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Mitchell (1983)
Principle: Actus Reus must be voluntary
Facts: D punched man in post office. Man fell into V who later died
Larsonneur (1933)
Principle: Some state of affairs don’t need voluntary Actus Reus
Facts: Found having entered UK illegally following deportation
Pitwood (1902)
Principle: A contractual duty to act exists
Facts: Railway crossing keeper omitted to shut gates, person crossing was struck and killed. Keeper guilty of manslaughter
Gibbins and Procter (1918)
Principle: Duty exists because of a relationship between victim and accused
Facts: Child’s father and mistress failed to feed baby, which died of starvation - guilty of murder
Stone & Dobinson (1977)
Principle: A duty voluntarily undertaken
Facts: Stone’s sister came to live with D. V became ill, unable to care for herself, resulting in her death
Evans (2009)
Principle: A duty voluntarily undertaken
Facts: 16 y/o heroin addict lived with mother & half sister. Evans gave heroin to half-sister who overdosed. D didn’t seek medical help
Dytham (1979)
Principle: a duty from an official position
Facts: D (police officer) witnessed attack on v, but didn’t intervene - drove away
Miller (1983)
Principle: Defendant created a dangerous situation
Facts: D (squatter) fell asleep in empty house - his lit cigarette started fire. D realised and left to sleep in other room, didn’t summon help / attempt to put out fire
Pagett (1983)
Principle: Defendant can only be guilty if the consequence wouldn’t have happened ‘but for’ the D’s conduct
Facts: D took pregnant gf from her home, police called on him, D came out holding girl, fired at police, police fired back killing girl.
Hughes (2013)
Principle: Defendant can only be guilty if the consequence wouldn’t have happened ‘but for’ the D’s conduct
Facts: D driving camper van, rounded corner, car swerved into van. V under influence of heroin, faced fatal injuries - D charged with causing death by driving without license & while uninsured
Kimsey (1996)
Principle: May be more than one act contributing to the consequence. Some of these acts may be made by people other than D
Facts: D in high-speed car chase, lost control of car, other driver killed. Court of Appeal upheld' D’s conviction for causing death by dangerous driving
Blaue (1975)
Principle: D must also take the victim as he finds him (Thin-Skull rule)
Facts: Young woman stabbed by D, needed blood transfusion - refused due to religion. V died, D convicted of murder
Smith (1959)
Principle: Medical treatment is unlikely to break the chain of causation unless it is so independent of the D’s acts and ‘in itself so potent in causing death’ that the D’s acts are insignificant
Facts: 2 soldiers fought, 1 stabbed in lung. V carried to medical centre but dropped on the way. At centre, staff gave artificial respiration - pressed on chest - made injury worse, V died. D still guilty of murder
Lamb (1967)
Principle: Actus Reus of Assault (Apprehend)
Facts: Two boys playing with a loaded revolver. Bullet was not adjacent to barrel, so no fear of violence. Boy killed. No fear of violence so it was not assault.
Constanza (1997)
Principle: Words can be the Actus Reus of assault
Facts: D sent over 800 threatening letters over a period of 20 months.
Ireland (1997)
Principle: Silence can be the Actus Reus of assault
Facts: D made a series of silent phone calls over three months to three different women.
Smith v Chief Constable of Woking (1983)
Principle: For assault, immediate means imminent not instantaneous
Facts: D broke into V’s garden, stared at V through window.
DPP V K (1990)
Principle: Indirect acts can form the actus reus of battery
Facts: D took acid from a science class and poured into a hand drier. V used it and sustained serious injury to his face.
Collins v Wilcock (1984)
Principle: Force can be slight for Actus Reus of battery
Facts: D had V’s arm to prevent from walking away, woman became abusive - scratched D’s arm
Wood (Fraser) v DPP (2008)
Principle: Force can be slight for the AR of battery
Facts: D was mistaken for another man, officer took hold of D’s arm – battery
Thomas (1985)
Principle: Touching a person’s clothing is akin to touching them
Facts: D touched V skirt but not touch V directly
T V DPP (2003)
Principle: Temporary loss of consciousness can be ABH
Facts: V was chased and fell, was kicked by D, V momentarily lost consciousness, remembered nothing until awoken by officer
Chan Fook (1994)
Principle: Psychiatric injury can be ABH
Facts: D interrogated V, V struck several times. D locked V in room and threatened further violence if ring not returned. V tried to escape through window, hurt in process
DPP v Smith (Michael) (2006)
Principle: Cutting of hair can be ABH
Facts: D and V argue, D pins down V and cuts off her ponytail
JJC V Eisenhower (1983)
Principle: Internal bleeding does not constitute a wound
Facts: V shot in eye with shotgun pellet. No break in the skin, though caused burst blood vessel. As there was no cut, it was held that there was no wound.
Burstow (1997)
Principle: Serious psychiatric injury can constitute GBH
Facts: D harassed V (phone calls etc). V suffered severe depression
Bollom (2004)
Principle: Severity of injuries assessed based on V’s age and health
Facts: 7 month old baby suffered bruising on her abdomen, arms and legs as a result of D’s actions.
Dica (2004)
Principle: Transmitting HIV is GBH
Facts: D did not inform V’s that he was HIV positive and passed on the infection
Morrison (1989)
Principle: S.18 resisting arrest = intent, subsequent injury can be recklessness
Facts: Police officer held D whilst placing him under arrest. D dived through window which badly cut officer
Taylor (2009)
Principle: Intent to wound not enough for s.18
Facts: V found with scratches and stab wound in his back
Cheshire (1991)
Principle: Medical treatment is unlikely to break the chain of causation unless it is so independent of the D’s acts and ‘in itself so potent in causing death’ that the D’s acts are insignificant
Facts: D shot V in thigh and stomach, V needed surgery, developed breathing problems and given tracheotomy. 2 months after, V died from rare complications by tracheotomy. D still liable for V’s death
Jordan (1956)
Principle: Medical treatment is unlikely to break the chain of causation unless it is so independent of the D’s acts and ‘in itself so potent in causing death’ that the D’s acts are insignificant
Facts: V stabbed in stomach, was treated in hospital and wounds were healing, given antibiotic but suffered allergic reaction. One doctor stopped use of antibiotic, next day another ordered a large dose of antibiotic to be given. V died, doctor held to be in intervening at which caused death - D not guilty of murder
Malcherek (1981)
Principle: Switching off a life-support machine by a doctor when decided that the V is brain-dead does not break the chain of causation
Facts: D stabbed wife in stomach, V put on life-support machine. After tests showed she was brain-dead, machine was switched off. D was convicted, Court of Appeal upheld his conviction
Roberts (1972)
Principle: If D causes V to react in a foreseeable way, then any injury to V will be considered to have been caused by the D
Facts: Girl jumped from car to escape D’s sexual advances. Car was travelling between 20-40mph, V injured from jump - D held liable
Kennedy (2007)
Principle: If D causes V to react in a foreseeable way, then any injury to V will be considered to have been caused by the D
Facts: D supplied class A drug to friend who died taking it. V had choice, knowing the facts, to inject or not. The heroin was self-administered, not jointly. D did not cause drug to be administered/taken, so did not cause death of V
Marjoram (2000)
Principle: If D causes V to react in a foreseeable way, then any injury to V will be considered to have been caused by the D
Facts: Several including D shouted abuse & kicked V’s hotel door. Door was forced open, V fell from window, suffered serious injury. D’s conviction for GBH upheld by Court of Appeal
Mohan (1975)
Principle: Defined direct intention - desire to bring about a particular consequence
Facts: D responded to police officers request to slow down and then accelerated in the direction of the officer who had to dive to avoid being hit
Hancock & Shankland (1986)
Principle: Consequence more likely means foreseeability more likely means intent more likely
Facts: D’s wished to stop a miner from working and pushed concrete block from bridge onto road below. Driver killed
Moloney (1985)
Principle: Foresight of consequences is evidence of intention not intent itself
Facts: D and stepfather were drunk and competed to assemble and load a gun first. D shot stepfather
Woolin (1998)
Principle: Jury cannot find intention unless sure that death or serious injury was a virtual certainty and D knew this
Facts: D threw three months old baby toward pram and frustration, killing child
Matthews & Alleyne (2003)
Principle: Foresight of consequences does not equal intention. Jury can find intention but does not have to
Facts: D’s dropped V from bridge into river. V said he couldn’t swim but appeared to be making his way to the bank. D’s left before V reached the bank. V drowned
Callow v Tillstone (1900)
Principle: example of strict liability offence (meat)
Facts: butcher offered unsound meat for sale even after asking a vet to examine the meat who then declared it safe
Cundy v Le Coq (1884)
Principle: example of strict liability offence (alcohol)
Facts: D charged with selling alcohol to an intoxicated person. Customer had been quiet in his demeanour & did not appear intoxicated
Fagan v MPC (1986)
Principle: continuing acts
Facts: D told to park by curb by police officer. In doing so, D drove onto officers foot accidentally. Upon being informed by officer, Fagan refused to move immediately
Adomako (1994)
Principle: example of negligence in criminal case (gross negligence manslaughter)
Facts: D was anaesthetist who failed to notice his patient’s oxygen pipe was disconnected & patient died
Church (1965)
Principal: coincidence of Actus Reus and Mens Rea
Facts: D knocked woman out. After attempting to resuscitate, he believed her dead, dumped her body in river, V drowned – D convicted of manslaughter
Cunningham (1957)
Principle: established definition of subjective recklessness
Facts: D removed gas meter to seal money. Gas leaked next door, affected resident.
Gnango (2011)
Principle: example of transferred malice
Facts: D & ‘bandana man’ shot at each other in street. Bandana man shot and killed in innocent passerby, D convicted of murder as result of attempts to kill bandana man
Nelson (2013)
Principle: Defines assault
Facts: threatened to smash prison guards face in.
Miller (1954)
Principle: Defines ABH - Any injury or hurt calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of V
Facts: D threw V to the ground several times