Conventions

Constitutional conventions

Rules of constitutional practice binding in operation but not in law

Cabinet Manual (2011)

Guide to laws, conventions and rules on operation of government

Nature of conventions

Not legally enforceable but politically binding

Function of conventions

Fill gaps in uncodified constitution and guide political behaviour

Development of conventions

Evolve over time based on accepted political practice

Moral obligation

Actors follow conventions due to constitutional expectations, not law

Flexibility of conventions

Can adapt as political standards change

Role in government

Define operation of Cabinet and ministerial behaviour

Role in institutions

Regulate relations between legislature, executive and judiciary

Lords–Commons convention

House of Lords should defer to House of Commons

Salisbury-Addison convention

Lords should not block manifesto Bills at second reading

Financial Bills convention

Introduced only in House of Commons by ministers

Sewel Convention

Westminster will not normally legislate on devolved matters without consent

War powers convention

Commons should be consulted before major military action

Monarch–Executive convention

Monarch acts on advice of ministers

Royal Assent convention

Monarch does not refuse assent to Bills

PM appointment convention

Leader able to command Commons confidence becomes PM

Cabinet appointment

Prime Minister selects ministers

PM & Chancellor convention

Should sit in House of Commons

Vote of no confidence

Government resigns and triggers general election

Monarch consent convention

Consent required for legislation affecting monarchy

Ministerial responsibility

Two conventions governing minister conduct (CMR + IMR)

Collective ministerial responsibility (CMR)

Ministers act as unified body

CMR confidentiality

Cabinet discussions remain secret

CMR unanimity

Ministers must publicly support agreed policy

CMR resignation

Ministers resign if unable to support policy

CMR purpose

Maintain confidence of Parliament

Loss of confidence

Government must resign after vote of no confidence

Individual ministerial responsibility (IMR)

Ministers accountable for their department

IMR traditional rule

Minister resigns for departmental failures

Modern IMR approach

Depends on personal involvement and responsibility

Maxwell-Fyfe guidelines

Distinguish policy(gov decisions/strategy) vs operational failures(regular day to day admin)

Policy failure

Minister responsible → resignation expected

Operational failure

Civil servants responsible → less likely resignation

Ministerial Code

Written standards of conduct for ministers (not law)

Nature of Code

Soft law, not legally enforceable

Content of Code

Based on seven principles of public life

Seven principles

Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty, Leadership

Enforcement of Code

Prime Minister decides consequences

Judicial conventions

Protect independence and neutrality of judiciary

Judicial neutrality

Judges must not be politically active

Parliamentary restraint

Parliament should not criticise judicial conduct

Executive criticism risk

May undermine separation of powers and rule of law

Conventions vs law

Conventions are not legally enforceable

Conflict rule

Law prevails over convention

Court role

Courts recognise but do not enforce conventions

Political consequences

Breach leads to political, not legal, consequences

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU

Courts confirmed Sewel Convention not legally enforceable

Effect of statutory reference to convention

Acknowledges but does not give legal force

Purpose of conventions

Support operation of constitution where law is silent

Key principle

Conventions guide behaviour but cannot be enforced in courts