J563 Court Cases

Dennis V. United States

Court Deciding: 

• Upheld 

Year: 

• 1966 

Issue: 

• “Raymond Dennis and others were members of the Communist Party; they were also officers and members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. They filed false affidavits between 1949 and 1955 to satisfy the stipulations of 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which required all union officers to submit non-Communist affidavits. The union officials retained their Communist Party affiliations, filed the affidavits, and enabled the union to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board. The union officers were indicted by the United States District Court for conspiracy to fraudulently obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board.” 

Conclusion: 

• The Supreme Court held that the indictment properly charged a conspiracy to defraud the United States Government under 18 U.S.C. 371. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Abe Fortas, argued that the conspiracy of filing the false affidavits was intentional and that the events of filing the affidavits and using the NLRB facilities together were a "concert of action" with the purpose of defrauding the Government. The Court refused to hear the question of the constitutionality of 9(h) as the union officers' attempt was to circumvent the law. The relevant standard, according to Fortas, is that the Court will not hear a constitutionality claim to supplant a "voluntary, deliberate, and calculated course of fraud and deceit," as conspiracy to defraud is not an appropriate way to challenge acts of government. The Court also held that the defense should have been allowed access to the grand jury minutes containing the prosecution witnesses' testimonies with an opportunity to question the witnesses regarding their statements. The majority opinion maintained that the union officers exceeded the particularized need standard that is used to evaluate access to grand jury testimony, and thus access should have been granted to the defense, especially as an evaluation is best made by a defense advocate and not a trial judge during in-camera inspection. Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo L. Black joined this part of the majority opinion but dissented from the remainder. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. 

Vote: 

• 7-2 

Importance: 

• The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. 

Whitney V. California

Court Deciding: 

• Upheld Whitney’s Conviction 

Year: 

• 1927 

Facts: 

• Charlotte Anita Whitney, a founding member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was prosecuted under California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act for helping to organize a group that sought to effect economic and political change through the unlawful use of violence. Whitney argued that she had not intended the organization to act this way and did not plan to aid it in those objectives. She claimed the California law violated the First Amendment. 

Issue: 

• Did the Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments? 

Conclusion: 

• In a unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clauses, and that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. The Court held that the state, in exercise of its police power, can punish those who abuse their rights to freedom of speech "by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow." In other words, words with a "bad tendency" can be punished. 

• Writing a separate concurrence, Justice Louis Brandeis, joined by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, argued that restrictions on government action under the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not extend to situations in which speech creates a clear and present danger of an evil outcome. The actions that the defendant took posed only a remote potential harm to the public, and she was involved only in contributing to the preparation of the actions. To satisfy the clear and present danger standard, the risk of harm must be severe, probable, and imminent. Broad statements advocating for revolution at some indefinite date in the future are protected by the First Amendment.  

• Justices Brandeis and Holmes concurred rather than dissented because the record showed evidence of a criminal conspiracy, which meant review was inappropriate without proof that constitutional rights were infringed during the criminal trial. 

•  

Vote: 

• Unanimous Decision 

Importance: 

• Emphasized that freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. 

Abrams V. United States

Court Deciding: 

• Held that the leaflets violated the Espionage Act 

Year: 

• 1919 

Facts: 

• In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian soil against Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for a general strike in ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City window. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production of weapons to be used against "Workers Soviets of Russia". They were sentenced to 20 years in prison. 

Issue: 

• Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? 

Conclusion: 

• The Court held that in calling for a general strike and the curtailment of munitions production, the leaflets violated the Espionage Act. Congress’ determination that all such propaganda posed a danger to the war effort was sufficient to meet the standard set in Schenck v. United States for prosecuting attempted crimes. As in Schenck, the Court emphasized that protections on speech are lower during wartime.  

• In a dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the First Amendment protects the right to dissent from the government’s viewpoints and objectives. Protections on speech, he continued, should not be curtailed unless there is a present danger of immediate evil, or the defendant intends to create such a danger. The evidence in this case consisted of two leaflets, which he concluded did not meet the “clear and present danger” test. 

Vote: 

• 7-2 

Importance: 

• The First Amendment does not protect speech that is designed to undermine the United States in war by fueling sedition and disorder. 

Brandenburg V. Ohio 

Court Deciding: 

• Reversed the conviction, Ohio’s syndicism law was in violation of 1a 

Year: 

• 1969 

Facts: 

• Appellant was a leader of the KKK was charged with "voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." 

• Appellant invited a journalist to film club proceedings that were later aired on a local news station 

• The videos illustrated the club members using derogatory language and stating "We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From there, we are dividing into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into Mississippi. Thank you. " 

• Was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." 

Issue: 

• Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? 

Conclusion: 

• The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution. 

Vote: 

• Unanimous 

Importance: 

• This case became the controlling standard for evaluating the limits of speech advocating for violence or unlawful conduct. It ensures that the government cannot punish speech based solely on its content or perceived offensiveness unless it poses an immediate, concrete threat of illegal activity. 

Holder V. Humanitarian Law Project 

Court Deciding: 

• the Court rejected the Humanitarian Law Project's claims 

Year: 

• 2010 

Facts: 

• Among the plaintiffs in this case are supporters of the Kurdistan Workers Party ("KWP") and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"). The KWP and LTTE engage in a variety of both lawful and unlawful activities. They sought an injunction to prevent the government from enforcing sections of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Section 302 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a "foreign terrorist organization." Section 303 makes it a crime for anyone to provide "material support or resources" to even the nonviolent activities of a designated organization. In previous cases, the courts have held that Section 303 was unconstitutionally vague. Congress then passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ("IRTPA") which amended the AEDPA. It added a state of mind requirement that individuals "knowingly" provide "material support or resources" in order to violate the Act. Congress also added terms to the Act that further clarified what constituted "material support or resources." The government moved for summary judgment arguing that challenged provisions of the AEDPA were not unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted a partial motion for summary judgment, but held that some parts of the Act were unconstitutionally vague. 

• On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the terms "service," "training," or "other specialized knowledge" within the AEDPA, as applied to the plaintiffs, were unconstitutionally vague. 

•  

Issue: 

• Are provisions of the AEDPA which prohibit providing "any . . . service, . . . training, [or] other specialized knowledge" to designated foreign terrorist organizations unconstitutionally vague? 

Conclusion: 

• Not as applied to the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that the material support provision of the AEDPA is constitutional as applied to the particular forms of support that the plaintiffs seek to provide to terrorist organizations. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that, as applied, the provision in question is not vague. Here, the statutory terms at issue -- "training," "expert advice or assistance," "service," and "personnel" -- are not similar to terms like "annoying" and "indecent" that the Court has struck down as being too vague. The Court recognized that the statute may not be clear in every respect, but it is clear enough with respect to the plaintiffs in this case. 

• Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, dissented. He agreed that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. However, Justice Breyer disagreed that the Constitution permits the government to prosecute the plaintiffs criminally for engaging in coordinated teaching and advocacy furthering the designated organizations' lawful political objectives. He reasoned that the government had not met its burden to show that the speech prohibited by the statute served a compelling governmental interest. 

Vote: 

• 6-3 

Importance: 

• The federal government may prohibit providing non-violent material support for terrorist organizations including legal services and advice without violating the free speech clause of the First Amendment. 

Dissent:

• The dissent agreed with the majority opinion in that the statute was not vague on its face. However, the dissent argued that the participation in lawful activities such as teaching and advocacy is not overridden by the government’s interest in controlling terrorism. The dissent reasoned that the government has not shown a compelling enough interest for prohibiting the “communication and advocacy of political ideas and lawful means of achieving political ends.” Further, the dissent noted that the majority misinterpreted the appropriate mens rea for “knowingly” aiding a terrorist organization, and would have remanded the case to the lower courts to determine exactly what type of activities the plaintiffs intended to engage in and whether these activities fall within the “knowing” mental state of the statute.

Near V. Minnesota 

Court Deciding: 

• Injunction was a violation of the 1a 

Year: 

• 1930s 

Facts: 

• In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court. 

Issue: 

• Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment? 

Conclusion: 

• In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was facially unconstitutional, meaning the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. (The majority used the incorporation doctrine to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might be able to justify a prior restraint.  

• Justices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland dissented in an opinion written by Justice Butler. 

Vote: 

• 5-4 

Importance: 

• The Supreme Court held that prior restraint on publication violated the First Amendment. 

NYT V. US (Pentagon Papers) 

Court Deciding: 

• The publishing of these articles was protected by the 1^st amendment. 

Year: 

• 1971 

Facts: 

• In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co. 

Issue: 

• Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment? 

Conclusion: 

• Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. 

Vote: 

• Per curiam 

Importance: 

• Expanded the freedom of the press and put limits on the Government’s powers of censorship. 

Nebraska Press Association V. Stuart 

Court Deciding: 

• Overturned the Judges order. 

Year: 

• 1976 

Facts: 

• A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused. 

Issue: 

• Did the judge's order violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? 

Conclusion: 

• Yes. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity." However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that"a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it." 

Vote: 

• Unanimous  

Importance: 

• upheld prior restraints on media as unconstitutional 

United States V. Progressive 

Court Deciding: 

• ? 

Year: 

• 1979 

Facts: 

• The Progressive, a monthly magazine, planned to publish an article written by Howard Morland titled “The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It—Why We’re Telling It.” 

• The United States government sought an injunction to prevent publication, arguing that the article contained information restricted under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 

• The government claimed that publication would cause “direct, immediate, and irreparable injury to the United States” by potentially aiding nuclear proliferation. 

Issue: 

• Does the publication of an article describing the construction of a hydrogen bomb justify prior restraint under the Atomic Energy Act, or does such restraint violate the First Amendment’s freedom of the press? 

Conclusion: 

• The district court granted a temporary injunction preventing The Progressive from publishing the article. 

• Judge Robert W. Warren held that although prior restraint is generally unconstitutional, the Atomic Energy Act created a narrow exception because the information involved “restricted data” related to nuclear weapons. 

Vote: 

• N/A 

Importance: 

• It remains one of the most significant examples of a court allowing prior restraint based on national security concerns, even though it did not result in binding Supreme Court precedent.