german history historigraphy 1933-45

kershaw

how the nazi state operated- significance of hitler

‘working towards the fuhrer’

‘radical initiatives from below’

sonderweg- special path idea

rise of nazism as part of a special path

schoenbaum- underlying political immaturity meant weimar democracy was ill-equipped to deal with nazism

richard evans- challenged sonderweg ‘germany did not embark on a straight or undeviating special path towards aggressive nationalism and political dictatorship’

nazism- old or new

evans- ‘a tangled mix of new and old’

burleigh- ‘new, spledid and light-filled future’-post 1929

the hitler state

kershaw theory- ‘hitler was indispensable to the rise and exercise of power of national socialism’

nazi ideology- ‘ an amalgam of prejudices, phobias and utopian social expectations’

mallmann and paul- termed ‘loyal reluctance’

hitler strong or weak dictator

norman rich- ‘ the point cannot be stressed too strongly, hitler was the master in the third reich

mommsen- challenges rich- ‘hitler was unwilling to make decisions, frequently uncertain, influenced by his entourage’. ‘in some respects a weak dictator’

jackel and hildebrand (intentialists)-hitler was at the heart of the regime intentionally dividing and ruling

kershaw- challenges intentionalists is too simple an explanation

brozat and mommsen (structuralists- suggests that structures grew within the state because hit;er was too unwilling to regulate or control top down

kershaw- his role as fuhrer was unchallenged

hitler and the gauleiters

gauleiters were hitlers most trusted and loyal lieutenants

kershaw- gaulieters were the backbone of his power

hitlers central role

kershaw- little threat to his power in war years, except deep divisions in nazi hierarchy- unquestioning loyalty to the leader

‘the innermost structure of the regime long depended on the way hitler could play off his paladins against each other’

‘hobbesian war of all, against all’

terror state- night of long knives

burleigh- ‘hitler and himmler were literally bound by blood’

terror state- gestapo threat vs denunciations

gellately- gestapo threat reliant on ‘malicious denunciations’

gellately- gestapo threatening but not all-pervasive

hitlers aims

A.J.P Taylor- argued that hitler had no fixed FP aims and just improvised

bullock- ‘hitler had only one programmer, power without limit and the rest was window dressing’

hildebrand- hitler wanted to challenge britain and USA as global hegemon- discredited view now

rearmament

naval agreement 1935 allowed german naval expansion- rich- ‘horrendous diplomatic blunder by britain’

rhineland

carr- ‘real turning point in the inter-war years, making the shift of balance of power in favour of berlin’

racial state

racial ideology- Fest- ‘the foundation of its belief and superiority’

jews- burleigh- lack of indifference from citizens to the plight of jews and nazi direct properganda

final solution- kershaw- the territorially the jewish problem resettlement was ‘synonymous with genocide’

kershaw- hitlers role was ‘authorizing more than directing’ but was ‘decisive and indispensable’

burleigh- nazi leaders ‘embodied the negation of everything worthwhile about being human; their followers demeaned and shamed themselves’

consent and opposition

resistenz- brozat termed this to cover dissent and nonconformity

mallmann and paul- loyal relucatance- summarised the mood of the majority of citizens

economic state

blitzkrieg economy- klein + milwald- germany was not fully mobilised for total war by 1939 hence needed to adapt

• suggest that this limited strategy made fewer civilian demands than the total war 1942

revisionist-herb- challenged orthadox assumptions that nazi economy was not ready

overy- also challenged argued that hitler planned a long war, hence the slow economic mobilisation was due to war occuring before hitler had planned

final solution- kershaw impact shows ‘economic irrationality’

society overview

neumann + peukert- minimal impact of nazi ideology- often ‘empty rhetoric’- reinforced class divisions

schoenbaum + dahrendorf- nazi social change was revolutionary since it dislocated the existing class structure and ignited fundamental social change

working class policies

peuken- ‘a certain general consent to the regime, or at least of a passive adjustment to a situation which could not be changed’

big business

mason- controversially- from 1936 ideology dominated economic policy

overy- despite the business classes ‘working towards the fuhrer’ remained ‘junior partner’

grunberger ‘the conductor of a runaway bus who has no control over the reaction of the driver but keeps collecting the passengers fares right up to the final crash’

rural society

grunberger ‘nazism defaulted on its agrarian utopia twice over’

young people

the nazification of the education system in creating a volkish community was considered a success by grunberger

‘one of the few nazi innovations to make a genuine, if partial contribution to proclaimed aim of a folk community’ grunberger

mettlemen- ‘we were brought up to love our fuhrer, who was to me like a second god’

social revolution

neumann argues that nazism reinforced class divisions with its favouring of the business class and failed to create a classless society

challenges- schoenbaum- workers appeared more confident than previously

factoring the rise of middle class generals by 1939- ‘hitlers social revolution amounted to the destruction of the traditional relationship between class and status.. nobody knew what was up or what was down’ - schoenbaum