PHL101 Short answer portion

Anselma ontological argument for gods existence

Anselm is proving that God exists – and by which he means an absolutely perfect being, a being so perfect that no greater being is conceivable. He is going against the atheist thought that God doesn't exist. 

: he says that if you understand God you have to conclude that he exists – whatever you think of in the mind (God, donald trump, loch ness monster) what you are thinking of must exist in your understanding

There are things that exist in the mind alone (loch ness monster), there are things that exist both in mind and reality (ex. you) and things that exist in reality but not in the mind (undiscovered species) – Anselm believes that God exists in the middle with you 

Anselm thinks that since God is a perfect being he exists in the mind and in reality as well (If X exists in the mind alone, then X is not perfect) and if God did only exist in the mind alone that would mean God is not perfect, therefore God is perfect and he exists in the mind and in reality

Arnaldo and Elisabeth of bohemia

Arnauld and Elisabeth of Bohemia both challenge aspects of Descartes’s dualist view of the mind. Arnauld targets Descartes’s Conceivability Argument, specifically Premise 2 (P2): that what is clearly and distinctly conceivable is possible.

Arnauld argues this is false unless we have “complete and adequate” knowledge of the essences involved. If our grasp of the essence-nature of say mind is incomplete then we may be able to conceive of the mind without the body if that is even possible. He uses examples like a right triangle or water (H₂O) to show how one can conceive of a glass full of water as water and not it as a know its a glass full of H20 )but that’s impossible for it not to be h20 so P2 is false) that seems possible but is actually not, due to “hidden natures our mind could be spatial and subject to physical law without us knowing or realizing-understanding

Elisabeth, on the other hand, critiques Descartes’s interactionist dualism by focusing on mental causation—how an immaterial mind could cause changes in a physical body. The nexus thesis {if c is a cause of e then c causing e proceeds via a nexus and interference whereby an object figuring in c transmits power to an object figuring in é} She Contact thesis}{ assumes that all causes involve a nexus and spatial contact, which makes it hard to understand how a non-physical mind can causally interact with the body. These critiques are important because they expose potential flaws in Descartes’s argument for the spiritual nature of the mind, questioning both the reliability of conceivability as a guide to possibility and the coherence of mind-body interaction.

Hobbes on why the state of nature is a state of war

Hobbes argues that in the absence of a governing authority—what he calls the "state of nature"—humans exist in a constant state of war, where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” due to competition, distrust (diffidence), and the desire for glory. 

According to Hobbes, in the state of nature: • We are roughly equal in body and mind; • We have equal hope of achieving our goals; • We have a “fear of death, a desire of such things as are necessary for commodious living, and a hope by [our] industry to obtain them” (XIII.14); • We have limited, highly partial benevolence; and • We are highly sensitive to slights to our honor and dignity (XVII.7).

He believes human beings are roughly equal in power and equally motivated by fear of death and the desire for comfort, which leads them to compete for resources and status. 

Since there are no enforceable rules or authority to keep order, conflict is inevitable, and even trivial signs of disrespect can escalate into violence. To escape this condition, 

Hobbes proposes a social contract where individuals collectively agree to give up their natural rights and authorize a sovereign—a person or assembly—with absolute power to ensure peace and security. Key claim: a political system is justified if and only if those subject to it could have rationally agreed to it. • In his Leviathan, Hobbes defends a version of the social contract theory of government.

This sovereign’s legitimacy comes not from divine right but from the mutual consent of the governed. Key terms include state of nature, social contract, sovereign, diffidence, and right of nature. This is important because it lays the foundation for modern political authority, showing why people would rationally submit to government control for the sake of peace and mutual protection.

Jacksons black and white Mary argument

Frank Jackson’s Black-and-White Mary argument challenges physicalism; the view that everything, including consciousness, is entirely physical.  In speaking of “physicalism,” Jackson means to be speaking of the same view we have been calling “materialism.”

In his thought experiment, Mary is a scientist who knows all the physical facts about color vision but has lived her entire life in a black-and-white room. When she is released and sees red for the first time she will come to know something she didn’t know before , Jackson argues that she learns something new—what it feels like to see red—proving that not all knowledge is physical. 

Ability hypothesis ‘’ knowledge Mary gains is not factual knowledge. Instead, it is ability knowledge, “know-how.”

This is known as the knowledge argument: 

(P1) Mary gains new knowledge upon seeing red; 

(P2) if physicalism were true, she wouldn’t learn anything new she will come to know something she didn’t before (since she already knew all the physical facts); therefore, 

(C) physicalism is false. 

Jackson uses this to support property dualism; the idea that mental properties like qualia—the subjective, felt qualities of experiences—are non-physical. If Mary does learn something, he reasons, then what she learns about isn’t physical. What is it? His answer is that she learns about a non-physical property of her experience, a property which determines its “reddish” qualitative character and which he calls a “quale.” Thus, Jackson is advocating property dualism

He claims these qualia are epiphenomenal, meaning they don’t cause anything in the physical world they don’t cause anything PHYSICAl to happen . 

Physicalist replies include the ability hypothesis (that Mary gains abilities, not knowledge) and the new knowledge-old fact hypothesis (that she gains a new conceptual understanding of a physical fact). 

However, Jackson argues that the wow moment of seeing red feels like learning a fundamentally new fact, not just gaining know-how or re-labeling something. His argument is significant because it exposes a gap in physicalist theories of mind and deepens the mind-body problem, pushing us to reconsider how consciousness fits into our understanding of reality and whether non-physical aspects of experience must be acknowledged.

Manta universal law of formulation of the categorical imperative

Kant’s Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative, from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, states that we should “act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”  Categorical imperatives tell you what to do unconditionally (i.e., not on the condition that you happen to want something or other)

For Kant, an action has moral worth only if done from duty, motivated by the idea that it is morally required—not by personal gain or emotion appreciating this reveals to us the key to universal moral truth. pleasure, intelligence, natural talents, sympathetic emotions, health, money, good fortune—can be used for evil ends just as easily as for good ones.

We deduce the moral rules from our concept of ourselves as autonomous beings (i.e., as free and rational beings).

He argues that good will is the only thing that is intrinsically good, and moral laws must apply to all rational beings through reason, which is universal. An action is morally permissible if its guiding principle (maxim) can be universalized without contradiction; if not, it is irrational and impermissible. 

This forms the basis of perfect duties (e.g., not lying) and imperfect duties (e.g., helping others). Kant also offers other versions of the imperative, like the End-in-Itself formulation, which says we must treat others as ends, not merely means. His theory emphasizes autonomy and rational consistency in moral action, though it raises questions about whether all contradictions are so clear and whether his different formulations are truly equivalent.

Nagel on what its like to be a bat

Thomas Nagel’s essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” argues that conscious experience, or phenomenal consciousness, has a subjective character that resists scientific explanation. 

Nagel claims that an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism—a uniquely first-person perspective that cannot be reduced to objective physical facts. Using bats as an example, he explains that while we know bats use echolocation, we cannot grasp what it’s like to experience the world as a bat does, since our perceptual systems are too different. Nagel says that we cannot know. Due to the differences between our human perceptual apparatus and that of bats, we cannot so much as entertain the correct hypothesis about bat subjective character, let alone know it

This leads to his core claim: the subjective quality of experience (“what it’s like-ness”) cannot be captured by objective science, which relies on third-person, multi-perspective explanations. Scientific models, like those explaining lightning, succeed by ignoring subjective appearances—but doing the same for consciousness ignores the very thing we’re trying to explain. “Consciousness” • Self-consciousness, sensory experience, bodily awareness, emoting, introspecting Our focus will be on phenomenal consciousness or, as we’ll call it, “phenomenality”: the subjective and qualitative “what it’s like-ness” of many mental states and processes.

Nagel stresses that phenomenality can only be known from a particular point of view, but physical facts are knowable from any point of view, suggesting a deep explanatory gap. While a formal argument (Argument X) suggests that phenomenality isn’t physical, Nagel doesn’t fully endorse this; instead, he concludes that our current science lacks the tools to explain consciousness without discarding its essential subjective nature. This raises the broader issue: can science ever explain consciousness without abandoning its defining features? in science we forego investigation of a phenomenon’s appearance and focus on its reality, the objective nature underlying the subjective appearance.

The natural sciences seek explanations of observed phenomena that are as objective as possible. • An explanation is “objective” to the degree that it is understandable from more than one type of point of view

Rawls two Pringle’s of justice

John Rawls’s Two Principles of Justice, developed in A Theory of Justice, aim to resolve the problem of distributive justice by balancing liberty and equality within a liberal democratic society. 

He proposes a social contract approach where rational individuals would choose principles of justice behind a “Veil of Ignorance”—a hypothetical scenario in which they don’t know their class, gender, race, or talents. 

From this “Original Position,” Rawls argues that people would choose: 

(1) the Liberty Principle, which guarantees equal basic liberties for all; E]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others

(2) the Difference Principle, which allows inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged, alongside Fair Equality of Opportunity, ensuring all social roles are open to everyone under just conditions. [S]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

Principle 1 has priority—freedom cannot be sacrificed for equality. These principles form Rawls’s vision of “Justice as Fairness”, a form of egalitarian liberalism that treats talents as common assets and insists that no one deserves their starting point in life. since all human lives are of equal importance, there should be no legal barriers to filling socially desirable positions; moreover, individuals who are equally talented and motivated should have equal chances of filling socially desirable positions

The Difference Principle Specifically counters morally arbitrary inequalities, such as those from birth or natural endowment, by allowing the better-off to benefit only if it improves conditions for the worse-off. 

Rawls’s framework has faced criticism from libertarians like Nozick, who see redistribution as a violation of liberty, and from socialists, who argue Rawls tolerates inequality too much. Nonetheless, Rawls defends his model as the most rational and fair way to structure society, promoting cooperation, fairness, and …

fraternity—a social attitude that values mutual respect and shared responsibility for justice.

Scheffler death and the after life

In “Death and the Afterlife,” Samuel Scheffler argues that our values and motivations depend not just on our own survival, but on the continued existence of human civilization after our death. 

Using a thought experiment—where the world ends 30 days after we die (doomsday)—he shows that we would still feel grief and loss, revealing that we care deeply about the future of others. 

Projects like curing diseases or creating art often assume a future where people benefit, and without that future, these pursuits would lose meaning. 

This challenges the Mattering Principle, which claims things only matter if they affect our experiences. Scheffler emphasizes that traditions, communities, and generational continuity give our lives structure and value. Even without belief in a supernatural afterlife, our sense of purpose is rooted in the belief that life will go on, and human extinction would undermine the significance we assign to many of our most cherished commitments.

Smarts sensations and brain processes

In “Sensations and Brain Processes,” J.J.C. Smart defends the identity theory, which claims that phenomenal mental states (like pain or color perception) are identical to physical brain processes—

for example, pain = C-fiber firing. He compares this to scientific identities like water = H₂O or lightning = electrical discharge, arguing that as science advances, even conscious states can and should be explained in physicalist terms. 

Smart rejects the idea that sensations are somehow non-physical “nomological danglers”—unexplainable leftovers outside the scientific worldview. He argues for identity theory using Occam’s Razor, claiming that positing non-physical properties is unnecessary. 

While Smart is sympathetic to behaviorist approaches for non-conscious states (like beliefs), he limits the identity theory to phenomenally conscious “sensations.” 

He addresses several objections: 

(1) that people can know their sensations without knowing brain science—he replies this is like accepting lightning as electrical discharge despite past ignorance; 

(4) that after-images are not spatial or colored like brain states—he argues we’re confusing the experience with the object; and 

(7) that sensations can be conceived without brain processes—he replies that conceivability does not prove separability. Overall, Smart insists that mental states are ultimately physical, and resisting this claim misrepresents the progress and power of scientific explanation.

Wolf and Scheffler on the meaning of life

Susan Wolf and Samuel Scheffler explore different dimensions of meaning—

Wolf focuses on what makes individual human lives meaningful, while Scheffler addresses the meaning of human life itself. 

Wolf defends the Fitting Fulfillment View (FFV), which holds that a meaningful life comes from loving and engaging with things that are objectively worthy of love—combining subjective passion with objective value. 

She critiques the Mere Fulfillment View (doing what you love) and the Be-a-Part-of-Something-Larger View, arguing that both fail without this crucial subjective-objective link. Examples like the Satisfied Sisyphus or a pot smoker show that fulfillment alone isn’t enough; meaningfulness depends on whether the things we love are actually worthwhile. 

Wolf acknowledges risks—poverty or social dysfunction may block access to meaningful engagement—and questions remain about whether objective values truly exist. Meanwhile, Scheffler explores how the continuation of humanity after our death gives life meaning, suggesting that many values and projects only matter if future generations exist to carry them on. Together, Wolf and Scheffler show that meaning in life involves both our personal investments and the broader context of human continuity and shared value.

Descartes the mind and body problem

The mind-body problem asks how mental states (like beliefs, desires, or sensations) relate to physical bodies. 

Something is material if it is spatial and subject to physical law. • Something is spiritual if (i) it is neither spatial nor subject to physical law and (ii) it has consciousness and intentionality. • Two things interact if they can causally influence each other.

Descartes argues that the mind and body are two different substances. He says that because we can clearly and distinctly imagine having a mind without a body, it must be possible for the mind to exist without the body. From this, he concludes that the mind is an immaterial, spiritual thing, completely separate from the material body.

René Descartes famously proposed interactionist substance dualism, claiming that the mind and body are two fundamentally different substances: 

the mind is spiritual (non-spatial and conscious), and the body is material (spatial and subject to physical law), yet they causally interact. 

This view faces a logical tension: if spirit and matter cannot interact, how can mind and body influence each other? Descartes solves this by rejecting that spirit and matter can’t interact, insisting their interaction is obvious from everyday experience (e.g., thoughts cause movements, pain causes feelings). 

His Conceivability Argument defends dualism by claiming that if we can clearly and distinctly conceive of the mind existing without the body, then it must be possible, and thus, the mind cannot be the body. 

(P1) I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my body existing (or without anything else material existing). (P2) What is clearly and distinctly conceivable is possible. (C1) It is possible for my mind to exist without my body existing (or without anything else material existing). (C2) My mind is not my body (or anything else material). (P3) My mind is a thing with consciousness and intentionality, not different in fundamental kind from other human minds. (C3) The human mind is a spiritual thing

While dualism maintains the distinctness and immateriality of the mind, it raises challenges about how non-spatial minds can affect physical brains—a question that continues to fuel debate between idealists and materialists, who argue the mind is ultimately physical.