AQA A Level Philosophy - What is Knowledge?

Define acquaintance knowledge (3)

Knowledge of a person or place - e.g. "I know Fred well"

Define ability knowledge (3)

Knowledge of how to do things - e.g. "I know how to ride a bike"

Define propositional knowledge (3)

Knowledge that something is the case (factual statements, which can be expressed in language) - e.g. "I know that London is the capital of England"

Explain the distinction between acquaintance knowledge, ability knowledge and propositional knowledge (5)

1) Philosophers have traditionally divided knowledge into three main types:

2) - practical knowledge (knowing 'how') "I know how to ride a bike".

- knowledge by acquaintance (knowing 'of') e.g. "I know Fred well".

- propositional knowledge (knowing 'that') e.g. "I know that London is the capital of England".

3) Factual/propositional knowledge can always be expressed in language

(not necessarily the case for the other two types):

4) A proposition is a sentence that makes a claim about the world such as 'I am hungry' or 'There are four fish in the bowl'.

5) What is asserted by such sentences is called a proposition, and for this

reason factual knowledge is often called propositional knowledge.

Outline the nature of definition (including Linda Zagzebski) (5)

1) According to philosophers a correct definition of anything must be both necessary and sufficient. A necessary condition is an essential requirement. For example, it is necessary to be unmarried to be a bachelor. If Mr A is married then it is impossible for him to be a bachelor as he lacks this essential requirement.

2) However, if Ms B is unmarried this does not mean she is a bachelor. Though she meets one requirement she does not meet all of them. Though she is unmarried she is not male. When all conditions have been met for a definition we say that the definition is sufficient and nothing else is required. So, a necessary condition - something that is needed- and sufficient condition - something that is enough.

3) Defining knowledge would help us understand what it is. But there are different types of definition. Linda Zagzebski argues that these definitions

depend on the different natures of the concepts or objects involved. Some objects have what Locke called a real essence (a real, underlying

cause that makes a thing the way it is). For example, water has a real

essence, it is the way it is because of its chemical composition H2O.

4) If an object has a real essence, then it can have a real definition.

- In contrast, consider 'weeds'. There is no underlying cause that makes

weeds, weeds.

5) There is no genetic difference between weeds and non-weeds. The classification is culturally specific - a question of which

plants humans like in their gardens.

6) We can still give a definition for

the term 'weed', but it will not be a real definition, as weeds do not have a real essence.

Outline the nature of definition (including Linda Zagzebski) (12)

Defining knowledge would help us understand what it is. But there are

different types of definition. Linda Zagzebski argues that these definitions

depend on the different natures of the concepts or objects involved.

Some objects have what Locke called a real essence (a real, underlying

cause that makes a thing the way it is). For example, water has a real

essence, it is the way it is because of its chemical composition H2O. If an object has a real essence, then it can have a real definition.

In contrast, consider 'weeds'. There is no underlying cause that makes

weeds, weeds. There is no genetic difference between weeds and non-weeds. The classification is culturally specific - a question of which

plants humans like in their gardens. We can still give a definition for

the term 'weed', but it will not be a real definition, as weeds do not

have a real essence.

Zagzebski is sceptical about whether knowledge has a real essence.

The term has varied so much in its use historically, which suggests the

concept may be a socially constructed one. However, she recommends

we treat knowledge as if it does have a real essence, so should seek a real

definition. We should only give up if we are defeated in the project.

According to philosophers a correct definition of anything must be both necessary and sufficient. A necessary condition is an essential requirement. For example, it is necessary to be unmarried to be a bachelor. If Mr A is married then it is impossible for him to be a bachelor as he lacks this essential requirement. However, if Ms B is unmarried this does not mean she is a bachelor. Though she meets one requirement she does not meet all of them. Though she is unmarried she is not male. When all conditions have been met for a definition we say that the definition is sufficient and nothing else is required. Therefore, finding necessary and sufficient conditions is a method of creating definitions.

Outlin how propositional knowledge may be analysed/defined (5)

1) Some objects have what Locke called a real essence (a real, underlying cause that makes a thing the way it is). For example, water has a real essence, it is the way it is because of its chemical composition H2O.

2) If an object has a real essence, then it can have a real definition.

3) In contrast, consider 'weeds'. There is no underlying cause that makes

weeds, weeds. There is no genetic difference between weeds and non-weeds. The classification is culturally specific - a question of which plants humans like in their gardens.

4) We can still give a definition for the term 'weed', but it will not be a real definition, as weeds do not have a real essence.

5) Zagzebski is sceptical about whether knowledge has a real essence.

The term has varied so much in its use historically, however, she recommends we treat knowledge as if it does have a real essence. So, we should seek a real definition. We should only give up if we are defeated in the project.

Define the tripartite definition of knowledge (3)

For us to say that we know something:

1. It must be true.

2. We must actually believe it (it must be consciously held).

3. It must be justified ( there must be convincing reasons for it.)

Therefore, we may say that knowledge is 'justified true belief'

Propositional knowledge is defined as justified true belief: S knows that p if and only if:

1. S is justified in believing that p,

2. p is true and

3. S believes that p (individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions)

Outline Plato's tripartite view of knowledge (5)

For us to say that we know something:

1. It must be true.

What is false cannot be known. For example, to say "I know the queen wrote the Harry Potter books" is not knowledge at all since it is false.

2. We must actually believe it (it must be consciously held).

If something is knowledge, then that requires us to accept it in our minds. No one says "I know London is the capital of England, but I don't believe it."

3. It must be justified (there must be convincing reasons for it)

What counts as justification is not always clear. Is it undeniable proof or proof beyond reasonable doubt? Whatever it is, we need good reasons (grounds) for justification. We are justified in believing that the sun will rise tomorrow (beyond reasonable doubt) or that 2+2=4 (undeniable).

Therefore, we may say that knowledge is 'justified true belief'.

Outline Plato's tripartite view of knowledge (12)

For us to say that we know something it must be true as what is false cannot be known. For example, to say "I know the queen wrote the Harry Potter books" is not knowledge at all since it is false. Additionally, We must actually believe it (it must be consciously held).

If something is knowledge, then that requires us to accept it in our minds. No one says "I know London is the capital of England, but I don't believe it.".

It must also be justified (there must be convincing reasons for it)

What counts as justification is not always clear. Is it undeniable proof or proof beyond reasonable doubt? Whatever it is, we need good reasons (grounds) for justification. We are justified in believing that the sun will rise tomorrow (beyond reasonable doubt) or that 2+2=4 (undeniable). Therefore, we may say that knowledge is 'justified true belief'.

The tripartite definition aims to provide a complete analysis of the concept of propositional knowledge. Its three conditions, taken together, are intended to be 'equivalent' to knowledge. So if someone knows some proposition, they should fulfil exactly those three conditions. And if they fulfil those conditions, then they know the proposition. The conditions are 'necessary and sufficient conditions' for their knowledge that p (p stands for any proposition).

An example of the use of this definition of knowledge it: "The cat is on the mat". Justification -I see the cat on the mat with my eyes.

True- my sight corresponds to a real cat on a real mat

Believed - I am consciously thinking and accepting this statement.

If you have a justified true belief that p, then you know that p. (p here stands for any proposition).

Explain why the criteria for the tri-partite definition of knowledge may not be individually necessary (12 marks)

Justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge. A lucky belief can be true even with no justification. In Plato's example of the Road to Larissa he demonstrates it is quite possible to arrive at Larissa by guessing the right way even if you had no justification for that guess. The person guessing the way arrived at the correct town just as much as the person who had justification for which way to go. There seems to be no difference for the outcome for these two people. Similarly, I might guess correctly that when I flip a coin it will land head up without any justification. Therefore, we could claim that justification is not necessary for knowledge.

Therefore, if we can arrive at the truth without justification then we could question whether justification is necessary for knowledge.

Truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge. Truth is quite a challenging concept in metaphysics. Some (e.g. subjectivists) argue that it is impossible to know if anything at all is true or false, which makes it tricky. There may be clashes in perspectives on truth in cases such as the question of the existence of God. Arguably, this is more of a claim of belief than a claim of knowledge. Individuals may accept a fact as "truth", but it may then turn out that it is not. For example, at some point, many knew that the earth was flat; at that moment in time, this was accepted as knowledge.

Belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge. The weak objection is that sometimes it is possible to know something without believing it. Suppose John is sitting an exam, but he's very nervous and has no confidence in his answers. When answering 'Which philosopher wrote the Meditations?', he writes 'Descartes'. He's right, and the answer isn't a lucky guess - he has remembered what he learned. So, it is plausible to say that John knows the answer but because he's unconfident, we should say that John doesn't believe that the answer is Descartes. So he knows the answer without believing it. A strong objection is that knowledge is not a form of belief, but an entirely different mental state. Either you believe something or you know it. You don't know something by believing it. You can only know that p if p is true. Belief, by contrast, is a mental state that can be true or false - eg belief in the proposition that Father Christmas exists. Knowledge is fact, belief is not.

What is the tripartite definition of knowledge and explain how one of Gettier's examples can be used to criticise it [1] (12 marks)

Gettier describes situations where all the traditional conditions for knowledge were fulfilled - and yet you could not say that it was sufficient for knowledge.

For instance, take the following situation: Smith and Jones are applying for the same job. Smith has excellent reason to believe that Jones will get the job, e.g. Smith has been told this by the employer.

Smith also has excellent reason to believe that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, e.g. Smith has just counted them. Therefore, both of these beliefs are justified. Smith then puts the two beliefs together and deduces that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

This belief is justified, because it is inferred deductively from justified beliefs. It turns out that Jones doesn't get the job, Smith does. It also so happens that, unknown to him, Smith also has ten coins in his pocket. Therefore, Smith's belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is justified and true. However, it does not amount to knowledge.

Smith's belief is both true and justified, but we shouldn't say that Smith knows that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith inferred his belief from a false belief, namely that Jones would get the job. So the reason Smith has for his belief is false.

What makes his belief true (Smith, who has ten coins in his pocked, gets the job) has come apart from what justifies his belief (his justified belief that Jones, who has ten coins in his pocket, will get the job). There is no connection between what justifies his belief and his belief's being true. So, justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. That means it is not the same as knowledge. If knowledge isn't justified true belief in these cases, then knowledge is never justified true belief.

What is the tripartite definition of knowledge and explain how one of Gettier's examples can be used to criticise it [2] (12 marks)

Gettier describes situations where all the traditional conditions for knowledge were fulfilled - and yet you could not say that it was sufficient for knowledge.

For instance: Smith has strong justification to believe that his friend, Jones owns a Ford. He has always owned a Ford and Smith has just seen Jones driving a Ford. Smith also knows someone named Brown, but he has no idea where Brown is. From this he forms several disjunctions, one of which is "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona". Despite his evidence, Smith is wrong, and it turns out that Jones does not own a Ford (he sold it and has just been borrowing someone else's Ford). However, by sheer coincidence Brown is in Barcelona. (Disjunction: contrasting alternative states of affairs.) Therefore, Smith's belief that "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona" is justified and true. However, it does not amount to knowledge.

He believed he had justification for claiming that Jones had a Ford but this was false. He had no justification for claiming that Brown was in Barcelona but this was true by coincidence/luck. It was only because he framed the two propositions in a lucky disjunction that justification, truth and belief are all present. He had made lots of other disjunctions which were false, eg "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston". The truth of the statement that Brown is in Barcelona is in no way connected with the justified belief that Jones own a Ford.

So justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. That means it is not the same as knowledge. If knowledge isn't justified true belief in these cases, then knowledge is never justified true belief.

Other examples of justified true belief without knowledge became known as 'Gettier cases'. They all describe situations in which we have justified true belief, but not knowledge, by demonstrating how the justified belief is only accidentally true.

Explain the response to the Gettier cases to strengthen the justification condition (5)

1) Infallibilism (Knowledge = J+T+B+ Certainty).

2) The tripartite definition of knowledge does not tell us what it is for a belief to be justified. Gettier has assumed that Smith's beliefs - that Jones will get the job and that he has ten coins in his pocket - are justified. But we can challenge Gettier's assumption.

3) Perhaps Smith's initial beliefs are not justified enough to count as knowledge. Smith has excellent reasons for both his beliefs about Jones getting the job and having ten coins in his pocket.

4) But infallibilism argues that knowledge is certain. Only certainty can provide the degree of justification needed to turn true belief into knowledge. In Gettier cases our beliefs are not sufficiently justified to count as knowledge.

5) Infallibilism is the theory that we should only count as knowledge those things which we cannot logically doubt. Under this theory, only justified true beliefs which were also certain would count as knowledge.

Explain the response to the Gettier cases to add a 'no false lemmas' condition (5)

1) A lemma is a term used in logic but generally it means a belief or assumption that is held to be true and is used to justify a piece of knowledge.

2) This is response suggests that Gettier's own example of JTB should not be considered valid because it relies upon a false belief (a false lemma).

3) In Gettier's example of Smith, Jones and the job, Smith's belief that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job was based on the false belief that jones would get the job.

4) Smith's reasoning might have gone like this;

a.) I believe that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket (having seen them)

b.) I believe that Jones will get the job (having been told)

c.) I believe that the person who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket

5)However, b.) is a false lemma. Gettier's examples both involve a use of a false lemma in the believer's reasoning. This theory claims that knowledge is a justified true belief only where the justification is not based on a false assumption. To put it more formally it claims that:

Knowledge = J+T+B+N (where N= No false lemma)

Explain the response to the Gettier cases to replace 'Justified' with 'Reliably Formed' and the issue of fake barn county (5)

1) (Knowledge = R+T+B) Reliabilism claims that you know that p if

1 p is true;

2 you believe that p;

3 your belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process.

2) A reliable cognitive process is just one that produces a high percentage of true beliefs. Examples include perception, memory and testimony. True beliefs caused by such processes count as knowledge.

3) However, reliabilism fails to be a definition of propositional knowledge, due to the following scenario:

Henry is driving through the countryside. He doesn't know it, but in this part of the country there are lots of fake barns, just barn facades. As he drives along, Henry often thinks 'There's a barn', or 'Hey, there's another barn'. These beliefs don't count as knowledge because they are false. But just once, Henry thinks 'There's a barn' when he is looking at the one and only real barn in the area.

4) This belief is not knowledge, because it is only a matter of luck that Henry's belief is true in this one instance. But simple reliabilism has to say that Henry does know. His belief is caused by a very reliable process, namely vision, and it is caused by precisely what makes it true.

5) The problem is that in Barn County, this reliable process has produced a true belief in circumstances in which the belief still seems only accidentally true.

Outline what is meant by a virtue in the context of virtue epistemology (3)

The idea of a 'virtue' in this context relates to intellectual virtue. An intellectual virtue can be understood as a particular intellectual skill or ability or trait that contributes to getting to the truth. Supporters of virtue epistemology focus on the virtues of cognitive faculties, such as accuracy of perceptual organs, reliability of memory, and rationality of thought processes.

Explain the response to the Gettier cases to replace 'justified' with an account of epistemic virtue (5)

1) Knowledge = V+T+B. Virtue epistemology claims that you know that p if

1 p is true;

2 you believe that p;

3 your true belief is a result of you exercising your intellectual virtues.

2) The fact that you have true belief represents a 'cognitive achievement' of yours for which you deserve 'credit'. You have the true belief' owing to your own abilities, efforts, and actions, rather than owing to blind chance, or something else.

3) Suppose an archer shoots an arrow at a target. We can assess the shot in three ways: accuracy: did the arrow hit the target? Adroitness: was the arrow shot well? Was the shot competent? Aptness: did the arrow hit the target because it was shot well?

4) This can be applied to a belief: Accuracy: is the belief true? Adroitness: is the way that the person formed the belief an exercise of their intellectual virtues? Aptness: is the belief true because the person used their intellectual virtues in forming it?

5) According to Sosa, knowledge is apt belief - belief that is true because it is formed by an exercise of intellectual virtue. This is more than being both true and the result of virtuous intellectual activity. The virtuous intellectual activity explains why the person holds a true belief.

Zagzebski's Pitfalls to Avoid in Defining

Circular

A definition that includes the term being defined, such as saying that "'Justice' is when 'Just' acts occur"

Obscure

Giving a definition that is more vague than the original term being defined

Negative

Describing a term by what it is not, ie "A good act is one that is not bad"

Ad hoc

Giving a definition that is only usable for a specific problem, ie defining knowledge as JTB that is not a Gettier counterexample