Studied by 6 people
Realism
Mind independent moral properties exist in the world
E.g. “good” and “bad”
Moral naturalism
Moral non naturalism
Moral anti - realism
There are no mind independant moral properties in the world
E.g. “good”
Moral non - cognitivitism
Moral statements are not truth apt
They cannot be true or false
Cannot be classed as propositional knowledge
Must be based on something other than finding knowledge
Moral cognitivism
Moral statements are truth apt
They are propositional and can be true or false
Moral statements can be known
Moral Naturalism (Mill)
Moral naturalism is cognitivst, claiming that moral statements have truth aptness - can be true or false and thus is propositional
Moral naturalism is realist as it claims moral properties exist according to the way the world is
E.g. Murder is wrong is true and it is also the case that murder’s wrongness exists as some feature of the world
Moral naturalism claims that moral properties can be reduced to relevant states of affairs
E.g. Hedonistic utilitarianism defines the “good as whatever is pleasurable” - with an action which is “good” maximising pleasure
Reductive naturalism
Realist position that moral statements can be translated into statements about some feature of the world
e.g. “moral goodness” can become “desiring pleasure”
Utilitarianism As Naturalism
Utilitarianism believes that the moral property of good can be reduce to pleasure and bad can be reduce to pain
The proof of hapiness principle - good is what is pleasurable, the right action is the one that maximisies pleasure
Virtue Ethics As Naturalism
In virtue ethics the good is equated to euadaimonia which is achieved through virtue
Moral non naturalism (Moore intuitionism)
Moral non naturalism is cognitivist moral statements have truth aptness
Moral naturalism falls into the naturalistic fallacy
Moral properties exist and are discoverable by reason intuitively by using a rational process of the mind
Realist position
Moral properties exist but “sui generis”
Moral properties are non - definable as basic simple proeprties
Goodness is like yellow
Open question argument
Attacks reductive property of moral statements to natural propertiess
Moral properties are unique “sui generis” - class of their own
Uses the example of good and pleasure
An open question can be answerd with yes or no
If good = pleasure then is pleasure good would not make sense as it would be like saying is pelasure pleasure, which is not an open question
First question is open ended
Goodness cannot be pleasure or be reduced down to any other natural property
As is x good will always be open ended but is x, x? can never be open ended
Critcism of open ended argument
The statement pleasure is goodness is analagous to saying water is H2O
Water is in fact H20 but this does not mean that the question is closed, and the question still makes sense
As saying is water H20 is not the same as saying H20 H20
Therefore we can still discuss whether if goodness is pleasure , with them being the same thing in the world
Hume’s fork
All propositions can either be a matter of fact or relation if ideas
Relation of ideas are all things which are intuitively certain, analytical truths including arithmetic e.g. 5 + 5 = 10. These propsitions can be discovered purely by thinking
Matters of fact are synthetic and known empirically. e.g. that book is red, Can be actual or potential we cannot have as strong grounds of thinking are true
Moral judgements are neither matters of fact or relations of ideas. Therefore we cannot have knowledge of them at all
Moral properties cannot exist
Verification Principle Ayer
Only two types of proposition have meaning
Those which are analyticaly true and those which are empiricaly verifiable
Ethical concepts are pseudo concepts and are unalayasable and not verifiable as knowledge
Instead they are just a branch of psychology
Discussion of verification principle
Verification principle is self refuting
Only propsitions with meaning are analytic or empirically verifiable
Verification principle is neither
Absurd to say discussions on things like art, ethics and religion are meaningless
[the unverifiable proposition] may be emotionally significant but it is not literally significant’
Hume is ought gap
It is irrational to move between what is the case in the world to what ought to be done
E.g. Cannot say we should not eat animals as they suffer when they are killed
Nothing in these claims illustrate the wrongness of these actions
There is a gap in reasoning
This conclusion leaves a gap between how things are and the moral imperative of what we should do
Anti - realist
Relativity anti - realist (Mackie)
It is empirically the case that moral codes differ from one society to the next
e.g. some socities all people should be treated as equals in others one is superior
How could there be moral properties if moral beliefs differ from society to society
Response to relativity (realist)
Just because there is moral disagreement between societies does not mean that there are no moral truths
Socities have also disagreed with empirical matters of fact e.g. some habe thought the earth is round while others thought the earth is flat.
However there was an objective truth and a right and wrong answer
Mere fact that socieities have disagreed over morality still leaves the posibility that their are objective moral truths some socities are just mistaken on good and bad
There are also general ethical principles held by most socieities, e.g. should not kill, steal
Response to reponse on relativity
Other moral judgements are relative to particular circumstances e.g. stealing is wrong is true in some socieities and false in others
People hold moral judgements not because there are general principles, but because something about the act arouses their disapproval and they have “intuition it is wrong”
Epistemological queerness
There is no clear way of knowing moral properties
Methods like sense percpetion or hypothetical reasoning cannot explain knowledge of reasoning
To say we know moral judgements by intuition is to say we do not know them using normal methods, doesn’t tell us how we know them by inntuition
Therefore we cannot find a connection between moral properties and natural properties
If moral truths are known they are not known empircaly or intuitively, and in a way which is fully understood.
Therefore we do not know them at all, as they are not the type of propsition we can known and moral realism is false
Error theory
The error theory is anti - realist as it asserts that there are no moral properties in existence
Is also cognitivst as it asserts that moral judgements are propositional and can be true or false
There are no moral properties, so there is no state of affairs for asserting that a moral statement is true.
Ethical language rests on an error
All ethical claims are false
Murder is wrong has truth aptness but is false, in the same way murder is right is false
Emotivism
The position that moral statements are only emotional assertions only reflecting an emotional reaction to a particular action
Non - cognitive must be neither true or false
e.g. If is say to someone you are wrong for stealing that money because
I am not doing more than envincing my moral disapproval of it
Therefore moral language is only based on emotion and how we feel
Moral properties do not exist in reality
Prescriptivism
Anti - realist position as claims that moral properties do not exist
Non - cognitive - moral properties do not tell us this is
cannot be true or false as the property doesn't exist
One property just fits an agenda better
Prescriptivism is that we are giving advice proscrbing what should be done using our own opinion
e.g. I don’t thing you should eat animals. Not it is wrong to kill animals
Not true as they are based on moral properties but given a set of agreed standars which can be universalised
Note
Flashcard