Eliminative Materialism

Eliminative materialism

The view that some or all folk-psychological mental states do not exist and our common-sense understanding of the mind is radically mistaken.

Core claim of eliminative materialism

Mental states like beliefs and desires are not real; neuroscience will replace mental language.

Folk psychology

The human capacity to explain and predict the behaviour of other people using non-scientific or non-technical terms.

Certainty about mental states

We are directly aware of our own experiences and the existence of mental states seems more certain than any scientific theory. Denying mental states seems less plausible than denying neuroscience. 

Unreliability of introspection for mental states

Introspection is unreliable and science often overturns common sense. Future neuroscience will explain why we think we have mental states, we're just not there yet. 

Explanation by reasons (beliefs, desires)

Folk-psychology explains mental states in terms of reasons. If reasons really explain behaviour, they probably refer to something real. Folk psychology is the best hypothesis.

Eliminative materialism response to the best hypothesis

Reasons only describe behaviour patterns. Neuroscience will eventually explain the real causes in terms of brain processes.

Self-refuting nature of eliminative materialism

The articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting; stating it requires a belief in it, which eliminative materialists believe is not real (believing things).

Limitations of current understanding of eliminative materialism

We are not yet neuroscientifically advanced enough to have the language to correctly state eliminative materialism.