionally stealing (no rule of larceny by negligence), and it's up to the jury to determine
People v. Marrero (Ct. App. N.Y. 1987) |
The rule should not be ignorance means u get off scot free, the exception should only be when the law is very clearly too ambiguous to understand |
Cheek v. United States (U.S 1991) |
One who genuinely believes that they aren't committing a crime and that they didnt have to do something they are legally required to do, then it can not be defined as a crime. (must be reasonable and up to the jury) |
Velazquez v. State (D.C. App. Fl. 1990)
While there was recklessness, the physical illegal act initiated by the defendant was over, and one can thus not be responsible for the reckless actions of another that ultimately leads to that person's demise. |
Oxendine v. State (De. 1987) |
Evidence of causation was insufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter, a lack of confirmation from medical examiners on who caused the death |
People v. Rideout (Ct. App. Mich. 2006)
Causation has two components: factual and proximate cause. The factual cause was that drunk driving caused the accident, but the proximate cause was that the victim's injury was not a direct natural result of the actions (wrong place, wrong time) |
State v. Rose (R.I. 1973) |
If man was killed upon impact its manslaughter but becasue time of death is unknown one can not know beyond a reasonable doubt that it was manslaughter |
People v. Eulo (Ct. App. N.Y. 1984) |
Ceasing of brain activity is a medical measure of death, legislatures concept of death is when actions cause injury leading to victims total loss of brain function - sufficient evidence for jury |
State v. Gutherie (S.Ct. App. W.V. 1995) |
The current definition of premeditation and deliberation is confusing and meaningless - intent came in the 1st time during killing (time between kill and consideration to kill) |
Midgett v. State (Ak. 1987) |
There is no evidence of premeditated murder and deliberate purpose of causing the death of another person (unless legislation changes the law) |
State v. Forrest (N.C. 1987) |
Want of provocation on the part of the deceased, conduct and statements before & after killing, threats & declarations of the defendant before & during inferring oncoming death, ill will or previous difficulty between the parties, dealing lethal blows after the deceased is helpless, evidence killing done in a brutal manner |
Girouard v. State (Ct. App. Md. 1991) |
Rules of Provocation: there must be adequate provocation, killing must be in the heat of passion, and the heat of passion must be sudden killing and must have followed provocation (no cooling off period), and there must be a causal connection between the provocation, passion, and fatal act |
People v. Casassa (Ct. Ap. N.Y. 1980) |
Extreme emotional disturbance is an outgrowth of heat of passion and must be reasonable, up to jury to decide this and jury waived so judge decided that despite evidence it was too odd to reasonable understand |
People v. Knoller (Cal. 2007) |
Implied malice requires a defendant's awareness of the risk of death of another |
Stave v. Williams (Ct. App. Wash. 1971) |
If duty to furnish care is not activated until it is too late, then failure to furnish medical care was not the proximate cause (they knew about it at a time they couldve done something, and have in the past, but didnt and thus proximate cause) |