meta ethics key terms

cognitivism

cognitivism

moral judgements are propositions which are ‘truth-apt’

‘lying is wrong’ is a statement that can be considered either true or false

non cognitivism

ethical sentences do not express propositions that are ‘truth-apt’

they can express approval or emotions in response to a claim

moral realism

in some sense moral judgements refer to objective, mind independent moral properties. it is through realism that moral laws are discovered

moral anti realism

claims that there are no objective moral properties, and moral terms don’t refer to anything real but something else entirely

emotivism

moral judgements express a feeling or cognitive attitude such as approval or disapproval, and aim to influence others’ feelings and actions

error theory

moral judgements make claims about objective moral properties, but that no such properties exist. moral judgements are cognitive but all false

intuitionism

some moral judgements are self evident, their truth can be known by rational reflection on the judgement. moral intuitions are a type of synthetic a priori knowledge

metaethics

the philosophical study of what morality is, enquiring into the meaning of moral language, the metaphysics of moral values, the epistemology of moral judgements, and the nature of moral attitudes

moral naturalism

moral terms are definable in terms of facts about the natural world. in reductive moral naturalism, moral properties are identical with natural properties that can be identified through science and sense experience

naturalistic fallacy

according to Moore, the mistake of identifying moral good with, or reducing it to, any natural property

open question argument

Moore’s argument that identifying the property ‘good’ with any other property is never correct because whether that property is in fact good, is an open question, whereas whether some property is itself is not an open question

prescriptivism

the non cognitive theory that moral judgements are prescriptive, so provide commands and recommendations about how to act

argument from queerness

Mackie’s argument that moral properties, understood as non natural properties are metaphysically and epistemologically confusing and improbable, which is a reason to believe they do not exist

relativism

discourse about truth, knowledge or morality is ‘relative’ to a society or person. a proposition may be true for one person but not another, or an action may be morally right in one society but not another

verification principle

Ayer’s claim that all meaningful claims are either analytic or empirically verifiable. a statement must be either true or false in virtue of its meaning, or verifiable by empirical evidence