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A landlord leased an apartment to a tenant by written lease for two years ending on the last day of a recent month. The lease provided for $700 in monthly rent. The tenant occupied the apartment and paid the rent for the first 15 months of the lease term, until he moved to another city to take a new job.
Without consulting the landlord, the tenant moved a friend into the apartment and signed an informal writing transferring to the friend his “lease rights” for the remaining nine months of the lease. The friend made the next four monthly $700 rent payments to the landlord. For the final five months of the lease term, no rent was paid by anyone, and the friend moved out with three months left of the lease term. The landlord was on an extended trip abroad, and did not learn of the default and the vacancy until the end of the lease term. The landlord has sued the tenant and the friend, jointly and severally, for $3,500 for the last five months’ rent.
What is the likely outcome of the lawsuit?
(A) Both the tenant and the friend are liable for the full $3,500, because the tenant is liable on privity of contract and the
friend is liable on privity of estate as assignee.
(B) The friend is liable for $1,400 on privity of estate, which lasted only until he vacated, and the tenant is liable for
$2,100 on privity of contract and estate for the period after the friend vacated.
(C) The friend is liable for $3,500 on privity of estate, and the tenant is not liable, because the landlord’s failure to object
to the friend’s payment of rent relieved the tenant of liability.
(D) The tenant is liable for $3,500 on privity of contract, and the friend is not liable, because a sublessee does not have
personal liability to the original landlord.
(A) Both the tenant and the friend are liable for the full $3,500, because the tenant is liable on privity of contract and the
friend is liable on privity of estate as assignee.
A landowner executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey his land to a friend. The landowner handed the instrument to the friend, saying, “This is yours, but please do not record it until after I am dead. Otherwise, it will cause me no end of trouble with my relatives.” Two days later, the landowner asked the friend to return the deed to him because he had decided that he should devise the land to the friend by will rather than by deed. The friend said that he would destroy the deed and a day or so later falsely told the landowner that the deed had been destroyed. Six months ago, the landowner, who had never executed a will, died intestate, survived by a daughter as his sole heir. The day after the landowner’s death, the friend recorded the deed from him. As soon as the daughter discovered this recording and the friend’s claim to the land, she brought an appropriate action against the friend to quiet title to the land.
For whom should the court hold?
(A) The daughter, because the death of the landowner deprived the subsequent recording of any effect.
(B) The daughter, because the friend was dishonest in reporting that he had destroyed the deed.
(C) The friend, because the deed was delivered to him.
(D) The friend, because the deed was recorded by him.
(C) The friend, because the deed was delivered to him.
A landowner conveyed his land by quitclaim deed to his daughter and son “as joint tenants in fee simple.” The language of the deed was sufficient to create a common law joint tenancy with right of survivorship, which is unmodified by statute.
The daughter then duly executed a will devising her interest in the land to a friend. Then the son duly executed a will devising his interest in the land to a cousin. The son died, and later the daughter died. Neither had ever married. The daughter’s friend and the cousin survived.
After both wills have been duly probated, who owns what interest in the land?
(A) The cousin owns the fee simple.
(B) The daughter’s friend and the cousin own equal shares as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
(C) The daughter’s friend and the cousin own equal shares as tenants in common.
(D) The daughter’s friend owns the fee simple.
(D) The daughter’s friend owns the fee simple.
A grantor executed an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed purporting to convey a tract of land to his church.
The granting clause of the instrument ran to the church “and its successors forever, so long as the premises are used for church purposes.” The church took possession of the land and used it as its site of worship for many years. Subsequently, the church decided to relocate and entered into a valid written contract to sell the land to a buyer for a substantial price.
The buyer wanted to use the land as a site for business activities and objected to the church’s title. The contract contained no provision relating to the quality of title the church was bound to convey. There is no applicable statute. When the buyer refused to close, the church sued the buyer for specific performance and properly joined the grantor as a party.
Is the church likely to prevail?
(A) No, because the grantor’s interest prevents the church’s title from being marketable.
(B) No, because the quoted provision is a valid restrictive covenant.
(C) Yes, because a charitable trust to support religion will attach to the proceeds of the sale.
(D) Yes, because the grantor cannot derogate from his warranty to the church.
(A) No, because the grantor’s interest prevents the church’s title from being marketable.
A creditor received a valid judgment against a debtor and promptly filed the judgment in the county. Two years later, the debtor purchased land in the county and promptly recorded the warranty deed to the land. Subsequently, the debtor borrowed $30,000 from his aunt, signed a promissory note for that amount, and secured the note with a mortgage on the land. The mortgage was promptly recorded. The aunt failed to make a title search before making the loan.
The debtor made no payment to the creditor and defaulted on the mortgage loan from his aunt. A valid judicial foreclosure proceeding was held, in which the creditor, the aunt, and the debtor were named parties. A dispute arose as to which lien had priority. A statute of the jurisdiction provides: “Any judgment properly filed shall, for 10 years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered.” A second statute of the jurisdiction provides: “No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first record.”
Who has the prior lien?
(A) The aunt, because a judgment lien is subordinate to a mortgage lien.
(B) The aunt, because she is a mortgagee under a purchase-money mortgage.
(C) The creditor, because its judgment was filed first.
(D) The creditor, because the aunt had a duty to make a title search of the property.
(C) The creditor, because its judgment was filed first.
An investor purchased a tract of commercial land, financing a large part of the purchase price with a loan from a business partner that was secured by a mortgage. The investor made the installment payments on the mortgage regularly for several years. Then the investor persuaded a neighbor to buy the land, subject to the mortgage to his partner. They expressly agreed that the neighbor would not assume and agree to pay the investor’s debt to the partner. The investor’s mortgage to the partner contained a due-on-sale clause stating, “If Mortgagor transfers his or her interest without the written consent of Mortgagee first obtained, then at Mortgagee’s option the entire principal balance of the debt secured by this Mortgage shall become immediately due and payable.” However, without seeking his partner’s consent, the investor conveyed the land to the neighbor, the deed stating that it was “subject to a mortgage to [the partner]” and giving details and recording data related to the mortgage. The neighbor took possession of the land and made several mortgage payments, which the partner accepted. Now, however, neither the neighbor nor the investor has made the last three mortgage payments. The partner has sued the neighbor for the amount of the delinquent payments.
In this action, for whom should the court render judgment?
(A) The neighbor, because she did not assume and agree to pay the investor’s mortgage debt.
(B) The neighbor, because she is not in privity of estate with the partner.
(C) The partner, because the investor’s deed to the neighbor violated the due-on-sale clause.
(D) The partner, because the neighbor is in privity of estate with the partner.
(A) The neighbor, because she did not assume and agree to pay the investor’s mortgage debt.
A seller and a purchaser signed a contract for the sale of a 60-year-old house. The contract required a warranty deed to be given at closing. The contract was silent regarding the condition of the house, and the purchaser did not ask. The purchaser received a warranty deed with all covenants of title at the closing and promptly recorded the deed. Approximately one month after the closing, the furnace in the house stopped working, the basement flooded, and the roof leaked so badly that the second floor could not be occupied. The seller, when told of the house’s condition, was genuinely surprised.
There is no applicable statute.
The purchaser has sued the seller for damages.
Will the purchaser likely be successful?
(A) Yes, because with a conveyance of residential real property, a warranty of fitness is implied.
(B) Yes, based on the covenants of title contained in the deed the purchaser received.
(C) No, because the seller gave no warranty regarding the condition of the house.
(D) No, because of the doctrine of merger.
(C) No, because the seller gave no warranty regarding the condition of the house.
A businessman owned a hotel, subject to a mortgage securing a debt he owed to a bank. The businessman later acquired a nearby parking garage, financing a part of the purchase price with a loan from a financing company, secured by a mortgage on the parking garage. Two years thereafter, the businessman defaulted on the loan owed to the bank, which caused the full amount of that loan to become immediately due and payable. The bank decided not to foreclose the mortgage on the hotel at that time, but instead properly sued for the full amount of the defaulted loan. The bank obtained and properly filed a judgment for that amount. A statute of the jurisdiction provides: “Any judgment properly filed shall, for 10 years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered.” There is no other applicable statute, except the statute providing for judicial foreclosure of mortgages, which places no restrictions on deficiency judgments.
Shortly thereafter, the bank brought an appropriate action for judicial foreclosure of its mortgage on the hotel and of its judgment lien on the parking garage. The financing company was joined as a party defendant, and appropriately sued for foreclosure of its mortgage on the parking garage, which was also in default. All procedures were properly followed, and the confirmed foreclosure sales resulted in the following: The net proceeds of the sale of the hotel to a third party were $200,000 less than the bank’s mortgage balance. The net proceeds of the sale of the parking garage to a fourth party were $200,000 more than the financing company’s mortgage balance.
How should the $200,000 surplus arising from the sale of the parking garage be distributed?
(A) It should be paid to the bank.
(B) It should be paid to the businessman.
(C) It should be paid to the financing company.
(D) It should be split equally between the bank and the financing company.
(A) It should be paid to the bank.
A landowner lawfully subdivided his land into 10 large lots. The recorded subdivision plan imposed no restrictions on any of the 10 lots. Within two months after recording the plan, the landowner conveyed Lot 1 to a buyer, by a deed that contained no restrictions on the lot’s use. There was then a lull in sales.
Two years later, the real estate market in the state had generally improved, and during the next six months, the landowner sold and conveyed eight of the remaining nine lots. In each of the eight deeds of conveyance, the landowner included the following language: “It is a term and condition of this conveyance, which shall be a covenant running with the land for the benefit of each of the 10 lots [with an appropriate reference to the recorded subdivision plan], that for 15 years from the date of recording of the plan, no use shall be made of the premises herein conveyed except for single-family residential purposes.”
The buyer of Lot 1 had actual knowledge of what the landowner had done. The landowner included the quoted language in part because the municipality had amended its zoning ordinance a year earlier to permit professional offices in any residential zone.
Shortly after the landowner’s most recent sale, when he owned only one unsold lot, the buyer of Lot 1 constructed a one-story house on Lot 1 and then conveyed Lot 1 to a doctor. The deed to the doctor contained no reference to any restriction on the use of Lot 1. The doctor applied for an appropriate certificate of occupancy to enable her to use a part of the house on Lot 1 as a medical office. The landowner, on behalf of himself as the owner of the unsold lot, and on behalf of the other lot owners, sued to enjoin the doctor from carrying out her plans and to impose the quoted restriction on Lot 1.
Who is likely to prevail?
(A) The doctor, because Lot 1 was conveyed without the restrictive covenant in the deed to the first buyer and the subsequent deed to the doctor.
(B) The doctor, because zoning ordinances override private restrictive covenants as a matter of public policy.
(C) The landowner, because the doctor, as a successor in interest to the first buyer, is estopped from denying that Lot 1 remains subject to the zoning ordinance as it existed when the landowner conveyed Lot 1 to the first buyer.
(D) The landowner, because with the first buyer’s knowledge of the facts, Lot 1 became incorporated into a common scheme.
(A) The doctor, because Lot 1 was conveyed without the restrictive covenant in the deed to the first buyer and the subsequent deed to the doctor.
A seller entered into a written contract to sell a tract of land to an investor. The contract made no mention of the quality of title to be conveyed. The seller and the investor later completed the sale, and the seller delivered a warranty deed to the investor. Soon thereafter, the value of the land increased dramatically. The investor entered into a written contract to sell the land to a buyer. The contract between the investor and the buyer expressly provided that the investor would convey a marketable title. The buyer’s attorney discovered that the title to the land was not marketable and had not been marketable when the original seller had conveyed to the investor. The buyer refused to complete the sale. The investor sued the original seller for breach of contract, claiming damages from the seller’s failure to convey marketable title, which resulted in the investor’s loss of the sale to the subsequent buyer.
Who is likely to prevail on this count?
(A) The investor, because the law implies in such a contract a covenant that the title will be marketable.
(B) The investor, because the original seller is liable for all reasonably foreseeable damages.
(C) The original seller, because her contract obligations as to title merged into the deed.
(D) The original seller, because she did not expressly agree to convey marketable title.
(C) The original seller, because her contract obligations as to title merged into the deed.
When a homeowner became ill, he properly executed a deed sufficient to convey his home to his nephew, who was then serving overseas in the military. Two persons signed as witnesses to qualify the deed for recording under an applicable statute. The homeowner handed the deed to his nephew’s friend and said, “I want [the nephew] to have my home. Please take this deed for him.” Shortly thereafter, the nephew’s friend learned that the homeowner’s death was imminent. One day before the homeowner’s death, the nephew’s friend recorded the deed. The nephew returned home shortly after the homeowner’s death, learned about the deed, and took possession of the home. The homeowner had died intestate, leaving a daughter as his sole heir. When she asserted ownership of the home, the nephew brought an appropriate action against her to determine title. The law of the jurisdiction requires only two witnesses for a will to be properly executed.
If the court rules for the nephew and against the daughter, what will be the most likely explanation?
(A) The deed was delivered when the homeowner handed it to the nephew’s friend.
(B) The delivery of the deed was accomplished by the recording of the deed.
(C) The homeowner’s death consummated a valid gift causa mortis to the nephew.
(D) The homeowner’s properly executed deed was effective as a testamentary document.
(A) The deed was delivered when the homeowner handed it to the nephew’s friend.
A buyer validly contracted in writing to buy improved land from a seller. The contract had no contingencies and was silent as to risk of loss if there was damage to, or destruction of, property improvements between contract and closing, and as to any duty to carry insurance. As soon as the parties signed the contract, the seller (who had already moved out) canceled her insurance covering the land. The buyer did not know this and did not obtain insurance. A few days later, three weeks before the agreed closing date, the building on the land was struck by lightning and burned to the ground. There is no applicable statute. In an appropriate action, the buyer asserted the right to cancel the contract and to recover his earnest money. The seller said that because the risk of fire loss had passed to the buyer before the fire, the buyer must perform.
If the seller prevails, what will be the most likely explanation?
(A) Once the parties signed the contract, only the buyer had an insurable interest and so could have protected against this loss.
(B) The buyer’s constructive possession arising from the contract gave him the affirmative duty of protecting against loss by fire.
(C) The seller’s cancellation of her casualty insurance caused the risk of loss to transfer to the buyer.
(D) Upon execution of the contract, the buyer became the equitable owner of the land under the doctrine of equitable conversion.
(D) Upon execution of the contract, the buyer became the equitable owner of the land under the doctrine of equitable conversion.
An uncle was the record title holder of a vacant tract of land. He often told friends that he would leave the land to his nephew in his will. The nephew knew of these conversations.
Prior to the uncle’s death, the nephew conveyed the land by warranty deed to a woman for $10,000. She did not conduct a title search of the land before she accepted the deed from the nephew. She promptly and properly recorded her deed. Last month, the uncle died, leaving the land to the nephew in his duly probated will. Both the nephew and the woman now claim ownership of the land. The nephew has offered to return the $10,000 to the woman.
Who has title to the land?
(A) The nephew, because at the time of the deed to the woman, the uncle was the owner of record.
(B) The nephew, because the woman did not conduct a title search.
(C) The woman, because of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
(D) The woman, because she recorded her deed prior to the uncle’s death.
(C) The woman, because of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
A buyer and a seller entered into a written contract for the sale of an identified parcel of land. The contract expressly provided that the buyer was to pay $150,000 cash for the land at the time of the closing but did not state the closing date.
The parties had not agreed on the closing date because the buyer was not sure at the time the contract was signed how she would raise the cash.
Fifteen days after the contract was signed, the seller learned that he could sell the land to a third party for $200,000.
The seller asked the buyer if she would agree to rescind the contract. The buyer refused. The seller then told her that he would not complete the transaction, contending that the contract was unenforceable under the statute of frauds because an essential element (time for performance) was not agreed upon by the parties and was not expressly stated in the written agreement. The seller sold the land to the third party.
The buyer brought an appropriate action against the seller for breach of contract.
For which party is the court likely to find?
(A) The buyer, because of the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
(B) The buyer, because the court will infer that performance within a reasonable time was intended.
(C) The seller, because the contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
(D) The seller, because time of performance is presumed to be of the essence.
(B) The buyer, because the court will infer that performance within a reasonable time was intended.
A landowner orally gave his neighbor permission to share the use of a private road on the landowner’s land so that the neighbor could have more convenient access to the neighbor’s land. Only the landowner maintained the road. After the neighbor had used the road on a daily basis for three years, the landowner conveyed his land to a grantee, who immediately notified the neighbor that the neighbor was not to use the road. The neighbor sued the grantee, seeking a declaration that the neighbor had a right to continue to use the road.
Who is likely to prevail?
(A) The grantee, because an oral license is invalid.
(B) The grantee, because the neighbor had a license that the grantee could terminate at any time.
(C) The neighbor, because the grantee is estopped from terminating the neighbor’s use of the road.
(D) The neighbor, because the neighbor’s use of the road was open and notorious when the grantee purchased the land.
(B) The grantee, because the neighbor had a license that the grantee could terminate at any time.
Thirty years ago, a landowner conveyed land by warranty deed to a church (a charity) “so long as the land herein conveyed is used as the site for the principal religious edifice maintained by said church.”
Twenty years ago, the landowner died intestate, survived by a single heir.
One year ago, the church dissolved and its church building situated on the land was demolished.
There is no applicable statute. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified in the jurisdiction.
In an appropriate action, the landowner’s heir and the attorney general, who is the appropriate official to assert public interests in charitable trusts, contest the right to the land.
In this action, who will prevail? land
(A) The landowner’s heir, as successor to the landowner’s possibility of reverter.
(B) The landowner’s heir, because a charity cannot convey assets donated to it.
(C) The attorney general, because cy pres should be applied to devote the land to religious purposes to carry out the
charitable intent of the landowner.
(D) The attorney general, because the landowner’s attempt to restrict the church’s fee simple violated the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities.
(A) The landowner’s heir, as successor to the landowner’s possibility of reverter.
A man borrowed money from a bank and executed a promissory note for the amount secured by a mortgage on an office building that he owned. Several years later, the man sold the building. As specified in the contract of sale, the deed to the buyer provided that the buyer agreed “to assume the existing mortgage debt” on the building.
Subsequently, the buyer defaulted on the mortgage loan to the bank, and appropriate foreclosure proceedings were initiated. The foreclosure sale resulted in a deficiency.
There is no applicable statute.
Is the buyer liable for the deficiency?
(A) No, because even if the buyer assumed the mortgage, the man is solely responsible for any deficiency.
(B) No, because the buyer did not sign a promissory note to the bank and therefore has no personal liability.
(C) Yes, because the buyer assumed the mortgage and therefore became personally liable for the mortgage loan and any
deficiency.
(D) Yes, because the transfer of the mortgage debt to the buyer resulted in a novation of the original mortgage and loan
and rendered the buyer solely responsible for any deficiency.
(C) Yes, because the buyer assumed the mortgage and therefore became personally liable for the mortgage loan and any
deficiency.
A seller owned a single-family house. A buyer gave the seller a signed handwritten offer to purchase the house. The offer was unconditional and sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, and when the seller signed an acceptance, an enforceable contract resulted.
The house had been the seller’s home, but he had moved to an apartment, so the house was vacant at all times relevant to the proposed transaction. Two weeks after the parties had entered into their contract, one week after the buyer had obtained a written mortgage lending commitment from a lender, and one week before the agreed-upon closing date, the house was struck by lightning and burned to the ground. The loss was not insured, because three years earlier, the seller had let his homeowner’s insurance policy lapse after he had paid his mortgage debt in full.
The handwritten contract was wholly silent as to matters of financing, risk of loss, and insurance. The buyer declared the contract voided by the fire, but the seller asserted a right to enforce the contract despite the loss.
There is no applicable statute.
If a court finds for the seller, what will be the likely reason?forceable contract resulted.
The house had been the seller’s home, but he
(A) The contract was construed against the buyer, who drafted it.
(B) The lender’s written commitment to make a mortgage loan to the buyer made the contract of sale fully binding on the
buyer.
(C) The risk of loss falls on the party in possession, and constructive possession passed to the buyer on the contract date.
(D) The risk of loss passed to the buyer on the contract date under the doctrine of equitable conversion.
(D) The risk of loss passed to the buyer on the contract date under the doctrine of equitable conversion.
A man died testate. The man’s estate consisted of a residence as well as significant personal property. By his duly probated will, the man devised the residence to a friend, who was specifically identified in the will. The residue of the estate was given to a stated charity.
The man’s friend, although alive at the time the man executed the will, had predeceased the man. The friend’s wife and their child, who has a disability, both survived the man.
The value of the residence has increased significantly because of recent zoning changes. There is credible extrinsic evidence that the man wanted his friend to own the residence after the man’s death so that the friend and his wife could care for their child there.
There is no applicable statute.
If both the charity and the child claim the residence, to whom should the estate distribute the residence?
(A) The charity, because the devise to the friend adeemed.
(B) The charity, because the devisee from the friend lapsed
(C) The child, because extrinsic evidence exists that the man’s intent was to benefit the child.
(D) The child, because no conditions of survivorship were noted in the will.
(B) The charity, because the devisee from the friend lapsed
A man owned property that he used as his residence. The man received a loan, secured by a mortgage on the property, from a bank. Later, the man defaulted on the loan. The bank then brought an appropriate action to foreclose the mortgage, was the sole bidder at the judicial sale, and received title to the property as a result of the foreclosure sale.
Shortly after the foreclosure sale, the man received a substantial inheritance. He approached the bank to repurchase the property, but the bank had decided to build a branch office on the property and declined to sell.
If the man prevails in an appropriate action to recover title to the property, what will be the most likely reason?
(A) He had used the property as his residence.
(B) He timely exercised an equitable right of redemption.
(C) The court applied the doctrine of exoneration.
(D) The jurisdiction provides a statutory right of redemption.
(D) The jurisdiction provides a statutory right of redemption.
A farmer borrowed $100,000 from a bank and gave the bank a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the farm that she owned. The bank promptly recorded the mortgage, which contained a due-on-sale provision.
A few years later, the farmer borrowed $5,000 from a second bank and gave that bank a promissory note secured by a mortgage on her farm. The bank promptly recorded the mortgage.
Subsequently, the farmer defaulted on her obligation to the first bank, which then validly accelerated the debt and instituted nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings as permitted by the jurisdiction. The second bank received notice of the foreclosure sale but did not send a representative to the sale. At the foreclosure sale, a buyer who was not acting in collusion with the farmer outbid all other bidders and received a deed to the farm.
Several months later, the original farmer repurchased her farm from the buyer, who executed a warranty deed transferring the farm to her. After the farmer promptly recorded that deed, the second bank commenced foreclosure proceedings on the farm. The farmer denied the validity of the second bank’s mortgage.
Does the second bank continue to have a valid mortgage on the farm?
(A) Yes, because of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
(B) Yes, because the original owner reacquired title to the farm.
(C) No, because the purchase at the foreclosure sale by the buyer under these facts eliminated the second bank’s junior
mortgage lien.
(D) No, because of the due-on-sale provision in the farmer’s mortgage to the first bank.
(C) No, because the purchase at the foreclosure sale by the buyer under these facts eliminated the second bank’s junior
mortgage lien.
A seller who owned land entered into a valid written agreement to sell the land to a buyer by installment purchase. The contract stipulated that the seller would deliver to the buyer, upon payment of the last installment due, “a warranty deed sufficient to convey a fee simple title.” The contract contained no other provision that could be construed as referring to title.
The buyer entered into possession of the land. After making 10 of the 300 installment payments obligated under the contract, the buyer discovered that there was outstanding a valid and enforceable mortgage on the land, securing the payment of a debt in the amount of 25 percent of the purchase price that the buyer had agreed to pay. There was no evidence that the seller had ever been late in payments due under the mortgage, and there was no evidence of any danger of insolvency of the seller. The value of the land was then four times the amount due on the debt secured by the mortgage.
The buyer quit possession of the land, stopped making payments on the contract, and demanded that the seller repay the amounts that the buyer had paid under the contract. After the seller refused the demand, the buyer sued the seller to recover damages for the seller’s alleged breach of the contract.
Should damages be awarded to the buyer?
(A) Yes, because in the absence of a contrary express agreement, an obligation to convey marketable title is implied.
(B) Yes, because an installment purchase contract is treated as a mortgage, and the outstanding mortgage impairs the buyer’s equity of redemption.
(C) No, because an installment purchase contract is treated as a security device.
(D) No, because the time for the seller to deliver marketable title has not arrived.
(D) No, because the time for the seller to deliver marketable title has not arrived.
By a valid written contract executed in March, a seller agreed to sell land to a buyer. The contract stated, “The parties agree that closing will occur on May 1 at 10 a.m.” There was no other reference to closing. The contract was silent as to quality of title.
On April 27, the seller notified the buyer that she had discovered that the land was subject to a long-standing easement in favor of a corporation for a towpath for a canal, should the corporation ever want to build a canal.
The buyer thought it so unlikely that a canal would ever be built that the closing should occur notwithstanding this easement. Therefore, the buyer notified the seller on April 28 that he would expect to close on May 1.
When the seller later refused to close, the buyer sued for specific performance.
Will the buyer be likely to prevail?
(A) No, because the easement renders the seller’s title unmarketable.
(B) No, because rights of third parties are unresolved.
(C) Yes, because the decision to terminate the contract for title not being marketable belongs only to the buyer.
(D) Yes, because the seller did not give notice of the easement a reasonable time before the closing date.
(C) Yes, because the decision to terminate the contract for title not being marketable belongs only to the buyer.
A rectangular parcel of undeveloped land contained three acres and had 150 feet of frontage on a public street. The applicable zoning ordinance required that a buildable lot contain at least two acres and have frontage of not less than 100 feet on a public street.
A brother and sister owned the land as tenants in common, the brother owning a one-third interest and the sister owning a two-thirds interest. Neither of them owned any other real property.
The sister brought an appropriate action to partition the land and proposed that a two-acre rectangular lot with 100 feet of frontage be set off to her and that a one-acre rectangular lot with 50 feet of frontage be set off to the brother. The brother’s defense included a demand that the land be sold and its proceeds be divided one-third to the brother and two-thirds to the sister.
Who will prevail?
(A) The brother, because partition by sale is the preferred remedy, unless a fair price is not the likely result of a sale.
(B) The brother, because the zoning ordinance makes it impossible to divide the land fairly.
(C) The sister, because partition by sale is not appropriate if the subject property can be physically divided.
(D) The sister, because the ratio of the two lots that would result from her proposal conforms exactly to the ownership ratio.
(B) The brother, because the zoning ordinance makes it impossible to divide the land fairly.
Six years ago, a landlord and a tenant entered into a 10-year commercial lease of land. The written lease provided that if a public entity under the power of eminent domain condemned any part of the land but not all of it, the lease would terminate and the landlord would receive the entire condemnation award. Thereafter, the city condemned approximately two-thirds of the land.
The tenant notified the city and the landlord that an independent appraisal of the value of the tenant’s possessory interest established that it substantially exceeded the tenant’s obligation under the lease and that the tenant was entitled to share the award. The appraisal was accurate.
In an appropriate action among the landlord, the tenant, and the city as to the right of the tenant to a portion of the condemnation award, for whom will the court likely find?
(A) The landlord, because the condemnation superseded and canceled the lease.
(B) The landlord, because the parties specifically agreed as to the consequences of a partial condemnation.
(C) The tenant, because the landlord breached the landlord’s implied warranty of quiet enjoyment.
(D) The tenant, because otherwise the landlord would be unjustly enriched.
(B) The landlord, because the parties specifically agreed as to the consequences of a partial condemnation.
A niece inherited vacant land from her uncle. She lived in a distant state and decided to sell the land to a colleague who was interested in purchasing the land as an investment. They orally agreed upon a price, and, at the colleague’s insistence, the niece agreed to provide him with a warranty deed without any exceptions. The price was paid, the warranty deed was delivered, and the deed was promptly recorded. Neither the niece nor the colleague had, at that point, ever seen the land.
After recording the deed, the colleague visited the land for the first time and discovered that it had no access to any public right-of-way and that none of the surrounding lands had ever been held in common ownership with any previous owner of the land.
The colleague sued the niece for damages.
For whom will the court find?
(A) The colleague, because lack of access makes title unmarketable.
(B) The colleague, because the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment in the deed were breached.
(C) The niece, because no title covenants were breached.
(D) The niece, because the agreement to sell was oral.
(C) The niece, because no title covenants were breached.
A landowner mortgaged her land to a nationally chartered bank as security for a loan. The mortgage provided that the bank could, at its option, declare the entire loan due and payable if all or any part of the land, or an interest therein, was sold or transferred without the bank’s prior written consent.
Subsequently, the landowner wanted to sell the land to a neighbor by an installment land contract, but the bank refused to consent. The neighbor’s credit was good, and all mortgage payments to the bank were fully current.
The landowner and the neighbor consulted an attorney about their proposed transaction, their desire to complete it, and the bank’s refusal to consent.
What would the attorney’s best advice be?
(A) Even if the landowner transfers to the neighbor by land contract, the bank may accelerate the debt and foreclose if the full amount is not paid.
(B) The due-on-sale clause is void as an illegal restraint on alienation of the fee simple, so they may proceed.
(C) By making the transfer in land contract form, the landowner will prevent enforcement of the due-on-sale clause if the mortgage payments are kept current.
(D) The only effect of the due-on-sale clause is that the proposed transfer will automatically make the neighbor personally liable on the debt, whether or not the neighbor specifically agrees to assume it.
(A) Even if the landowner transfers to the neighbor by land contract, the bank may accelerate the debt and foreclose if the full amount is not paid.
A man contacted his lawyer regarding his right to use a path that was on his neighbor’s vacant land.
Fifteen years ago, after part of a path located on his land and connecting his cabin to the public highway washed out, the man cleared a small part of his neighbor’s land and rerouted a section of the path through the neighbor’s land.
Twelve years ago, the neighbor leased her land to some hunters. For the next 12 years, the hunters and the man who had rerouted the path used the path for access to the highway.
A month ago, the neighbor discovered that part of the path was on her land. The neighbor told the man that she had not given him permission to cross her land and that she would be closing the rerouted path after 90 days.
The man’s land and the neighbor’s land have never been in common ownership.
The period of time necessary to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is 10 years. The period of time necessary to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years.
What should the lawyer tell the man concerning his right to use the rerouted path on the neighbor’s land?
(A) The man has fee title by adverse possession of the land included in the path.
(B) The man has an easement by necessity to use the path.
(C) The man has an easement by prescription to use the path.
(D) The man has no right to use the path.
(C) The man has an easement by prescription to use the path.
Twenty-five years ago, a man who owned a 45-acre tract of land conveyed 40 of the 45 acres to a developer by warranty deed. The man retained the rear five-acre portion of the land and continues to live there in a large farmhouse.
The deed to the 40-acre tract was promptly recorded. It contained the following language:
“It is a term and condition of this deed, which shall be a covenant running with the land and binding on all owners, their heirs and assigns, that no use shall be made of the 40-acre tract of land except for residential purposes.”
Subsequently, the developer fully developed the 40-acre tract into a residential subdivision consisting of 40 lots with a single-family residence on each lot.
Although there have been multiple transfers of ownership of each of the 40 lots within the subdivision, none of them included a reference to the quoted provision in the deed from the man to the developer, nor did any deed to a subdivision lot create any new covenants restricting use.
Last year, a major new medical center was constructed adjacent to the subdivision. A doctor who owns a house in the subdivision wishes to relocate her medical office to her house. For the first time, the doctor learned of the restrictive covenant in the deed from the man to the developer. The applicable zoning ordinance permits the doctor’s intended use. The man, as owner of the five-acre tract, however, objects to the doctor’s proposed use of her property.
There are no governing statutes other than the zoning code. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified in the jurisdiction.
May the doctor convert her house in the subdivision into a medical office?
(A) No, because the owners of lots in the subdivision own property benefitted by the original residential covenant and have the sole right to enforce it.
(B) No, because the man owns property benefitted by the original restrictive covenant and has a right to enforce it.
(C) Yes, because the original restrictive covenant violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
(D) Yes, because the zoning ordinance allows the doctor’s proposed use and preempts the restrictive covenant.
(B) No, because the man owns property benefitted by the original restrictive covenant and has a right to enforce it.
Five years ago, an investor who owned a vacant lot in a residential area borrowed $25,000 from a friend and gave the friend a note for $25,000 due in five years, secured by a mortgage on the lot. The friend neglected to record the mortgage. The fair market value of the lot was then $25,000.
Three years ago, the investor discovered that the friend had not recorded his mortgage and in consideration of $50,000 conveyed the lot to a buyer. The fair market value of the lot was then $50,000. The buyer knew nothing of the friend’s mortgage. One month thereafter, the friend discovered the sale to the buyer, recorded his $25,000 mortgage, and notified the buyer that he held a $25,000 mortgage on the lot.
Two years ago, the buyer needed funds. Although she told her bank of the mortgage claimed by the investor’s friend, the bank loaned her $15,000, and she gave the bank a note for $15,000 due in two years secured by a mortgage on the lot. The bank promptly recorded the mortgage. At that time, the fair market value of the lot was $75,000.
The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: “No conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice unless the same be recorded according to law.”
Both notes are now due, and both the investor and the buyer have refused to pay. The lot is now worth only $50,000. What are the rights of the investor’s friend and the bank in the lot?
(A) Both mortgages are enforceable liens, and the friend’s has priority because it was first recorded.
(B) Both mortgages are enforceable liens, but the bank’s has priority because the buyer was an innocent purchaser for value.
(C) Only the friend’s mortgage is an enforceable lien, because the bank had actual and constructive notice of the investor’s fraud.
(D) Only the bank’s mortgage is an enforceable lien, because the buyer was an innocent purchaser for value.
(D) Only the bank’s mortgage is an enforceable lien, because the buyer was an innocent purchaser for value.
A grantor owned two tracts of land, one of 15 acres and another of 5 acres. The two tracts were a mile apart.
Fifteen years ago, the grantor conveyed the smaller tract to a grantee. The grantor retained the larger tract. The deed to the grantee contained, in addition to proper legal descriptions of both properties and identifications of the parties, the following language:
“I, the grantor, bind myself and my heirs and assigns that in the event that the larger tract that I now retain is ever offered for sale, I will notify the grantee and his heirs and assigns in writing, and the grantee and his heirs and assigns shall have the right to purchase the larger tract for its fair market value as determined by a board consisting of three qualified expert independent real estate appraisers.”
With appropriate references to the other property and the parties, there followed a reciprocal provision that conferred upon the grantor and her heirs and assigns a similar right to purchase the smaller tract, purportedly binding the grantee and his heirs and assigns.
Ten years ago, a corporation acquired the larger tract from the grantor. At that time, the grantee had no interest in acquiring the larger tract and by an appropriate written document released any interest he or his heirs or assigns might have had in the larger tract.
Last year, the grantee died. The smaller tract passed by the grantee’s will to his daughter. She has decided to sell the smaller tract. However, because she believes that the corporation has been a very poor steward of the larger tract, she refuses to sell the smaller tract to the corporation even though she has offered it for sale in the local real estate market.
The corporation has brought an appropriate action for specific performance of the right of first refusal after taking all of the necessary preliminary steps in its effort to exercise its right to purchase the smaller tract.
The daughter has asserted all possible defenses.
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified in the jurisdiction, and there are no applicable statutes. If the court rules for the daughter, what will be the likely reason?
(A) The provision setting out the right to purchase violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
(B) The grantee’s release 10 years ago operates as a waiver regarding any right to purchase that the corporation might have.
(C) The two tracts of land were not adjacent parcels of real estate, and thus the right to purchase is in gross and is therefore unenforceable.
(D) Noncompliance with a right to purchase gives rise to a claim for money damages, but not for specific performance.
(A) The provision setting out the right to purchase violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
A landlord and a tenant orally agreed to a commercial tenancy for a term of six months beginning on July 1. Rent was to be
paid by the first day of each month, and the tenant paid the first month’s rent at the time of the agreement.
When the tenant arrived at the leased premises on July 1, the tenant learned that the previous tenant had not vacated the premises at the end of her lease term on May 31 and did not intend to vacate. The tenant then successfully sued the previous tenant for possession. The tenant did not inform the landlord of the eviction action until after the tenant received
possession.
The tenant then sued the landlord, claiming damages for that portion of the lease period during which the tenant was not in
possession.
If the court finds for the landlord, what will be the most likely explanation?
(A) By suing the previous tenant for possession, the tenant elected that remedy in lieu of a suit against the landlord.
(B) The landlord had delivered the legal right of possession to the tenant.
(C) The tenant failed to timely vacate as required to sue for constructive eviction.
(D) The tenant had not notified the landlord before bringing the eviction action.
(B) The landlord had delivered the legal right of possession to the tenant.
Six months ago, a man told his cousin that he would give her his farm as a gift on her next birthday. The cousin then entered into a valid written contract to sell the farm to an investor with the closing to take place “one week after [the cousin’s] next birthday.”
The man failed to convey the farm to the cousin on her birthday. One week after the cousin’s birthday, on the intended closing date, the investor first learned of the cousin’s inability to convey the farm because the man had breached his promise. The investor considered suing the cousin but realized that she could not compel the cousin to convey the farm because it was still owned by the man.
Two weeks after the cousin’s birthday, the man died. Under his valid will, the man devised the farm to the cousin. Within a week, the executor of the man’s estate gave the cousin an executor’s deed to the farm in compliance with state law. The investor promptly learned of this transfer and demanded that the cousin convey the farm to her. The cousin refused. The investor sued the cousin for specific performance.
Who will likely prevail?
(A) The cousin, because the contract to convey was not signed by the legal owner of the farm as of the date of the contract
and was therefore void.
(B) The cousin, because she received title by devise rather than by conveyance.
(C) The investor, because the contract to convey merged into the executor’s deed to the cousin.
(D) The investor, because the contract to convey remained enforceable by her within a reasonable period of time after the
proposed closing date.
D) The investor, because the contract to convey remained enforceable by her within a reasonable period of time after the
proposed closing date.
A mother who died testate devised her farm to her son and her daughter as “joint tenants with right of survivorship.” The language of the will was sufficient to create a common law joint tenancy with right of survivorship, which is unmodified
by statute in the jurisdiction. After the mother’s death and with the daughter’s permission, the son took sole possession of the farm and agreed to pay the daughter a stipulated monthly rent.
Several years later, the son defaulted on a personal loan, and his creditor obtained a judgment against him for $30,000. The creditor promptly and properly filed the judgment.
A statute of the jurisdiction provides: “Any judgment properly filed shall, for 10 years from filing, be a lien on the real
property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered.” Six months later, the son died. There are no other applicable statutes.
Is the creditor entitled to enforce its judgment lien against the farm?
(A) No, because the daughter became sole owner of the farm free and clear of the creditor’s judgment lien when the son
died.
(B) No, because the son’s interest was severed from the daughter’s interest upon the filing of the lien.
(C) Yes, because a joint tenancy cannot be created by devise, and the son died owning a 50% undivided interest in the
farm as a tenant in common.
(D) Yes, because the son died owning a 50% undivided interest in the farm as a joint tenant with the daughter.
(A) No, because the daughter became sole owner of the farm free and clear of the creditor’s judgment lien when the son
died.
A landowner borrowed $100,000 from a lender and executed a valid mortgage on a commercial tract of land to secure the debt. The lender promptly recorded the mortgage.
A year later, the landowner conveyed the same tract to a developer by a deed that expressly stated that the conveyance was
subject to the mortgage to the lender and that the grantee expressly assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage obligation as part of the consideration for the purchase. The mortgage was properly described in the deed, and the deed was properly executed by the landowner; however, because there was no provision or place in the deed for the developer to sign, he did not do so. The developer promptly recorded the deed.
The developer made the monthly mortgage payments of principal and interest for six payments but then stopped payments
and defaulted on the mortgage obligation. The lender properly instituted foreclosure procedures in accordance with the governing law. After the foreclosure sale, there was a $10,000 deficiency due to the lender. Both the landowner and the developer had sufficient assets to pay the deficiency. There is no applicable statute in the jurisdiction other than the statute relating to foreclosure proceedings.
At the appropriate stage of the foreclosure action, which party will the court decide is responsible for payment of the
deficiency?
(A) The developer, because he accepted delivery of the deed from the landowner and in so doing accepted the terms and
conditions of the deed.
(B) The developer, because he is estopped by his having made six monthly payments to the lender.
(C) The landowner, because the developer was not a signatory to the deed.
(D) The landowner, because he was the maker of the note and the mortgage, and at most the developer is liable only as a
guarantor of the landowner’s obligation.
(A) The developer, because he accepted delivery of the deed from the landowner and in so doing accepted the terms and
conditions of the deed.
Seven years ago, a man, his sister, and his cousin became equal owners, as tenants in common, of a house. Until a year ago, the man lived in the house alone. The sister and the cousin are longtime residents of another state.
One year ago, the man moved to an apartment and rented the house to a tenant for three years under a lease that the man and the tenant both signed. The tenant has since paid the rent each month to the man. Recently, the sister and the cousin learned about the rental. They brought an appropriate action against the tenant to have the lease declared void and to have the tenant evicted. The tenant raised all available defenses.
What will the court likely decide?
(A) The lease is void, and the tenant is evicted.
(B) The lease is valid, and the tenant retains exclusive occupancy rights for the balance of the term.
(C) The lease is valid, but the tenant is evicted because one-third of the lease term has expired and the man had only a
one-third interest to transfer.
(D) The lease is valid, and the tenant is not evicted but must share possession with the sister and the cousin.
(D) The lease is valid, and the tenant is not evicted but must share possession with the sister and the cousin.
A man decided to give his farm to his nephew. The man took a deed to his attorney and told the attorney to deliver the deed to the nephew upon the man’s death. The man also told the attorney to return the deed to him if he asked. None of these instructions to the attorney were in writing, and the deed was not recorded. The man then e-mailed the nephew informing him of the arrangement.
Shortly thereafter, the nephew died testate. In his will, he devised the farm to his daughter. Several years later, the man died intestate, survived by two sons. The nephew’s daughter immediately claimed ownership of the farm and demanded
that the attorney deliver the deed to her.
Must the attorney deliver the deed to the daughter?
(A) No, because a gratuitous death escrow is void unless supported by a written contract.
(B) No, because the man never placed the deed beyond his control.
(C) Yes, because the death of the nephew rendered the gratuitous death escrow irrevocable by the man.
(D) Yes, because the deed to the nephew was legally delivered when the man took it to his attorney.
(B) No, because the man never placed the deed beyond his control.
A businesswoman owned two adjoining tracts of land, one that was improved with a commercial rental building and
another that was vacant and abutted a river.
Twenty years ago, the businesswoman conveyed the vacant tract to a grantee by a warranty deed that the businesswoman
signed but the grantee did not. The deed contained a covenant by the grantee as owner of the vacant tract that neither he nor
his heirs or assigns would “erect any building” on the vacant tract, in order to preserve the view of the river from the
commercial building on the improved tract. The grantee intended to use the vacant tract as a nature preserve. The grantee
promptly and properly recorded the deed.
Last year, the businesswoman conveyed the improved tract to a businessman. A month later, the grantee died, devising all
of his property, including the vacant land, to his cousin.
Six weeks ago, the cousin began construction of a building on the vacant tract.
The businessman objected and sued to enjoin construction of the building.
Who is likely to prevail?
(A) The businessman, because the commercial building was constructed before the cousin began his construction project.
(B) The businessman, because the cousin is bound by the covenant made by the grantee.
(C) The cousin, because an equitable servitude does not survive the death of the promisor.
(D) The cousin, because the grantee did not sign the deed.
(B) The businessman, because the cousin is bound by the covenant made by the grantee.
A seller owns a 400-acre tract of land with 5,000 feet of frontage on a county highway. The seller and a buyer entered into a written agreement for the sale of a portion of the tract identified only as “a parcel of land, containing not less than 100 acres and having not less than 1,000 feet of frontage on the county highway, whose exact location and dimensions are to be
determined by the parties hereto, at a price of $8,000 per acre.”
Shortly after the execution of the agreement, the parties met to stake out the parcel of land to be sold, but they could not
agree. The disagreement intensified, and the seller repudiated the contract. The buyer has sued the seller for specific performance. The seller has asserted all available defenses.
Is the buyer entitled to specific performance of the contract?
(A) No, because a contract for the sale of real property that requires further agreement on an essential element cannot be
specifically enforced.
(B) No, because the purchase price was not fixed by, nor determinable under, the contract terms.
(C) Yes, because the contract bound the parties to act in good faith and to agree upon the specific land to be conveyed.
(D) Yes, because the equity powers of the court enable the court to appoint a master, or to take other appropriate action, to
identify the land to be conveyed.
(A) No, because a contract for the sale of real property that requires further agreement on an essential element cannot be
specifically enforced.
A woman died, devising land that she owned in another state to her daughter, who was then 17 years old. A neighbor who owned the property immediately adjacent to the land wrongfully began to possess the land at that time. For 24 of the next 25 years, the neighbor planted and harvested crops on the land, hunted on it, and parked cars on it. However, in the sixth year after he first took possession of the land, the neighbor neither planted crops nor hunted nor
parked cars on the land because he spent that entire year living in Europe. The neighbor built a small gardening shed on the land, but he never built a residence on it. When the daughter was 28, she was declared mentally incompetent and had a conservator appointed to oversee her affairs. Since then, she has continuously resided in a care facility. The applicable statute of limitations provides as follows: “An ejectment action shall be brought within 21 years after the cause of action accrues, but if the person entitled to bring the cause of action is under age 18 or mentally incompetent at the
time the cause of action accrues, it may be brought by such person within 10 years after attaining age 18 or after the person
becomes competent.”
If the daughter’s conservator wins an ejectment action against the neighbor, what will be the most likely explanation?
(A) The daughter was age 17 when the neighbor first took possession of the land.
(B) Because the daughter is mentally incompetent, the statute of limitations has been tolled.
(C) The neighbor never built a residence on the land.
(D) The neighbor was not in continuous possession of the land for 21 years.
(D) The neighbor was not in continuous possession of the land for 21 years.
Ten years ago, a seller sold land to a buyer, who financed the purchase price with a loan from a bank that was secured by a
mortgage on the land. The buyer purchased a title insurance policy running to both the buyer and the bank, showing no
liens on the property other than the buyer’s mortgage to the bank. Eight years ago, the buyer paid the mortgage in full.
Seven years ago, the buyer sold the land to an investor by a full covenant and warranty deed without exceptions. Six years ago, the investor gave the land to a donee by a quitclaim deed.
Last year, the donee discovered an outstanding mortgage on the land that predated all of these conveyances. As a result of a title examiner’s negligence, this mortgage was not disclosed in the title insurance policy issued to the buyer and the bank.
Following this discovery, the donee successfully sued the buyer to recover the amount of the outstanding mortgage.
If the buyer sues the title insurance company to recover the amount he paid to the donee, is he likely to prevail?
(A) No, because the buyer conveyed the land to an investor.
(B) No, because the title insurance policy lapsed when the buyer paid off the bank’s mortgage.
(C) Yes, because the buyer is protected by the title insurance policy even though he no longer owns the land.
(D) Yes, because the buyer was successfully sued by a donee and not by a bona fide purchaser for value.
(C) Yes, because the buyer is protected by the title insurance policy even though he no longer owns the land.
A woman owned a house on a lot abutting a public street. Six months ago, the city validly revised its zoning ordinances
and placed the woman’s lot and the surrounding lots abutting the public street from the north in a zone limited to
residential use; the lots abutting the public street on the south side were zoned for both residential and light business use.
The woman asked the city’s zoning appeals board to approve her proposal to operate a court-reporting service from her
house. This type of use would be permitted on the south side of the public street and, in fact, one such business has existed
there for several years.The board approved the woman’s proposal.Why?
(A) A variance was granted.
(B) The doctrine of amortization applied.
(C) The doctrine of change of circumstances applied.
(D) The woman’s use of her house was a nonconforming use.
A) A variance was granted.
A woman died testate. In her will, she devised a farm she owned to her husband for life, remainder to her niece. Her will did not specify the duties of the husband and the niece with regard to maintenance and expenses related to the farm. The husband took sole possession of the farm, did not farm the land, and did not rent the land to a third person, although the fair
rental value was substantial.
For two years in a row after the woman died, the county assessor sent the tax bills to the niece, but the niece did not pay the
bills, because she and the husband could not agree on who should pay them. Finally, the niece paid the taxes to avoid a tax
foreclosure sale.
The niece then sued the husband for reimbursement for the two years’ worth of property taxes.
There is no applicable statute.
Is the niece likely to prevail?
(A) No, because remaindermen are solely responsible for the payment of property taxes.
(B) No, because the county assessor sent the bills to the niece.
(C) No, because the woman’s will was silent on responsibility for payment of property taxes.
(D) Yes, because the niece paid an obligation that was the sole responsibility of the husband.
D) Yes, because the niece paid an obligation that was the sole responsibility of the husband.
A woman acquired title to a four-acre lot. Several years later, she executed a mortgage on the lot to a bank to secure repayment of a $100,000 loan. Subsequently, the woman executed a mortgage on the same four-acre lot to a finance company to secure repayment of a $50,000 loan. Both mortgages were promptly recorded.
The woman recently defaulted on both loans. The bank promptly initiated foreclosure proceedings and sent proper notice to
all necessary parties. The current fair market value of the four-acre lot is $250,000.
The finance company has filed a timely motion in the foreclosure proceeding asking the court to require the bank to first
foreclose on two of the four acres in the four-acre lot. The bank opposes this motion and insists that it has the right to
subject the entire four-acre lot to the foreclosure sale.
Will the court grant the finance company’s motion?
(A) No, because the bank holds a purchase-money mortgage.
(B) No, because the entire four-acre lot is subject to the bank’s senior mortgage.
(C) Yes, because a pro rata foreclosure of the lot will not prejudice the rights of the bank.
(D) Yes, because of the “two funds” rule of marshalling.
(B) No, because the entire four-acre lot is subject to the bank’s senior mortgage.
Under the terms of his duly probated will, a testator devised his house to his “grandchildren in fee simple” and the residue
of his estate to his brother. The testator had had two children, a son and a daughter, but only the daughter survived the
testator. At the time of the testator’s death, the daughter was 30 years old and had two minor children (grandchildren of the
testator) who also survived the testator.
A third grandchild of the testator, who was the child of the testator’s predeceased son, had been alive when the testator
executed the will, but had predeceased the testator. Under the applicable intestate succession laws, the deceased
grandchild’s sole heir was his mother.
A statute of the jurisdiction provides as follows: “If a devisee, including a devisee of a class gift, who is a grandparent or a
lineal descendant of a grandparent of the testator is dead at the time of execution of the will or fails to survive the testator,
the issue of such deceased devisee shall take the deceased’s share under the will, unless the will expressly provides that this
statute shall not apply. For this purpose, words of survivorship, such as ‘if he survives me,’ are a sufficient expression that the statute shall not apply.”
Who now owns the house?
(A) The testator’s brother.
(B) The testator’s two surviving grandchildren.
(C) The testator’s two surviving grandchildren and all other grandchildren who are born to the testator’s daughter.
(D) The testator’s two surviving grandchildren and the deceased grandchild’s mother.
(B) The testator’s two surviving grandchildren.
Last year, a buyer and a seller entered into a valid contract for the sale of a parcel of real property. The contract contained
no contingencies. The seller was killed in a car accident before the parcel was conveyed, but the closing eventually took
place with the conveyance by a deed from the personal representative of the seller’s estate.
The personal representative of the seller’s estate wants to distribute the proceeds of the real property sale. The seller’s will
was executed many years ago and was duly admitted to probate. Paragraph 5 of his will leaves all of the seller’s real
property to his son, and Paragraph 6 leaves the residue of the estate to the seller’s daughter. No other provisions of the will
are pertinent to the question regarding to whom the proceeds of the sale should be distributed.
What will determine who receives the proceeds?
(A) Whether Paragraph 5 refers specifically to the parcel of real property that was sold or simply to “all of my real
property.”
(B) Whether the closing date originally specified in the contract was a date before or after the seller’s death.
(C) Whether the jurisdiction has adopted the doctrine of equitable conversion.
(D) Whether the sale was completed in accordance with a court order.
(C) Whether the jurisdiction has adopted the doctrine of equitable conversion.
A man conveyed his house to his wife for life, remainder to his only child, a son by a previous marriage. Thereafter, the
man died, devising his entire estate to his son.
The wife later removed a light fixture in the dining room of the house and replaced it with a chandelier that was one of her
family heirlooms. She then informed her nephew and her late husband’s son that after her death, the chandelier should be
removed from the dining room and replaced with the former light fixture, which she had stored in the basement.
The wife died and under her will bequeathed her entire estate to her nephew. She also named the nephew as the personal
representative of her estate. After the nephew, in his capacity as personal representative, removed the chandelier and
replaced it with the original light fixture shortly after the wife’s death, the son sued to have the chandelier reinstalled.
Who will likely prevail?
(A) The nephew, because he had the right to remove the chandelier within a reasonable time after the wife’s death.
(B) The nephew, because of the doctrine of accession.
(C) The son, because the chandelier could not be legally removed after the death of the wife.
(D) The son, because a personal representative can remove only trade fixtures from real property.
A) The nephew, because he had the right to remove the chandelier within a reasonable time after the wife’s death.
A man obtained a bank loan secured by a mortgage on an office building that he owned. After several years, the man conveyed the office building to a woman, who took title subject to the mortgage. The deed to the woman was not recorded.
The woman took immediate possession of the building and made the mortgage payments for several years.
Subsequently, the woman stopped making payments on the mortgage loan, and the bank eventually commenced
foreclosure proceedings in which the man and the woman were both named parties. At the foreclosure sale, a third party purchased the building for less than the outstanding balance on the mortgage loan. The bank then sought to collect the deficiency from the woman.
Is the bank entitled to collect the deficiency from the woman?
(A) No, because the woman did not record the deed from the man.
(B) No, because the woman is not personally liable on the loan.
(C) Yes, because the woman took immediate possession of the building when she bought it from the man.
(D) Yes, because the woman was a party to the foreclosure proceeding
(B) No, because the woman is not personally liable on the loan.
A credit card company obtained and properly filed a judgment against a man after he failed to pay a $10,000 debt. A statute
in the jurisdiction provides as follows: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for 10 years from filing, be a lien on the real
property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered."
Two years later, the man purchased land for $200,000. He made a down payment of $20,000 and borrowed the remaining
$180,000 from a bank. The bank loan was secured by a mortgage on the land. Immediately after the closing, the deed to the
man was recorded first, and the bank's mortgage was recorded second.
Five months later, the man defaulted on the mortgage loan and the bank initiated judicial foreclosure proceedings. After
receiving notice of the proceedings, the credit card company filed a motion to have its judgment lien declared to be the first
lien on the land.
Is the credit card company's motion likely to be granted?
(A) No, because the bank's mortgage secured a loan used to purchase the land.
(B) No, because the man's down payment exceeded the amount of his debt to the credit card company.
(C) Yes, because the bank had constructive notice of the judgment lien.
(D) Yes, because the bank is a third-party lender and not the seller of the land.
(A) No, because the bank's mortgage secured a loan used to purchase the land.
A husband and wife acquired land as common law joint tenants with right of survivorship. One year later, without his
wife's knowledge, the husband executed a will devising the land to his best friend. The husband subsequently died.
Is the wife now the sole owner of the land?
(A) No, because a joint tenant has the unilateral right to end a joint tenancy without the consent of the other joint tenant.
(B) No, because the wife's interest in the husband's undivided 50% ownership in the land adeemed.
(C) Yes, because of the doctrine of after-acquired title.
(D) Yes, because the devise to the friend did not sever the joint tenancy.
(D) Yes, because the devise to the friend did not sever the joint tenancy.
A husband and wife acquired land as common law joint tenants with right of survivorship. One year later, without his wife's knowledge, the husband executed a will devising the land to his best friend. The husband subsequently died.
Is the wife now the sole owner of the land?
(A) No, because a joint tenant has the unilateral right to end a joint tenancy without the consent of the other joint tenant.
(B) No, because the wife's interest in the husband's undivided 50% ownership in the land adeemed.
(C) Yes, because of the doctrine of after-acquired title.
(D) Yes, because the devise to the friend did not sever the joint tenancy.
(D) Yes, because the devise to the friend did not sever the joint tenancy.
A landlord leased a building to a tenant for a 10-year term. Two years after the term began, the tenant subleased the
building to a sublessee for a 5-year term. Under the terms of the sublease, the sublessee agreed to make monthly rent payments to the tenant.
Although the sublessee made timely rent payments to the tenant, the tenant did not forward four of those payments to the landlord. The tenant has left the jurisdiction and cannot be found. The landlord has sued the sublessee for the unpaid rent.
There is no applicable statute.If the court rules that the sublessee is not liable to the landlord for the unpaid rent, what will be the most likely reason?
(A) A sublessee is responsible to the landlord only as a surety for unpaid rent owed by the tenant.
(B) The sublease constitutes a novation of the original lease.
(C) The sublessee is not in privity of estate or contract with the landlord.
(D) The sublessee's rent payments to the tenant fully discharged the sublessee's obligation to pay rent to the landlord.
(C) The sublessee is not in privity of estate or contract with the landlord.
A woman who owned a house executed a deed purporting to convey the house to her son and his wife. The language of the deed was sufficient to create a common law joint tenancy with right of survivorship, which is unmodified by statute in the jurisdiction. The woman mailed the deed to the son with a letter saying: "Because I intend you and your wife to have my house after my death, I am enclosing a deed to the house. However, I intend to live in the house for the rest of my life, so don't record the deed until I die. The deed will be effective at my death." The son put the deed in his desk. The wife discovered the deed and recorded it without the son's knowledge. Subsequently,
the son and the wife separated, and the wife, without telling anyone, conveyed her interest in the house to a friend who immediately reconveyed it to the wife. The woman learned that the son and the wife had separated and also learned what had happened to the deed to the house.
The woman then brought an appropriate action against the son and the wife to obtain a declaration that the woman was still the owner of the house and an order canceling of record the woman's deed and the subsequent deeds.If the court determines that the woman owns the house in fee simple, what will be the likely explanation?
(A) The deed was not delivered.
(B) The wife's conduct entitles the woman to equitable relief.
(C) The woman expressly reserved a life estate.
(D) The woman received no consideration for her deed.
(A) The deed was not delivered.
A woman borrowed $100,000 from a bank and executed a promissory note to the bank in that amount. As security for repayment of the loan, the woman's brother gave the bank a mortgage on a tract of land solely owned by him. The brother did not sign the promissory note.
The woman subsequently defaulted on the loan, and after acceleration, the bank instituted foreclosure proceedings on the brother's land. The brother filed a timely objection to the foreclosure. Will the bank succeed in foreclosing on the tract of land?
(A) No, because the bank has an equitable mortgage rather than a legal mortgage.
(B) No, because a mortgage from the brother is invalid without a mortgage debt owed by him.
(C) Yes, because the bank has a valid mortgage.
(D) Yes, because the bank is a surety for the brother's mortgage.
(C) Yes, because the bank has a valid mortgage.
A mother executed a will devising vacant land to her son. The mother showed the will to her son. Thereafter, the son purported to convey the land to a friend by a warranty deed that contained no exceptions. The friend
paid value for the land and promptly recorded the deed without having first conducted any title search. The friend never took possession of the land. The mother later died, and the will devising the land to her son was duly admitted to probate. Thereafter, the friend conducted a title search for the land and asked the son for a new deed. The son refused, because the
value of the land had doubled, but he offered to refund the purchase price to the friend.
The friend has sued to quiet title to the land.
Is the friend likely to prevail?
(A) No, because the friend failed to conduct a title search before purchasing the land.
(B) No, because the son had no interest in the land at the time of conveyance.
(C) Yes, because of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
(D) Yes, because the deed was recorded.
(C) Yes, because of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
A woman inherited a house from a distant relative. The woman had never visited the house, which was located in another
state, and did not want to own it. Upon learning this, a man who lived next door to the house called the woman and asked
to buy the house. The woman agreed, provided that the house was sold "as is." The man agreed, and the woman conveyed the house to the man by a warranty deed. The man had purchased the house for investment purposes, intending to rent it out while continuing to live next door. After
the sale, the man started to renovate the house and discovered serious termite damage. The man sued the woman for breach
of contract. There are no applicable statutes.
How should the court rule?
(A) For the woman, because the man planned to change the use of the house for investment purposes.
(B) For the woman, because she sold the house "as is."
(C) For the man, because of the doctrine of caveat emptor.
(D) For the man, because he received a warranty deed.
(B) For the woman, because she sold the house "as is."
A man owned a large tract of land. The eastern portion of the land was undeveloped and unused. A farmer owned a farm,
the western border of which was along the eastern border of the man's land. The two tracts of land had never been in common ownership. Five years ago, the farmer asked the man for permission to use a designated two acres of the eastern portion of the man's land to enlarge her farm's irrigation facilities. The man orally gave his permission for such use. Since then, the farmer has invested substantial amounts of money and effort each year to develop and maintain the irrigation facilities within the
two-acre parcel. The man has been fully aware of the farmer's actions. Nothing regarding this matter was ever reduced to writing. Last year, the man gave the entire tract of land as a gift to his nephew. The deed of gift made no reference to the farmer or the two-acre parcel. When the nephew had the land surveyed and discovered the facts, he notified the farmer in writing,"Your license to use the two-acre parcel has been terminated." The notice instructed the farmer to remove her facilities from the two-acre parcel immediately. The farmer refused the nephew's demand. In an appropriate action between the nephew and the farmer to determine whether the farmer had a right to continue to use the two-acre parcel, the court ruled in favor of the farmer. What is the most likely reason for the court's ruling?
(A) The investments and efforts by the farmer in reliance on the license estop the man, and now the nephew as the man's
donee, from terminating the license.
(B) The nephew is merely a donee.
(C) The farmer has acquired an easement based on prior use.
(D) The farmer received a license coupled with an interest.
(A) The investments and efforts by the farmer in reliance on the license estop the man, and now the nephew as the man's
Two friends planned to incorporate a business together and agreed that they would own all of the corporation's stock in equal proportion. A businesswoman conveyed land by a warranty deed to "the corporation and its successors and assigns." The deed was recorded. Thereafter, the friends had a disagreement. No papers were ever filed to incorporate the business.There is no applicable statute. Who owns the land?
(A) The businesswoman, because the deed was a warranty deed.
(B) The businesswoman, because the deed was void.
(C) The two friends as tenants in common, because they intended to own the corporation's stock in equal proportion.
(D) The two friends as tenants in common, because they were the intended sole shareholders.
(B) The businesswoman, because the deed was void.
A landlord leased a building to a tenant for a term of six years. The lease complied with the statute of frauds and was not recorded. During the lease term, the tenant sent an email to the landlord that stated: "I hereby offer to purchase for $250,000 the building that I am now occupying under a six-year lease with you." The tenant's name was placed below the word "signed" on the message.
In response, the landlord emailed the tenant: "That's fine. We'll close in 60 days." The landlord's name was placed below the word "signed" on the reply message. Sixty days later, the landlord refused to tender the deed to the building when the tenant tendered the $250,000 purchase price. The tenant has sued for specific performance. Who is likely to prevail?
(A) The landlord, because formation of an enforceable contract to convey the building could not occur until after the lease
term expired.
(B) The landlord, because the landlord's email response did not contain a sufficient signature under the statute of frauds.
(C) The tenant, because the email messages constitute an insufficient attornment of the lease.
(D) The tenant, because the email messages constitute a sufficient memorandum under the statute of frauds.
(D) The tenant, because the email messages constitute a sufficient memorandum under the statute of frauds.
A tenant leased a commercial property from a landlord for a 12-year term. The property included a large store and a parking lot. At the start of the lease period, the tenant took possession and with the landlord's oral consent installed counters, display cases, shelving, and special lighting. Both parties complied with all lease terms. The lease is set to expire next month. Two weeks ago, when the landlord contacted the tenant about a possible lease renewal, she learned that the tenant had decided not to renew the lease, and that the tenant planned to remove all of the
above-listed items on or before the lease termination date. The landlord claimed that all the items had become part of the real estate and had to remain on the premises. The tenant asserted his right and intention to remove all the items. Both the lease and the statutes of the jurisdiction are silent on the matter in dispute. At the time the landlord consented and the tenant installed the items, nothing was said about the tenant's right to retain or remove the items.The landlord has sued the tenant to enjoin his removal of the items.
How is the court likely to rule?
(A) For the landlord, because the items have become part of the landlord's real estate.
(B) For the landlord as to items bolted or otherwise attached to the premises, and for the tenant as to items not attached to
the premises other than by weight.
(C) For the tenant, provided that the tenant reasonably restores the premises to the prior condition or pays for the cost of
restoration.
(D) For the tenant, because all of the items may be removed as trade fixtures without any obligation to restore the
premises.
(C) For the tenant, provided that the tenant reasonably restores the premises to the prior condition or pays for the cost of
restoration.
For 22 years, the land records have shown a man as the owner of an 80-acre farm. The man has never physically occupied
the land. Nineteen years ago, a woman entered the farm. The character and duration of the woman's possession of the farm caused her to become the owner of the farm under the adverse possession law of the jurisdiction. Three years ago, when the woman was not present, a neighbor took over possession of the farm. The neighbor repaired
fences, put up "no trespassing" signs, and did some plowing. When the woman returned, she found the neighbor in possession of the farm. The neighbor vigorously rejected the woman's claimed right to possession and threatened force. The woman withdrew. The woman then went to the man and told him of the history of activity on the farm. The woman orally told the man that she had been wrong to try to take his farm. She expressly waived any claim she had to the land. The man thanked her. Last month, unsure of the effect of her conversation with the man, the woman executed a deed purporting to convey the farm to her son. The son promptly recorded the deed. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years. Who now owns the farm?
(A) The man, because the woman's later words and actions released title to the man.
(B) The neighbor, because the neighbor succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of possession.
(C) The son, because he succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of conveyance.
(D) The woman, because she must bring a quiet title action to establish her title to the farm before she can convey the farm
to her son.
(C) The son, because he succeeded to the woman's adverse possession title by privity of conveyance.
In the most recent deed in the chain of title to a tract of land, a man conveyed the land as follows: "To my niece and her heirs and assigns in fee simple until my niece's daughter marries, and then to my niece's daughter and her heirs and assigns in fee simple."
There is no applicable statute, and the common law Rule Against Perpetuities has not been modified in the jurisdiction. Which of the following is the most accurate statement concerning the title to the land?
(A) The niece has a life estate and the daughter has a contingent remainder.
(B) The niece has a fee simple and the daughter has no interest, because after the grant of a fee simple there can be no gift
over.
(C) The niece has a fee simple and the daughter has no interest, because she might not marry within 21 years after the date
of the deed.
(D) The niece has a defeasible fee simple determinable and the daughter has an executory interest.
(D) The niece has a defeasible fee simple determinable and the daughter has an executory interest.
A businessman executed a promissory note for $200,000 to a bank, secured by a mortgage on commercial real estate owned by the businessman. The promissory note stated that the businessman was not personally liable for the mortgage debt. One week later, a finance company obtained a judgment against the businessman for $50,000 and filed the judgment in the county where the real estate was located. At the time the judgment was filed, the finance company had no actual notice of
the bank's mortgage. Two weeks after that filing, the bank recorded its mortgage on the businessman's real estate.The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "Unless the same be recorded according to law, no conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice or against judgment creditors without notice." The finance company sued to enforce its judgment lien against the businessman's real estate. The bank intervened in the action, contending that the judgment lien was a second lien on the real estate and that its mortgage was a first lien. Is the bank's contention correct?
(A) No, because the judgment lien was recorded before the mortgage, and the finance company had no actual notice of the
mortgage.
(B) No, because the businessman was not personally liable for the mortgage debt, and the mortgage was therefore void.
(C) Yes, because a mortgage prior in time has priority over a subsequent judgment lien.
(D) Yes, because the recording of a mortgage relates back to the date of execution of the mortgage note.
(A) No, because the judgment lien was recorded before the mortgage, and the finance company had no actual notice of the
mortgage.
A seller conveyed residential land to a buyer by a warranty deed that contained no exceptions and recited that the full consideration had been paid. To finance the purchase, the buyer borrowed 80% of the necessary funds from a bank. The seller agreed to finance 15% of the purchase price, and the buyer agreed to provide cash for the remaining 5%. At the closing, the buyer signed a promissory note to the seller for 15% of the purchase price but did not execute a
mortgage. The bank knew of the loan made by the seller and of the promissory note executed by the buyer to the seller. The buyer also signed a note to the bank, secured by a mortgage, for the 80% advanced by the bank.
The buyer has now defaulted on both loans.
There are no applicable statutes.
Which loan has priority?
(A) The bank's loan, because the seller can finance a part of the purchase price only by use of an installment land contract.
(B) The bank's loan, because it was secured by a purchase-money mortgage.
(C) The seller's loan, because a promissory note to a seller has priority over a bank loan for residential property.
(D) The seller's loan, because the bank knew that the seller had an equitable vendor's lien.
(B) The bank's loan, because it was secured by a purchase-money mortgage.
A seller and a buyer signed a contract for the sale of vacant land. The contract was silent concerning the quality of title, but the seller agreed in the contract to convey the land to the buyer by a warranty deed without any exceptions. When the buyer conducted a title search for the land, she learned that the applicable zoning did not allow for her planned commercial use. She also discovered that there was a recorded restrictive covenant limiting the use of the land to residential use. The buyer no longer wants to purchase the land. Must the buyer purchase the land?
(A) No, because the restrictive covenant renders the title unmarketable.
(B) No, because the zoning places a cloud on the title.
(C) Yes, because the buyer would receive a warranty deed without any exceptions.
(D) Yes, because the contract was silent regarding the quality of the title.
(A) No, because the restrictive covenant renders the title unmarketable.
A farmer entered into a written contract to sell land to a neighbor by warranty deed. The closing was scheduled to take place in six months. The contract did not except encumbrances of record.
When the parties entered into the contract, the land was encumbered by a recorded mortgage securing a loan. Four months remained on the term of the mortgage loan at that time. The farmer did not disclose the existence of the mortgage and has never been late in making the mortgage payments.
The neighbor discovered the mortgage during a title search and has informed the farmer that he will not purchase the land because the title is not marketable. The neighbor claims that the farmer has breached the contract because the title is unmarketable.
The farmer has contacted you for advice.
Should you advise the farmer that the neighbor is correct? Select one.
A.No, because the farmer has never been late in making the mortgage payments.
C.Yes, because the farmer did not disclose the existence of the mortgage.
D.Yes, because without a contrary express agreement, an obligation to convey marketable title is implied in a purchase agreement.
B.No, because the time for the farmer to deliver marketable title has not arrived.
Your client owns vacant land. Twenty years ago, the client granted an easement over that land, by deed of gift, to a neighbor for use as a shortcut to a fishpond located on another parcel owned by the neighbor that adjoins your client’s land. The deed did not specify the easement’s location; however, the neighbor afterward regularly used a footpath along the north side of the client’s land with no objection from the client.
Two years ago, the fishpond dried up after a severe drought. The neighbor rebuilt the fishpond in a new location and now wishes to access the pond from the south side of the client’s land. As a result, the neighbor wants to relocate the easement to the south side of the client’s land. The client has asked you for advice regarding whether he has the right to stop the neighbor from relocating the easement.
Should you advise the client that he has such a right? Select one.
A.No, because the location of the easement was not fixed in the deed.
B.No, because the neighbor would not have wanted to relocate the easement if the fishpond had not dried up due to natural causes.
C.Yes, because the neighbor did not pay consideration for the easement.
D.Yes, because the neighbor’s regular use of the easement on the north side without objection from the client fixed the easement’s location.
D.Yes, because the neighbor’s regular use of the easement on the north side without objection from the client fixed the easement’s location.
A woman inherited vacant land located in another state. The woman decided to sell the land to a buyer who also lived in another state and was interested in purchasing it as an investment. The parties orally agreed on a price. At the buyer’s insistence, the woman agreed to provide the buyer with a warranty deed without any exceptions. The buyer paid the purchase price, the woman delivered the warranty deed, and the buyer promptly recorded the deed. At the time of sale, neither the woman nor the buyer had seen the land.
Sometime after recording the deed, the buyer visited the land and discovered that it lacked access to a public right-of-way and that none of the surrounding real property had ever been held in common ownership with any previous owner of the land.
The buyer has sued the woman for damages. The woman has contacted you for advice.
Should you advise the woman that she is likely to prevail in the suit? Select one.
A.No, because the land’s lack of access to any public right-of-way makes title unmarketable.
B.No, because the woman breached the covenants of warranty and quiet enjoyment in the deed.
C.Yes, because the agreement to sell the land was oral.
D.Yes, because the buyer accepted the deed, and the woman did not breach any title covenants in the deed.
D.Yes, because the buyer accepted the deed, and the woman did not breach any title covenants in the deed.
For many years, a homeowner had enjoyed beautiful views of sunsets from her back porch. Several months ago, the homeowner’s neighbor placed several old, rusted, and broken-down vehicles entirely on his own property but in a location visible from the homeowner’s back porch.
The homeowner asked the neighbor to move the vehicles to a different area of his property, out of the homeowner’s line of sight. The neighbor acknowledged that it was not common for residents of the neighborhood to keep old vehicles on their property in locations visible to others but nonetheless refused to move them. The placement of the vehicles does not violate any local ordinance. Concerned that the presence of the vehicles might adversely affect the market value of her home, the homeowner hired a home appraiser. The appraiser concluded, however, that the presence of the vehicles did not diminish the market value of the home.
The homeowner has filed an action against the neighbor for private nuisance. The neighbor seeks your advice about defending against the action.
Which of the following should you advise the neighbor is his best argument against liability? Select one.
A.The presence of the vehicles has not diminished the market value of the homeowner’s home.
B.There is no applicable ordinance barring property owners from storing old vehicles on their property.
C.The vehicles do not physically encroach on the homeowner’s property.
D.Unsightly conditions do not of themselves ordinarily amount to an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of a neighboring property.
D.Unsightly conditions do not of themselves ordinarily amount to an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of a neighboring property.
A developer and an investor own a nine-acre parcel of land as tenants in common, with the developer owning a one-third interest and the investor owning a two-thirds interest. The developer does not own any other real property in the area. An applicable zoning ordinance requires a minimum lot size of five acres for subdivided land.
After the investor’s efforts to persuade the developer to divide the land between them were unsuccessful, the investor sued for partition and proposed that a six-acre parcel of the land be awarded to the investor and a parcel containing the remaining three acres of the land be awarded to the developer, as those proportions are equivalent to their respective ownership shares.
You have been hired to defend the developer in the partition action. The developer wants the land sold and the proceeds divided one-third to the developer and two-thirds to the investor.
Are you likely to achieve the developer’s goal in the partition action? Select one.
A.No, because partition by sale is not appropriate if the subject property can be physically divided.
B.No, because the proposed division of the land is consistent with the parties’ respective ownership shares in the land.
C.Yes, because partition by sale is the preferred remedy unless a fair price is not the likely result of a sale.
D.Yes, because the applicable zoning ordinance makes it impossible to physically divide the parcel between the co-owners according to their interests.
D.Yes, because the applicable zoning ordinance makes it impossible to physically divide the parcel between the co-owners according to their interests.
By a valid written contract signed in March, your client agreed to purchase land from its owner, with the closing to occur on May 1. The contract did not mention the quality of title to be conveyed.
On April 27, the owner notified your client that she had discovered that the land is subject to a long-standing easement, held by a corporation, for an access road. You discovered that the corporation has not used the road for many years. Upon learning all this information, you advised the client of two options: (1) rescind the contract, because the easement makes the title unmarketable, or (2) close the purchase notwithstanding the easement. The client, who wants the land, has decided to close, and you have asked the owner to be ready to close on May 1.
If the owner refuses to close on May 1, may the client successfully pursue a claim for specific performance? Select one.
A.No, because the easement renders the owner’s title unmarketable.
B.No, because the rights of third parties are unresolved.
C.Yes, because the corporation has not used the access road for many years.
D.Yes, because the decision to terminate a contract for unmarketable title belongs to the client, as the buyer.
D.Yes, because the decision to terminate a contract for unmarketable title belongs to the client, as the buyer.
Fifteen years ago, a rockslide buried part of a driveway located on a landowner’s property. The driveway connected the landowner’s house to a public highway. The landowner cleared a small section of adjacent vacant land, which was owned by an out-of-state investor, and built a new rerouted section of the driveway that crossed the investor’s land and terminated at the public highway.
Twelve years ago, the investor began leasing her land to a geologist. For the next 12 years, the geologist and the landowner both regularly used the rerouted driveway for access to the highway.
A month ago, the investor discovered that the rerouted driveway crossed her land. The investor blocked the rerouted driveway and told the landowner that she had not given him permission to cross her land.
The landowner’s property and the investor’s vacant land have never been in common ownership. The period of time necessary to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is 10 years.
The landowner has sought your advice regarding his right to use the rerouted driveway across the investor’s land.
What should you advise? Select one.
A.The landowner has an easement by necessity to use the rerouted driveway.
B.The landowner has an easement by prescription to use the rerouted driveway.
C.The landowner has an easement implied from prior existing use to use the rerouted driveway.
D.The landowner has no right to use the rerouted driveway, because the geologist also used the driveway during the prescriptive period.
B.The landowner has an easement by prescription to use the rerouted driveway.
Your client recently began renting a house. The house has no garage or driveway, which is typical in the neighborhood, so your client parks his car on the street. A neighbor has repeatedly asked the client not to park his car in front of her house, but the client has continued to do so when no other space is available nearby. On a few of those occasions, the neighbor was seen painting the words “crappy neighbor” on the windshield of the car and placing a bag of dog feces on the hood of the car. Because the paint used was water soluble, the client was easily able to remove the paint and the feces, but he suffered great emotional distress from the neighbor’s actions.
The client wants to discuss his options for suing the neighbor.
Which of the following claims would be the most likely to lead to a favorable outcome for the client? Select two.
A.Assault.
B.Battery.
C.Conversion.
D.Intentional infliction of emotional distress.
E.Negligence.
F.Trespass to chattels.
IIED and Trespass to Chattel
A developer signed a valid contract with your client for the purchase of an apartment building owned by the client. The contract provided that the closing was to occur at your office 45 days after the date of the contract. The contract did not state that time was of the essence.
Fifteen days after signing the contract, the developer asked if the closing could be postponed for 10 days beyond the scheduled closing date because he was going to be out of the country. After the client consented to the change, you emailed the developer, agreeing to the extension but also stating, “time is now of the essence.” The developer emailed back, thanking you and the client for agreeing to the change.
The developer did not appear on the rescheduled closing date because his flight had been canceled due to weather. When the developer returned home a week later, he told you that he was ready to close. However, the client had accepted a secondary, more favorable offer on the building in the meantime and now wants to sell to the secondary buyer. After consulting with the client, you respond that the developer’s conduct constituted a breach of the contract and that the client will cancel the deal with the developer.
Can the developer still enforce the contract? Select one.
A.No, because the developer requested the rescheduled closing date.
B.No, because time was made of the essence as to the rescheduled closing date.
C.Yes, because the developer’s failure to appear on the rescheduled closing date was justified.
D.Yes, because the original contract did not state that time was of the essence.
B.No, because time was made of the essence as to the rescheduled closing date.
The owner of a small commercial building decided to give it to a former high school classmate by deed of gift. The owner signed and promptly recorded a deed properly describing the property and identifying the classmate by name as the grantee. Because the owner disliked the classmate’s brother, the deed specified that under no circumstances was the property “ever to pass to [the classmate’s brother].”
Unbeknownst to the owner at the time, the classmate had died before the owner executed the deed. The classmate had left his entire estate to his brother under a duly probated will. The owner, after learning of the classmate’s death, said in the presence of several witnesses, “I must take back that deed, because I don’t want [the brother] to own the building.”
The owner, however, also died a few weeks later, before having taken any steps to change the deed. The owner’s entire estate was left to a friend by a duly probated will.
The brother has come to you for advice regarding the building. Your research reveals that there are no applicable statutes.
Which of the parties should you advise the brother now owns the building? Select one.
A.The brother, because he was named as the beneficiary in the classmate’s will.
B.The brother, because the deed to the classmate was recorded.
C.The friend, because the deed to the classmate is void.
D.The friend, because the owner clearly stated an intent to take back the deed of gift.
C.The friend, because the deed to the classmate is void.
A landlord owns a 10-unit apartment building and lives in one of the apartments. The landlord uniformly enforces a “no pets” provision in all his apartment leases. A tenant with a seizure disorder asked the landlord for permission to keep a trained service dog in her apartment to alert and assist her in the event of a seizure.
The landlord has sought your advice on whether the landlord can refuse the tenant’s request.
Should you advise the landlord that refusing the request would be a violation of the federal Fair Housing Act? Select one.
A.No, because the landlord lives in an apartment in the building.
B.No, because the landlord uniformly enforces a “no pets” provision in all his apartment leases.
C.Yes, because the landlord’s refusal would be arbitrary.
D.Yes, because the tenant is entitled to a reasonable accommodation for her disability.
D.Yes, because the tenant is entitled to a reasonable accommodation for her disability.
A private high school in a quiet residential neighborhood constructed a football stadium on its property. The school obtained all necessary municipal permits for the construction of the stadium, which includes large light fixtures for night games. Although the high school could conduct games during daylight hours, it prefers to do so at night to increase attendance.
When the stadium lights are on during evening football games, they seriously disturb one homeowner in the neighborhood who purchased her house before the stadium was constructed and is abnormally sensitive to bright lights. No other residents of the neighborhood are disturbed by the lights.
The homeowner has asked you whether she has a viable nuisance claim against the school.
Should you advise the homeowner that she has such a claim? Select one.
A.No, because the lights do not disturb other residents of the neighborhood.
B.No, because the school obtained the requisite municipal permits to construct the stadium.
C.Yes, because the homeowner purchased her house before the stadium was constructed.
D.Yes, because the lights interfere with the homeowner’s use and enjoyment of her property, and nothing prevents the high school from conducting games during daylight hours.
A.No, because the lights do not disturb other residents of the neighborhood.