Beauty and Metaphor: QUIZ 1

In what kinds of things can we discern beauty?

In concrete objects, abstract ideas, nature, art, animals, people, qualities, actions—almost every ontological category.

Why does beauty not function like a simple property such as shape or colour?

Because beauty appears across vastly different types of things, making it unlikely to be a single, uniform property detectable in the same way.

Why isn’t the comparison between beauty and the colour blue valid?

Because when we call songs, moods, or souls “blue,” we’re using a metaphor, not describing an actual shared property.

What is required for understanding metaphors like describing a mood or song as “blue”?

A leap of imagination—metaphors rely on associative, not literal, connections.

What do metaphors actually aim to convey?

Not a property, but an experience or impression suggested by the comparison.

What does the widespread use of metaphors reveal about human cognition?

We create connections not found in reality itself but generated by our associative powers.

Is the word “beautiful” typically used as a metaphor?

No. In its normal uses, “beautiful” is not a metaphor, even though it applies to many different categories of objects.

What puzzle arises from the fact that “beautiful” applies to so many kinds of things?

It raises the question of why we call things beautiful and what we mean by doing so.

What does the author ask about our use of the word “beautiful”?

What point we are making and what state of mind our judgement of beauty expresses.

What idea about beauty goes back to Plato and Plotinus and entered Christian thinking?

That beauty is an ultimate value pursued for its own sake, comparable to truth and goodness.

How is beauty traditionally grouped with truth and goodness?

Beauty, truth, and goodness are seen as a trio of ultimate values that justify rational inclinations.

What makes an ultimate value such as truth or goodness a “final answer”?

Because asking “Why believe what is true?” or “Why want what is good?” misunderstands reasoning—these values ground justification itself.

What question does the author raise about beauty as an ultimate value?

Whether “because it is beautiful” can function as a final, rationally immune justification like “because it is true” or “because it is good.”

Why might beauty not be a final justification in the way truth and goodness are?

Because beauty can conflict with truth and goodness, showing its “subversive” nature.

How can beauty threaten truth?

A myth’s beauty can tempt someone to believe it, making beauty “the enemy of truth.” (e.g., Pindar: beauty makes the incredible credible.)

How can beauty threaten goodness?

Attraction to a beautiful person may tempt someone to overlook their vices, making beauty “the enemy of goodness.” (e.g., Manon Lescaut.)

How do truth and goodness differ from beauty regarding conflict?

Truth and goodness are assumed never to conflict; beauty often does.

What is the “aesthetic way of life,” and how has it been criticized?

A life where beauty is supreme; criticized by thinkers from Kierkegaard to Wilde as being opposed to virtue.

How has beauty influenced religious belief, according to the passage?

People may be drawn to myths, rituals, and religious beliefs because they are beautiful or consoling, regardless of their truth.

Why have certain artists (Flaubert, Baudelaire, Wagner, Canova) been accused of immorality?

Because their works are thought to make morally questionable themes appear alluring through beauty.

What does the author say about beauty’s status as an ultimate value?

Its status is questionable, unlike the more secure status of truth and goodness.

Why is the idea of beauty as an ultimate value harder for modern thinkers to accept?

Because it relied on a theological framework that many no longer assume.

What assumption did earlier philosophers (like Plotinus) make about truth, beauty, and goodness?

That they are attributes of the deity—ways the divine unity reveals itself to the human soul.

What does the author propose to do regarding theological interpretations of beauty?

Set them aside and analyze beauty without relying on theological claims.

How did Christian philosophy, especially St. Thomas Aquinas, treat the relationship between truth, beauty, and goodness?

It integrated and elaborated this theological vision, making beauty an attribute of the divine alongside truth and goodness.

What does the author propose to do regarding theological interpretations of beauty?

Set them aside and analyze beauty without relying on theological claims.

What did Aquinas regard as “transcendentals”?

Truth, goodness, and unity—features of reality possessed by all things because they are aspects of being.

How did Aquinas implicitly treat beauty?

As a transcendental as well, suggesting beauty belongs to every category of being.

What did Aquinas believe about the relationship between beauty and goodness?

He viewed them as identical—different rational apprehensions of one positive reality.

What philosophical difficulty arises if beauty and goodness are identical?

It becomes hard to explain ugliness, or the existence of dangerous, corrupting, or immoral beauties.

Why do these difficulties matter for Aquinas’s view?

They challenge any philosophy that puts beauty on the same metaphysical level as truth and goodness, rooted in being itself.

What is the “natural response” to these difficulties?

To say beauty concerns appearance, not being, and studying beauty is about human sentiments rather than the structure of reality.

Transcendentals

refer to fundamental properties of being—Truth, Goodness, and Beauty—that go beyond the physical world

Why is it hard to define truth?

Defining truth creates a circular problem—you need to assume the difference between true and false definitions before you can define what truth is.

What are "logical platitudes" about truth?

Simple, basic principles about truth that seem obvious but serve as tests for any theory of truth.

Give an example of a logical platitude about truth.

If a sentence is true, then saying "that sentence is true" is also true (and vice versa).

What are three other platitudes about truth?

• One truth cannot contradict another truth

• When we make assertions, we claim they are true

• Something isn't true just because we say it is

What's the problem with many philosophical theories about truth?

They often sound deep and profound, but end up denying one of the basic, obvious principles (platitudes) about truth.

What lesson should we take from the philosophy of truth?

Instead of trying to define what truth deeply "is," we should focus on whether theories respect the simple, basic principles that we all recognize about truth.

comparable platitudes about beauty

• Beauty pleases us.

• One thing can be more beautiful than another.

• Beauty is always a reason for paying attention to the thing that has it.

• Beauty is the subject of a judgment called the "judgment of taste."

• I'm describing the object itself, not my own state of mind or feelings.

• You can't argue someone into finding something beautiful. I must experience and judge beauty for myself—I can't become an expert just by studying what others say.

What doubt might we have about the last platitude (that beauty judgments can't be secondhand)?

Someone might argue they trust a music critic's opinions like gospel—similar to trusting scientific experts or legal courts.

What does it mean when I trust a critic's judgment?

It means I'm deferring to their judgment, but I haven't made my own judgment yet.

What does my own judgment of beauty require?

My own judgment requires personal experience—I must actually experience the thing myself.

When does a borrowed opinion about beauty become MY judgment?

Only when I've experienced the thing myself (like hearing the music piece) in the moment of appreciation. Until then, it's just a borrowed opinion, not truly my judgment.

Which three platitudes about beauty also apply to things that are enjoyable?

• Enjoyable things please us

• Some things are more enjoyable than others

• You can't judge something enjoyable secondhand—you need your own experience

What's the best you can say about something others find enjoyable if you haven't experienced it yourself?

You can say it's "apparently enjoyable" or "seems to be enjoyable" since others find it so, but you can't sincerely judge it as enjoyable without your own experience.

What's the key difference between judging beauty vs. judging enjoyability?

When judging beauty, we're describing the object itself. When judging enjoyability, it's unclear if we're describing the object or describing people's reactions and character

Can we judge that it's right to enjoy some things and wrong to enjoy others?

Yes, we make these judgments all the time.

When we judge enjoyments as right or wrong, what are we focusing on?

We're focusing on the subject's state of mind (the person enjoying), not a quality in the object itself.

hat's different about beauty compared to enjoyability?

Beauty judgments focus on the object being judged, not on the person who judges it.

What distinctions do we make with beauty that we don't make with enjoyability?

We distinguish true beauty from fake beauty—from kitsch, schmaltz, and whimsy.

How do we treat beauty judgments differently than enjoyment?

We argue about beauty and try to educate our taste. We support beauty judgments with critical reasoning that focuses entirely on the object's character.

What paradox arises from the platitudes about beauty?

Beauty judgments are genuine judgments supported by reasons, BUT these reasons can never form a deductive argument (a logical proof).

Why can't reasons for beauty be deductive arguments?

If they could be, then there could be secondhand opinions about beauty—experts who never experienced the beautiful things, and rules for creating beauty that anyone could follow without having aesthetic taste.

Why does this paradox threaten aesthetics as a subject?

It combines seemingly obvious points that contradict each other: beauty requires reasoning about the object, yet also requires personal experience and can't be reduced to rules or formulas.

What does the second platitude remind us about beauty?

Things can be compared and ranked according to their beauty, and there's also minimal beauty—beauty in its lowest degree.

What's the difference between minimal beauty and "sacred" beauty?

Minimal beauty is everyday beauty (like setting a table or tidying a room). "Sacred" beauty refers to great works of art and nature that philosophers discuss.

Despite being minimal, why does everyday beauty still matter?

You still want things to "look right," and this matters in the same way beauty generally matters—not just by pleasing the eye, but by conveying meanings and values that are important to you and that you're consciously displaying.

What do minimal beauties express and confirm?

Our desire for harmony, fittingness, and civility.

How do we usually make judgments about beauty and goodness?

We tend to compare things and rank alternatives, usually to choose between them. We're not looking for absolute or ideal beauty.

What's more important than pursuing absolute beauty?

For most of us, it's more important to achieve order in our surroundings and ensure that our eyes, ears, and sense of fittingness are not repeatedly offended—getting things right rather than perfect.

Why can emphasizing "beauty" sometimes be self-defeating?

It implies we must always choose what is "most beautiful" in everything. This can lead to aiming for supreme beauty in all cases, which defeats the purpose.

In urban design, what should be the first goal?

To fit in, not to stand out. Only stand out if you're worthy of the attention you claim (like Longhena's church).

What would happen if we aimed for supreme beauty in every building?

We'd get aesthetic overload. The masterpieces jostling for attention side by side would lose their distinctiveness, and each one's beauty would be at war with the others.

What realm does the word "beautiful" belong to?

A more exalted realm—sufficiently apart from everyday concerns that we mention it with hesitation.

What matters more than the specific terms we use?

The delight itself matters more than the words used to express it. The terms are used more to suggest an effect than to pinpoint exact qualities.

What does a judgment of beauty require beyond stating a preference?

It demands an act of attention—an attempt to show what is right, fitting, worthwhile, attractive, or expressive in the object.

What's more important than the final verdict about beauty?

The attempt to identify the aspect of the thing that claims our attention.

Is it contradictory to call something ugly but still praise it aesthetically?

No. For example, Bartok's Miraculous Mandarin is harsh, rebarbative, even ugly, yet it's praised as a triumph of early modern music. Its aesthetic virtues are different from something like Fauré's Pavane, which aims only to be exquisitely beautiful.

What are the two concepts of beauty?

(1) Beauty as aesthetic success in general, and (2) Beauty as a specific kind of aesthetic success—pure, breathtaking beauty.

What does "sheer beauty" imply?

Beauty so pure that if we tried to analyze its effect on us, words would fail. We're content merely to bathe in its glow.

How does the interest in beauty differ from the interest in getting things done?

We appreciate beautiful things not just for their utility, but for what they are in themselves—or more precisely, for how they appear in themselves.

When do we begin to speak of a thing's beauty?

When our interest is entirely taken up by how it appears in our perception, independently of any use we might put it to.

What's the difference between fine arts and useful arts?

Useful arts (like architecture, carpet-weaving, carpentry) have a function and can be judged by how well they fulfill it. Fine arts are appreciated as ends in themselves, not as means to a goal.

Can something functional also be beautiful?

Yes, but being functional doesn't make it beautiful. When we call architecture a useful art, we're emphasizing the aspect that lies beyond utility—appreciating it as intrinsically meaningful, not just as a means to a goal.

What did Oscar Wilde mean by "All art is quite useless"?

Art's value resides in itself, not in its purpose. This doesn't mean art has no effects (his own Salomé had powerful effects), but that its value isn't in being useful.

Did other historical periods recognize the art/craft distinction we make today?

No. The Greek word "poetry" (poiesis) meant the skill of making things in general. Roman "artes" included every kind of practical endeavor.

What's a practical way to understand aesthetic appreciation without needing philosophical terms?

We understand when someone finds a work so appealing they could engage with it endlessly, with no purpose beyond the experience itself.

In the peach example, what's puzzling about Rachel's response?

She insists on "that particular peach" and no other will do, even though any ripe peach would serve the same practical purpose (eating).

What explains Rachel wanting that specific peach and no other?

The judgment of beauty: "I want that peach because it is so beautiful."

What's the difference between wanting something for its beauty vs. wanting to do something with it?

Wanting something for its beauty is wanting it—the thing itself—not wanting to use it or do something with it.

Can Rachel's desire for the beautiful peach be satisfied?

No. Even after obtaining it, holding it, turning it around, and studying it from every angle, she can't say "good, that's it, I'm satisfied." There's no point at which the desire is over and done with.

What's the difference between inspecting something and contemplating it?

Inspecting is searching for information or expressing appetite. Contemplating is something more—it's wanting the thing for its beauty.

What kind of want is wanting something for its beauty?

A want without a goal—a desire that cannot be fulfilled since there is nothing that would count as its fulfillment.

What does offering Rachel a substitute peach show?

A failure to understand her motive. She's interested in this particular fruit that she finds beautiful. No substitute can satisfy her interest because it's an interest in the individual thing, as the thing that it is.

When would another object satisfy Rachel's desire for the peach?

If she wanted it for a further purpose (to eat it or throw it). Then some other object might serve her purpose, because her desire would be for any member of a functionally equivalent class, not the individual peach.

What danger exists in taking the fine arts/useful arts distinction too seriously?

It might imply that we must completely discount utility when judging beauty—that we should focus only on pure form, detached from utility. But this ignores that knowledge of function is vital to experiencing form.

Why do we need to know what something is to judge its beauty?

Example: If someone hands you an unusual object, you can't judge its beauty until you know what it's supposed to do. A boot-pull might be beautiful as a boot-pull but shapeless and clumsy as a knife.

What was Louis Sullivan's slogan about beauty in architecture?

"Form follows function"—meaning we experience beauty when we see how a thing's function generates and is expressed in its observable features

What's the counterpoint to "form follows function"?

In beautiful architecture, function follows form. Beautiful buildings change their uses and survive; merely functional buildings get torn down.

Give an example of a building changing functions while remaining beautiful.

Sancta Sophia in Istanbul: built as a church, became a barracks, then a stable, then a mosque, then a museum. The lofts of Lower Manhattan changed from warehouses to apartments to shops and back—surviving because of their charm.