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forecasting proliferation
countries have used military force + global sanctions + international institutions to counter proliferation
supply/demand arguments
supply: without supply of knowledge and parts, demand won’t matter so focus on supply
demand: lots of states can build if desperate enough
security logic/dilemma
in anarchy, states must provide for their security via internal balancing (build up military capacities) or external balancing (create alliances)
nuclear security logic
nuclear weapons enhance your security
if facing powerful threat, seek nuke; if not, don’t
nuclear security case - soviet union
no allies, scared of us, get nuke
nuclear security case - iraq
surrounded by threats, no ally, external constraints so no nuke
nuclear security case - uk
threat by soviets, weak ally, so nukes
political economy model
leaders’ political & economic choices affect proliferation, with liberal international policies discouraging it and inward-focused ones promoting
internationalizing regimes
less likely to pursue nukes bc they endanger internationalization (export-led growth)
inward-looking regimes
likely to pursue nukes because favor state enterprise & military-industrial complex (import-led growth), also grants legitmacy
norms model
nukes seen seen as immoral, leading to (NPT) where states agreed not to build nukes in exchange for civilian support
strengthen norms that tie national identity/legitimacy to nonprolif
if norms model is right
nuke zero is possible if norms against possession get stronger
if security model is right
us can’t go nuclear zero, must keep nukes and use first-use doctrine