Exclusionary Rule in Interrogation

What is the purpose of the Exclusionary Rule and when does it apply in interrogation cases?

The exclusionary rule is a remedy for a constitutional violation.
If the police obtain evidence through a violation of the Constitution, that evidence may be suppressed.

• It applies to interrogation violations under:
  ✔ Due Process (voluntariness)
  ✔ Sixth Amendment (Massiah violations)
  ✔ Miranda (5A prophylactic rule)

• SCOTUS treats the exclusionary rule as a compromise between Due Process and Crime Control:

  • Doesn’t want broad suppression that hampers investigations.

  • Uses limiting doctrines (e.g., good-faith, police culpability, Hudson) to narrow exclusion.

What would a “broad” exclusionary rule look like, and why does the Court reject it?

A broad ER would exclude all evidence that the government obtained because of an unconstitutional act — classic “but-for” causation.

SCOTUS rejects this:

• Would be a massive Due Process victory.

• Court emphasizes deterrence, not strict restoration of rights.

• Prefers a narrow remedy that excludes only where benefits outweigh societal costs.

Do defendants need to establish standing to suppress confession evidence?

No.
Standing is essentially automatic in confession cases because:

• A confession obtained from Defendant A is admissible only against A.

• Defendant B cannot be harmed by A’s confession due to the Confrontation Clause.

• Thus, standing is not a meaningful barrier in 5A, 6A, or DP interrogation claims.

What are the three types of interrogation violations relevant to Fruit of the Poisonous Tree (FOTPT)?

1. Due Process (DP) involuntary confession

2. Sixth Amendment Massiah violation

3. Miranda violation (prophylactic, judge-made rule)

Each category has different FOTPT consequences.

How does FOTPT apply to involuntary (DP) confessions?

• This is a true constitutional violation.

• FOTPT applies fully, just like in 4A.

• A coerced confession is inadmissible for ANY purpose:

  • ❌ No use in the case-in-chief

  • ❌ No impeachment

  • ❌ Fruits must be suppressed (no exceptions other than standard 4A exceptions)

Why?
Two-layer violation:

1. Involuntary confession

2. Use at trial
   This violates fundamental fairness.

How does FOTPT apply to Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel violations (Massiah)?

• Consensus: FOTPT applies to the same extent as 4A (attenuation, independent source, inevitable discovery).

• Example: Brewer (Christian Burial Speech)

  • 6A violated when officers deliberately elicited info after charging.

  • Court created inevitable discovery in this context → confirms FOTPT applies.

Exam note:
Even though some modern opinions hint that Massiah might be “judge-made,” assume full FOTPT applies for Massiah violations.

Does FOTPT apply to Miranda violations?

Generally no — because the Court treats Miranda violations as prophylactic, not constitutional.

Key points:

• SCOTUS continues to call Miranda a judge-made rule, even after Dickerson.

• Therefore, the typical Miranda suppression rule is:

  • Suppress the statement only.

  • NOT its fruits.

• This is why cases like Quarles, Elstad, Patane, and Seibert exist—exceptions and limitations.

What did Dickerson do to the status of Miranda, and why does this matter for FOTPT?

• Dickerson held Miranda is constitutional because it applies to the states.

• BUT the Court also reaffirmed all prior cases treating Miranda as judge-made:

  • Quarles (public safety)

  • Elstad (two-step confessions allowed)

  • Patane (physical fruits allowed)

• Result:

  • Miranda is “constitutional” in name but operates like a judge-made rule.

  • Therefore, FOTPT does NOT apply to Miranda violations.

What common question did Patane and Seibert address regarding fruits of Miranda violations?

Both asked whether evidence obtained after a Miranda violation must be suppressed as fruit.

Common facts across both:

1. Suspect was in custody

2. No proper Miranda warnings

3. Court examined whether fruits of the unwarned statements had to be suppressed

Their holdings:

• Patane: Physical fruits are admissible

• Seibert: Confession fruits may be suppressed if police used a deliberate two-step strategy

Together they confirm:
👉 FOTPT generally does not apply to Miranda violations, except when police deliberately manipulate Miranda to evade it.

What rule did Oregon v. Elstad (1985) establish for fruits of a Miranda violation?

An unwarned (but voluntary) statement does NOT taint a later warned statement.

• Miranda violations do not trigger Fruit of the Poisonous Tree.

• A later, properly Mirandized confession is admissible, even if it resulted from a prior unwarned admission.

• Rationale: Miranda is a prophylactic, not constitutional, rule.

Exam Trigger:
“Cat out of the bag” argument → Rejected under Elstad.

Takeaway:
👉 Miranda violations do NOT create FOTPT, unless something more (coercion) is present.

What did United States v. Patane (2004) hold about physical fruits of an unwarned statement?

Physical evidence obtained as a result of Miranda violations is admissible.

Reasoning across multiple opinions:

• Plurality (Thomas):

  • No actual Miranda violation until the statement is introduced at trial.

  • 5A protects only testimonial evidence, not physical fruits.

• Kennedy/O’Connor concurrence:

  • Even assuming a Miranda violation, FOTPT does not apply because Miranda is prophylactic.

Takeaway:
👉 Miranda protects against compelled testimonial self-incrimination — not physical evidence.
👉 Physical items discovered from unwarned statements are not suppressed.

When must you suppress physical evidence discovered after an unwarned statement?

Only if there is actual coercion (Due Process voluntariness problem).
Mere failure to warn → Gun/weapon/drugs admissible.

What issue did Missouri v. Seibert (2004) address?

Deliberate two-step interrogation technique:

1. Question → get confession without Miranda

2. Give Miranda warnings

3. Immediately re-elicit the same confession

This is used to circumvent Miranda and render warnings ineffective.

What is the Seibert plurality’s rule on two-step interrogations?

A post-warning confession is inadmissible when the midstream Miranda warning is ineffective.

Plurality focuses on objective factors showing warnings are meaningless:

1. Completeness/detail of first unwarned statement

2. Overlap of the two interrogations

3. Proximity in time and place

4. Continuity of personnel

5. Whether the second interrogation treated the first confession as a given

Takeaway:
👉 Warnings must be meaningful.
👉 If the second interrogation is basically a continuation, suppression required.

What test did Justice Kennedy introduce, which controls under Marks?

Kennedy’s test controls because it is the narrowest grounds.

Rule:
If officers deliberately employ a two-step strategy to undermine Miranda,
→ Post-warning statements must be suppressed, unless curative measures are taken.

Curative measures may include:

• Significant break in time/place

• Explicit warning that the first statement is inadmissible

• Allowing the suspect to “reset” before the second interrogation

Takeaway:
👉 Deliberate two-step = inadmissible.
👉 Accidental two-step = governed by Elstad.

How do courts decide whether to apply Elstad or Seibert?

• If the first unwarned statement was good faith/accidental → Elstad applies → second confession admissible.

• If the first unwarned statement was deliberately used as strategy → Seibert applies → second confession suppressed unless cured.

Takeaway:
👉 Ask: Was this deliberate?
That answer chooses which case controls.

Can an involuntary (Due Process–violative) statement ever be used for impeachment?

NO.
A DP-involuntary statement is inadmissible for ANY purpose, including impeachment.

Rule:

• DP involuntariness = true constitutional violation.

• Reliability concerns are paramount → cannot be used at all.

Takeaway:
👉 Involuntary = absolute bar.
No impeachment.

Can statements obtained in violation of the 6A Massiah rule be used for impeachment?

YES.
Under Kansas v. Ventris (2009), statements obtained via a 6A Massiah violation may be used to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony.

Reasoning:

• The 6A violation occurs when the statement is elicited, not when used.

• Use on cross does not “add to” the violation.

• Deterrence is mostly achieved by excluding it from case-in-chief.

Takeaway:
👉 6A Massiah statements = EXCLUDED in case-in-chief but ALLOWED for impeachment.

Are statements obtained in violation of Miranda admissible for impeachment?

YES — if voluntary.

Cases:

• Harris v. NY (1971): unwarned but voluntary statements → impeach.

• Oregon v. Hass (1975): even post-invocation (Edwards violation) → impeach.

Limits:

• Statement must still be voluntary.

• Cannot impeach with defendant’s post-Miranda silence (Doyle rule).

Takeaway:
👉 Miranda violation + voluntary statement = impeachment OK.
👉 Miranda silence = cannot impeach (Doyle).

Can the prosecution impeach a defendant with his silence after receiving Miranda warnings?

NO.
Under Doyle v. Ohio (1976), post-Miranda silence cannot be used for impeachment.

Reason:
Miranda warnings carry an “implicit assurance” that silence will not be used against the suspect.

Exceptions:

• Pre-custody silence → impeachable.

• Custody but no Miranda given → impeachable.

• Post-Miranda silence → NOT impeachable.

Takeaway:
👉 Doyle is absolute: post-Miranda silence = off limits.

Can the prosecution use illegally seized 4A evidence to impeach?

YES.
Walder (1954): Defendant who “opens the door” by falsely claiming purity/innocence may be impeached with suppressed evidence.

Rationale:

• Defendant has no “license to commit perjury.”

• 4A exclusion does not protect false testimony.

Takeaway:
👉 4A-suppressed evidence = NOT admissible in case-in-chief, but IS admissible to impeach if defendant lies.

Can a defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing be used against them at trial?

NO — in general.
Under Simmons v. United States, testimony given to establish standing at a suppression hearing cannot be used at trial on the issue of guilt.

Caveat:
SCOTUS has hinted (not held) that inconsistencies may potentially be used for impeachment, but this is unresolved.

Takeaway:
👉 Suppression-hearing testimony is protected — but not 100% clearly when used for impeachment.

Which interrogation-related violations allow impeachment use?

Rule Violated	Can Prosecution Use for Impeachment?	Why
DP involuntariness	❌ NO	Reliability + true constitutional violation
6A Massiah	✔ YES	Ventris → violation complete at elicitation
Miranda warning violation	✔ YES (if voluntary)	Harris / Hass
Post-Miranda silence	❌ NO	Doyle implicit assurance
4A violation	✔ YES (if D lies)	Walder rule
Simmons testimony	✔/❌ (uncertain)	Generally protected but unresolved