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Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
Homer Plessy, a mixed-race man, boarded a whites-only train car in New Orleans. He was charged with violating Louisiana's Separate Car Act of 1890, which required equal, but separate railroad accommodations for white and black passengers.
Plessy v. Ferguson Question
Did the Louisiana Separate Car Act violate the Fourteenth Amendment?
Plessy v. Ferguson Holding
No. The Act did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plessy v. Ferguson Reasoning
Separate but equal doctrine. While there must be legal equality between white and black people, this does not require the elimination of all distinctions based upon color.
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
Black students in Topeka, Kansas, including the daughter of Oliver Brown, were required to ride a bus to segregated black schools farther away from the schools closest to their homes. There was a policy of segregation in public schools. The Browns and 12 other local black families filed a class action lawsuit.
Brown v. Board of Education Question
Does racial segregation in public schooling violate the Fourteenth Amendment? ("Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?")
Brown v. Board of Education Holding
Yes. Racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional, as it violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Brown v. Board of Education Reasoning
Segregation in schooling has a detrimental effect on children of color. The "separate but equal doctrine" has no place in public education. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
Gideon was arrested in Florida for breaking and entering with intent to commit petty larceny. He was too poor to afford a defense lawyer. During his trial, he was denied a court-appointed attorney because, in Florida, only those charged with capital offenses were entitled to a court-appointed defense attorney.
Gideon v. Wainwright Question
Does the Sixth Amendment guarantee indigent criminal defendants the right to defense counsel in state criminal proceedings?
Gideon v. Wainwright Holding
Yes. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to defense counsel in state criminal proceedings.
Gideon v. Wainwright Reasoning
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a fair trial and due process. The assistance of counsel is essential for this guarantee. Lawyers in criminal court are necessities. If a defendant who desires counsel cannot afford an attorney, they should be appointed one in order to ensure there is a fair trial and the individual is guaranteed due process of the law.
Gideon v. Wainwright Note
This case resulted in the rapid expansion of public defense programs across the country which, in turn, helped promote legal services work, shift the culture of the ABA, and strengthen the LLN.
MacPherson v. Buick (1916)
Buick, a car manufacturer, sold an automobile to a retail dealer. The retail dealer then resold the car to MacPherson. While he was driving the car, it collapsed. One of the wheels was made of defective wood and the spokes crumbled into fragments. He was thrown out of the car and injured. The wheel was not made by Buick, but by a separate, reputable manufacturer. Buick did not inspect the wheel when it manufactured the car.
MacPherson v. Buick Question
Did Buick owe a duty of care to anyone other than the immediate purchaser of the car (the retail dealer)?
MacPherson v. Buick Holding
Yes. Buick owes a duty of care to those beyond just the immediate purchaser of the car.
MacPherson v. Buick Reasoning 1
Previous case about poison being falsely labeled already held that duty of care owed to ultimate consumer of the product. Poison is likely to injure anyone who consumes it. The danger is foreseeable. Here, automobiles have a similar degree ofprobable danger (they drive fast and are large).
MacPherson v. Buick Reasoning 2
2. Also, previous case about improperly built scaffold. The builder of scaffold owed a duty of care to the workers who used
the scaffold. It was held that builder of scaffold should have known that it would be workers using the scaffold and, if that
scaffold was defective, those workers would be injured. Here, Buick knew that people beyond the immediate purchaser
would be using the car (they sold it to a retailer and it has multiple seats).
MacPherson v. Buick Reasoning 3
Purchaser, Buick sould have known that, if defectively made, the car was likely to cause injury. Lastly, the test to discover the defect would have been simple and ordinary.
Allen v. United States (1987)
In 1950, the Atomic Energy Commission chose an area in Nevada for atomic testing. Between 1951 and 1962, eight series of open-air tests were conducted. Over 100 atomic bombs were detonated. Each test explosion was executed according to detailed plans which with AEC reviewed and adopted. There were separate plans for protecting the public and providing information to the public. The AEC delegated some of its authority to a Test Manager, a Radiological Safety Officer, and a Test Information Officer. The Plaintiffs (this is a class action) alleged the government (specifically the Rad Safety Officer, and Test Info officer) failed to fully monitor offsite fallout exposure and to full provide information to the public.
Allen v. United States Question
Is the government immune from suit for the atomic bomb testing it conducted in Nevada? In its nuclear testing did the Government act negligently in performing specific, mandatory duties, or did it simply fall in its discretionary function?
Allen v. United States Holding
Yes, the government is immune. All challenged actions surrounding the government atomic bomb tests in the 1950s, and 1960s are immune from suit because it was performance of a "discretionary function."
Allen v. United States Reasoning
In the Federal Tort Claims Act, there is immunity for the government if the claim is about a "discretionary function" its agents were performing. Government actors have a general statutory duty to promote safety; but, this duty is broad and discretionary. It was left to the AEC to decide exactly how to protect public safety. There is no evidence of test site personnel ignoring or failing to implement specific procedures mandated by the AEC for monitoring and informing the public. Instead, the operational plans the district court considered deficient embody AEC policy decisions. As such, these plans clearly fall within the discretionary function exception.
Downwinders
Howard Ball (1986) gives three possible ways that harm to Downwinders could be remedied: the political remedy, the administrative remedy, and the judicial remedy.
Judicial Remedy
- a judicial order enforcing a right or redressing a wrong
- ultimately unsuccessful in court (Allen case).
Administrative remedy
- A remedy that the law permits an administrative agency to grant.
- Department of Health and Human Services or Department of Veterans
Administration could provide services
Political remedy
legislation passed to provide compensation
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (1990)
"Downwinders" are individuals who developed certain cancers after presumed exposure to radiation released during the atmospheric nuclear tests conducted within the United States.
Downwinder Criteria
(1) The Downwinder must have been physically present in an affected area for specific durations and years, and
(2) they must show that they were diagnosed with a specified compensable disease. The specified compensable diseases are leukemia (other than chronic lymphocytic leukemia), multiple myeloma, lymphomas (other than Hodgkin's disease), and primary cancers of the: thyroid, male or female breast, esophagus, stomach, pharynx, small intestine, pancreas, bile ducts, gall bladder, salivary gland, urinary bladder, brain, colon, ovary, liver (except if cirrhosis or Hepatitis B is indicated, or lung.
Downwinders Compensation
Amounts were: $50,000 to individuals residing or working downwind of the Nevada Test Site, $75,000 for workers participating in atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, and $100,000 for uranium miners, millers, and ore transporters