Dworkin

According to Dworkin, what is the difference between an internal and an external moral skeptic?

Dworkin describes an internal moral skeptic as someone who denies familiar positive moral claims by endorsing a different positive moral claim. In contrast, an external moral skeptic purports to offer a second-level theory about the philosophical standing of moral claims, appearing to be austere and neutral by not relying on positive moral judgments or taking sides in moral controversies.

How does Dworkin respond to the external moral skeptic's argument that there are no objective moral truths because there are no independent physical facts to judge them against?

Dworkin finds the external skeptic's underlying platonic vision absurd, particularly the idea of 'morons' existing as special particles that constitute morality and interact with the human nervous system. He argues that the skeptic inevitably occupies some abstract moral position and that their stance is not truly neutral because it has implications for action similar to substantive moral assertions.

Explain Dworkin's concept of "interpretive concepts" and contrast them with "criterial" and "natural kind" concepts, providing an example for each.

Criterial concepts are shared when people agree on a definition setting out criteria for correct application (e.g., 'bachelor' as a single man). Natural kind concepts refer to instances with a natural physical or biological structure (e.g., 'tiger'). Interpretive concepts require interpretation by a subject engaged with the concept, involving a pre-interpretive, interpretive, and post-interpretive phase where the value of the concept is discerned and applied in potentially divergent ways (e.g., 'courtesy').

What is the "semantic sting" according to Dworkin, and how does the author of "Questioning Dworkin's 'One Right Answer'" partially refute this charge in the context of moral truth?

The 'semantic sting' is Dworkin's term for the fallacious view that interpretive concepts can be reduced to semantic criteria, leading to a trivialized understanding of disagreement. The author partially refutes this by arguing that while speaking of moral truth can involve people talking past each other due to a lack of shared criteria, the term gains a deceptive sense by attaching itself to scientific paradigms of truth, enabling its discussion.

Summarize Guest's main argument for the existence of "one right answer" in legal and moral reasoning.

Guest argues that legal arguments are evaluative arguments of political morality, and therefore Dworkin's theory of law depends on the idea that there are unique correct answers to most evaluative questions. He posits that the logic of evaluative moral discourse inherently involves objectivity or fallibility, and denying moral truth leads to a moral permissibility. He suggests the best argument for the 'one right answer' thesis is morally evaluative, emphasizing the moral duty of lawyers and political actors to construct coherent justifications that resolve tensions between principles without contradiction.

Explain the "sorites paradox" as it relates to moral vagueness, as discussed in one of the sources.

The sorites paradox, illustrated by the example of waiting times for exam results, highlights the problem of vagueness in moral concepts. If six months is unreasonably long, then so is six months minus a fraction of a second, leading to the difficulty of drawing a non-arbitrary line. This paradox suggests that many moral properties have gray areas of borderline cases where there is no determinately correct answer.

What are the two versions of the "no-right-answer" thesis regarding legal questions, as outlined in the New York University Law Review excerpt?

The first version of the 'no-right-answer' thesis argues that lawyers' language is misleading because it suggests no logical space between a dispositive concept and its negation; in reality, both might be false, with a third possibility existing (e.g., an 'inchoate' contract between valid and invalid). The second version does not posit a third possibility but argues that neither the positive nor the negative claim might be true, especially at the borderlines of vague concepts (e.g., whether someone on the border of youth and middle age is 'middle-aged' or not).

According to one source, what are the two dimensions along which a theory is judged to provide the best justification for legal materials, potentially leading to a "right answer"?

The two dimensions are 'fit' with the legal materials and 'political morality.' Fit refers to how well a theory justifies existing legal rules, while political morality concerns whether the theory aligns with sound moral principles and captures people's rights. The availability of the political morality dimension makes a case having no right answer even less likely.

How does the concept of "jurisprudential insularity" relate to the debate surrounding Dworkin's "one right answer" thesis?

Jurisprudential insularity, the tendency to study law as a closed system without external influences, contrasts with approaches that apply insights from sociology, philosophy, and economics to legal understanding. Dworkin's focus on a single internal perspective through rational reconstruction can be seen as a form of this insularity, potentially overlooking the subject's contribution to law and other purposes of legal understanding.

According to one source, what is the key difference between how Dworkin and positivists understand the negation of a legal proposition, and how does this relate to the "no-right-answer" position?

Dworkin argues that positivists believe the negation of a legal proposition (~p) is valid only if there are social facts L(~p) making it true. One source argues that for positivists, (~p) can also be valid if there are no relevant social facts at all (~L(p)), meaning the law says nothing about the matter. This difference highlights a key point of contention regarding the conditions under which a legal proposition might be considered not valid, potentially leading to a 'no-right-answer' scenario from a positivist perspective.