soft behaviourism

Ryle on reduction

not possible to entirely reduce mental states to behaviour

disposition

liability or proneness to act in a certain way

eg “smoker” means would smoke, not ‘is smoking’

dispositional analysis

denies that mental states are anything more than a predictable way of acting

human dispositions are expressed in conditional (if-then) statements

we will never have a complete list of conditions relevant to the disposition

cr 1 - multiple realisability

if mental state = disposition, what behaviour is it a disposition towards?

same state expressed in diff. behaviours

reply to multiple realisability

on the whole, same state = same disposition

obj, focuses on individual pieces of behaviour, misunderstands Rylee

combination of factors eg linguistics and bodily processes > translation

cr 1 - circularity

cannot analyses behaviour w/o referring to other mental states

NOT specify disposition w/o beliefs, knowledge, desires etc

reply to circularity

mental concepts = infinitely heterogenous sets of dispositions so cannot be exhaustively characterised

and dispositions are ‘open’, no full analytical reduction

cr 2 - conceivability of mind w/o body

log. beh.: inconceivable for mind w/o body

a mind is not a thing (category error)

IF mind can exist w/o body, log. beh. = false

common thoughts (mind w/o body) God, soul etc

should be made coherent by analysis

reply to conceivability of mind w/o body

such beliefs (God, soul) NOT reflect actual everyday use of of concepts

beliefs of mind w/o body NOT everyday, but bc of theorising

no clear and distinct idea of ourselves as ‘minds’

cr 3 - self knowledge

asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others

behaviourism = false, bc fails to acount for self-knowledge

reply to self-knowledge

must reject self-knowledge to solve problem of other minds

infer dispositions from behaviour BUT, NOT infer mind

link between behaviour and mind NOT evidential, but logical

rebuild of self-knowledge

P1. dispositional analysis rules out asymmetry

P2. obvious from experience that there is

C1. so, logical behaviourism is false

reply to rebuild of self-knowledge

self-knowledge is a myth

self + others gained in the same way, paying attention

only difference is having more evidence about ourselves

cr 4 - conceivability of mental states w/o behaviour

mental states have ‘inner’ aspect, NOT behaviour

to be in pain = show ‘pain’ behaviour

but can have pain w/o behaviour (stoic) or vice versa (actor)

reply to conceivability of mental states w/o behvaiour

pain is NOT just showing behaviour

it is disposition to do behaviour

stoic can have certain dispositions, but actor NOT

rebuild of conceivability of mental states w/o behaviour

pain NOT disposition, but how it feels, ‘what it is like’

distinguishes stoic fro actor

counter intuitive: how pain feels = just disposition

Putnam: super-spartans (community, supress pain)

no disposition to demonstrate pain in behaviour

BUT still in pain, so pain NOT just dispositions