Studied by 3 people
Manstein’s Plan in France invasion
Allies suspected correctly that GER planned to attack from north through neutral BEL and LUX
However, GER plan changed when Commander Manstein, persuaded German High Command and H to shift main German effort southwards
Proposed to use Panzer divisions (units of tanks + armoured vehicles), striking ahead of main body of army, to disrupt Allies
→ Risky + ambitious strategy - GER had less tanks than Allies (2500 vs 3500)
While AGB occupied Allies in North, AGA + 7 Panzer divisions would enter FR through Sedan, unprotected by Maginot Line and make for the Channel Coast as quickly as possible
Allied forces would be trapped between two GER army groups, unable to retreat
German invasion of France: Part 1
10 May 1940 - GER units from AGB moved westwards into NED, BEL and LUX using Blitzkrieg tactics
Thinking they’d predicted H’s strategy correctly, Allies moved most of BEF + FR 7th & 1st Armies (best forces) northeast to help BEL & NED
Initial stages went well but things began to disintegrate - sudden incorporation of BEL & NED into Allied coalition complicated Allied command and control arrangements
FR force advancing towards Breda (NED) was pushed back
Speed of Nazi Blitzkrieg tactics (+ brutal bombing of civilians) proved psychologically + militarily overwhelming - NED surrendered 14 May 1940
German invasion of France: Part 2
Then main GER attack began as planned
13 May 1940 - AGA (44 divisions) with strong air support invaded further south, from Ardennes near Sedan, on River Meuse - area only defended by weak 9th & 2nd FR armies
Allies confused - next two weeks saw conflicting orders + failed attacks on GER invading forces
Some success achieved by FR 4th armoured division and BR tank brigade at Arras but collapsed due to lack of manpower
By 20 May 1940, GER reached Channel coast + BEL resistance was collapsing
Why did French and British resistance collapse?
Planning
Intelligence failings
Equipment
Psychology
1. Planning in France invasion
Too much faith in Maginot Line + unprepared for direction of main GER offensive
Didn’t believe next war would be different to WWI so hadn’t planned for mobile war
Failed to develop offensive tank tactics rather than defensive
FR assumed roads around Ardennes Forest were unsuitable for tanks so attack caught them by surprise
2. Intelligence failings in France invasion
Fell into bait set by Manstein
BEF + best FR troops still in north, countering AGB when main attack begun
Then forced into rapid retreat, desperate to avoid being trapped with backs to sea
3. Equipment in France invasion
GER army smaller, but superior to BR + FR armies
Army built up + Luftwaffe developed, with aircraft such as Stuka dive bomber wreaking havoc on Allies
Panzer MK IV tank easily overcame Allied equivalents
4. Psychology in France invasion
Defeatism among FR people as country split between Left and Right
→ Many disgusted with Third Republic - belief spread that FR couldn’t defeat GER and any attempt to do so was pointless
In many sections of FR society, there was sort of admiration for Nazism and H’s achievements in GER
BR fully intended to abandon allies, evacuate as many troops as possible and prioritise own national security if situation grew desperate
Blitzkrieg surprise, speed and ruthlessness gave Nazis psychological advantage
Fall of France
95 GER divisions prepared to sweep south
Weygand had remnants of 45 divisions, only 3 were mobile
14 June - capital occupied
Marshal Petain (elderly WWI hero) asked for GER armistice on 21 June - GER would occupy N FR directly, while Petain himself would head an authoritarian and collaborationist (i.e. working with Nazis) regime in S FR, centred on Vichy
H made them sign armistice
GER army suffered 157 000 casualties during invasion
Allies lost 2x - 360 000 casualties, with 2 million men captured
Armistice
22 June 1940
FR signing of armistice was result of replacement as PM of Reynaud (wanted to continue war from N Africa) with elderly WWI hero Marshal Petain
Petain pushed for immediate surrender
Terms of Armistice
France divided into occupied and ‘free’ zones
Small slice of SE FR was given to ITA for helping invasion
FR govt, led by Petain, would operate from Vichy, in ‘free’ zone
Small FR army allowed, stationed in unoccupied/free zone, but under GER command
Formation of Vichy government
FR parliament and govt met in Vichy, 1 July 1940
Full power to Petain
Many politicians who would’ve opposed this decision had already gone into exile
Vichy regime, led by Petain = puppet regime controlled by GER but with some ingredients stemming from conflicts of French pre-war politics
Values of Vichy government
Restoration of Roman Catholicism
Traditional family values - domestic roles for women
Antisemitism: not imposed on FR by GER - already infected FR, as well as most places in Europe
Vichy regime collaborated willingly in fate of FR Jews
Authoritarian govt
Impact of occupation and Vichy regime on people’s lives
Occupation of FR less brutal (in some ways) than occupation of Poland
FR people not considered racially ‘subhuman’ like Poles
Cooperation with new life system = manageable life, despite hardships + restrictions
Brutal repression for people who actively opposed regime
Research has shown there were far more willing collaborators in FR than they admitted for decades
Strong home grown movement sharing many of Nazis’ values
→ Germans could be ‘light touch’ as occupying force; could afford to leave relatively few troops in FR
Disastrous for FR Jewish population
Points of impact of occupation and Vichy regime on people’s lives
General restrictions
Economic hardship / hunger
Work
Displacement
Culture
Gender roles
Young people
Policing
National pride / language / customs
Poor treatment of Jews
General restrictions during occupation and Vichy regime
GER soldiers billeted (stationed) in people’s homes
Famous hotels taken over as HQ of Nazi orgs
Listening to ‘foreign prop’ (i.e. all non Nazi-approved radio) was illegal
Curfew: 12am-6am
Economic hardship / hunger during occupation and Vichy regime
Exchange between Franc and Reichsmark fixed at 20:1 - GER soldiers did well from this
Requisitioning of luxury items happened initially, inc looting of art
Then essentials requisitioned - wax, metal, leather
Rations in 1941 were 1200-1500 calories a day (2000 for Germans)
Led to flourishing black market
Work during occupation and Vichy regime
Petain wanted to reorganise FR people’s work life by assigning specific roles within society
Labour Charter in Oct 1941
Young men could learn a trade / spend 6 months in countryside learning peasant skills
Young women had more restricted choices: in urban + rural centres, learned ‘feminine skills’ (cooking, laundry, sewing) - were promised eventual employment, but their ultimate training was to become wives/mothers
STO: compulsory work service (slave labour programme) - 3 FR workers = 1 FR POW released
This was breaking point for many FR people + led to huge increase in resistance
Displacement during occupation and Vichy regime
2m FR soldiers were POWs
Communities became ghost towns
Paris pop. fell from 3m - 800 000
Prop to persuade people to work in GER was issued in co-op with Vichy govt
3 FR citizens volunteering to work in GER = 1 FR POW released
250 000 volunteers by 1942
Culture during occupation and Vichy regime
Traditionalist right of Vichy convinced that FR defeat in war was divine punishment for years of easy living
According to Vichy, FR had to return to being agricultural peasant’s country - ‘return to soil’ was a policy
Govt sought to promote rural values + peasant culture
During years of regime, FR’s motto changed from ‘freedom, equality, brotherhood’ to ‘family, work, nation’
Gender roles during occupation and Vichy regime
Fathers had absolute authority over wives and children - woman’s legal + civil rights restricted by legislation
Women encouraged to do ‘duty’ as mothers, repopulating FR - large families given certain privileges and allowances (same as Nazi GER)
Vichy law of 1940 restricted women’s ability to work in civil service; denied promotion to senior positions
By 1942, 14% of women in senior posts dismissed
Vichy wanted to restrict women’s employment, yet female labour was needed by 1942 - at first, women involved in charity networks + assisting POWs
By 1942, almost 1/4 of all FR workers in GER were women - by 1944, about 50 000 women worked there
Young people during occupation and Vichy regime
Fundamental in new regime, but didn’t set up single youth body like Hitler Youth
As well as Ministry of Youth, Family and Sport, created 60+ orgs engaged in training youth in discipline, courage, loyalty, practical ability
Changed school system
Offered ‘healthy collective experiences’ in organised groups
Youth initiatives combatting underemployment were most successful
Assigned community work to groups of young people to engage them in activities, e.g. helping those in need; helping harvesting
Orgs gave basic training for unemployed between 14-21yo
Policing during occupation and Vichy regime
FR police during WWI used:
As collaboration tool (between Vichy regime and Nazi occupier)
To enforce internal political reform: police actions included handing over of Communists + Jews to Nazis
From beginning, GERs used collective punishment to respond to resistance - if resistance member was caught, family was executed
Widened to indiscriminate retaliation, especially in rural areas
Confirmed by 1944 with discovery of mass graves + abandoned communities whose residents had been killed
Milice = paramilitary force of FR collaborators - some because of own fascists convictions, some for better rations + exemption from forced labour
Regularly tortured people to extract info, often leading directly to many massacres committed during occupation
National pride / language / customs during occupation and Vichy regime
Alsace-Lorraine Germanised
School lessons in German
Nazi orgs like Hitler Youth introduced
Statues of Joan of Arc pulled down
Berets forbidden
Treatment of Jews during occupation and Vichy regime
Vichy regime passed Jewish Statute in two phases (Oct 1940 and June 1941), modelled on German rules in place in Occupied Zone
Jews only allowed menial jobs
Mar 1941 - Vichy govt created General Commissariat for Jewish Affairs
Jewish property ‘Aryanised’ (confiscated by French state)
This left most Jews, especially foreign, in France destitute
French authorities interned (imprisoned) 1000s of Jews in French-administered detention camps in terrible conditions
Gurs, Saint-Cyprien etc - at least 3000 dead
Jan 1942: Jews in FR forced to wear yellow star
Destination for most Jews was Drancy transit camp on outskirts of Paris
By autumn 1942, 42,000 Jews had passed through this camp
Nearly 1/3 of these came from unoccupied France
Many were foreign Jews - Vichy regime claimed they were sacrificed to spare FR Jewish population
Final destination of deportees was Auschwitz, where majority were murdered by SS
Events of Dunkirk
May 1940 - GER ‘sickle cut’ pinned back BR + FR around BEL coast as BEL surrendered
20 May 1940 - GER reached Amiens + trapped BEF & remains of French 1st army around Dunkirk coast
26 May 1940 - orders given by Britain for evacuation by sea (‘Operation Dynamo’) - appeal for all civilian vessels (yachts, fishing boats etc.) that could cross Channel to help transport troops from beaches to larger offshore ships
26 May - 4 June - 340,000 men escaped, inc 140 000 FR, POL and BEL troops evacuated to England
How was Dunkirk evacuation possible?
GER advance, led by Rundstedt, halted on 24 May - half tanks broken down, many more needed maintenance
Misunderstanding in GER High Command about which units were responsible for eradicating Dunkirk pocket
Rundstedt thought turning South to defeat FR was top priority; Goering boasted that Luftwaffe alone could achieve FR surrender
Most evacuation at night when Luftwaffe couldn’t operate
40 000 troops of French 1st Army fought to protect Dunkirk from encircling GER - most were taken prisoner
Complacency from GER soldiers on the ground - assumed Allied surrender was imminent + reluctant to expend lives unnecessarily
Operation Dynamo was a success?
Number evacuated exceeded initial BR expectations
Bulk of BR professional army could’ve been wiped out if GER focused fire on pocket of trapped troops - instead they evacuated under the gaze of surrounding Germans
BR govt + press used this to boost BR morale
Operation Dynamo was a failure?
Churchill privately regarded this as greatest BR military catastrophe for generations
BR Army abandoned FR + BEL to GER
Left all equipment behind (475 tanks, 1000 artillery guns, 165,000 tonnes of fuel)
FR left bitter that BR troops prioritised in early stages of evacuation
26,000 FR soldiers evacuated on last day, but 30,000 - 40,000 left behind + captured by GER
39% FR troops evacuated vs 59% BR troops
Churchill refused FR air force 120 spitfires which he believed needed to defend BR
28% vessels were sunk during operation
RAF Fighter Command lost 106 aircraft over Dunkirk; Luftwaffe lost 135
Around 16 000 FR soldiers + 1000 BR soldiers died during evacuation
Dunkirk positive propaganda
BR press spun it as ‘Miracle of Dunkirk’
Essential for boosting morale at desperate moment for national security
Stressed heroism of owners of civilian vessels in rallying the cause and putting themselves in danger - origin of ‘Spirit of Dunkirk’ (BR spirit of pulling together in adversity)
Dunkirk propaganda lies
However, myth didn’t reflect full story:
Small private boats only involved after 31 May, only evacuated small % of troops
Most taken by ferry after navy’s vessels ran aground in mud
Was some heroism and sacrifice - over 200 civilian vessels lost
Soldiers not always disciplined, let alone heroic
Reports of stealing food from locals + officers deserting their men to get onto boats first
Strong reasons for FR to feel bitter at behaviour of ally
Why did Hitler plan Operation Sea Lion?
After fall of FR (June 1940), H hoped BR govt would give in
When it didn’t, he reluctantly considered invasion of BR, codenamed Operation Sea Lion
What was Operation Sea Lion?
Involved planned landings by sea and several points on SE coast of ENG
Setting out from FR ports in 3 waves: infantry → artillery + armoured vehicles → horses + vehicles
Doubts about Operation Sea Lion
H’s advisers were concerned:
Wehrmacht had no sea warfare experience
Troops not fully equipped to successfully complete operation
Would be taking on strength of Royal Navy
Hitler’s decision about Operation Sea Lion
Knowing that invasion must begin before bad weather in autumn, H ordered invasion prep to begin in July
H admitted that GER navy needed control of English Channel before launch of invasion
H ordered Luftwaffe to destroy BR air force ASAP so Op Sea Lion could start
Date of BoB
July-Oct 1940
Causes of BoB
After fall of FR, H expected BR to make agreement with GER - allowing H to rule Europe + invade USSR (priority) unopposed
H had no desire to invade + occupy Britain
But Churchill wouldn’t make terms
H considered diff options on how to deal with this - Operation Sealion was one
Two possibilities of how air campaign attacking RAF fit into wider plans:
H still planning to implement Operation Sealion - this was first stage
Aimed to wear down RAF so it was incapable of protecting Royal Navy vessels defending BR from Channel or interfering with transport of GER troops + equipment across Channel
More likely: H already abandoned idea of invading BR (Op Sealion), or never had serious intention to do so - but still wanted to pressure BR to make agreement by allowing BR to think GER invasion was still possible
How were the sides balanced in BoB?
BoB often presented as ‘few’ pilots of BR RAF taking on giant of Nazism alone and defeating it - sides were actually more equally matched
GER advantages in BoB
More bombers, dive bombers
More fighter aircraft
More fighting experience
BR advantages in BoB
Spitfire
Dowding system - tight network of comms to enable interception of GER aircraft
Superior aircraft production capacity
Faster training programme
Geography: if GER pilots were shot down + survived, taken as POWs - BR pilots shot down could return to base + fight again
BoB - 10 July
Luftwaffe began sending bombers to destroy BR defence and force them into submission
At first, bombed convoys of BR ships in Channel
BoB - 12 Aug
Switched to full-scale attacks on SE England, targeting airfields and radar stations
BoB - 18 Aug
GER switched to attacking fighter bases
Flew 750 missions, destroying hangers + aircraft at several locations
Also bombed Isle of Wight - important radar location
Position began to look grim for BR
BoB - 31 Aug
Even larger attack mounted by GER
Fighter Command losses were heaviest of whole battle, with 39 aircraft shot down + 14 pilots killed
BoB - Early Sept
BR used up all reserves of fighter planes + close to defeat
BoB - 7 Sept
Crucial turning point
GER turned from successful attacks on fighter bases in Kent and began bombing London
They believed RAF was on verge of collapse and attacking morale of BR people would be final act required to push BR out of war
This gave RAF vital breathing space
BoB - 15 Sept
Luftwaffe made supreme effort with all-out assault on London in daylight
However, BR defences had time to recover; fighter plane production continued
Attack came in 2 waves, allowing RAF time to recover
GER lost 58 planes
GER failed to gain air control; couldn’t continue with number of losses
BoB - 17 Sept
H postponed invasion - BR saved
What was Dowding system?
First wide area ground based interception network in the world
Mainly used RADAR
Covered whole of BR air space
Used landline telephone network to rapidly collect info from radar stations to direct aircraft + anti-aircraft artillery to intercept enemy aircraft
Developed by RAF under leadership of Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding shortly before war begun
Why was Dowding system important?
Maximising efficiency of RAF, targeting crucial resources where needed most + conserving fuel, planes and energy of pilots
Average rates of interception (i.e. encountering enemy) in BoB was 90% (100% during certain raids)
In contrast, Luftwaffe had little info on location of RAF, often returning to base without seeing them
Dowding system acted as force multiplier (concept in military science) - enabled RAF to accomplish what would be expected of an air force many times larger
How BR advantages led to BR win in BoB
Two BR fighter planes, Hurricane and Spitfire, were good match for GER counterpart, Messerschmitt Me109
Other main GER fighter, Messerschmitt Me110 was unsuitable for dogfights with BR fighter planes
Me109 was good fighter but lacked fuel capacity to stay very long over SE BR
BR fighting over own territory - BR pilots shot down could go back to combat
BR factories produced additional 1836 fighter planes in 4 months
Possession of ‘Ultra’ (key to GER radio codes) meant BR had advance warning of plans
How GER weaknesses led to BR win in BoB
Goering was commander of Luftwaffe
Had little understanding of tactics
Underestimated strength of RAF, esp fighter planes
H and Goering made mistake of switching attacks on 7 Sept, just when RAF was running out of fighter planes
GER had to fight over BR
GER lost far more pilots - if GER plane was shot down, pilot was killed / taken prisoner
GER fighter planes could only carry limited fuel + couldn’t fly over BR long enough to protect GER bombers
Luftwaffe didn’t have heavy bombers (aeroplanes which could carry large bombs)
Medium bomber forces no match for BR fighters
Consequences of BoB
Hitler called off invasion of BR
Both sides suffered enormous loss of life + aircraft
BR weakened Luftwaffe + prevented GER air superiority
Vital to eventual liberation of W Europe, as it was springboard for deployment of USA power
Background to Operation Barbarossa
Alliance between H and S in Aug 1939 led to period of military cooperation between GER and USSR, as seen in invasion of POL
H’s domination of Europe was facilitated by S’s cooperation
During 1939-41, GER benefitted economically from alliance
Friendship would not last
H’s overriding aim was to expand Eastwards, meaning Soviet Union
H saw USSR as GER’s ‘natural enemy’, only allied temporarily to achieve end goals
Hitler’s objectives for Operation Barbarossa
Lebensraum for Aryan GERs, meaning subjugation of USSR’s racially ‘inferior’ Slavic population
Destroying ‘Jewish Bolshevik’ regime
Economic exploitation - obtain more raw materials, e.g. oil in Caucasus
Why Hitler underestimated Soviet strength
Racial prejudices saw Slavs as inferior race
USSR fought brief war with Finland, winter 1939-40, and did badly → H believed Red Army could be defeated in 4 months
Believed FR military stronger than USSR, yet defeated FR very quickly
Plan for Operation Barbarossa
18 Dec 1940 - H issued order to invade USSR
Goal was to advance up A-A line, an imaginary line from port of Archangel in N RUS to port of Astrakhan on Caspian Sea by winter 1941
Would bring most Soviet population + resources under GER control
Operation Barbarossa launch date
22 June 1941
Operation Barbarossa involved:
Over 3.5m GER and other Axis troops
1800-mile front
148 divisions - 80% of GER army
17 Panzer divisions (3400 tanks in 4 groups)
2700 aircraft of Luftwaffe
Barbarossa Decree
13 May 1941 - Just before invasion, H signed Barbarossa Decree - gave GER troops exemption from normal rules of war by engaging in ‘extreme measures’ + crimes against humanity, inc. indiscriminate killing of Soviets
German Army Groups
GER forces split into three army groups:
Army Group North: head through Baltic states to take Leningrad
Army Group South: attack into Ukraine towards Kiev + Donbas industrial region
Army Group Centre: Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow
H expected these all to be attained within 10 weeks
Army Group North - Initial German success in Operation Barbarossa
AGN charged through Baltic states and reached Leningrad on 8 Sept 1941
Cut off Leningrad from rest of RUS, but lacked strength to take the city
H ordered to starve it into submission → 890-day siege
Army Group Centre - Initial German success in Operation Barbarossa
AGC encircled three RUS armies and captured 320,000 men by end of June
Proceeded towards Smolensk, trapping more sections of Red Army and taking further 300,000 prisoners
Reached Smolensk by 7 Aug 1941, then paused to mop up resistance, but were within striking distance of Moscow
Army Group South - Initial German success in Operation Barbarossa
AGS had furthest to go and stiffest RUS resistance
Headed on to Kiev (UKR capital and key to coal-rich Donets Basin) - surrounded 700 000 Red Army troops, took city and reached Rostov on 21 Nov 1941
Reasons for early German success in Operation Barbarossa
Soviet unpreparedness: S massed large forces on W frontier, but gave orders not to provoke Germans
S didn’t believe H would attack so soon, despite GER build-up and constant intelligence warnings, inc. from Churchill
Despite having 5m men and 23 000 tanks available immediately, Red Army was taken by surprise; fell apart in confusion
Stalin weakened Red Army officer corps in purges of 1930s
Many of experienced generals killed
Luftwaffe won air control
On first day alone, 1800 Soviet aircraft destroyed, most on ground
Soviet armies short of weapons, tanks, motorised transport
Tank crews badly trained + tanks prone to mechanical breakdown
Turning point of Operation Barbarossa
August 1941 - attack seemed to be going well, infantry just had to catch up with Panzer (tank) divisions and mop up remaining pockets of RUS resistance
However, AGC running out of supplies: General Staff wanted to capture capital Moscow, hopefully forcing surrender - H wanted focus on USSR’s economic resources
This would mean stalling AGC, posed to take Moscow, and diverting manpower to AGS to conquer Crimea and Donets Basin
Despite protest from General Staff, H ordered advance on Moscow to be halted
Why did Operation Barbarossa fail?
Planning + intelligence failures
H’s personal intervention
Soviet industrial production (therefore tank superiority)
GER logistical problems
Soviet Resistance
OB failure - Planning and intelligence failures
GERs had no long-term plan for invasion
H’s overconfidence + racial views mistakenly assumed short campaign - expected Soviets to surrender after suffering shock of huge initial defeats
Nazis only planned for Soviet army groups in West, not expected S to bring reinforcements from East
GER estimated USSR could field 3m men, but by winter 1941 they’d taken 3m prisoner
Once shock of initial Blitzkrieg wore off, became war of attrition + production, where vast resources + manpower of USSR would turn momentum against GER
After invasion of Moscow stopped in early Dec, GERs still believed USSR had nothing left to counterattack
OB failure - Hitler’s personal intervention
H’s decision to halt Moscow invasion heavily criticised
Wasn’t that stupid considering desperate need for industrial resources
But threw away only real chance of victory
Early capture of Moscow would have had undeniable psychological impact - may have been tipping point
OB failure - Soviet industrial production
Long war would favour side which could most effectively turn its economy to full war production
H hadn’t yet fully mobilised GER economy so inadequate weapons production
Even in mid-1941, only 250 new tanks being built each month, insufficient to replace losses
S relocated Soviet industry, inc. tank, aircraft and munitions factories to East of Ural mountains - made USSR better prepared for long war
Soviet tanks in initial campaign inferior to GER’s, but new model, T-34, had sloping armour (doubled strength), powerful gun, reliable diesel engine, wide tracks to cope with mud/snow
USSR began to produce it in huge numbers
OB failure - German logistical problems
Further GER advanced = harder to stay supplied with fuel, ammunition and food
Distances very challenging
GER couldn’t take over train network as Russian gauges were different
Roads became impassable after heavy rain/snow
Biggest issue was cold
Tank + vehicle lubricants froze as temp plunged
Hundreds of thousands of troops suffered frostbite or froze to death as winter clothing supplies were held up in POL - fuel + ammo took priority
Soviet troops better trained + equipped to deal with low temp
OB failure - Soviet resistance
H severely underestimated Russian will to resist
S made fight about defending ‘Mother Russia’ rather than his own power or even Soviet Communism
Rallied many people who had reasons to fear/hate S regime
Re-introduced old Tsarist shoulder boards on uniforms to appeal to secret tsarists
Initial German offensive in BoS
Despite catastrophic losses and OB failure, in summer 1942, with AGC retreating and AGN besieging Leningrad, H launched major offensive by GER 6th Army
AGS sent to S RUS to destroy remains of Soviet Army and capture Caucasus oilfields
Initial advance went well - GER 6th Army under General Paulus winning Battle of Kharkov under H’s orders, with a loss of 300,000 Soviet troops
From then, Paulus had faith in H military brilliance
Victory caused H to gamble further - decided to try capture 300 miles of Black Sea coast AND Stalingrad AND Caucasus oilfields
Paulus ordered to capture S’grad while rest of 6th army went to Caucasus
Troops made slower progress than expected in harsh conditions of Caucasus
One general sent back to inform H attack failing - armies exhausted + short of fuel
H refused to accept - thought they misinterpreted orders
6th Army’s progress towards S’grad proceeded more hopefully
Why did Hitler launch the offensive in BoS?
Need for oil - H’s war machine would grind to halt without it; capturing Caucasus oilfields could solve this
H fired most top generals after OB failure; took complete control of armies - seemingly had complete faith in himself
H made architect Speer new Minister of Armaments and War Production (partly to spite Goering) - Speer lacked appropriate experience and convinced H that new production drive would win war
Stalin’s response in BoS
Despite GER invasion plans falling into S’s hands, S didn’t believe H planned to attack S’grad, thought it was a trick and main target still Moscow
→ S’grad not properly defended when Luftwaffe began bombing + 1m GER soldiers advanced
By Oct, S’grad heavily bombed and most of city in German hands
S almost pleased - saw chance to defeat Nazis in city bearing his name
Demanded to defend it at all costs, every available soldier + civilian mobilised
Forbade civilian evacuation → army would fight harder for living city
Paulus’ 6th Army at tip of bulge of GER troops surrounded by RUS
Soviets held out while counteroffensive prepared
S made crucial decision of restoring Marshal Zhukov to command counteroffensive
Zhukov’s success in saving Moscow made S see him as threat to power - but he was S’s best hope of saving S’grad
Zhukov’s counteroffensive in BoS
Nov 1942: Zhukov counteroffensive launched - two-pronged offensive
Zhukov built up fresh forces either side of city and mounted assault aimed at encircling + trapping Paulus’ 6th Army
Sensing danger, Paulus appealed to H for enforcements
H refused - only interested in when S’grad would fall, he’d announced this to the nation
Within days, 6th Army was cut off
German response to Zhukov counteroffensive
Paulus asked H permission to withdraw from S’grad to more favourable ground which could be defended
H forbade this along with any surrender
Mid Dec 1942 - New Soviet offensives in Caucasus led to disintegration of armies supporting Germans, the 8th Italian, 2nd Hungarian and 3rd Romanian
Goering (wanted to regain H’s favour) convinced H he could supply 6th army in S’grad with supplies by air without checking if it was viable
This failed - didn’t have necessary numbers and only carried a fraction of the required supplies
Winter conditions → impossible for most planes to land, those that did were attacked by RUS
Back in GER, Speer began faking figures to convince H war production targets were being met
Conditions in Stalingrad
Temp reached -30oC - many soldiers lost body parts to frostbite, others froze to death
Typhus spread by lice through 6th Army
Starvation rations → ate horses, other creatures and even cannibalism
New Year - RUS dropped thousands of leaflets wishing Germans Happy New Year with skull + crossbones, telling them to surrender or die
Germany surrender in BoS
Forbidden to withdraw/surrender, Paulus was informed he’d been made Field Marshal
No Field Marshal had ever surrendered - H’s way of telling him to commit suicide
Feb 1943 - GER surrender
GER lost 500 000 men during S’grad campaign, inc 91 000 prisoners
USSR lost 500 000 soldiers and 40 000 civilians sacrificed by S to defend city bearing his name
Why were Nazis defeated at S’grad?
Hitler’s leadership
Stalin’s leadership
Soviet tactics
German overstretch - men and resources
Reasons for GER defeat at S’grad - H’s leadership
Appointed himself as Commander in Chief; refused to listen to logic + reason from generals
Paulus constantly presented realistic alternatives (e.g. pause for reinforcements, retreat to more defensible ground) but was shut down
H’s racial beliefs
Made him ignore practical realities and believe in mystical power of Aryan race to triumph over ‘inferior’ race
Kharkov victory went to his head
Convinced himself of infallibility as military decision maker, made his already reckless strategy even more ambitious
Whole plan gambled on thin odds
Overstretching forces without adequate supply lines, rather than concentrating forces on oilfields, which would’ve been more strategically significant
Role played by Speer + Goering
Both convinced H their own plans would work, misled him when they knew it wasn’t working
Speer lied about production figures
Goering continued with plan to supply S’grad by air when he knew it was doomed, simply to impress Hitler
Reasons for GER defeat at S’grad - S’s leadership
Put faith in star general, Zhukov at critical moment
Overcome paranoia which made him purge best generals before war broke out and side-line Zhukov for fear of being outdone by him
Reasons for GER defeat at S’grad - Soviet tactics
Operation Uranus, huge-scale counteroffensive which encircled 6th Army was bold, brilliantly-planned exploitation of opportunity for which Zhukov deserves credit
Soviet regime’s lack of care for human life and suffering meant that immense casualties (inc. civilians) were tolerated for symbolic victory
Reasons for GER defeat at S’grad - German overstretch
GER manpower disadvantage exposed
6th Army left exposed because supporting armies depleted
Half their number were sent to Caucasus on doomed offensive to obtain necessary oil
Linked to H’s leadership as he refused to listen to Paulus’s request for more men before launching assault on S’grad
In contrast, vast population of USSR meant Zhukov could bring in necessary manpower from East to make Uranus succeed
GER population + raw material base couldn’t support occupation of USSR
Blitzkrieg successful for short campaigns, but this became prolonged war of production
S’s regime churned out war material
Despite Speer’s ruthless use of forced labour, couldn’t compete and supply GER military adequately, especially when soldiers were 1000 miles into enemy territory
Why BoS was the key turning point in war
First big defeat of Nazis
From then, Nazis not regarded as invincible
S exposed manpower and supply weaknesses
Symbolic power
City bore S’s name
Defeat there would’ve been disastrous for S, yet victory elevated status, made people overlook his atrocities of 1930s and embrace him as war leader
Geographically the furthest GER would get into USSR
Fought nearly 1000 miles across USSR to get to S’grad
Spent next 3+ years making fighting retreat back to centre of Berlin
S stopped believing he knew better than his generals
S trusted generals more
Victory only possible because he allowed two best commanders, Zhukov and Vasilevsky, time and space in autumn 1942 to plan Uranus
Why BoS wasn’t the key turning point in war
GER defeat already likely by Jan 1943?
H couldn’t win Blitzkrieg war over vast territory in short time he had before Soviet manpower + material advantages showed
This might overlook how close H’s armies came to taking Moscow
If GERs took Moscow, Soviet morale / faith in Stalin might’ve collapsed
Maybe failure of Barbarossa, when H halted Moscow advance, was real turning point
GER still had chance to win after Jan 1943?
Still lots of power left in H’s war machine
Battle of Kursk, late summer 1943 - largest tank battle in history
If Nazis won it, they might’ve turned the tide
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Flashcard