Non-fatal offences

Mitchell (1983)

Principle: Actus Reus must be voluntary

Facts: D punched man in post office. Man fell into V who later died

Larsonneur (1933)

Principle: Some state of affairs don’t need voluntary Actus Reus

Facts: Found having entered UK illegally following deportation

Pitwood (1902)

Principle: A contractual duty to act exists

Facts: Railway crossing keeper omitted to shut gates, person crossing was struck and killed. Keeper guilty of manslaughter

Gibbins and Procter (1918)

Principle: Duty exists because of a relationship between victim and accused

Facts: Child’s father and mistress failed to feed baby, which died of starvation - guilty of murder

Stone & Dobinson (1977)

Principle: A duty voluntarily undertaken

Facts: Stone’s sister came to live with D. V became ill, unable to care for herself, resulting in her death

Evans (2009)

Principle: A duty voluntarily undertaken

Facts: 16 y/o heroin addict lived with mother & half sister. Evans gave heroin to half-sister who overdosed. D didn’t seek medical help

Dytham (1979)

Principle: a duty from an official position

Facts: D (police officer) witnessed attack on v, but didn’t intervene - drove away

Miller (1983)

Principle: Defendant created a dangerous situation

Facts: D (squatter) fell asleep in empty house - his lit cigarette started fire. D realised and left to sleep in other room, didn’t summon help / attempt to put out fire

Pagett (1983)

Principle: Defendant can only be guilty if the consequence wouldn’t have happened ‘but for’ the D’s conduct

Facts: D took pregnant gf from her home, police called on him, D came out holding girl, fired at police, police fired back killing girl.

Hughes (2013)

Principle: Defendant can only be guilty if the consequence wouldn’t have happened ‘but for’ the D’s conduct

Facts: D driving camper van, rounded corner, car swerved into van. V under influence of heroin, faced fatal injuries - D charged with causing death by driving without license & while uninsured

Kimsey (1996)

Principle: May be more than one act contributing to the consequence. Some of these acts may be made by people other than D

Facts: D in high-speed car chase, lost control of car, other driver killed. Court of Appeal upheld' D’s conviction for causing death by dangerous driving

Blaue (1975)

Principle: D must also take the victim as he finds him (Thin-Skull rule)

Facts: Young woman stabbed by D, needed blood transfusion - refused due to religion. V died, D convicted of murder

Smith (1959)

Principle: Medical treatment is unlikely to break the chain of causation unless it is so independent of the D’s acts and ‘in itself so potent in causing death’ that the D’s acts are insignificant

Facts: 2 soldiers fought, 1 stabbed in lung. V carried to medical centre but dropped on the way. At centre, staff gave artificial respiration - pressed on chest - made injury worse, V died. D still guilty of murder

Lamb (1967)

Principle: Actus Reus of Assault (Apprehend)

Facts: Two boys playing with a loaded revolver. Bullet was not adjacent to barrel, so no fear of violence. Boy killed. No fear of violence so it was not assault.

Constanza (1997)

Principle: Words can be the Actus Reus of assault

Facts: D sent over 800 threatening letters over a period of 20 months.

Ireland (1997)

Silence can be the Actus Reus of assault

Facts: D made a series of silent phone calls over three months to three different women.

Smith v Chief Constable of Woking (1983)

Principle: For assault, immediate means imminent not instantaneous

Facts: D broke into V’s garden, stared at V through window.

DPP V K (1990)

Principle: Indirect acts can form the actus reus of battery

Facts: D took acid from a science class and poured into a hand drier. V used it and sustained serious injury to his face.

Collins v Wilcock (1984)

Principle: Force can be slight for Actus Reus of battery

Facts: D had V’s arm to prevent from walking away, woman became abusive - scratched D’s arm

T V DPP (2003)

Principle: Temporary loss of consciousness can be ABH

Facts: V was chased and fell, was kicked by D, V momentarily lost consciousness, remembered nothing until awoken by officer

JJC V Eisenhower (1983)

Principle: Internal bleeding does not constitute a wound

Facts: V shot in eye with shotgun pellet. No break in the skin, though caused burst blood vessel. As there was no cut, it was held that there was no wound.

Bollom (2004)

Principle: Severity of injuries assessed based on V’s age and health Facts: 7 month old baby suffered bruising on her abdomen, arms and legs as a result of D’s actions.

Dica (2004)

Principle: Transmitting HIV is GBH

Facts: D did not inform V’s that he was HIV positive and passed on the infection

Cheshire (1991)

Principle: Medical treatment is unlikely to break the chain of causation unless it is so independent of the D’s acts and ‘in itself so potent in causing death’ that the D’s acts are insignificant

Facts: D shot V in thigh and stomach, V needed surgery, developed breathing problems and given tracheotomy. 2 months after, V died from rare complications by tracheotomy. D still liable for V’s death

Jordan (1956)

Principle: Medical treatment is unlikely to break the chain of causation unless it is so independent of the D’s acts and ‘in itself so potent in causing death’ that the D’s acts are insignificant

Facts: V stabbed in stomach, was treated in hospital and wounds were healing, given antibiotic but suffered allergic reaction. One doctor stopped use of antibiotic, next day another ordered a large dose of antibiotic to be given. V died, doctor held to be in intervening at which caused death - D not guilty of murder

Malcherek (1981)

Principle: Switching off a life-support machine by a doctor when decided that the V is brain-dead does not break the chain of causation

Facts: D stabbed wife in stomach, V put on life-support machine. After tests showed she was brain-dead, machine was switched off. D was convicted, Court of Appeal upheld his conviction

Roberts (1972)

Principle: If D causes V to react in a foreseeable way, then any injury to V will be considered to have been caused by the D

Facts: Girl jumped from car to escape D’s sexual advances. Car was travelling between 20-40mph, V injured from jump - D held liable

Kennedy (2007)

Principle: If D causes V to react in a foreseeable way, then any injury to V will be considered to have been caused by the D

Facts: D supplied class A drug to friend who died taking it. V had choice, knowing the facts, to inject or not. The heroin was self-administered, not jointly. D did not cause drug to be administered/taken, so did not cause death of V

Marjoram (2000)

Principle: If D causes V to react in a foreseeable way, then any injury to V will be considered to have been caused by the D

Facts: Several including D shouted abuse & kicked V’s hotel door. Door was forced open, V fell from window, suffered serious injury. D’s conviction for GBH upheld by Court of Appeal

Mohan (1975)

Principle: Defined direct intention - desire to bring about a particular consequence

Facts: D responded to police officers request to slow down and then accelerated in the direction of the officer who had to dive to avoid being hit

Hancock & Shankland (1986)

Principle: Consequence more likely means foreseeability more likely means intent more likely

Facts: D’s wished to stop a miner from working and pushed concrete block from bridge onto road below. Driver killed