Case Law(State V. Martin)

State v. Marquez (1975)

Defendant charged with offense requiring a mental state of "knowingly" argued that the evidence was insufficient because there was no indication she desired or hoped for a particular result. Held: Conviction affirmed. Although a defendant who acted purposefully or who intended a particular result certainly acted knowingly, MPC § 18-103 makes clear there is no such requirement.

State v. Butler (1978)

A trial court may not prevent a case of murder from going to the jury under an "extreme reckless murder" theory if the evidence, viewed as a whole, could be reasonably interpreted as showing the type of heightened recklessness that equates to purposeful or knowing homicide.

State v. Dawson (2012)

Defendant's conviction for reckless murder in a vehicular-homicide case was affirmed because "the facts show[ed] a marked deviation in degree away from the established standards of regard for life and the safety of others that is typically seen in the negligent acts that cause most vehicular homicides."

State v. Barrow (2018)

Defendant appeals his conviction for murder based on a violation of MPC §18-303(A)(2). Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence of "extreme recklessness" to convict him of murder. MPC §18-303(A)(2) prohibits the reckless killing of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. The legal concept behind this version of murder has been described as "death by a thousand cuts." While the Court declines to adopt that phrase as a valid legal doctrine, the concept presented therein is apt. When a defendant commits a series of actions that may not, in and of themselves, evince a specific intent to kill the victim, that defendant can still be found guilty of murder if the cumulative harm of their actions shows an extreme indifference to the value of human life. For example, if a defendant purposefully or knowingly put poison in someone's food, that defendant would be guilty of murder. But if, instead, that defendant mistakenly gave someone peanuts when the defendant knew that person had a peanut allergy, that defendant would be guilty of at least negligent homicide and perhaps manslaughter. However, if the defendant gave someone nonfatal doses of a toxic substance every day for an extended period of time and eventually the cumulative toxicity killed the person, the defendant would be guilty of murder under MPC §18-303(A)(2). Clearly, the repeated harmful actions by the defendant show greater culpability than accidental or unintentional poisoning. Because the actions of this defendant were a marked deviation from the standards of a law-abiding person, his actions were reckless, and the repeated injurious acts prove that the defendant manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life.

State v. Durden (1996)

Defendant appeals his conviction for mayhem and domestic terrorism on the grounds that he was found to be "temporarily insane" at the time of the offenses. Midlands does not recognize "temporary insanity" as a valid legal defense. However, a defendant shall be permitted to present evidence of his mens rea at the time of the offense, subject to the MRE. The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant when it ruled that the defendant could not present any evidence about his state of "temporary insanity" during trial. While a defendant shall not argue that he should be acquitted by reason of insanity based on a "temporary insanity" defense, he may present evidence that calls into question his ability to form the requisite mens rea for the charged offense(s), subject to the MRE. Held: "Temporary insanity" is relevant evidence for the jury to consider even if it isn't a legal defense; case remanded for retrial.

State v. Arbuckle (2016)

Defendant appealed his conviction for murder pursuant to MPC 18-303(A)(2). State argued that Defendant was guilty of murder because Defendant acted recklessly under circumstances that manifested an extreme indifference to human life, or what was known at common law as depraved heart murder. Here, Defendant argues that the State failed to show this heightened mens rea and instead only established recklessness, which is the mens rea for manslaughter. We agree. Proving only that a defendant acted in a way that ignored an unjustifiable risk of harm, including loss of life of another, is insufficient evidence of depraved heart murder. That is recklessness. Depraved heart murder requires evidence that (1) the defendant acted reckless and (2) did so in a way that shows the defendant had an extreme indifference towards the value of human life. The most common way in which the State can prove a Defendant violated MPC 18- 303(A)(2) is by proving the Defendant committed multiple reckless actions that had a high probability of causing severe bodily harm to another. Here there was only one act of recklessness, and it was not sufficient proof of an extreme indifference to life. Conviction overturned.

State v. Bernardi (2018)

Defendant appealed her conviction for murder of an employee. Defendant was a high-level manager for a home construction contractor business. To say that safety of its employees was not a concern for the business is an understatement. Defendant now argues that she cannot be convicted for depraved heart murder because the CEO of the business told her to deny OSHArequired safety equipment and other PPE to employees. While that evidence may be used as mitigation evidence, it is not dispositive on culpability. The Defendant's own acts and omissions are still relevant to establish her extreme indifference to human life under MPC 18-303(A)(2). Just because another may have acted with an extreme indifference to human life does not acquit the Defendant of her own bad acts.

State v. Teglia (2025)

Defendant appeals her conviction for depraved heart murder. Defendant was a famous movie actor and director who worked for Pohlmann & Smith Production Studios. During the filming of a bank robbery scene in a movie that Defendant was directing, a prop gun was used. Unfortunately, the firearm was loaded with live ammunition and one of the cast members died from a gunshot wound. The production studio was found liable for wrongful death; however, the trial court prohibited the Defendant from presenting evidence of negligence or recklessness of cast members and production managers during Defendant's murder trial. Evidence of 5 recklessness or negligence of others may be relevant to whether the Defendant knew or should have known that her actions or omissions had a high probability of causing severe bodily harm to another person. However, the actions of others are not dispositive on whether the Defendant manifested an extreme indifference to human life when evaluating the Defendant's actions independent of the additional negligent or reckless actions of a third party.

State v. Bunker (2025)

Defendant appeals his conviction for premeditated murder. Defendant entered a written plea of not guilty by reasons of insanity; however, he was found to be legally sane at the time of the crime by a forensic psychologist. While temporary insanity is not a viable defense in the State of Midlands, a Defendant is always permitted to present, otherwise admissible, evidence of his inability to form the requisite mens rea. Such "mental impairments" are always relevant because such evidence helps the jury determine whether the Defendant had the alleged mens rea to commit the charged offense.

State v. Rich (1904)

In a criminal case, the burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to each and every element of the charged offense(s). The burden is on the State and never shifts to the defendant.

State v. Smith (1981)

The State's burden of proof applies to elements, not discrete facts. The question in every case is whether cumulative impact of the otherwise-admissible evidence is sufficient to convince the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt that the element has been proven.

State v. Tamoe (2015)

A criminal defendant is never required to present evidence or offer an alternative theory of the crime. If a defendant does so, however, a prosecutor may note the defense's failure to offer evidence in support of its theory of the case. Such comments do not imply that the burden of proof has shifted to the defense, nor do they necessarily constitute an infringement on a defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent.

State v. Lazares (2016)

Criminal defendants have a constitutionally protected right to refuse to speak with police officers and to decline to testify in their own defense. No prosecutor or witness may comment (expressly or implicitly) on a defendant's exercise of either right or suggest that refusal to testify or termination of a police interrogation demonstrates consciousness of guilt.

State v. Chatterjee (2017)

If a criminal defendant chooses to testify, the defendant's credibility may be challenged just like that of any other witness. For that reason, it is not "burden-shifting" for a prosecutor to point out during cross-examination or summation that the defense has not produced documents or other evidence to support a theory or argument that has been advanced by the defense. The State may not, however, suggest that a defendant had an affirmative duty to produce any documents in order to be found not guilty.

State v. Haughey (2007)

In Midlands, all criminal trials are bifurcated with a guilt phase followed by a penalty phase.

State v. Deters (2009)

During the guilt phase, evidence is not relevant if it is directed solely to the penalty to be given to the defendant if found guilty. It also is improper for an attorney to comment on sentencing or discuss potential penalties during the guilt phase of the trial. Such conduct is grounds for a mistrial and may constitute conduct for which sanctions are appropriate.

State v. Niehaus (2002)

Under Midlands practice, both sides may always present evidence to prove or rebut any element of a charged offense. Neither side may object to such evidence on the ground that the objecting party is no longer pursuing (or challenging) the pertinent issue.

State v. Rittgers (1945)

Unlike some jurisdictions, MRE 615 allows for the sequestration of the lead investigating officer in a criminal case if that law enforcement officer is not elected to be the government's representative during pretrial matters.

State v. Singh (2019)

Venue and identification of the defendant are necessary elements of every criminal prosecution. Because Midlands does not permit motions for acquittal, the defense closing argument is the proper place to bring it to the court's attention that the prosecutor has failed to prove these necessary elements of the charged offense.

Ahmed v. O'Keeffe (2014)

Civil case arising from alleged assault. The plaintiff was called as a witness and testified fully on direct examination. On cross examination, however, the plaintiff failed to respond to some questions, purportedly because of a condition arising from the assault. Held: The judgment for the plaintiff must be reversed. The reason why the witness failed to respond to questions on cross examination is immaterial. If a witness becomes unable or unwilling to respond to otherwise proper questions on cross examination, the trial court must strike the witness's testimony in its entirety.

State v. Nakajima (1986)

Under MRE Rule 404, general evidence of a defendant's good character or law-abiding nature is not admissible. However, under Rule 404(a)(1), a criminal defendant may offer certain evidence of a "pertinent" character trait. The requirement that evidence be "pertinent" significantly exceeds the comparably low bar of relevancy. "Pertinence" is a more exacting standard by which the trait itself must directly relate to a particular element or facet of the crime charged

Estate of Hamilton v. Walton (2009)

Testimony about a psychological condition does not constitute "[e]vidence of a person's character or character trait," the only evidence excluded by MRE 404(a)(1). The fact that a person suffers from a medically recognized psychological disorder is not character evidence any more than the fact that a person has a physical condition that would make it easier or harder for them to perform a given act.

Ellis v. Norton (1999)

Testimony about an individual's willingness to strain or "push" themselves mentally, physically, or both to finish a task does not constitute "[e]vidence of a person's character or character trait," the only evidence excluded by MRE 404(a)(1). General discussions of a person's resolve or pluckiness does not constitute improper character evidence.

State v. Wiseman (1975)

The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden does not apply to threshold matters involving the admissibility of evidence. In Midlands, the proponent of evidence need only prove these evidentiary matters by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., it must establish that all elements are more likely than not true).

Zomerfeld v. Noto (2012)

Under MRE 104(a), when evaluating the admissibility of evidence, a trial court is permitted to rely on both admissible and inadmissible evidence. The use of underlying inadmissible evidence does not make that inadmissible evidence admissible. Instead, the court is permitted to consider the underlying inadmissible evidence to assess the admissibility of the offered evidence. In a jury trial, the jury may not always be privy to the underlying facts used to determine what evidence is admissible, but the Court may hear it. Previously upheld examples include using character evidence to make a ruling on hearsay exceptions, using hearsay to make a ruling on character evidence, and using hearsay to decide whether an expert has adequate foundation to testify.

State v. Watt (1983)

Under MRE 104(a), courts may consider custodial documents, such as clerks' certifications or affidavits of records keepers, when determining the admissibility of other evidence without regard for the admissibility of the custodial document itself. The custodial document typically only addresses preliminary matters of admissibility and is not entered into evidence.

Kennedy v. Kennedy-Jones (2005)

As long as the proponent of the statement produces evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a given person made a particular statement, a court assessing admissibility must assume that the statement was made by that person.

Ginger v. Heisman (2015)

Absent particularized reason to believe that the communication may have been sent by someone else, the fact that an electronic communication (an email, text, or social media post) is listed as coming from a number or account that is either known or purports to belong to a particular person is sufficient foundation that the communication was sent by the person

Davis v. Adams (1993)

Trial judges must ensure that any scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable. In determining reliability, judges should consider only the methods employed and the data relied upon, not the conclusions themselves. The proponent of the evidence has the burden of proving each section of Rule 702 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Tarot Readers Association of Midlands v. Merrell Dow (1994)

In assessing reliability under Rule 702(C), judges should consider whether the theory or technique has been or can be tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, whether it has a known error rate, and whether it has gained widespread acceptance within the field. These factors, while relevant, are not necessarily dispositive. For example, lack of publication does not automatically foreclose admission; sometimes well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published. There is no definitive checklist. Judges must make such assessments based on the totality of the circumstances.

Richards v. Mississippi BBQ (1997)

Midlands Rule of Evidence 703 does not permit experts to testify or to present a chart in a manner that simply summarizes inadmissible hearsay without first relating that hearsay to some specialized knowledge on the expert's part. The court must distinguish experts relying on otherwise inadmissible hearsay to form scientific conclusions from conduits who merely repeat what they are told. The testimony of the former is admissible; that of the latter is not. Of course, statements that would otherwise be admissible are not inadmissible simply because they are offered by or through an expert witness.

State v. Richardson (2017)

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the forensic pathologist to testify to the cause and manner of death even though the pathologist was not tendered as an expert prior to providing her testimony. Unlike other jurisdictions, Midlands does not require a party to "tender an expert" before eliciting an expert opinion. Whether MRE 702 foundational requirements have been satisfied is an evidentiary determination that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Kane Software Co. v. Mars Investigations (1998)

Midlands does not permit parties to use their experts as weapons in a trial by ambush or unfair surprise. Expert reports that are exchanged prior to trial must contain a complete statement of all opinions the expert will testify to and the basis and reasons for them, the facts or data considered by the expert in forming their opinions, and the expert's qualifications. Experts are strictly prohibited from testifying on direct and redirect examination about any opinions or conclusions not stated in their report, and such testimony must be excluded upon a timely objection from opposing counsel. For example, an expert may not testify on direct or redirect examination that they formed a conclusion based on evidence that came out during trial that the expert did not previously review. However, if an expert is asked during cross examination about matters not contained in their report, the expert may freely answer the question as long as the answer is responsive. When an objection is made under Kane Software, the trial court should ask the proponent of the testimony to refer the trial court to where the proposed testimony is contained or otherwise referenced in the expert's disclosure to ensure that the record is clear.

Yu-Oh Industries v. Beckstein Alekri Inc. (2000)

Appellants argue that the trial court improperly excluded testimony from the defense expert on the basis that certain testimony amounted to "trial by ambush" under the precedent set by Kane Software Co. v. Mars Investigations (1998). Appellants admit that the defense expert was attempting to testify to certain underlying facts that were not expressly disclosed in the expert report and that such facts contributed to the expert's conclusions, but they argue that the conclusion itself was disclosed and thus it was unnecessary for every underlying detail to be disclosed. We hold that the Appellants' argument has merit. Experts should not be expected to include in their reports every basic scientific fact known to lay people and known realities of their expertise that support their conclusion. Similarly, experts should not be expected to include in their reports every underlying fact from a specific document so long as the experts explicitly disclosed that they relied upon that document in forming their opinions and that document was made available to the other party through discovery. Such requirements would lead to expert reports that are hundreds, if not thousands, of pages long. For example, an accident reconstructionist need not explain Newton's laws of motion in their report. However, if an expert wishes to testify that they believe the indentations on a vehicle's door means that the vehicle collided with a streetlamp at 45 MPH, then measurements, equations, and other relevant facts that form the basis for that specific conclusion must be disclosed in the expert's report.

Jeffries v. Polk County Police Department (2007)

Generally, law enforcement officers are not "experts" subject to MRE 702 or this Court's holding in Tarot Readers Association of Midlands v. Merrell Dow (1994) and its progeny. However, law enforcement officers may have specialized training, skills, and experience beyond the average citizen as contemplated in MRE 701 and may testify based on such specialized knowledge. Insofar as a law enforcement officer is asked to provide an opinion based on that officer's general training, skills, and experience as a law enforcement officer (e.g., whether the officer followed standard protocol in collecting evidence), the admissibility thresholds of MRE 702 and Tarot Readers do not apply. Rather, the admissibility of a law enforcement officer's non-expert opinion is subject to the standards of MRE 701 and any other applicable rule of evidence.

Omnidirectional Solutions v. Little Bird Word LLC (2023)

It was never the intention of this Court for its holding in Tarot Readers Association of Midlands v. Merrell Dow (1994) and its progeny to create a rigid and unyielding standard for expert opinions. So long as the expert can sufficiently explain their expertise, training, and method for review, Tarot Readers Assoc. shall not be used by trial courts to prohibit otherwise credible and admissible opinions simply because there is not a known error rate or prior peer review of the expert's analysis. Such questions and potential challenges of credibility are better left to cross examination.

America's Best Cookie v. International House of Waffles (2009)

The Court recognizes that practices differ in other jurisdictions. But, in Midlands, the definition of "hearsay" includes out-of-court statements by a witness who is on the stand or by another person who has or will be testifying in a particular trial.

State v. Tate (1987)

Midlands Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) may be invoked in only one direction in a criminal case. Specifically, Rule 801(d)(2) permits the State to offer statements by a criminal defendant. Subject to MRE 106, Rule 801(d)(2) does not permit the defense to offer the defendant's own statements, even if the State has already elicited other out-of-court statements by a defendant during a preceding examination.

Homel v. Arnzen (2015)

For purposes of MRE 801(d)(2), police officers, prosecutors, informants, and others working with law enforcement officials are not an "opposing party" of a criminal defendant.

State v. Hilton (1985)

MRE 801(d)(2) governs statements "offered against an opposing party." This rule does not require the proponent of the evidence to offer the statement "against the party's interests" in order to qualify as an exemption to hearsay under MRE 801(d)(2) - that language is notably only found in MRE 804(b)(3). If the drafters of the MRE had wanted 801(d)(2) to only apply if the statement was "against the party's interest," it would have drafted the rule as such.

State v. Smarda (2005)

A witness testifying to their own recollection of what they saw occur on a video recording cannot be hearsay. Here, the defendant's description of what she viewed happening (e.g. people's movements and interactions) during a movie "outtake" video is not hearsay. However, it may be a violation of MRE 802 if a witness testifies to statements they heard or saw on the video depending on whether the statements met the definition of hearsay or if an exception to the hearsay rule applied.

State v. Bowling (2004)

For statements offered pursuant to MRE 801(d)(2)(E), the proof of the conspiracy need only be shown by a preponderance standard. Given that the Midlands Rules of Criminal procedure do not permit recalling witnesses, the proponent of the evidence may request that a statement be admitted conditionally so that further foundation of the conspiracy can be developed through other witnesses. Whether the evidence will be admitted conditionally is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

State v. Desiato (2020)

Under traditional common law, a defendant could be found liable for the death of a victim if that victim died within a year and a day from the injury suffered at the hands of the defendant. The idea being that the victim's cause of death was still directly and proximately caused by the defendant within that timeframe. We see no reason to divert from the common law "year plus one day" framework. Held: In a criminal homicide case, the prosecutor must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's volitional act was the direct and foreseeable cause of the victim's death.

State v. Rodgers (2014)

Defendant argues that the trial court should not have instructed the jury that he conceded causation when he conceded negligence. The trial court's instruction was proper. It is axiomatic that causation is an element of negligence. Conviction affirmed.

Spear v. Vietnam Travel Agency (2016)

Plaintiff appeals the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff argues that he had no duty to protect himself from harm. While Midlands law does not impose an affirmative duty to save others, Midlands law does require someone to protect themselves from obvious harm. Appeal denied.

State v. Shepard

Defendant comes to the court for relief from judgment following a conviction for murder following a motor vehicle accident that caused the death of three individuals. Defendant was charged with murder after the prosecution put forth evidence that Defendant had a B.A.C. of .23, was speeding in excess of 20 mph over the speed limit and texting while driving. Defendant is asking this Court to overturn his conviction and remand for a new trial because Defendant believes the trial court improperly excluded evidence offered by the Defense regarding the Defendant’s claim that the victims would not have died but for the subsequent negligent actions of the hospital emergency room staff. Specifically, the Defendant sought to include evidence that the emergency room physicians failed to properly diagnose head traumas and did not order a CT scan. As a result, two of the three patients died as a result of a brain bleed. The trial court found that the actions of the emergency room department after the accident occurred were not relevant to assess the material fact of whether Defendant’s actions constituted an extreme indifference to the value of human life. Specifically, the trial court excluded the evidence because defendants “take their victims as they find them.” We agree. While there may be some cases in which the subsequent intervening actions of a third party may impact whether the Defendant knew or should have known that their own actions could result in death, in this case it is well established common sense that driving dangerously could result in danger to other drivers or, as is the case here, pedestrians.

Chambers v. By the Book Publishing, LTD

The hearsay rule is only implicated where an out-of-court statement is being used for the truth of the matter asserted. If it only matters whether the out-of-court statement was made (not whether it was true), then the hearsay rule is not implicated.

State v. B.F. De La Porta

Defendant offered statements of the investigating agent (“I know that you did this. You’re a mastermind and this is exactly the type of job that you would pull . . . and now you’re gonna be mine”) to show bias in the investigation. The State objected to hearsay, arguing the “truth value”— that which the Defense wished the jury to infer from the statement—was that the Agent was out to get the Defendant and that was the purpose for which the Defense was entering it. Held: To be inadmissible as hearsay, an out-of-court statement must be (a) an assertion of fact (b) offered to establish the truth of that asserted fact. No part of the rule against hearsay concerns itself with the “truth value” of an out-of-court statement beyond the fact asserted in the statement. The statement here contains several assertions of fact—that the investigating agent knew the Defendant was involved; that the Defendant was a mastermind and that the heist was of the sort the Defendant would commit; and that the Defendant would be his. Because the Defense disputed these assertions, it cannot be reasonably argued that any part of the Agent’s statement was offered to prove the truth of the matter(s) asserted. As such, the statement is definitionally not hearsay.