TCT week 1 - introduction to terrorism & counterterrorism

Terrorism (Matusitz)

Terrorism is the use of violence to create fear (i.e. terror, psychic fear) for (1) political, (2) religious, or (3) ideological reasons. The terror is intentionally aimed at noncombatant targets (i.e. civilians or iconic symbols), and the objective is to achieve the greatest attainable publicity for a group, cause, or individual.

4 waves of modern terrorism

• 1st wave: The Anarchist Wave (1880s-1910s)

• 2nd wave: The Anticolonial Wave (1920s-1960s)

• 3rd wave: The New Left Wave (1960s-1990s)

• 4th wave: The Religious Wave (1990s-?)

Old terrorism

Terrorism that strikes only selected targets. (quality targeting)

New terrorism

Terrorism that is indiscriminate; it causes as many casualties as possible. (quantity targeting)

Transition from old terrorism to new terrorism

During first half of 1990s:

• WTC bomb attack in New York (1993)

• Aum Shinrikyo attack on Tokyo subway (1995)

Terrorism as a result of rational choice

Terrorism is a deliberate, strategic choice to achieve political, ideological, or religious goals when non-violent options seem ineffective.

Terrorism as a result of personal traits

Terrorism is driven by individual psychological factors, such as childhood trauma, personality disorders, or personal grievances.

Terrorism as a result of social interactions

Terrorism emerges from social networks. Recruitment happens through friendship, kinship, or community ties.

Does terrorism work?

Terrorist groups often manage to reach their short-term goals, such as the payment of ransoms or prisoners exchanges. Only in very rare cases, they manage to reach their long-term or ultimate goals, such as policy changes or complete transformation of the existing social/political order.

Assumption: one can recognise a terrorist (CT)

Evaluation: false for individuals though more research is needed.

• No standard profile

• False positives / negatives

• Profiling can lead to discrimination

• Ethical concerns

Stages of data collection

1. Surveillance - someone recording or monitoring activities.

2. Elicitation - people or organisations attempting to gain information about military operations, capabilities, or people.

3. Tests of security - any attempts to assess strengths and weaknesses.

4. Funding / supplies - suspicious transactions, deposits, withdrawals, donations, buying, or stealing of controlled items.

5. Impersonation - assuming false identities (e.g., posing as officials, employees, or civilians to gain access).

6. Rehearsal - practicing the attack (e.g., dry runs, timing movements, simulating scenarios).

7. Deployment - executing the attack

Assumption: decapitation of terrorist groups works (CT)

Evaluation: partly true, with shortcomings.

• Mixed results

  • Successes: Shining Path and PKK weakened significantly after leadership arrests.

  • Failures: Hamas & Al-Qaeda adapted or retaliated.

• Context matters

  • Younger, smaller groups are more vulnerable to collapse.

  • Religious groups are more resilient due to ideological commitment.

• Decapitation may disrupt operations but can also prolong conflicts by creating martyrs or power struggles.

• Targeted killings (e.g., drones) risk civilian casualties and backlash.

Assumption: terrorism cannot be defeated (CT)

Evaluation: false, or at best very partly true.

• Individual groups can be defeated.

  • 40% of groups ended due to policing or joining politics.

  • Examples: RAF (Germany) & ANC (South Africa transitioned to politics).

• Terrorism as a phenomenon persists.

  • "waves" theory shows terrorism evolves.

  • New groups emerge as old ones fade (e.g., ISIS after Al-Qaeda).

4 reasons for the end of a terrorist group

• Local police and intelligence service

• Military force

• Terrorists join the political process

• They achieved their goal

Assumption: counter-terrorism requires a holistic approach (CT)

Evaluation: partly true, with shortcomings.

• Combines hard (military, policing) and soft (education, de-radicalisation) measures (e.g., UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy).

• Addresses root causes (e.g., socio-economic marginalisation, governance failures).

• Challenges: little empirical evidence, coordination issues between agencies, budget constraints.

Assumption: de-radicalisation of terrorists is possible (CT)

Evaluation: true.

• Examples like Daveed Gartenstein-Ross (former radical turned counterterrorism expert) and Noman Benotman (former LIFG leader) show individuals can disengage from violence.

• Programs in Nordic countries (e.g., EXIT Sweden), Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia have demonstrated partial success, though recidivism rates vary.

• While full ideological de-radicalisation is rare, behavioural disengagement (e.g., leaving a group) is achievable and reduces violence risk.

• De-radicalised individuals often become credible voices in countering extremism.

Assumption: terrorism is caused by poverty (T)

Evaluation: false.

• Most terrorists are not poorer than their peers. Examples: Osama bin Laden (wealthy) & Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (middle-class).

• There is no direct link between poverty and terrorism.

Assumption: terrorists are crazy (T)

Evaluation: false.

• Most terrorists are psychologically normal and act rationally for political goals.

• Some lone wolves (e.g., Ted Kaczynski, Anders Breivik) show mental health issues, but this is not the norm.

Assumption: terrorism is increasingly lethal (T)

Evaluation: partly true.

• Total fatalities: Fluctuate over time (e.g., spikes after 9/11, but no consistent upward trend).

• Fatalities per attack: Increased (e.g., 1980s: ~4 victims/attack; 2000s: ~11 victims/attack).

• Attacks are deadlier, but not consistently more frequent.

Assumption: terrorism is predominantly anti-Western (T)

Evaluation: false.

• Targets: Most attacks occur in Middle East, South Asia, Africa (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria).

• Victims: Majority are Muslims (82–97% of fatalities, per U.S. National Counterterrorism Center).

• While groups like Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram use anti-Western rhetoric, their actions target locals.

Assumption: terrorism is successful (T)

Evaluation: partly true, depends on the definition of success.

• Political goals: Rarely achieved (e.g., only 7% of groups succeed, per Max Abrahms).

• Attention & fear: Terrorists excel at gaining media coverage and spreading fear (e.g., 9/11, Boston Marathon).

• Groups like Al-Qaeda persist but fail to achieve long-term goals (e.g., caliphate, regime change).