Quiz 3 ICC

How Contestation Moderates the Effects of International Institutions: Stephen Chaudoin Argument

The ICC efficacy is not universal; it depends on the preexisting balance of power between opposing domestic groups

Deterrence Effect

The ICC signal can trigger the AC group to increase their effort

Non-monotonic relationship

The marginal effect of the ICC on increasing the probability of compliance is not linear. It is non-monotonically related to the ratio of costs to benefits of the opposing domestic groups

How does the ICC induce compliance 

The ICC has the greatest ability to induce compliance when the competing domestic groups are balanced ex ante (they have comparable political incentives)

Weak PC group; strong AC group

The AC group counter-mobilizes forcefully in response to the ICC shock, muting the institution’s effectiveness. The ICC effect is minimal

Strong PC group; weak AC group

Strong PC group; weak AC group. PC is already investing heavily in winning. The ICC produces little marginal effect

When is the ICC most impactful?

The ICC is most impactful when it’s truly pivotal. Where forces are balanced.

2013 Kenyan election

ICC issued summonses (2011) against two major presidential candidates (Kenyatta and Ruto)

When does the ICC have the greatest negative effect?

ICC indictment had the greatest negative effect on support for the main indicted candidate (Kenyatta) only in regions where his initial support was middling (balanced ex ante with opposition forces)

Kenyatta and opponents strongholds

In Kenyatta’s strongholds or opponent’s strongholds, the ICC had a much weaker marginal effect on voter behavior

Outcome of strongholds

Despite the ICC’s intervention, the indicted candidates won the election. It demonstrates the capacity of AC mobilization to defeat the PC

Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity? Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons Argument:

The ICC deters violators by reducing killings of civilians

ICC critics inconsistent argument 

The Court is weak, which makes it unable to deter crime. AND the Court exacerbates conflict by (credibly) threatening to punish perpetrators

Jo & Simmons argument:

The ICC jurisdiction increases the risk or prosecution (compared to impunity). More likely to deter when the ICC signals its will and capacity to prosecute. More likely to deter when actors are sensitive to social pressure

Prosecutorial deterrence

Ratification of the ICC increases the risk of punishment. Threat of punishment also increases when the court demonstrates its will and capacity to prosecute.  Investigations, indictments, and convictions. Threat of punishment increases with ICC-consistent domestic statutes

Social deterrence

More human rights organizations increase the likelihood of naming and shaming. More dependence on foreign aid creates more deterrence. Secessionist groups more likely to be deterred because they need to cultivate international legitimacy

Reduction of civilian killings

Presence of ICC-consistent domestic legal reforms reduce civilian killings by 61%

Reduction of secessionist rebel groups killings

Secessionist rebel groups kill fewer civilians when the ICC investigates other countries

The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? Alyssa Prorok Argument:

Active ICC involvement decreases the likelihood of civil conflict termination (lengthening war)

What makes civil wars less likely to end

ICC involvement (investigations and indictments) will make civil wars less likely to end and therefore prolong their duration

Rational leader mechanism

Leaders are rational actors seeking to maximize power and utility (e.g., liberty, security, wealth), An ICC indictment represents an existential threat (loss of all utility) because it eliminates the “safe harbor” of impunity typically granted in peace negotiations. The ICC doesn’t end an ongoing investigation because the killing stops

ICC as a spoiler of peace

It makes the credible promise of amnesty impossible for international actors to guarantee

What decreases the hazard of conflict termination

Active ICC investigation or indictment decreases the hazard of conflict termination but is conditional on the domestic political environment

When is the ICC’s additional effect less significant?

When the threat of domestic punishment (e.g., a local transitional justice mechanism or a powerful domestic opposition) is already high, the ICC’s additional effect is less significant

When is the ICC’s negative impact the strongest?

The ICC’s negative impact is strongest where local institutions are weak. Here the ICC is the only serious threat to the leader’s future liberty

Unintended Positive Complementary Geoff Dancy and Florencia Montal Argument:

ICC provides domestic pro-compliance groups the political space to increase the number of state agents prosecuted for human rights abuses (outside the ICC’s jurisdiction

Principle of complementarity

The ICC can only act if national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute

Strategic Response

When under ICC investigation, the ruling elite (the “anti-compliance” forces) must simulate cooperation (show to be willing to prosecute) to satisfy the ICC and avoid the case being escalated to The Hague

Judicial Mobilization

Domestic pro-compliance forces (civil society, human rights advocates, reformist judicial factions) seize this moment of simulated willingness. Use the political space created by the ICC’s scrutiny to file cases for abuses that the ICC ignores (the “gap-filling litigation”). Ruling elite cannot credibly shut down all prosecutions without proving their unwillingness to the ICC

Result of The “Willingness” Game

Strategic interaction between simulated compliance and judicial activism leads to a real increase in domestic prosecutions, primarily of lower-level state agents

Hypothesis of Unintended Positive Complementary- Geoff Dancy and Florencia Montal

ICC investigation serves as a political shock that, rather than replacing domestic justice, stimulates it in unexpected ways

Findings of Unintended Positive Complementary- Geoff Dancy and Florencia Montal

The increase in domestic prosecutions is not depending on high pre-existing levels of judicial independence. The ICC’s effect is not simply reinforcing strong courts; it acts as an external political catalyst. The effect is tied specifically to the onset of the ICC investigation, not just to the country being an ICC member. The justice achieved is mostly for mid-to-low level state agents and often for crimes below the ICC’s threshold

Prorok (macro-level failure)

The ICC is bad at macro-political transitions (ending war) because it incentivizes powerful leaders to fight for survival. (But this argument focuses only on the high-level actors and high-stakes outcome)

Dancy and Montal (micro-level success)

The ICC is good at micro-institutional change (inciting domestic courts) because it changes the domestic political opportunity structure. (But in this argument the success is unintended and doesn’t address the ongoing war)

Takeaway of different measures of “success”

The ICC should be viewed not as a substitute for domestic systems, but as an external pressure point that disrupts the status quo of impunity, creating both negative and positive consequences simultaneously

Effectiveness of the ICC is conditional

Determined less by the severity of the crimes targeted and more by the pre-existing domestic political equilibrium. Determined by the type of actor involved in a conflict and their sensitivity to social pressure

ICC mobilization is maximized when local pro-compliance and anti-compliance forces are politically balanced ex ante

When institutional intervention occurs in heavily imbalanced states, the ICC risk to fail to induce compliance

ICC reduces intentional killing in conflicts

Prosecutorial deterrence (formal punishment risk). Social deterrence (informal costs/legitimacy)