hard behaviourism

physicalism

everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (incl properties, events, objects and any substance that exists)

physical behaviourism

mental states are what we say and do

denies that there is anything beyond the behaviour of others needed to understand mental terms

statements about emotions, sensations, beliefs and desires are not hidden processes, but way of talking about physically observable behaviour

strength of physical behaviourism

no problem of qualia/ interaction

logical behaviourism

all statements about mental states can be analytically reduced without loss of meaning

analytically reduced

replace one concept with another without losing meaning

3 strengths of logical behaviourism

1. no longer need to appeal to something non-physical

2. no vague words. use behaviour to have clear meanings

3. no problem of interaction. no separate non-physical property

carl hempel

logical, analytical, hard behaviourism

(but sometimes logical = philosophical)

wants to eradicate ‘mental states talk’ eg the word angry and replace with descriptions of behaviour

5 ways to translate psychological states

1. bodily behaviour

2. linguistics

3. physical bodily states

4. physiological changes

5. brain processes

implications of translating psychological states

1. must be checked publicly

2. translated without losing meaning

3. no longer need mental concepts

4. no essence of mental states

5. mental states exist because behaviour exists

must be checked publicly

psychological states cannot be about private or inaccessible states of the person

only have meaning if we can check

means of checking must be public

translated without losing meaning

statement eg ‘Paul has a toothache’ can be translated into claims of bodily processes

we no longer need mental concepts

all psychological statements can be translated without changing the meaning of what is saud, into statements that only use physical concepts of this kind

there is no essence of mental states

no essence to mental states and events (eg consciousness or intentionality) that distinguishes them from what is physical

no genuine question of how mind and body relate to eachother or interact

mental states exist because behaviour exists

to say that someone is in pain isn’t to say that pain exists, just makes observations about behaviour

behaviourism on the mind

we dont have to infer someone has a mind from their behaviour

behaviour = mind

cr 1 - multiple realisability

bodily states can represent more than one mental state

the reduction cannot adequately account for range

so, mental states cannot be analytically reduced

cr 2 - circularity

mental states cannot be fully reduced w/o introducing more mental states

the reduction cannot be completed w/o mental states

but supposed to be ditching them!