Courts and Tribunals

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25 Terms

1
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How many permanent international tribunals exist today, and what share exercise compulsory jurisdiction?

25 tribunals; about 84 % have compulsory jurisdiction (Lecture notes 2025).

2
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Which conference years “planted the seeds” of permanent international adjudication, according to Alter?

1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences (Alter 2014).

3
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Alter on why courts proliferated after WWII.

“International courts became a cheaper substitute for war as treaties multiplied and legal bureaucracies expanded.” (Alter 2014, p. 23).

4
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State Keohane, Moravcsik & Slaughter’s three dimensions of legalisation.

Obligation, Precision, Delegation (Keohane et al. 2000).

5
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Give Posner’s sceptical one‑liner about compliance.

“States comply with international law only when it serves their interests.” (Posner 2009, p. 4).

6
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What are the four core crimes under ICC jurisdiction?

Genocide; Crimes against humanity; War crimes; Aggression (Rome Statute 1998; in force 2002).

7
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Provide the ICC arrest‑warrant execution statistic Posner cites.

Only ≈ 14 % of ICC warrants fully executed (Posner 2009, p. 103).

8
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Shany on the weakness of usage‑rate metrics.

“High usage may signal a court’s failure to give adequate normative guidance as much as its success.” (Shany 2014, p. 35)

9
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Define “compliance constituency” per Simmons.

“A coalition of domestic actors with the ability and motivation to press for adherence to international norms.” (Simmons 2009, p. 129).

10
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Jo & Simmons’ headline deterrence figure for governments after ICC ratification.

Intentional civilian killings drop ≈ 47 % (incidence‑rate ratio 0.53) (Jo & Simmons 2016, p. 460).

11
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Jo & Simmons on ICC’s social vs. prosecutorial deterrence.

“The ICC mobilises both legal and social mechanisms that extend far beyond the courtroom.” (Jo & Simmons 2016, p. 445).

12
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Clark’s four notions of complementarity—list them.

Legal; Political; Relational; Developmental (Clark 2018, pp. 30‑35).

13
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Clark on African perceptions of ICC bias.

“The ICC is widely viewed as a neo‑colonial institution disproportionately targeting African leaders.” (Clark 2018, p. 45).

14
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What compliance rate does Council of Europe report for ECHR judgments?

~90 % leading judgments executed (Council of Europe 2021).

15
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Give the WTO dispute‑settlement compliance figure cited in lecture.

≈ 85 % compliance with adopted rulings (Lecture notes 2025, based on Shany 2014).

16
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Keohane et al. on soft vs. hard law influence.

“Even soft legalization reshapes state expectations and behaviour through shared legal discourse.” (Keohane et al. 2000, p. 478).

17
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List Alter’s five traits of “new‑style” ICs

Permanent; Independent judges; Predetermined procedures; Binding rulings; State/IO defendants (Alter 2014, ch. 1).

18
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Alter on courts empowering legality‑minded actors.

“Courts are agents of political change because they empower actors who care about legality.” (Alter 2014, p. 60).

19
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Which two African states formally moved to leave the ICC in 2016?

Burundi (withdrew 2017); South Africa (notice later rescinded) (Lecture notes 2025).

20
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What domestic reform followed ICC pressure in Uganda?

2006 ICC Bill enabled Ugandan High Court to cooperate with the ICC (Nouwen & Werner 2010).

21
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Nouwen & Werner on ICC’s catalytic effect.

“ICC investigations catalysed legal reforms as states preferred domestic trials to international scrutiny.” (Nouwen & Werner 2010, p. 700).

22
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State the date the ICC issued a warrant for Vladimir Putin.

17 March 2023 (ICC press release; cited BBC 2023).

23
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Quote Simmons on reputational pressure and treaty compliance.

“Eighty‑two percent of human‑rights compliance effects come from reputational, not coercive, pressures.” (Simmons 2009, p. 156).

24
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Provide Kingsbury’s line on uneven judicialization.

“International courts face varied acceptance; their influence is curtailed in regions where local frameworks do not align with global judicial standards.” (Kingsbury 2009, p. 112).

25
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Summarise Shany’s goal‑based definition of court effectiveness

“Effective international courts attain, within time, the goals set by their mandate providers.” (Shany 2014, p. 54).