Epistemology Final

Armstrong’s Case 1 (ordinary knowledge)

Radford’s original case with an explicit causal mechanism such that a memory-trace, produced by the original teaching, existed until the moment of the so-called guess, and the memory-trace is responsible for Jean picking ‘1603’.

Armstrong’s Case 2 (ordinary false belief)

Jean guesses ‘1630’ and later recollects that he was previously taught, albeit incorrectly, that Queen Elizabeth died in 1630. This prior incorrect teaching produced a memory-trace that existed until the moment of the so-called guess and was responsible for Jean picking ‘1630’.

Armstrong’s Case 3 (unconscious (mere) true belief)

Jean guesses ‘1603’. Jean later recollects that he was previously taught the incorrect year of 1630 but shortly afterwards became muddled in his recollection and came to believe that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. This muddled memory-trace existed until the moment of the so-called guess and was responsible for Jean picking ‘1603’.

Core disagreement between Radford and Armstrong’s interpretations of the unconfident examinee

Radford argues that this is a counterexample to JTB as p is true, S is justified in believing p, but S does not believe that p. Armstrong argues that this is not a counterexample to JTB as S simultaneously believes p and ~p. According to Armstrong, Case 3 features a simultaneous occurrence of Bap—‘Jean believes that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603’—and Ba~p—‘Jean believes that it is not the case that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603’—due to Jean’s muddled memory-trace. Since Case 3 is an instance of Bap, Case 3 cannot be ~Bap—‘it is not the case that Jean believes Queen Elizabeth died in 1603’—because ~Bap & Bap is a contradictory conjunction. Similarly, since the cases are parallel, Case 1 cannot be, as Radford says, ~Bap. Thus, Armstrong concludes that the Case of the Unconfident Examinee is an example of (b) Kap & Bap & Ba~p, rather than an example of (a) ~Bap.

Simple belief

belief as an all or nothing concept (i.e. you believe something entirely or you don’t). Under this conception belief is divided into things one believes, disbelieves, and neither believes nor disbelieves

Degrees of belief

probabilities of belief such that there exists a probability threshold where if that threshold is exceeded, the belief is no longer subjective and becomes simple belief

Kyburg Lottery Problem

consider a fair election where there exists a threshold articulated in the same manner as degrees of belief such that there is one over-threshold (say the threshold is 0.95) ticket out of one-hundred tickets. If S buys a ticket, then S has a 1/100 chance of that being the winning ticket, so S has a 0.99 chance of having a winning ticket. 0.99 is over the 0.95 threshold, so S can form a simple belief that every ticket in the lottery will lose; yet, this is a fair lottery so one ticket will inevitably win.

Certainty

belief in the highest possible degree of belief. Belief and knowledge do not require certainty

JTB analysis of knowledge

KSp iff (1) p, (2) BSp, and (3) S’s belief that p is justified.

JTB vagueness

notions of justification are vague which could implicate the vagueness of knowledge itself. Nevertheless, under JTB vagueness of justification is a feature of the theory rather than a bug

JTB+

Adds a fourth condition (called No False Lemmas) to JTB in hopes of addressing Gettier Counterexamples

No False Lemmas

S’s justification for believing that p cannot depend on any false belief that S has

Defeasibility Strategy (no false lemmas amendment)

There is no proposition d that defeats S’s justification for believing that p. This constructs knowledge as undefeated JTB.

Defeat (as understood in the defeasibility strategy)

If evidence e justifies S’s belief that p, then d defeats that justification iff (1) d is true and (2) the conjunction e&d does not justify S in believing that p

Lehrer and Paxson’s thesis

this notion of defeat isn’t quite right + too weak and, thus, cannot be added to JTB to get a correct account of knowledge.

Lehrer and Paxson’s amendment to defeat

want to add a third condition to defeat such that (3) S is completely justified in their belief and does not believe that d is false. While this third condition is helpful when discussing examples such as Pathological Mrs. Grabit, it is unnecessary in other cases

Core insight of defeasibility theorists

Evidence e justifies belief in p. This allows one to recognize that this evidential relation is non-monotonic

Non-monotonic

one can have a certain body of evidence that justifies you in believing something, and something can be added to that body of evidence which leads to the justification for believing the thing being undermined

Main point of Gettier

rebut the JTB analysis of knowledge by demonstrating all three conditions’ sufficiency

Assumptions made by Gettier

(1) you can be justified in BSp even if ~p and (2) if p |– q, S is justified in believing that p, and S deduces q from p on the basis of this entailment, then S is justified in believing that q

Entailment

p entails q when there is no possible world in which p is true and q is false (a necessary truth)

Smith-Jones 10 coins example

S has justification for believing that (1) jones will get the job and (2) jones has ten coins in his pocket. from these, S deduces that the person who will get the job has ten coins in their pocket. However, S himself will get the job and S has ten coins in his pocket, so p (the person who will get the job has ten coins in their pocket) is true and S is justified in believing it, but S doesnt know it bc he will actually get the job, not Jones {type-1 example where S’ justification relies on a false belief}

Nogot and Havit Example

s has evidence that justifies his belief that nogot has a ford and nogot is in s’ office. s infers that someone in his office has a ford (p), thus nogot having a ford and nogot being in s’ office entails that someone in his office has a ford. nvtl, nogot doesnt have a ford, yet p is true bc havit has a ford. {type-1 example where S’ justification relies on a false belief}

Newspaper Example

s gets a newspaper and learns that there was an assassination of a dictator, s then falls asleep and when s wakes up they go to a cafe. unbeknownst to s, after the publication of the first newspaper the ruling party has decided to cover up the story of the assassination by saying it was a failed assassination attempt. the newspaper retracts the original story but s is at the cafe w people who didnt read the first edition of the newspaper but rather are only aware of the cover up story and s never learns of the cover up. smith now doesnt know that the dictator was assassinated bc his JTB has persevered in the face of disinfo due to an unlikely string of events (if s wouldve learned the cover up, his belief of the assassination would no longer exist) {type-2 example where S’ justification relies of missing information; means that no false lemmas does not address type-2 cases as S’s justification doesn’t rely on false beliefs, rather on a lack of subsequent true beliefs}

Donald in San Francisco Example

s has a friend named donald who lives in SF + barely ever leaves SF and donald decides to play a prank on s. donald wants to convince s that donald is in tuscany, so donald finds italian post cards and writes post cards to s + arranges to have an acquaintance in tuscany send the cards to s. however, s happens to live in a house w a mailbox on the front door that got jammed, so the mail deliverer pushed the cards under the door and the door mat is slightly raised so donald’s post cards end up being pushed under the door mat and s doesnt get them. thus, s believes donald is in SF and is justified in this belief. this JTB doesnt count as knowledge bc s only has JTB due to sheer luck of the post cards never being read {type-2 example where S’ justification relies of missing information; means that no false lemmas does not address type-2 cases as S’s justification doesn’t rely on false beliefs, rather on a lack of subsequent true beliefs}

Radical Skepticism

the view that nobody knows anything

Internal propositions

propositions about one’s current mental state and how things appear to be. The skeptic says we can be certain of these

External propositions

propositions about an external, real, and physical world independent of one’s own cognitive and experiential states such that the propositions remain true regardless one’s mental state

Bad argument for skepticism (Unger)

(1) if anyone knows that p, then they are entitled to be absolutely certain that p, (2) no one is ever entitled to be absolutely certain that p, so (3) no one knows that p

Critique of the bad argument for skepticism

the first premise is too demanding an account of knowledge as absolute certainty of belief refers to belief to the highest possible degree. In this sense, nothing can meet this impossible condition.

Knowledge without certainty

lack of certainty doesn’t give up on the claim to knowledge, it is just a different usage of language

Practical vs. absolute certainty

practical certainty is certainty to the highest degree, and absolute certainty is certainty with no possibility of doubt. If one changes premise 1 to read ‘practical’ instead of ‘absolute’ certainty, it doesn’t raise the standards of knowledge impossibly high but introduces a problem with the second premise as now no one is entitled to be practically certain of internal propositions – meaning one cannot be practically certain of anything and, thereby, knows nothing

Good argument for skepticism (Stroud)

p is the target proposition and q is the skeptical hypothesis. (1) you don’t know that q is false, (2) if you know that p is true, then you know that q is false [follows from PCKE], so (3) you don’t know that p is true

Principle of Closure under Known Entailment (PCKE)

If I know that X and I know that X entails Y (and I come to believe Y on the basis of knowing that entailment), then I know that Y. Plausible because what you know is closed under what you know is entailed

Duke of Devonshire Example

the duke dreams he’s giving a speech in front of the house of lords and wakes up and actually is giving a speech in front of the house of lords. Stroud worries that cases like this, where one dreams that p is true but reality is consistent with p, undermine PCKE by showing that p and q and be consistent with each other.

Epistemic possibility

Something might be true for all you know

Logical Possibility

something is logically possible (meaning that it cannot be ruled out by logic alone/that its falsehood doesn’t follow from the truths of logic)

Core motivation of Dretske

realized that the debate about radical skepticism would come down to whether or not PCKE should be believed, so he analyzed PCKE in relation to epistemic operators (notices that there are a large number of cases similar to ‘S knows that p’ where it is less clear that PCKE holds)

Mrs. Murphy Example (of ‘it is a mistake that’)

mrs. murphy mistakenly gave cat some dog food to eat which entails that she gave her cat something to eat. was it a mistake that she gave her cat something to eat? the mistake isnt giving the cat something to eat, rather the mistake is giving the cat the wrong type of food

Brenda’s Dessert Example

brenda didnt order dessert. brenda is on a diet. that brenda didnt order dessert entails that she didnt order dessert and throw it at the waiter; however, if someone asks, why didnt brenda order dessert and throw it at the waiter, the response ‘she’s on a diet’ isnt applicable. Demonstrates that just because you explain p and know that p → q, you don’t have an explanation of q.

Explanans

does the explaining

Explanadum

what is being explained

Lefty and Otto Example

why did lefty kill otto? this question could be asking ‘why didnt someone else kill otto?’ or ‘why didnt lefty threaten otto instead?’ or ‘why didnt lefty kill someone else?’ we indicate this though verbal/tonal emphasis. This question is showing that explanation is a contrastive concept such that any request for explanation is made with respect to a contrast class that is indicated in the request or may fail to be transmitted in the asking of the question. this explains why explanation isnt CKE by saying that ‘e explains f’ isnt complete and, instead, it should be ‘explains (why) f rather than h’

Zebra Example

if someone thought knowledge is contrastive, they would say ‘when i told my 5 year old, ‘this is a zebra’ i knew this assertion was made legitimate in the sense that i know animals like that are called zebras not kangaroos, hippos, elephants, etc.’ so if the contrast class is various other zoo animals, i know this animal is a zebra rather than another zoo animal. however, there are other contrast classes that include possibilities of the zebra being a painted mule, hologram, etc. with respect to those contrast classes, you dont know that it is a zebra rather than a painted mule. We can think abt this case by remembering that whenever we speak abt/make/challenge knowledge claims there’s always a set of relevant alts (the elements of the contrast class). if this is true, where does it leave PCKE?

Contrast class

what you weigh something against to see if that thing is a relevant alternative

Relevant alternative

a relevant proposition such that if it is true, p must be false. Raises a concern about the lack of clarity about what counts as ‘relevant’ since this definition must be motivated by something other than the skeptical argument and, at the moment, relevancy is defined entirely by the skeptical argument.

Modal sensitivity of truth

account for the possibility that, had the truth of p been different, S’ belief, as a knower, would have been different and still accurate. This allows us to account for the reliability of S’ knowledge in the actual world and possible non-actual worlds

Counterfactual conditional

a conditional whose antecedent is contrary to fact (a false antecedent gives you this) and the conditional sentence has to be expressed in the subjunctive mood

Shakespeare and Hamlet example

If Shakespeare didn't write Hamlet, then someone else did (an indicative conditional, inclined to say it is true) vs. if Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, then someone else would have (a subjunctive conditional, inclined to say it is false). Demonstrates the difference between the indicative and subjunctive conditionals and how they tell us different things

Nozick’s model of knowledge

KSp iff (1) p {truth}, (2) BSp {belief}, (3) ~p []→ ~BSp {sensitivity}, and (4) p []→ BSp {stability}

Clause 3 (sensitivity) and Gettier cases

Accounts for type-1 Gettier causes by by ensuring ¬KSp if S bases their justification for BSp on a false belief

Clause 4 (stability) and Gettier cases

by ensuring ¬KSp if BSp due to an accidental lack of information about p.

Key thought of Clause 4

some respects of similarity/closeness count for nothing such that there are worlds that differ from @ but only in ways that are as similar to @ as @ is to itself

Weakly centered

for all X, @ ≤ x. Ensures that some non-actual worlds may be as close to the actual worlds as the actual world is to itself

Strongly centered

for all X =/= @, @ < x

Ways of reading Clause 4 in the metalanguage

if p had been true, S would’ve believed that p OR p wouldn’t have been true unless S believed it

The skeptical argument Nozick is responding to

(1) ~KS~q, (2) KSp |– KS~q, and (3) ~KSp

Nozick’s goal in responding to the skeptic

show that the second premise of the skeptical argument (KSp |– KS~q) is false such that it is possible for KSp, KS(p |– ~q), yet ~KS~q. To show KSp, Nozick demonstrates that his own conditions for knowledge are true. To show KS(p |– ~q), Nozick shows the closure of belief under known entailment. To show ~KS~q, Nozick demonstrates that not all of his own conditions for knowledge are true

Main thesis of Lewis and Stalnaker

X []→ Y is true in the actual world iff Y is true in all worlds closest to the actual world at which X is true. Closeness is understood as a matter of similarity to the actual world which can be visualized using the visual metaphor of possibility space where the more similar a world is to @, the physically close it is placed in the diagram

Visually depicting entailment

X |– Y means that a proposition p is true in all possible worlds, not in a contingent/subset of possible worlds

Similarity in the subjunctive

referring to similarity with respect to laws of nature

Comparative closeness

Comparative closeness is any comparative relation that satisfies the following two conditions (1) the relation is connected such that for all x, y either x ≤ y or y ≤ x or both (aka equally close to the actual world) and (2) the relation is transitive such that for all x, y, z if x ≤ y and y ≤ z, then x ≤ z

v ≤ w and v < w

v is at least as close to A as w is and v i closer to @ than w is

Strengthening the antecedent

if A []→ C, then to strengthen the antecedent would be to say (A&B) []→ C. This is a fallacious inference under Lewis and Stalnaker’s understanding of comparative closeness. Holds for indicative + material conditionals and entailment but not for subjunctive conditional

Contraposition

A → C, so ~C → ~A. This holds for entailment too but fails for the subjunctive conditional

Transitivity

A→B, B→C, so A→C. This holds for entailment too but fails for the subjunctive conditional

Goal of Kripke’s piece

to demonstrate that in (almost) every case in which a failure of either clause (3) or (4) denies S knowledge that p, there is a simply proposition r such that, according to Nozick, S does not know that (p and r). Kripke says that this is absurd

Recipe 1 (focuses on (3))

Suppose p is true but S’s belief that p actually fails to be knowledge because of a failure of Clause 3. Further, let r be some feature of S’ perceptual experience that would’ve been different had p been false. Then, according to Nozick’s conception of knowledge, S knows that p&r despite not knowing that p

Fake vs. Real Barns example (Recipe 1)

p – there is a barn in that field there, r – the barn is red, p&r – there is a red barn in that field there. S sees a red barn, but unbeknownst to S, this area has many paper mache fake barns. Thus, p, BSp, p []→BSp, but ~p []→ ~BSp is false because if the barn was fake, Henry still wouldve believed that it was a real barn. Now, suppose that all the fake barns are green and S is looking at a red barn; under (3), if p had been false, the barn would’ve been green and this allows S to distinguish between real and fake barns. Thus, p&r, BS(p&r), ~(p&r) → ~B(p&r), and (p&r) → B(p&r). So, it must follow that Henry knows p&r but does not know p which seems absurd.

Recipe 2 (focuses on (3))

Suppose p is a true proposition about some relatively essential property of some thing or person and that S would believe p regardless of p’s truth. Let r be a true proposition about some relatively accidental feature of that thing or person. In this case, p does not satisfy (3), but p&r satisfies (3).

Essential property

a property that something couldn’t possibly lack (i.e. there’s no possible would in which that thing exists and fails to have that property)

Relatively essential property

a property that something is very likely to have. The further out in possibility space one must go to find a world where that property does not hold, the more relatively essential, and the closer one must go, the more accidental the property.

Karri and Jarrah tree example (Recipe 2)

S is hiking in Pemberton where there exist two types of trees called karri and jarrah such that there exist regions that are only karri and regions that are only jarrah. S does not know how to tell the difference between karri and jarrah trees. S overhears a comment about S’ cousin Carrie but mistakes that comment as saying that the trees around them are karri trees. This leads S to form the belief that the trees they’re looking at are karri trees. In this case, p, BSp, p []→BSp, but ~p []→ ~BSp is false because if the tree was jarrah, S still would’ve believed it was karri. Consider the conjunction “this is a karri tree and this tree has an inscription ‘daryl and kylie forever’”. The tree being karri is more relatively essential than it having an inscription, so one must consider that close possible worlds of ~(p&r) because r is false. Thus, Thus, p&r, BS(p&r), ~(p&r) → ~B(p&r), and (p&r) → B(p&r). So, it must follow that S knows p&r but does not know p which seems absurd.

Glenn Close example (Recipe 2)

S believes for a bad reason that glenn close is a woman, S believes for a good reason that glenn close is an actor, thus, S infers that glenn close is a woman actor. gender is a more accidental property than profession, so one must consider close possible worlds where glenn close is a man. In those worlds, S still believes glenn close is a woman bc per premise 1, all people named glenn are women – in this case, p, BSp, p []→BSp, but ~p []→ ~BSp is false. According to nozick, it is easier to know that glenn close is a woman actor than to know glenn close is a woman or glenn close is an actor. conjunction passes the sensitivity condition — kripke says this is absurd and a counter-example of the theory

Recipe 3 (focuses on (4))

take a true proposition p that S believes but fails to be knowledge. Per Nozick, if p and BSp but fails to be knowledge, ~KSp. Type-2 gettier cases can be examined under this recipe

r as BSp example (Recipe 3)

p&BSp, BS(p&BSp), ~(p&BSp) []→ ~BS(p&BSp), and (p&BSp) []→ BS(p&BSp). This is devastating for Nozick because this should fail his conditions since p alone failed (4) – remember that type-2 gettier cases fail (4)

Grandmother Example

suppose there’s a grandmother whose grandson goes to visit her. the grandmother comes to believe that her grandson is healthy on the basis of seeing him in person. if the grandson hadnt been healthy, the family wouldve told the grandmother than the grandson was on vacation and the grandmother wouldve continued believing that her grandson was healthy on the basis of her family’s testimony. This highlights the importance of having a consistent method of belief formation

Belief formulation modification of Clause (3)

if p had been false and yet S had come to believe p, via the same method, then S wouldn’t have come to believe that p by that method

Probability states

Your belief state at any given moment is a probability state p

p evolves under the impact of some evidence such that it becomes pe by conditionalizing evidence

Conditionalizing

pe = p(-/e) (example Px(x) = P(x-e))

Pe(h) > P(h)

e is ev in favor of hypothesis h and e is justification for believing that h

Bayesian principle of evidence

If h entails e, then e cannot be evidence against h

If e is evidence against q, it should lower the probability of q such that the prior probability of q is higher than the posterior probability of e (meaning Pe(q) < P(q))

Syntax

has to do with the symbols and sounds of which language is built

Semantics

has to do with meaning

Pragmatics

argues that a sentence only fixes the proposition with some aspect of that context

Contextualist diagnosis of the skeptical argument

the skeptic equivocates the context for s’ utterance and the context for the skeptic’s utterance such that both utterances can be true in the respective contexts in which they were uttered

DeRose’s contextualism

context adjusts the strength of the epistemic position required to be sensitive to the truth of what one is talking about

Lewis on evidence

KSp iff p holds in every possibility that is not eliminated by s’ evidence, except for the possibilities we are properly ignoring

Rule of actuality

you are never allowed to ignore the actual situation (restrictive rule which tells you what you cannot properly ignore)

Rule of belief

you cannot properly ignore any situation which you believe/have reason to believe is the case (restrictive rule which tells you what you cannot properly ignore)

Rule of resemblance

if two possibilities resemble one another saliently, then either both or neither can be properly ignored (restrictive rule which tells you what you cannot properly ignore)

Rule of reliability

you are entitled to take for granted that the processes through which information is transmitted (perception, memory, and testimony) are reliable (permissive rule which tells you what you can properly ignore)

Rule of method

you are entitled to presuppose that a sample is representative and that the best explanation for our evidence is the true explanation (permissive rule which tells you what you can properly ignore)

Rule of conservatism

generally ignored possibilities may be properly ignored; usually and mutually accepted presuppositions may be adopted (permissive rule which tells you what you can properly ignore)

Rule of attention

saying a possibility is properly ignored means exactly that, so a possibility that is not ignored at all is not properly ignored (permissive rule which tells you what you can properly ignore)

Contextualism’s argument

the attributor’s relationship to the subject and proposition is what should be considered

type/token

• type: the general concept of the thing; token: the specific thing itself

  • Type/token allows us to see that the same string of symbols has different means depending on context 

Stanley on knowledge and practical interests

Argues that knowledge is sensitive to the stakes of the subject by considering cases of high/low stakes and subject/attributor

SSI’s argument

the subject’s relation to the proposition is what should be considered

Gradable adjectives

adjectives that allow for modifiers such as very, really, etc.