Metaphysics of the mind vocab

Ability knowledge

This refers to 'know-how' – the practical knowledge of how to perform a specific action or activity. It encompasses the capacity to execute both physical tasks, such as knowing how to drive, and mental operations, like performing mental arithmetic. It is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowledge 'that').

Ability knowledge, response to the ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument

This is an objection to Jackson's 'knowledge/Mary argument', which supports property dualism and opposes reductive physicalism. Jackson's argument features Mary, a color-blind neurophysiologist who, despite knowing all physical facts about color, learns something new (a non-physical fact or quale) upon experiencing color. The 'ability knowledge' response agrees Mary learns something new but rejects that it's new propositional knowledge of a non-physical fact. Instead, it claims Mary acquires 'ability knowledge' ('know-how'), such as the ability to identify, discriminate, and remember colors. This acquisition of 'know-how' is argued to be consistent with physicalism, thereby undermining the 'knowledge/Mary' argument for property dualism.

Actual world

This term designates the totality of existence as it truly is. It stands in contrast to 'possible worlds', which are theoretical alternatives that are logically or metaphysically coherent but do not actually exist. For instance, in our actual world, Mount Everest is the highest mountain above sea level, but in a possible world, it might rank differently.

Analogy

An analogy is a cognitive process where a comparison is drawn between two distinct things or sets of things to highlight similarities. Its primary purpose is to clarify or explain one concept by relating it to another that is better understood. For example, human life can be analogized to a narrative or journey, both having temporal phases (beginning, middle, end) and being characterized by agents pursuing goals.

Analogy (argument from/responding to issues for dualism)

This is a first-person perspective response to the 'problem of other minds' that dualism faces. An individual knows with certainty they possess a mind and that their mental states cause their behavioral states. Observing similar behaviors in others under similar circumstances (e.g., clapping and cheering indicating enjoyment) leads, by analogy, to the inference that others also possess minds and mental states. The argument is often supported by the intuition that 'like effects have like causes,' suggesting a common underlying cause (minds) for similar observable behaviors.

Asymmetry

Refers to a state of imbalance, inequality, or a lack of equivalence between two or more elements, aspects, or states of affairs.

Asymmetry (issues for behaviourism)

This objection critiques behaviorism's claim that mental state language can be entirely reduced to language about behavior or behavioral dispositions without semantic loss. The core issue highlights an 'asymmetry' in how we access minds: we have direct, seemingly certain, first-person introspective access to our own mental states, whereas our knowledge of others' mental states is always indirect, inferred from their behavior, and therefore fallible. This fundamental difference suggests that mental states are not merely identical to observable behavior or dispositions, raising a challenge for behaviorist and other physicalist theories.

Behaviourism (hard)

A strong form of physicalist behaviorism, often linked to the philosopher Carl Hempel. This view posits that all statements or propositions concerning mental states can be analytically reduced – meaning translated without any loss of meaning – into propositions that exclusively refer to physical bodily states, movements, or behaviors, using only the language of physics.

Behaviourism (soft)

A more moderate form of physicalist behaviorism, associated with Gilbert Ryle. This perspective proposes that propositions about mental states can be translated or reduced into propositions concerning behavioral dispositions, using everyday, ordinary language rather than a specialized scientific vocabulary.

Behaviourism (philosophical)

This refers to a family of physicalist theories in the philosophy of mind. These theories assert that language used to describe the mind or mental states can be analyzed and understood by referring to language about observable behavior and/or inherent behavioral dispositions. Essentially, our mental concepts derive their meaning and content from their connection or relationship with behavior.

Best hypothesis

This term describes a theory or thesis that emerges from inductive or abductive reasoning as the most convincing explanation for a given set of empirical evidence. It is selected as superior after evaluating and comparing it against other plausible explanations for the same observed data.

Best hypothesis (responding to issues for dualism)

An inductive or abductive 'objective' (third-person) response to the 'problem of other minds' for dualism, distinct from the argument from analogy. It argues that among all possible explanations for the complex and intelligent behavior observed in humans (and some non-human animals), the most compelling hypothesis is the existence of minds in these beings. This is often contrasted with rival ideas, such as the 'philosophical zombie' thesis, which suggests beings could act as if minded but lack conscious mental states, asserting that the mind hypothesis is empirically superior.

Brain states

These are the physiological conditions and processes occurring within the brain, such as specific patterns of neural activity or electrochemical configurations. In some physicalist theories, like mind-brain type identity theory, mental states are argued to be ontologically reducible to, or identical with, specific types of brain states.

Category mistake

An intellectual error that occurs when a concept or property is wrongly assigned to a logical category to which it does not belong. For example, to claim that 'the number three smells green' is a category mistake, as sensory properties are attributed to an abstract mathematical concept that cannot possess them.

Category mistake (Ryle/issues for dualism)

Gilbert Ryle argued that dualism commits a 'category mistake.' He contended that it is erroneous to conceive of mental states as 'belonging to the mind' as if 'the mind' were a distinct entity—a non-physical thinking substance—existing in the same logical category as physical objects or living bodies. Ryle believed this error leads to the problematic concept of the mind as a 'ghost in the machine,' incorrectly reifying mental phenomena into a separate, mysterious substance.

China thought experiment (issues for functionalism)

Proposed by Ned Block, this hypothetical scenario challenges machine functionalism. It envisions the entire population of China, connected by two-way radios, collectively simulating the functional organization of a human brain neuron by neuron. Block argues that functionalism would be committed to attributing genuine mental states (like qualia) to this vast system. If this conclusion seems radically counterintuitive – because we believe such a system would not truly be conscious – then, Block suggests, it reveals a flaw in machine functionalism's ability to fully account for mental states.

Circularity (issues for behaviourism)

A problem for philosophical behaviorists attempting to define mental states purely in terms of behavior. The issue arises because an exhaustive analysis of a mental state (e.g., 'S believes the ice is thin') often requires reference to other mental states (e.g., 'S does not desire an icy plunge'). If these other mental states are also defined behaviorally, the analysis can become circular: the definition of one mental state implicitly or explicitly relies on another, which in turn relies on the first. This defeats the goal of reducing mental language entirely to behavioral descriptions without loss of meaning.

Conceivability (argument for substance dualism)

A deductive argument by Descartes for substance dualism, concluding that minds are distinct mental substances, not identical with physical bodies or their parts. Descartes believed conceivability entails possibility. He argued it is conceivable for the mind to exist without the body and vice versa because he had a 'clear and distinct idea' of their essentially different natures: mind characterized by unextended thought, body by unthinking extension. If this separate existence is possible ('God could make it so'), then mind and body must be distinct substances.

Conceivable

A concept is conceivable if it can be thought of or imagined without internal contradiction or incoherence. Many philosophers view conceivability as a strong indicator of 'logical possibility' (what can be coherently thought). It is often contrasted with 'metaphysical possibility,' which concerns what could actually exist in reality even if it's not immediately apparent from thought alone.

Conceptual interaction problem (Elisabeth Princess of Bohemia/issues for dualism)

An objection to Descartes' interactionist substance dualism, raised by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. She argued that Descartes' dualism lacked a coherent explanation for how an unextended, non-physical mind could causally interact with an extended, physical body. Standard causal interaction was understood to require physical contact or proximity between extended entities. Since Descartes denied the mind had extension, Elisabeth concluded there was a fundamental conceptual barrier preventing the causal interaction he proposed, thus making mind-body interaction inexplicable.

Disposition (behavioural)

Behavioral dispositions refer to the inherent tendencies or potentials of an entity (person or object) to act or react in a predictable way under specific circumstances. This encompasses the full spectrum of what a being is likely to do, could do, or will do given a set of hypothetical conditions. Examples include coffee's disposition to dissolve in hot water or a baby's disposition to cry when hungry.

Dualism (epiphenomenalist)

A variant of dualism, a view holding that mind (or mental states) and body (or physical states) are ontologically distinct. Epiphenomenal dualism specifically proposes that mental states are 'epiphenomena' – causally impotent by-products generated by physical processes. On this view, mental states (e.g., sensations, thoughts) have no causal effects on the physical world, though some versions concede they might causally affect other mental states.

Dualism (interactionist)

A common type of dualism, which posits that the mind (or mental states) and body (or physical states) are ontologically distinct substances or properties. Crucially, interactionist dualism maintains that there is a reciprocal, 'two-way' causal relationship between them: mental events can cause physical events (e.g., a decision leading to a bodily movement), and physical events can cause mental events (e.g., a bodily injury causing pain).

Dualism (property)

A form of dualism that accepts there is only one kind of substance—physical substance (e.g., bodies). However, it argues that within these physical substances, there exist at least some mental properties that are irreducible to physical properties and do not supervene upon them, thus being ontologically distinct. Some property dualists may accept that mental properties contingentlry supervene on physical properties in our world, but maintain this isn't necessarily true in all possible worlds.

Dualism (substance)

A prominent form of dualism, particularly associated with Descartes, asserting that minds are not identical to bodies or any parts of bodies. Instead, minds and bodies are fundamentally distinct substances, each ontologically independent and possessing different essential properties. Descartes defined the essence of mind as active thought (or intellect) and the essence of body as passive, unthinking extension.

Eliminative materialism

A radical physicalist theory that claims some, or even all, common-sense ('folk-psychological') mental states—such as beliefs, desires, and intentions—do not actually exist. Proponents argue that our ordinary understanding of these mental states is a radically mistaken, pre-scientific theory of mind that will eventually be superseded and shown to be false by a mature and advanced neuroscience.

Empirical interaction problem (issues for dualism)

This objection critiques interactionist dualism by arguing that the claim of non-physical minds causing physical changes in the body fundamentally contradicts established scientific theories and empirical evidence. For instance, it challenges how a non-physical entity could exert force or transfer energy to a physical body without violating fundamental laws of physics, such such as the conservation of energy, implying gaps in the physical world's causal closure.

Folk psychology

Refers to the everyday, common-sense framework or theory people use to understand, explain, and predict their own and others' behavior. It typically involves attributing 'internal' mental states like beliefs, desires, intentions, and fears. According to eliminative materialists, folk psychology is a pre-scientific and ultimately flawed theory of mind that will be replaced by a more scientific neuroscience.

Functionalism

The philosophical theory that mental states are defined by their functional roles – i.e., by their causal relationships to environmental inputs, behavioral outputs, and other internal mental states. A key tenet is 'multiple realizability,' meaning the same mental state (e.g., pain) can be realized or instantiated in physically different systems (e.g., human brains, animal brains, or artificial intelligences). While often a physicalist theory by attributing mental states to diverse physical systems, functionalism is also logically compatible with non-physicalist ontologies.

Functional duplicate

Two systems are considered functional duplicates (or functionally isomorphic) if their internal states exhibit the exact same functional roles. This means that the entire network of causal interactions – between environmental inputs, their internal states, and their behavioral outputs – is identical for both systems, even if their underlying physical composition or structure differs.

Indivisibility argument

An argument presented by Descartes to support substance dualism. This argument contends that physical bodies, by their very nature of being extended in space, are inherently divisible into parts. In contrast, the mind, whose essence is pure thought and lacks extension, appears to be a unified and indivisible entity. Since minds and bodies possess fundamentally different essential characteristics (divisibility vs. indivisibility), Descartes concludes that the mind cannot be identical with the body or any part of it, thus establishing them as distinct substances.

Intentional properties (i.e. intentionality)

These are the characteristic features of some, or possibly all, mental states by virtue of which they are 'directed at' or 'about' something distinct from themselves. For example, a belief is always about a proposition (e.g., believing that Paris is the capital of France), and a desire is directed at an object or state of affairs (e.g., desiring to visit Australia).

Introspectively accessible

This describes mental states that are directly available to an individual's conscious awareness through a privileged, first-person perspective. It is akin to a form of 'internal observation,' where one can experience and reflect upon their own thoughts, feelings, and sensations immediately and without inference, in a way that is not available to others.

Introspective self-knowledge (issues for epiphenomenal dualism)

This objection challenges the epiphenomenalist dualist claim that mental states are causally inert. It appeals to our direct, first-person introspective experience of our own mental lives. We have seemingly indubitable evidence that our mental states have causal effects; for instance, the vivid phenomenal character ('what it is like') of perceiving a rainbow seems to be the direct cause of one's decision to pause and look. This intuitive experience of mental causation contradicts the epiphenomenalist's assertion that mental states cannot influence physical actions or events.

Inverted qualia (issues for functionalism)

A thought experiment used to critique functionalism, particularly its ability to account for the qualitative aspect of experience. It proposes a scenario where two individuals are functionally indistinguishable – their mental states play identical causal roles – yet the 'qualia' ('what it is like') of their experiences are systematically inverted (e.g., one person sees a banana and experiences what the other person experiences when seeing a ripe tomato, though both correctly label the banana 'yellow'). This conceivable difference in subjective experience despite functional identity suggests functionalism cannot fully explain all mental states, especially their phenomenal character.

‘Knowledge/Mary’ argument

A thought experiment by Frank Jackson aimed at defending property dualism and refuting reductive physicalism. The experiment features Mary, a brilliant neurophysiologist who lives in a black-and-white room and possesses all physical facts about color and vision. Jackson asks if Mary would learn anything genuinely new (a new fact or proposition) upon seeing color for the first time. The intuitive answer is yes: she would learn about the phenomenal properties, or 'qualia,' of color vision. This suggests her prior physical knowledge was incomplete, implying the existence of non-physical mental properties beyond the scope of physical science, thus challenging reductive physicalism.

Logically possible

Describes a claim or imaginary scenario that can be thought of or coherently conceived without leading to any internal contradiction or logical inconsistency. For example, a world where the chemical formula for water is something other than H₂O is logically possible, even if it contradicts our scientific understanding of the actual world.

Mental states

These are psychological conditions or processes that constitute our conscious and unconscious inner life. They include cognitive states (e.g., beliefs, thoughts), perceptual states (e.g., sensations, perceptions), affective states (e.g., emotions, feelings), and memory states. Philosophers often characterize mental states in terms of their phenomenal properties ('what it is like' to experience them) and/or their intentional properties (being 'about' something).

Mental properties

These are the distinguishing characteristics or attributes of the mind. Key examples include qualia (or phenomenal properties), which refer to the subjective, qualitative aspects of experience, and intentionality (or intentional/representational properties), which describe the 'aboutness' or directedness of mental states towards objects or states of affairs.

Metaphysically possible

A claim or scenario is metaphysically possible if it could exist or be true in at least one 'possible world' – a coherent way reality might have been. This concept often differs from mere 'logical possibility.' For instance, while it may be logically conceivable that water is not H₂O, many philosophers would argue it is not metaphysically possible, as the chemical composition (H₂O) is considered essential to what water is. Metaphysical possibility concerns what could truly exist, not just what can be coherently thought.

Mind-brain type identity theory

A reductive physicalist (or materialist) theory which asserts that types of mental states are ontologically (but not analytically) identical to types of brain states. This means that a specific kind of mental event or experience, such as 'pain,' is not merely correlated with but is fundamentally the very same thing as a specific kind of neural or brain process. It proposes a direct identity between categories of mental and physical phenomena.

Multiple realisability (issues for behaviourism)

This is the argument that a single mental state can be expressed or manifested through an enormous variety of different behaviors, potentially an infinite number. This poses a significant challenge for behaviorist theories that attempt to reduce mental states to specific behaviors or behavioral dispositions, as no finite list of behaviors could ever fully capture the essence of a mental state that can be realized in so many diverse ways.

Multiple realisability (issues for mind-brain type identity theory)

This argument posits that the same mental state (e.g., pain) can be instantiated or realized by different physical processes or systems. For example, humans, octopuses, and even hypothetical aliens might all experience pain, but their underlying brain structures and biochemical processes are vastly different. This challenges mind-brain type identity theory, which claims that types of mental states are identical to specific types of brain states, because a single mental type could not be identical to multiple distinct physical types across different organisms.

New knowledge/old fact response (‘knowledge/Mary’ argument)

A response to Jackson's 'knowledge/Mary' argument against reductive physicalism. This view concedes that Mary, who knows all physical facts about color vision but has never seen color, does indeed gain new propositional knowledge upon seeing color for the first time. However, it denies that she learns about a new, non-physical fact. Instead, it argues that Mary acquires an 'old fact' (a physical fact she already knew) in a new way, by developing new 'phenomenal concepts' for color that were previously inaccessible. Thus, this response maintains that physical facts still provide a complete explanation of her experience, negating the need for non-physical mental properties.

Natural selection/evolution

Natural selection is a core mechanism proposed by Darwinian evolutionary theory that drives biological evolution. It describes the process whereby organisms with traits best adapted to their environment are more likely to survive, reproduce, and transmit those advantageous heritable characteristics to their offspring. Over long periods, this differential survival and reproduction, now understood to be influenced by genetic mutations, leads to the gradual development and divergence of species.

Natural selection/evolution (issues for epiphenomenalist dualism)

This objection targets the epiphenomenalist dualist claim that mental states have no causal influence on behavior or the physical world. If mental states are causally inert, they cannot offer any survival advantage. However, evolution by natural selection 'selects' for traits that benefit an organism's survival. If mental states, like fear or pain, have evolved, they should contribute to survival (e.g., fear causing avoidance of danger). If mental states have no physical effects, they cannot confer such an advantage. Therefore, if one accepts evolution by natural selection, one must reject epiphenomenalism because it implies that evolved mental states are causally irrelevant to survival.

Ordinary language (behaviourism/Ryle)

Ordinary language refers to the everyday, common usage of words and expressions. For some philosophical behaviorists, particularly Gilbert Ryle, philosophical analysis of the mind should commence with and remain anchored in ordinary language. Ryle argued that talk about mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions, desires) can be translated, without loss of meaning, into talk about observable behaviors or behavioral dispositions using this common, everyday language, rather than needing specialized scientific terminology.

Perfect actors (issues for behaviourism)

This thought experiment challenges behaviorist theories by positing the theoretical existence of a 'perfect actor' capable of flawlessly simulating any mental state (e.g., joy, fear, pain) such that their external behavior is indistinguishable from someone genuinely experiencing that state. The crucial insight is that despite identical outward behavior, there's an obvious difference between a simulated mental state (the actor's performance) and a real one (a non-actor's actual pain). This discrepancy undermines the behaviorist claim that mental state language can be fully reduced to, or defined solely by, behavior or behavioral dispositions, as it fails to account for the internal experience.

Phenomenal properties

These are the directly experienced, qualitative features or attributes of conscious mental states. For many philosophers, 'phenomenal properties' are synonymous with 'qualia,' representing the raw, subjective 'what it is like' aspect of an experience, such as the specific hue of red, the taste of coffee, or the feeling of warmth. They are distinct from the intentional content of a mental state.

Phenomenology of our mental life

Phenomenology, in this context, refers to the study and description of the first-person, subjective appearance of conscious mental states. It encompasses the entirety of the mind's inner life – its intentional (directed) and qualitative (experiential) aspects. For some philosophers, this also specifically includes the introspectively observed causal connections between different psychological states (e.g., a desire leading to a decision) and between mental states and physical behaviors (e.g., an intention causing a bodily movement).

Phenomenology of our mental life (issues for epiphenomenalist dualism)

This objection points out that epiphenomenalist dualism—which claims mental states are causally inert—is inconsistent with our fundamental introspective experience. We seemingly observe direct and compelling causal connections within our own mental lives: our thoughts lead to other thoughts, our desires prompt our actions, and our perceptions influence our choices. This rich tapestry of perceived mental-mental and mental-physical causation, apparent in the phenomenology of our conscious experience, challenges the epiphenomenalist's denial of mental efficacy.

Philosophical zombie (Chalmers/property dualism)

An argument formulated by David Chalmers in support of property dualism and against reductive physicalism. Chalmers proposes that it is conceivable, and hence metaphysically possible, for a 'philosophical zombie' to exist. This is a being that is a perfect physical (and thus behavioral) duplicate of a human but completely lacks conscious mental states or qualia ('there is nothing it is like' to be a zombie). If such a creature is possible, it implies that conscious properties (qualia) are distinct from and not entirely determined by physical properties, thus arguing for the existence of non-physical properties of the mind.

Philosophical zombies

Hypothetical entities that are exact physical and behavioral duplicates of human beings but entirely lack conscious experience or 'qualia' (i.e., they display all outward signs of mind but have no inner subjective life). These creatures are often deployed in thought experiments, particularly in arguments for property dualism, to challenge physicalist accounts of consciousness by suggesting that the physical facts alone may not exhaust reality.

Physicalism

Physicalism is a fundamental metaphysical theory asserting that everything that exists is ultimately physical (or material) or is entirely reducible to the physical. In the philosophy of mind, this translates into a family of positions that reject the existence of non-physical mental substances or properties. Some physicalists propose that mental states (e.g., beliefs, sensations) can be fully explained in physical terms, while more radical versions (like eliminative materialism) argue that common-sense 'folk-psychological' mental states will be eliminated from advanced physical theories of mind.

Physical properties

These are the characteristic features or attributes of physical (or material) phenomena. They are the properties discovered, described, and referred to within the natural sciences. Examples include mass, spatial extension, charge (e.g., positive or negative charge of subatomic particles), temperature, and velocity.

Problem of other minds

This is a significant epistemological difficulty for dualism. Since dualism generally prioritizes first-person introspective knowledge of one's own mind, the 'problem of other minds' concerns how one can justifiably know, or even have strong reasons to believe, that other individuals also possess minds. Given that direct access is limited to one’s own mental states, all conclusions about the minds of others must necessarily be inferred from their observable behavior, making certainty problematic.

Properties

In philosophy, properties are attributes, characteristics, or features that belong to or are possessed by a substance or an object. They describe what something is like or what qualities it has (e.g., being red, being heavy, being intelligent).

Propositional knowledge

This type of knowledge is commonly referred to as 'knowledge that' some specific proposition or claim is true. It is factual knowledge, concerned with verifiable statements and facts, such as knowing 'that' Washington D.C. is the capital of the United States of America, or knowing 'that' 2+2=4. It is distinct from 'ability knowledge' (know-how) or 'knowledge by acquaintance.'

Psychological

Pertaining to or involving the mind, mental processes, or mental states. This broad term encompasses all aspects of cognitive functions, emotions, perceptions, motivations, and behaviors.

Psycho-physical

This term refers to the relationship between mental or psychological states and bodily or physical states. It specifically addresses how these two domains relate to each other, including any causal connections where mental states might influence physical states or vice-versa.

Qualia

Qualia are generally understood as the intrinsic, non-intentional, and phenomenal properties of conscious experience that are directly introspectively accessible. They represent the distinctive 'what it is like' aspect of experiencing something, such as the specific taste of coffee, the vibrant redness of a rose, or the feeling of pain. While some philosophers use 'qualia' broadly for any phenomenal properties, others restrict it to explicitly non-physical phenomenal properties, and a few deny their existence entirely.

Reduction (analytical)

Analytical reduction is the claim that a particular language or way of speaking about a phenomenon can be completely translated into another language or mode of expression without any loss of its original meaning. In the philosophy of mind, this refers to the assertion that statements about mental states can be exhaustively translated into statements about other states, such as behavioral or functional states, without leaving any residual meaning.

Reduction (ontological)

Ontological reduction is the claim that a phenomenon X is, in fundamental reality, the same type or kind of phenomenon as Y. In the philosophy of mind, especially within physicalist theories like mind-brain type identity theory, this means arguments are made that types of mental states are literally identical to types of brain states. Consequently, truths about mental states and their properties are reducible to and explained by truths about physical states and their properties.

Self-knowledge

This refers to an individual's direct, first-person awareness and understanding of their own mental states, events, or processes. It is the capacity to introspect and be conscious of one's own thoughts, emotions, perceptions, and intentions.

Self-refuting

A claim or theory is considered self-refuting if, in the very act of its assertion or proposal, it implicitly demonstrates its own falsehood or inconsistency. This means the statement's truth would logically undermine the conditions necessary for it to be coherently made. For instance, the statement 'I cannot make any statements' is self-refuting.

Self-refuting (issues for eliminative materialism)

This objection highlights a potential internal inconsistency within radical eliminative materialism. The theory argues that ordinary 'folk psychological' mental states (like beliefs, intentions, and being persuaded) do not exist. However, for the theory to be successfully presented and accepted, philosophers must 'believe' it to be true based on 'persuasive reasons.' Since 'believing' and 'being persuaded' are themselves folk psychological states that the theory denies, the very act of articulating and accepting eliminative materialism relies on the existence of the phenomena it claims to eliminate, thereby rendering the theory self-refuting.

Substance

The philosophical concept of 'substance' has multiple interpretations. Two significant ones are: (1) A fundamental ontological category, denoting what ultimately exists (e.g., for Descartes, physical/material beings characterized by extension, and mental beings characterized by thought). (2) An individual entity (e.g., a human being) that serves as a bearer for various properties, some accidental (like hair color) and others essential to its nature. Descartes also defined substances as things 'capable of existing independently,' with God as the perfectly independent substance, and minds and bodies as created substances capable of independent existence due to their distinct essential natures.

Super Spartans (issues for behaviourism)

A thought experiment by Hilary Putnam designed to challenge behaviorism. Super Spartans are a hypothetical people who genuinely feel pain, just like humans, but are psychologically conditioned to completely suppress all outward behavioral expressions of pain. The conceivability and presumed possibility of such individuals demonstrate that mental states (like pain) can exist without corresponding behaviors. This shows that language about mental states cannot be exhaustively reduced to language about behavior or behavioral dispositions without losing crucial meaning, thus undermining core behaviorist claims.

Supervene

Supervenience describes a relationship of dependence between two sets of properties or facts, X and Y. X supervenes on Y if and only if there can be no change in X without a corresponding change in Y. In the philosophy of mind, physicalists often argue that mental states (X) supervene on physical states (Y), particularly brain states, implying that mental states cannot exist or change independently of their underlying physical basis, even if they are not necessarily reducible to physical states.

Thought experiment

A philosophical method, frequently utilized in the philosophy of mind, that employs a hypothetical situation or scenario to test the logical implications, consistency, and intuitive plausibility of a philosophical claim or theory. These scenarios are generally presumed to be logically and metaphysically possible, and prominent examples include Jackson’s 'knowledge/Mary' argument and Putnam’s 'Super Spartans' argument.

Ability knowledge

Knowledge of how to do something: the ability to perform some physical and/or mental activity (e.g. knowing how to drive or do mental arithmetic).

Ability knowledge (response to ‘knowledge/Mary’)

An objection to Jackson’s ‘knowledge/Mary argument’ claiming Mary learns new ability knowledge (‘know how’) rather than propositional knowledge of anything non-physical, consistent with physicalism.

Actual world

The world as it really is, contrasted with merely possible worlds.

Analogy (argument from/responding to issues for dualism)

A first-person response to the ‘problem of other minds’ where one infers others have minds by analogy from one's own mental states being causally connected to similar behavioral states.

Behaviourism (philosophical)

A family of physicalist theories claiming that language about the mind can be analysed in terms of language about behaviour (and/or behavioural dispositions), acquiring meaning via reference to behaviour.

Behaviourism (hard)

The view that all propositions about mental states can be analytically reduced, without loss of meaning, to propositions exclusively using the language of physics to describe bodily states.

Behaviourism (soft)

The view that propositions about mental states are (or can be translated/reduced to) propositions about behavioural dispositions that use ordinary language.

Brain states

Physiological states and processes of the brain (e.g. patterns of neural activity). Some physicalist theories, like mind-brain type identity theory, argue for an ontological reduction of mental states to brain states.

Category mistake (Ryle/issues for dualism)

Ryle's argument that an error arises when treating 'the mind' as a 'thing' existing like physical objects, leading to a 'ghost in the machine' concept.

Conceivability (argument for substance dualism)

Descartes' deductive argument that minds are distinct substances from bodies because it's conceivable for the mind to exist without the body and vice versa, based on their different essential natures.

Conceptual interaction problem (Elisabeth Princess of Bohemia)

Objection to Descartes' interactionist dualism: if minds are not extended physical bodies, they cannot be in contact with or proximity to bodies, thus no causal interaction is possible.

Dualism (epiphenomenalist)

A version of dualism holding that mental states are causally impotent by-products (epiphenomena) caused by physical processes, having no physical effects.

Dualism (interactionist)

A version of dualism holding that there is two-way causal interaction between mental and physical states (or substances/properties).

Dualism (property)

A version of dualism claiming that while there are only physical substances, there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties, thus being ontologically distinct.

Dualism (substance)

A version of dualism where minds and bodies constitute distinct, ontologically independent substances with different essential properties (e.g., thought for mind, extension for body).

Eliminative materialism

A physicalist theory holding that some or all common-sense ('folk-psychological') mental states do not exist and our understanding of them is radically mistaken.

Functionalism

The theory that all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles (causal interactions between environmental inputs, behavioural outputs, and internal states) which can be multiply realised in different physical systems.

Indivisibility argument

Descartes' argument for substance dualism: bodies are divisible, but minds are not, therefore minds cannot be identical with bodies or parts of bodies.

Intentional properties (i.e. intentionality)

Features of some (or all) mental states whereby they are 'directed' at (or 'about') something (e.g., a belief about France or a desire to visit Australia).

‘Knowledge/Mary’ argument

Jackson's thought experiment for property dualism: Mary, a scientist knowing all physical facts about color, learns something new about phenomenal properties when she first sees color, implying non-physical properties.

Mind-brain type identity theory

A reductive, physicalist theory claiming that types of mental states are ontologically (but not analytically) identical to types of brain (or neural) states.

Multiple realisability (issues for mind-brain type identity theory)

The claim that the same mental state can be instantiated by different physical processes, challenging the view that types of mental state are identical to types of brain state.

Natural selection/evolution (issues for epiphenomenalist dualism)

Objection that if mental states evolved via natural selection, they must contribute to survival. But if epiphenomenal, they have no physical effects and thus cannot make a difference to survival.

Philosophical zombie (Chalmers/property dualism)

Chalmers' argument: it is conceivable and therefore possible for a being to be physically identical to humans but lack conscious mental states (qualia), implying conscious states are non-physical properties.

Physicalism

The theory that everything that exists is physical (or material) or is reducible to the physical. In philosophy of mind, it rejects non-physical mental substances or properties.

Problem of other minds

An epistemological issue for dualism: how can we know or have good reason to believe other minds exist, given direct access only to our own mental states, and only inferring others' from their behaviour?

Qualia

Intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible ('what it is like' to experience something, such as the taste of coffee).

Reduction (ontological)

To claim that some phenomenon X is ontologically reducible to phenomenon Y is to say they are in fact the same type/kind of phenomenon.

Self-refuting (issues for eliminative materialism)

The objection that eliminative materialism is self-refuting because its articulation and acceptance relies on the very intentional and cognitive mental states ('being persuaded', 'believing theories') that it denies exist.

Super Spartans (issues for behaviourism)

Putnam's thought experiment of people who feel pain but suppress all pain behaviour, challenging behaviourism's claim that mental states are reducible to behaviour or behavioural dispositions.