PSCI 257: Hinnebusch reading ME Uprisings Divergent Trajectories

What are the two main dimensions shaping post-uprising outcomes in Arab states?

State capacity and regime type (Dahl’s Dimensions)

State Capacity

Whether the state collapses (Libya, Syria) or persists (Egypt, Tunisia), determining if there’s an authority vacuum or institutional continuity (person in charge has lost control and no one has replaced them, political structures fail)

Elite contestation

Extent of intra-elite political competition

Mass inclusion

extent of popular participation (activities where citizens engage with political process, e.g. voting, protesting, lobbying, social media activism, etc).

Dahl Dimension Regime Types: Polyarchy

High contestation and high inclusion (rare in MENA region)

Dahl Dimension Regime Types: Hybrid Regimes

Electoral authoritarianism (elections exist but are not free), mixed mass inclusion

Dahl Dimension Regime Types: Patrimonial authoritarianism

Low contestation and low inclusion (e.g. Gulf Monarchies)

3 Main Post-Uprising Trajectories: State collapse/near collapse

Elite contestation surges, often leading to identity driven violence

Emergence of regimes-in-formation with charismatic warlords or military remnants

Exclusion of losers from new power arrangements

3 Main Post-Uprising Trajectories: Hybrid Restoration (e.g. Egypt)

A return to electoral authoritarianism with limited political pluralism

Use of tools such as Coercion, co-optation, divide and rule tactics (e.g. Secularists vs. Islamists)

3 Main Post-Uprising Trajectories: Democratic Transition (e.g. Tunisia)

Peaceful Leadership change

Negotiated pacts between regime softliners and moderate opposition

Movement towards genuine polyarchy

3 Post-Uprising Trajectory Starting Point Features: Anti-regime Mobilization

Broad, cross-class coalitions can force the elites to concede to pacts

Requires unity among moderates inside and outside the regime

3 Post-Uprising Trajectory Starting Point Features: Authoritarian/Regime Resistance and Resilience

The regime has strong coercive capacity (army and police are loyal, can use force against people), and strong co-optative capacity (absorbs opposition, buys people off and calms them down)

Regime Resilience also depends on: Neo-patrimonial balance - Strong Patrimonialism

Ruler controls everything through personal loyalty, favours, client networks

Institutions are weak and are tied to the ruler personally

If the ruler falls, everything collapses, there’s no strong political system to hold the state together

e.g. Libya and Gadaffi

Regime Resilience also depends on: Neo-patrimonial balance - Bureaucratic Dominance

Power is spread throughout institutions, not just the ruler

Civil service, courts, and army have some independence

Thus, if the ruler is removed, the system can still function, and peaceful transition is more likely

E.g. Tunisia

Regime Resilience also depends on: Neo-patrimonial balance - Mix between Patrimonialism and Bureaucracy

Regime has some personal networks (patrimonialism) and some functioning institutions (bureaucracy)

This can lead to: Neither a quick collapse nor a smooth transition

Prolonger violence/stalemate because: the ruler won’t leave easily (too much personal power), but the system is not strong enough to fully survive or reform either

e.g. Syria

What Structural Theories explain outbreak of Arab Uprisings? - Modernization Theory

Rising education, urbanization, and thus development of the middle class- but political exclusion → revolutionary potential

e.g. Tunisia had high social mobilization but low political incorporation

What Structural Theories explain outbreak of Arab Uprisings? - Marxist/political economy

Shift from populist redistribution to neoliberal exclusion (e.g. Egypt)

Leads to grievances: Privatization, unemployment, inequality, elite capture of wealth

What Structural Theories explain outbreak of Arab Uprisings? - Integrated Hypothesis

Intersection of economic blockage, youth unemployment, dynastic succesions, and elite alienation

What theories explain mobilization strength/success? - Social Movement Theory factors

Framing of grievances → higher clarity and unity in grievances means more success

Political opportunity structures → strength of civil society, IT/Social media use, access to shared Arab public sphere (e.g. satellite TV)

What theories explain mobilization strength/success? - Aligned Cleavages

Deep social divide in society, splits people into groups with different interests

Aligned Cleavages = Stronger Protest Unity

• This happens when class and identity overlap.

• Example: Bahrain

  • The Shiʿa majority in Bahrain is also economically disadvantaged.

  • So, both their class interests (poor vs. rich) and communal identity (Shiʿa vs. ruling Sunni elite) push them to protest — together.

What theories explain mobilization strength/success? - Cross-cutting cleavages

Cross-Cutting Cleavages = Divided Mobilization

• This is when people are divided in one way but united in another, so there's no clear "us vs. them".

• Example: Lebanon

  • A poor Sunni and a poor Shiʿa might both suffer economically, but belong to different religious groups.

  • These identity divisions stop them from fully uniting — distrust and sectarian politics get in the way.

  • Result: Weaker, fragmented protests, or multiple rival protests that cancel each other out.

Outcomes - United, peaceful protests

Rapid regime change (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt)

Outcomes - Divided or violent protests

Regime survival or state collapse (Libya, Bahrain, Syria)

Why didn’t mass protests always lead to democracy in MENA? - Mass protest paradigm

Theory states: peaceful protests are powerful and can cause regime collapse through

1. Backfire (gov, using violence turns public opinion and elites against them)

2. security force defection

3. International sanctions and global pressure

Why this didn’t work in MENA: In many cases regimes responded with repression but 1) security forces did not defect, 2) repression did not backfire enough to collapse the regime, 3) external support (Russia, Saudi Arabia) kept regimes afloat

Thus protests lead to conflict instead of transition (e.g. Syria, Bahrain)

Why didnt mass protests always lead to democracy in MENA? - Transition paradigm

Theory states: for successful transition to democracy, you need a pact between regime softliners (people in power who are open to reform), and moderate opposition (protests/opposition leaders)

Why this often does not work in MENA: Many uprisings were leaderless, fragmented (secularists, islamists, youth, all pulling in different directions), maximalist (not willing to compromise, ‘all or nothing’)

What happens instead: Hardliners in regime use violence/fear to stay in power → protests are either repressed or turn violent → no trust between sides means to pact → collapse (Libya) or civil war (Syria)

How authoritarian regimes in MENA survive uprisings? Neo-patrimonialism - Patrimonial regimes

Strong personal networks, and weak bureaucracy → collapse when ruler falls (Libya)

How authoritarian regimes in MENA survive uprisings? Neo-patrimonialism - Bureaucratic Regimes

Institutional continuity allows ruler to be ousted while the state survives (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia)

How authoritarian regimes in MENA survive uprisings? Neo-patrimonialism - Mixed regimes

Leads to prolonged stalemate (Yemen, Syria)

Regime survival mechanisms - Co-optation

1) Buy off opposition and bring them into political system (patronage to different groups), 2) Include different cleavages (selective inclusion to certain groups), 3) make superficial reforms to create illusion of change

Goal: divide and weaken opposition and deflate anger without giving up real control (e.g. Jordan, Morocco)

Regime survival mechanisms - Repression

Use of force, fear, and violence to suppress dissent

Done by - 1) making sure security forces are controlled and will obey orders, 2) use brutality (arrests, torture, killings) to scare people off streets, 3) get external support (help from allies with money, weapons, troops)

e.g. Bahrain