#12 is the spread of nuclear weapons good or bad?

waltz is..

a nuclear optimist

sagan is..

a nuclear pessimist

waltz argues that

nukes reduce intensity and frequency of wars by deterring big wars (slow proliferation is good)

waltz con: proliferation can cause preventative/preemptive wars

early on, others know you have no nukes so they might attack, but later uncertainty about whether you already have them makes attacking too risky

waltz con: new nuke states have less stable polities and so loose nukes could result

unstable govs can’t build nukes, and while somewhat unstable ones might, nuclear weapons are useless in civil conflict and unlikely to trigger interstate war even if used.

• REALITY: new nuclear states have less stable polities and so loose nukes could result

waltz con: more nuclear states means more risk of escalation and catastrophe

if a nuke is used, all sides will rush to stop the conflict, making further use and any large exchange very unlikely.

waltz on nukes and war

• threaten a nuclear state’s vital interests, devastating retaliation is possible

• if you threaten a nuclear state’s non-vital interests, devastating relationation is not credible

waltz con: some interests are of uncertain vitality

• mainly applies to superpowers, whose far-flung, shaky interests made them constantly anxious about maintaining credibility through extended deterrence

• new nuclear states have simpler vital interests (regime survival and ungoverned territory)

• REALITY: not really..

waltz on nukes and security

• if you have nukes, you don’t need to conquer strategic territory and eliminate enemies

• securing your own homeland is more important to you than an attacker

waltz con: nukes create first-strike incentives

nuclear survivability is easy, while attackers can’t ensure a perfect first strike because even a small surviving force makes retaliation too costly.

• REALITY: survivability wasn’t easy even for USSR, but that didn’t lead to war

waltz on nukes and simplicity

because threat of devastating retaliation, no point in arms race

waltz con: the dilemma of what to do if deterrence failts

the problem isn’t the defender’s dilemma but the attacker’s risk, since they can never be sure the defender won’t retaliate, and that uncertainty makes credibility easy to achieve.

• REALITY: attempt to escape dilemma led to massive arms race

waltz con: newly nuclear states could behave radically

future nuclear rivalries won’t be more extreme than the cold war, leaders remain cautious, and reckless behavior risks being checked or removed.

• reality: ussr and china were very radical.

waltz con: new states could use nukes for blackmail or offensive gains

offensive nuclear threats are ineffective, since vital interests can’t be taken without risking devastating retaliation, and gains or blackmail apply only to non-vital interests, making threats not credible.

• reality: north korea and pakistan do it

sagan’s argument (simplified)

states aren’t perfectly rational; bureaucracies (especially militaries) can undermine deterrence, and new nuclear states are often less able to control their armed forces

sagan’s 3 requirements for rational deterrence to work

• no preventive war to stop proliferation

• survivability of second-strike forces

• prevention of accidents or unauthorized use

sagan thinks military is biased to

preventative war; winning war and not dealing with aftermath

waltz in short

• if states are close enough to being unitary, rational, well-informed, risk-averse actors

• then spread of nukes is met with caution and fewer, smaller wars

sagan in short

• if deviations from unitary, rational, well-informed risk-averse are big enough

• then spread of nukes just means more errors and risk of catastrophe