PHIL Exam 2

1.      What is the symbol-grounding problem?

it’s the problem of how symbols (like words or numbers) get their meaning. Symbols by themselves don’t mean anything unless they are connected to real-world experiences or things.

Harnads Symbol Grounding Problem:

• Our symbols have meanings + words have referents. But syntax alone cannot ground any symbols. 

• Harnad's proposal: sensorimotor experience grounds our initial symbols (direct grounding). Once you have enough, indirect grounding becomes possible.

• Harnad also claims that sensorimotor experience is what our ability to generalize (into categories) depends on.

• Mirror neurons: these fire when we see someone else doing things (not directly sensor motor) → these are are action based neurons that are firing by watching others do things → can speed up the learning progress 

• From reading task:

  • Harnad’s central concern is how symbols (like words) come to mean something and he argues that we, as humans, ground our symbols through our experiences and our words are connected directly to things we can perceive and manipulate in the world. He distinguishes between direct grounding when a symbol is connected to the world through experience/ our categorization capabilities (like the word red being grounded in our ability to perceive and discriminate things that are red visually) and indirect grounding where other symbols seem to be grounded/defined indirectly by already grounded symbols (like “puppy” coming from “young” and “dog”).

1.      What does Harnad propose as the way that human beings ground symbols (solving the symbol-grounding problem)?

Humans ground symbols by connecting them to sensory experiences—what we see, hear, touch, taste, and feel. We understand words because we can link them to real things and actions in the world.

1.      What is Chomsky’s suggestion about the “laws of thought”?

Chomsky suggests that humans have built-in mental rules—a kind of internal structure for thinking and language—that guide how we form ideas and understand the world. These are like universal “laws” of how the mind works.

1.      What does ChatGPT contribute to the dialogue?

ChatGPT contributes by generating human-like text based on patterns in the data it was trained on. It can continue conversations, answer questions, and provide information—but it doesn’t truly understand meaning like humans do.

1.      If Harnad is correct about how we ground our symbols, what would it take to build an AI that has grounded symbols? Would it be possible to take an LLM like ChatGPT and ground its symbols top-down?

To have grounded symbols, an AI would need direct connections to the real world—like seeing, touching, hearing, and interacting with things, just like humans do. You cannot simply take a ChatGPT LLM and give meaning top-down, because it only manipulates symbols based on patterns; it doesn’t experience the world. → would need to be sensorimotor grounding bottom up

• How might a LLM be constructed so as to "ground" its symbols? What does Harnad think of those possible approaches?: 

  • A LLM is trained purely on text and symbols and has no sensory/ contextual relationship with the world. So, some ways to "ground" it to its symbols might be to equip it with sensors, give it a body, or integrate linguistic learning with real world interaction. For Harold, he is not sure if these would be enough and the crucial question would be whether the system actually understands or just simulates understanding.

1.      According to Andrews, what is Maynard-Smith and Harper’s biological account of communication?

It’s the idea that communication in animals evolved to benefit both sender and receiver. Signals (like calls, displays, or gestures) are shaped by natural selection to be honest and useful, helping organisms survive and reproduce.

From notes: Expression but not communication:

• Expressing current emotions or state (when you stub your toe and you shout out ouch!)

• Communication

  • Has some impact on another organism

  • Change in state of one organism causes a change in another organism 

  • Both the changes in the sender and receiver evolved for that reason 

1.      On this account, how do bean plants “communicate” about aphid problems?

Bean plants release chemical signals when attacked by aphids. Nearby plants detect these chemicals and prepare their own defenses. This is a form of communication shaped by evolution—it benefits both sender and receiver

1.      What are the basic tenets of the informational accounts of communication?

Informational accounts see communication as sending and receiving messages. Key ideas:

• Information is encoded by the sender.

• The receiver decodes the message.

• Success depends on accurate transmission, like in telephone or computer systems.

1.      What is the definition of “information” in the informational accounts?

Information is a message that reduces uncertainty for the receiver. It’s something that tells the receiver something they didn’t already know, regardless of meaning or understanding.

• Increase in information = how surprising it is

  • If you know everything someone is going to say in a speech it carries no information

1.      On the intentional accounts of communication, what does it mean to say that a signal is “flexible”?

A flexible signal is one that the sender can use in different ways for different purposes, not just a fixed response. It shows the sender intentionally chooses how to communicate depending on the situation.

→ signals are flexible: organism can choose to send the signal or not

1.      According to Grice, what is “speaker meaning”? What is “conventional meaning”?

• Speaker meaning – What the speaker intends to communicate in a particular situation. It depends on intentions and context.

  • Reflexive: has its content because the speaker intends the message to have an impact on the audience 

  • Audience is expected to recognize the speakers intention 

  • Speaker expects impact because audience recognizes speakers intentions 

• Conventional meaning – The fixed meaning of words or symbols in a language, independent of who is speaking (like dictionary definitions). → IE., whatever the sentence means according to standard rules of that language

How is speaker meaning reflexive in Grice’s theory?

Speaker meaning is reflexive because the speaker knows that the listener will recognize their intention. In other words, communication works only if the speaker intends the listener to understand that the speaker intends to communicate something. → IE., Reflexive: has its content because the speaker intends the message to have an impact on the audience 

1.      What does it mean to have a “theory of mind”? What intentions does Grice require a speaker to have, in order to communicate?

• Theory of mind – The ability to understand that others have thoughts, beliefs, and intentions different from your own.

• Grice’s requirement for communication – The speaker must intend:

  1. To produce an effect in the listener (make them understand something).

  2. That the listener recognizes this intention.

Communication only works when the speaker assumes the listener can read their mind in this way.

1.      What are the “levels of intentionality” that Andrews ascribes to Grice’s theory?

Levels of intentionality describe how many “layers” of intention a speaker has:

1. First-order intention – The speaker wants to produce an effect on the listener.

2. Second-order intention – The speaker wants the listener to recognize that the speaker has this intention.

3. Higher-order intentions – Can involve even more reflexive levels, like the speaker wanting the listener to recognize that the speaker expects them to recognize the intention, and so on.

Communication works because the listener can track these intentions.

1.      What is Andrews’ objection to Grice’s theory?

Andrews argues that Grice’s theory relies too much on idealized mind-reading. Real communication doesn’t always require speakers and listeners to track complex intentions or higher-order mental states—sometimes people communicate effectively without fully understanding each other’s intentions.

1.      How is Moore’s ostensive communication account different from Grice’s? How is it similar? What does Moore require of the sender and receiver of a communicative signal? What would Grice add to that picture?

• Similarity to Grice: Both focus on intentions—communication involves showing your intention to convey something.

• Difference from Grice: Moore emphasizes making your intention obvious (ostensive), not necessarily tracking higher-order intentions.

• Requirements in Moore’s view:

  • Sender: Must show that they intend to communicate.

  • Receiver: Must recognize that the sender intends to communicate.

• Grice adds: He emphasizes higher-order reflexive intentions, where the sender wants the receiver to recognize the sender’s intentions and the fact that the sender intends them to recognize it.

1.      How does Moore use the example of groupers and moray eels? What features of his theory does this example illustrate?

• Example: Groupers signal moray eels to help them hunt by performing a “head shake” or gesture. The moray eel follows the signal, helping both predators catch prey.

• Illustrated features of Moore’s theory:

  1. Ostension: The grouper makes its intention obvious to the moray eel.

  2. Receiver recognition: The moray eel recognizes the signal as intentional, not just automatic behavior.

  3. Cooperative communication: Signals benefit both sender and receiver, fitting Moore’s focus on intentional, goal-directed communication.

1.      What are the basic tenets of the dynamical systems account of communication?

• Communication is seen as a dynamic, interactive process, not just sending or receiving messages.

• Meaning emerges from the interaction between participants over time.

• Focus is on patterns, coordination, and feedback, rather than fixed signals or intentions.

• Communication is situated and context-dependent, constantly adapting to the environment and each participant.

1.      According to Marler, what are the two criteria for a signal to be referential?

A signal is referential if:

1. It elicits a specific, consistent response in the receiver.

2. It refers to something external in the environment, not just the internal state of the sender.

1.      Do non-human animals have calls that function as names?

Yes, some animals do. For example:

• Signature whistles of dolphins uniquely identify individuals.

• Some primates’ calls can refer to specific group members.
  These calls act like “names” because they label particular individuals, not just general events or threats.

1.      Cheyney and Seyfarth claim that many species display “audience effects”. What are these, and what would their existence provide evidence for?

• Audience effects: Animals change their signals depending on who is watching or listening. For example, a monkey may call differently if close relatives are nearby versus strangers.

• Evidence they provide: They suggest animals consider the perspective or knowledge of others, hinting at basic social cognition or intentional communication.

Crockford provides evidence that apes are sensitive to other apes’ “informational states”. What does this claim mean, and how is it related to whether their signals are voluntary or not?

• Meaning: Apes can understand what other apes know or don’t know (their informational state) and adjust their behavior accordingly.

• Relation to voluntary signals: If apes change their calls based on what others know, it shows their signals are controlled and intentional, not just automatic reactions.

1.      According to Leavens (working with chimpanzees) and Cartmill and Byrne (working with orangutans) what do the apes do when humans don’t respond appropriately to their signals? What does that indicate about the nature of those signals?

• What apes do: They persist, repeat, or modify their gestures or calls until the human responds correctly.

• What it indicates: Their signals are voluntary and intentional, showing that apes actively try to influence othersrather than just reacting reflexively.

1.      What is Bar-On’s “Neo-Expressivism”? What is “force-independence”? You should be able to provide an example.

• Neo-Expressivism: Emotions are expressed through signals, but the signals don’t have to cause the emotion directly in others. They convey the sender’s emotional state without requiring a specific response. → alarm calls have both an action component and a semantic component 

• Force-independence: The effect of the signal on the receiver doesn’t determine its meaning. The signal communicates the sender’s state even if the receiver reacts differently or not at all. → the same signal can casue different actions in differerent circumstances

• Example: A chimpanzee screams in fear. Other chimps might run, ignore it, or look around—but the scream still expresses the sender’s fear, regardless of how others react.

1.      Explain why Arbib and Corvalis think that mirror neurons provide a reason to accept the gestures-first approach to the development of language in humans.

• Mirror neurons fire both when performing an action and when observing the same action.

• This shows humans can understand others’ actions through imitation and recognition, forming a foundation for communication.

• Gestures-first approach: Language likely started with manual and bodily gestures, not vocal speech, because mirror neurons help link perception and action, supporting intentional signaling.

1.      What did Chaser the Dog’s performance show about how she understood words?

• Chaser could learn and remember over 1,000 words for objects and toys.

• She could correctly fetch items based on novel combinations of words (like “bring the ball to the box”), showing she understood words as symbols with specific referents, not just as trained commands.

• This demonstrates symbolic understanding, a basic step toward language comprehension.

1.      We discussed a list of features that a communicative system should have in order to count as a language. You should understand these distinctions: learned v. innate, expressive v. referential, instrumental v. non-instrumental, generalization beyond the original context, and stimulus-independence.

1. Learned vs. Innate – Language is learned through experience, not purely instinctive.

2. Expressive vs. Referential – Signals can express internal states (like emotions) or refer to objects/events in the world.

3. Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental – Communication can be goal-directed (to get something) or informative without immediate practical benefit.

4. Generalization beyond the original context – Words or symbols can be used in new situations, not just the one in which they were first learned.

5. Stimulus-independence – Signals can be used without a direct trigger; the sender doesn’t need an immediate stimulus to produce them.

These distinctions help separate true language from simpler signaling systems.

1.      Considering Washoe, and the experiments wherein Washoe was asked “What, Who, What-Color, and Whose” type of questions, what kind of result was counted as a success? Why would the experimenters be looking for that kind of result?

• Success: Washoe gave the correct sign (from American Sign Language) that appropriately answered the question. For example:

  • “What?” → sign for “ball”

  • “Who?” → sign for “Tom”

  • “What-color?” → sign for “red”

  • “Whose?” → sign for “my” or “hers”

• Why: Experimenters wanted to see if Washoe could understand and respond to structured questions, demonstrating:

  1. Referential understanding (linking signs to objects or people).

  2. Basic comprehension of question types—a key feature of human-like language.

1.      What kind of experimental flaws does Anderson find in the Washoe (and other early studies that attempted to teach apes to use human language)?

• Cueing / Clever Hans effect – Experimenters may have unintentionally signaled answers to the apes.

• Inconsistent criteria for success – Sometimes any approximate or partial sign was counted as correct.

• Small sample sizes – Only a few apes were studied, making results hard to generalize.

• Lack of control conditions – Few safeguards against guessing or imitation, rather than true understanding.

• Overinterpretation of data – Researchers sometimes assumed intentional communication when behaviors could be reflexive or trained responses.

1.      How did the studies with Nim Chimpsky correct some of those prior experimental flaws? What flaws does Anderson find in the Nim experiments?

• Corrections:

  1. More rigorous controls – Reduced experimenter cueing to avoid the Clever Hans effect.

  2. Detailed video records – All interactions were recorded for objective analysis.

  3. Structured coding system – Clear criteria for what counted as a correct sign.

• Remaining flaws:

  1. Limited evidence of syntax – Signs were mostly isolated words, not structured like human sentences.

  2. Instrumental focus – Nim mainly used signs to get rewards, not for true expressive or referential communication.

  3. Context dependence – Signs were often tied to specific situations, limiting generalization beyond the immediate context.

1.      Anderson considers three theoretical possibilities for what might be occurring in non-humans’ multi-sign combinations, “semantic soup”, “word chains”, and “true syntax”. You should know what each of those means. What theoretical approach, that we’ve encountered before, does Anderson not address at all?

• Semantic soup: Signs are mixed together without consistent order or structure; meaning comes from the collection of signs, not their arrangement.

• Word chains: Signs follow a consistent order, but it’s based on learned sequences rather than grammar rules; still no true syntax.

• True syntax: Signs are combined according to rules that create novel meanings, like human language. → rules more complicated than a simple word chain

• Approach not addressed: pragmatics: the usage based approaches

1.      Considering Chantek, how were those studies improvements over the prior studies? What did those studies establish about Chantek’s use of signs?

• Improvements over prior studies:

  1. Long-term, immersive environment – Chantek was raised in a human-like setting from a young age, increasing naturalistic learning.

  2. Consistent social interactions – Daily communication with humans provided rich context for sign use.

  3. Detailed recordings and coding – Allowed more objective analysis of sign usage and combinations.

• What was established:

  1. Chantek used signs referentially, linking them to specific objects, actions, and people.

  2. He could combine signs in meaningful ways, though not fully syntactic like humans.

  3. He demonstrated flexibility and some creative use, suggesting intentional communication rather than just trained responses.

1.      Considering Kanzi, what kind of language was involved? Going back to our list of features that languages should have, which are present in the Kanzi studies?

• Kind of language: Kanzi learned lexigrams—symbols representing words—and some spoken English comprehension, combining symbolic and referential communication.

• Language features present in Kanzi studies:

  1. Learned – Kanzi acquired the symbols through experience and training, not instinct.

  2. Expressive & Referential – Used symbols to refer to objects, actions, and desires.

  3. Instrumental & Non-instrumental – Could request things (instrumental) and sometimes inform or comment without immediate reward (non-instrumental).

  4. Generalization beyond original context – Could apply symbols in new combinations to novel situations.

  5. Stimulus-independence – Could use symbols without an immediate trigger, showing flexible symbolic use.

Kanzi’s abilities approach human-like communication more closely than earlier ape studies, though full syntax is still limited.

1.      What is the model-rival technique, that Pepperberg uses in training her parrots?

• Model-Rival Technique: A training method where:

  1. Two humans interact—one acts as the trainer, the other as the “student” or model-rival.

  2. The parrot observes the interaction, watching the model get rewards or corrections based on performance.

  3. The parrot learns by observing and competing to get the trainer’s attention and rewards.

• Purpose: Encourages active learning, attention, and understanding rather than rote repetition.

1.      How did Pepperberg get the idea to study Alex for the ability to perform addition?

• Pepperberg noticed that Alex could label numbers, colors, and objects accurately.

• She realized he could understand numerical concepts beyond just counting objects.

• This suggested that he might combine numerical labels meaningfully, leading to testing whether he could perform simple addition with small quantities.

1.      What does this study show about Alex’s ability to perform addition?

• Alex could combine small numbers of objects and give the correct total using his number labels.

• This shows he could mentally represent quantities and add them, not just memorize sequences.

• It demonstrates that some parrots can perform basic symbolic arithmetic and have conceptual understanding of numbers.

1.      Describe how Alex was taught to use “none”, and how he extended its use on his own.

• Teaching: Pepperberg explicitly taught Alex to use the label “none” when a set of objects was empty.

• Extension: Alex applied “none” correctly on his own to new situations he hadn’t been directly taught, showing he understood the concept of zero or absence.

• Significance: This demonstrates conceptual understanding, not just rote memorization of a word.

1.      Did this study show that Alex understood “none” to mean zero (the numerical concept)? Why or why not?

• Yes, partially: Alex correctly used “none” to indicate no objects were present.

• Why cautious: While he clearly grasped absence, the study did not test higher-level arithmetic with zero, so it’s unclear if he understood “none” as the abstract numerical concept of zero.

• Takeaway: Alex demonstrated a concrete understanding of “no items”, which is an important step toward understanding zero.

1.      According to the Millian position, what is the meaning of any particular proper name? On the Millian view, does “Sam Clemens” mean the same thing as “Mark Twain”?

• Millian view: A proper name refers directly to an object or person and its meaning is just the object it picks out.

• Implication: “Sam Clemens” and “Mark Twain” both refer to the same person, so on the Millian view, they mean the same thing because the meaning of a name is just the individual it names.

Why do Devitt and Sterelny claim that “Sam Clemens” and “Mark Twain” have different meanings?

• They argue that even though both names refer to the same person, the names carry different historical or cultural information.

• “Sam Clemens” emphasizes his private, personal identity, while “Mark Twain” emphasizes his public, literary persona.

• So, the meaning is not just reference; it also includes the conceptual or descriptive associations people connect with each name.

1.      What is the “Cartesian Assumption” about the meanings of terms, and why do Devitt and Sterelny think it is so false and misleading?

• Cartesian Assumption: The idea that the meaning of a term is entirely “in the head”—that is, it depends on an individual’s mental concept of the word.

• Why it’s misleading:

  1. Meanings are social and external: Words often depend on how a community uses them, not just private thought.

  2. Reference can persist despite mistaken beliefs: You can use a term correctly even if your mental concept is incomplete or wrong.

  3. Ignoring causal-historical links: Proper names and some natural kind terms depend on their connection to the real-world referent, not just internal ideas.

1.      What is the difference between an Opaque context and a Transparent one?

• Transparent context: You can substitute co-referential terms without changing the truth of the sentence.

  • Example: “Sam Clemens is the author of Huckleberry Finn. Therefore, Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn.” → Truth preserved.

• Opaque context: Substituting co-referential terms can change the truth because the context depends on belief, knowledge, or attitude.

  • Example: “Alice believes that Sam Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn.” → You cannot automatically replace with “Mark Twain” without possibly changing truth.

1.      The Millian view faces challenges. You should know the threats to Mill’s Paradise posed by: existence statements, empty names, and opacity.

• the veiw: Meaning of a name just is the refferent

• Existence statements:

  • noun exists (noun could be a proper name) “santa claus exists”

  • Millian names refer directly, so “santa claus does not exist” becomes tricky—how can a non-existent entity be referred to?

• Empty names:

  • Names like “Pegasus” or “Santa Claus” have no real-world referent (they are not an existing person), according to this theory, any sentance including “Santa Claus” should be meaningless → but we still seem to understand and talk about them meaningfully, which Millianism struggles to explain.

• Opacity:

  • In contexts involving belief, knowledge, or intention, substituting co-referential names can change truth/meaning (opaque contexts). → peter Parker/ spider man have the same refferent and therefore should have the same meaning

  • Millianism treats names as pure reference, so it cannot account for these differences in understanding.

1.      What is the distinction between Use and Mention of a word or phrase? How is this connected to Frege’s rejection of his first (early-Frege) attempt to explain informative identity statements?

• Use vs. Mention:

  • Use: A word is used to refer to its meaning or the object itself.

    • Example: “Hesperus is bright tonight” → Hesperus refers to the planet Venus.

  • Mention: A word is mentioned as a linguistic item itself, not what it refers to.

    • Example: “‘Hesperus’ has eight letters” → talking about the word, not the planet.

• Connection to Frege:

  • Early Frege tried to explain informative identity statements like “Hesperus = Phosphorus” in terms of meaning alone.

  • But using Use vs. Mention shows why some statements are informative: two names refer to the same object but have different senses (ways of presenting that object), explaining why “Hesperus = Phosphorus” is informative while “Hesperus = Hesperus” is trivial.

1.      For Frege, what is a Mode of Presentation?

• A Mode of Presentation (Sinn / sense) is the way in which a reference (Bedeutung) is given or presented.

• Even if two expressions refer to the same object, they can have different senses, which explains why identity statements can be informative.

  • Example: “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” both refer to Venus, but they present it differently—one as the evening star, the other as the morning star.

• Importance: Sense accounts for the cognitive value of a statement, not just its reference.

1.      For Frege, what is Sense? How does it work to help explain how Names refer to Objects? Include all of the needed conceptual machinery (Modes of Presentation, Meaning, and Aspects of the Object).

• Sense (Sinn): The cognitive content or Mode of Presentation of a name or expression—the way the object is presented to the mind.

• Reference (Bedeutung): The actual object the name picks out in the world.

• How it works:

  1. A name has both a sense and a reference.

  2. The sense provides the Mode of Presentation: how we conceptually grasp the object.

     • Example: “Hesperus” → presented as the evening star.

     • “Phosphorus” → presented as the morning star.

  3. Meaningful communication and informative statements rely on the sense, because even if two names refer to the same object, their different senses convey different information.

  4. The sense allows us to pick out particular aspects of the object, which is why identity statements can be informative: the object is the same, but the perspective or aspect differs.

• Summary: Sense = conceptual grasp (Mode of Presentation) → allows a name to refer meaningfully to an object and explain informative identity statements.

1.      What is a Definite Description?

• A definite description is a phrase that uniquely identifies an object using a description.

• Usually has the form: “the so-and-so”.

  • Example: “The first person to walk on the moon” → refers to Neil Armstrong.

• Purpose: Allows us to refer to objects by their properties rather than by a proper name.

• In Frege’s framework, definite descriptions have a sense (mode of presentation) and a reference (the unique object they pick out).

1.      What is Frege’s distinction between Ordinary and Extraordinary use of signs? What is the distinction between Direct Sense and Indirect Sense?

1. Ordinary vs. Extraordinary use of signs:

   • Ordinary use: A word or phrase is used to refer to its usual object.

     • Example: “Hesperus is bright tonight” → Hesperus refers to Venus.

   • Extraordinary use: A word or phrase is talked about as a word or symbol itself, not its usual referent.

     • Example: “‘Hesperus’ has eight letters” → mentioning the word Hesperus, not Venus.

2. Direct Sense vs. Indirect Sense:

   • Direct Sense: The mode of presentation of the object itself when using the term ordinarily.

     • Example: “Hesperus” → sense is the way Venus is presented as the evening star.

   • Indirect Sense: The mode of presentation when a term is used extraordinarily, i.e., when we talk about the term itself, not its referent.

     • Example: “‘Hesperus’ has eight letters” → the sense is about the word “Hesperus,” not the planet.

• Key point: Frege’s machinery lets us distinguish between talking about objects vs. talking about words and preserves clarity in identity and reference statements.

1.      For Frege, what are Ideas? What are Thoughts?

• Ideas: Frege’s term for concepts or predicates—functions that take objects as input and return a truth value.

  • Example: “is a planet” → an Idea applied to “Venus” → True.

• Thoughts (Gedanken): The complete propositions that can be true or false.

  • Formed by applying Ideas to objects.

  • Example: “Venus is a planet” → a Thought that can be evaluated for truth.

• Summary:

  • Ideas = functions/predicates

  • Thoughts = complete, truth-evaluable statements made by combining Ideas with objects.

1.      McGinn presents a challenge to Frege, that Frege’s theory falls prey to exactly the same problem that the Direct Reference theory of Names (that is, early-Frege) had, with respect to informative identity claims. How could Frege respond to that challenge?

• McGinn’s challenge: Even with the Sense-Reference distinction, informative identity statements like “Hesperus = Phosphorus” still seem problematic, because:

  • Both names refer to the same object (Venus).

  • How does Sense alone explain why the statement is informative rather than trivial?

• Frege’s potential response:

  1. Emphasize the role of Sense (Sinn): The different Modes of Presentation for “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” mean they present the same object in distinct ways.

     1. H presentes under mode of presentation 1

     2. P presents under modes of presentation 2

  2. Informative identity statements: Are informative because they connect two different senses of the same reference, revealing that the same object can be conceived in different ways.

     1. are identity statements about modes of presetation?

        1. if Frege says “yes”, problem arises

        2. if frege says “no”, mode of presentation 1/ sense 1 → illuminate/ present differernt aspects of person ← mode of presentation 2/ sense 2

  3. Thoughts carry cognitive value: Even if the reference is identical, the Thought expressed is new and non-trivial because it combines the two senses.

• Key idea: Sense is what preserves informativeness, solving the problem that direct reference alone could not.

modes of presentation in photo = percepttual/ pscyhological notion

• example: seeing proff on multiple ocasions (perceptual or psychological types of events)

Senses in photo= meanings/thoughts

• most people can grasp on to → base category

1.      What does Frege think that the referent of a sentence would have to be, if used in its Ordinary way? What would the referent of a sentence be if used in an Extraordinary way?

• Ordinary use: The sentence refers to a Thought (Gedanke)—a truth-evaluable proposition.

  • Example: “Venus is bright tonight” → refers to the Thought that Venus is bright tonight, which can be true or false.

• Extraordinary use: The sentence refers to a linguistic object, such as the sentence itself or its words, not the Thought it expresses.

  • Example: “‘Venus is bright tonight’ has twenty-three letters” → refers to the string of symbols, not the proposition about Venus.

• Key point: Frege distinguishes between talking about the world (ordinary) and talking about language itself (extraordinary), allowing clarity in analysis of meaning, truth, and reference.

1.      What is the difference between an Opaque context and a Transparent one? You should be able to work through an example of each in Frege’s system.

• Transparent context: You can substitute co-referential expressions without changing the truth of the sentence.

  • Fregean explanation: The reference (Bedeutung) of each name determines the truth of the Thought (Gedanke).

  • Example:

    • “Hesperus is bright tonight.”

    • “Phosphorus is bright tonight.”

    • Both refer to Venus, so substitution preserves truth → transparent.

• Opaque context: Substituting co-referential expressions can change the truth value, because the sentence depends on the sense (Sinn), the mode of presentation, or the perspective of a subject.

  • Fregean explanation: In belief, knowledge, or propositional attitude contexts, the Thought expressed is not fully determined by reference alone.

  • Example:

    • “Alice believes that Hesperus is bright tonight.”

    • “Alice believes that Phosphorus is bright tonight.” → Truth may change if Alice does not know Hesperus = Phosphorus → opaque.

• Key point: Transparent contexts allow free substitution of names; opaque contexts do not, because sense (Sinn) mattersin addition to reference (Bedeutung).