Chap 3: The Social Self

According to research on the accuracy of self-knowledge, for what qualities are we the best judges of ourselves? For what qualities are others superior judges of us? How does motivation contribute to this asymmetry?

Although people predict that they are the best judges of themselves, when it comes to predicting behavior, others know us about as well as we know ourselves. However, we are superior judges of ourselves when it comes to private, inner qualities that are not easily observable (like our inner thoughts and feelings). Others are superior judges of us when it comes to qualities that are readily displayed in social settings (like our level of talkativeness and enthusiasm). Motivation contributes to the self/other knowledge asymmetry regarding qualities that have a positive or negative connotation. We are strongly motivated to see ourselves favorably, which may give us blind spots about our socially undesirable shortcomings. In these cases, others tend to know us more accurately than we know ourselves. (And thank goodness; you wouldn't want to be fully aware of your every flaw!)

How might an undergraduate woman's working self-concept regarding her gender shift during a day on campus as she attends her advanced math class (in which she is the only woman), has a low-key lunch with a friend, and attends her gender studies class? Will her frequently shifting self-concept undermine her sense of having a coherent self?

The working self-concept shifts with situational cues such that in a given situation, especially relevant and/or distinctive self-aspects become part of the working self-concept. In her advanced math class, this young woman's gender identity is highly distinctive (as she is the only woman), and in her gender studies class, her gender identity is highly relevant to the situation (discussing gender theory). Thus, both class contexts should highlight her gender identity in her working self-concept. During lunch, however, it's unlikely that gender will be part of her working self-concept, being neither particularly relevant nor distinctive in that context. Despite these shifts in her working self-concept, she is probably not confused about her identity; she probably has a core set of self-aspects that define who she is regardless of her current working self-concept. Moreover, she is probably used to these fluctuations during her days on campus, since they form a stable pattern of activation and deactivation of her gender in her working self-concept (making her feel especially like a woman in her math and gender studies classes and less so at other times).

How do people's daily experiences in their contingent versus noncontingent domains affect their state self-esteem? Over time, how might these experiences translate to trait self-esteem?

Performing well in a contingent domain boosts state self-esteem, whereas performing poorly in a contingent domain diminishes state self-esteem. Performance in noncontingent domains has less influence on state self-esteem. Over time, accumulating experiences of good versus poor performance may influence trait self-esteem. Repeatedly performing poorly in contingent domains (threatening state self-esteem frequently) may ultimately reduce overall trait self-esteem, Similarly, regularly performing well in contingent domains (boosting state self-esteem repeatedly) may ultimately increase overall trait self-esteem. Performance over time in noncontingent domains is unlikely to affect trait self-esteem.

Do people from Eastern cultures generally feel worse about themselves than people from Western cultures do? How do researchers interpret self-reported self-esteem differences between cultures?

Members of Eastern cultures tend to report lower feelings of self-esteem than members of Western cultures; however, rather than reflecting an overall more negative view of the self, this difference may reflect differing cultural value systems. In East Asian and other non-Western cultures, views of the self are more interwoven with the social context. Accordingly, these cultures prioritize improving the self (perhaps to better fulfill one's obligations and duties in social relationships and systems) and meeting the goals of the group, rather than meeting the goal of being a self-confident and powerful individual (which Western cultures tend to prioritize). Thus, it may not be accurate to conclude that members of Eastern cultures feel worse about themselves than Westerners; they simply feel different about the self as a whole.

Should people be more likely to display the better-than-average effect for their own intelligence before or after learning how intelligence is measured in scientific research? How do construals contribute to this process?

According to research on self-serving construals, the better-than-average effect is more prevalent for qualities with ambiguous, or fuzzy, definitions but dissipates in strength when objective standards become apparent. Thus, before obtaining a clear definition of intelligence, people may be more prone to self-enhance with respect to their intelligence in order to bolster their self-worth. Under these conditions of ambiguity, people may construe different qualities as being more or less important to intelligence, construing their own strengths (perhaps artistic or interpersonal skill) as key to intelligence and construing their weaknesses as less relevant to intelligence.
However, once people learn the scientific standards for intelligence, their tendency to display the better-than-average effect should decrease because the standards reduce their freedom to construe their own best qualities as core to intelligence.

If you're fairly sure you are scatterbrained, but a friend tells you that you're organized and focused, what will your cognitive reaction likely be? What will your emotional reaction likely be?
Which motive-self-enhancement or self-verification-drives which set of reactions?

Self-verification, the need to be seen accurately by others for important self-defining traits, should drive your cognitive reactions to this feedback, making you dubious about the quality of the feedback your friend has provided. In contrast, your emotional system, ruled more by self-enhancement, should register this as positive feedback and lead you to feel good about this feedback, even as your cognitive mind tells you it is inaccurate. Thus, you may think your friend is off base in her compliment to you (perhaps making you question her competence as a judge of you), but you will still feel emotionally better about it than if she had confirmed your negative self-view of being scatterbrained.

Suppose two friends both have an actual self that is relatively happy and a potential self that is extremely happy (happier than their actual self). If this discrepancy in happiness leads one friend to experience agitation and the other friend to experience dejection, what does this tell you? What theory would this evidence support?

Actual selves that are discrepant with ought selves produce agitation, whereas actual selves discrepant with ideal selves produce dejection. This suggests that for the agitated friend, the extremely happy potential self is an ought self, whereas for the dejected friend, the extremely happy potential self is an ideal self. In other words, the first friend feels that she really should be happier, whereas the second friend feels she would like to ideally be happier (but it's not a matter of "should"). This pattern of emotional responses would support self-discrepancy theory.