Courts and Tribunals

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30 Terms

1
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How many permanent international tribunals exist today, and what share exercise compulsory jurisdiction?

25 tribunals; about 84 % have compulsory jurisdiction

2
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Which conference years “planted the seeds” of permanent international adjudication, according to Alter?

1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences (Alter 2014).

3
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Alter on why courts proliferated after WWII.

“International courts became a cheaper substitute for war as treaties multiplied and legal bureaucracies expanded.” (Alter 2014, p. 23).

4
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State Keohane, Moravcsik & Slaughter’s three dimensions of legalisation.

Obligation, Precision, Delegation (Keohane et al. 2000).

5
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Give Posner’s sceptical one‑liner about compliance.

“States comply with international law only when it serves their interests.” (Posner 2009, p. 4).

6
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What are the four core crimes under ICC jurisdiction?

Genocide; Crimes against humanity; War crimes; Aggression (Rome Statute 1998; in force 2002).

7
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Provide the ICC arrest‑warrant execution statistic post-Posner

“As of 2024, the ICC has issued 61 arrest warrants, with 22 individuals (36%) detained and brought before the Court, 30 (49%) still at large, and 8 (13%) with charges dropped due to death. The Court has secured 11 convictions and 4 acquittals.”

8
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Shany on the weakness of usage‑rate metrics.

“High usage may signal a court’s failure to give adequate normative guidance as much as its success.” (Shany 2014, p. 35)

9
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Define “compliance constituency” per Simmons.

“A coalition of domestic actors with the ability and motivation to press for adherence to international norms.” (Simmons 2009, p. 129).

10
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Jo & Simmons’ headline deterrence figure for governments after ICC ratification.

Intentional civilian killings drop roughly 47 % (incidence‑rate ratio 0.53) (Jo & Simmons 2016, p. 460).

11
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Jo & Simmons on ICC’s social vs. prosecutorial deterrence.

“The ICC mobilises both legal and social mechanisms that extend far beyond the courtroom.” (Jo & Simmons 2016, p. 445).

12
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Clark’s four notions of complementarity—list them.

Legal; Political; Relational; Developmental (Clark 2018, pp. 30‑35).

13
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Clark on African perceptions of ICC bias.

“The ICC is widely viewed as a neo‑colonial institution disproportionately targeting African leaders.” (Clark 2018, p. 45).

14
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What compliance rate does Council of Europe report for ECHR judgments?

~90 % leading judgments executed (Council of Europe 2021).

15
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Give the WTO dispute‑settlement compliance figure cited in lecture.

≈ 85 % compliance with adopted rulings (Lecture notes 2025, based on Shany 2014).

16
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Keohane et al. on soft vs. hard law influence.

“Even soft legalization reshapes state expectations and behaviour through shared legal discourse.” (Keohane et al. 2000, p. 478).

17
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List Alter’s five traits of “new‑style” ICs

Permanent; Independent judges; Predetermined procedures; Binding rulings; State/IO defendants (Alter 2014, ch. 1).

18
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Alter on courts empowering legality‑minded actors.

“Courts are agents of political change because they empower actors who care about legality.” (Alter 2014, p. 60).

19
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Which two African states formally moved to leave the ICC in 2016?

Burundi (withdrew 2017); South Africa (notice later rescinded)

20
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What domestic reform followed ICC pressure in Uganda?

2006 ICC Bill enabled Ugandan High Court to cooperate with the ICC (Nouwen & Werner 2010).

21
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Nouwen & Werner on ICC’s catalytic effect.

“ICC investigations catalysed legal reforms as states preferred domestic trials to international scrutiny.” (Nouwen & Werner 2010, p. 700).

22
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State the date the ICC issued a warrant for Vladimir Putin.

17 March 2023 (ICC press release; cited BBC 2023).

23
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Quote Simmons on reputational pressure and treaty compliance.

“Eighty‑two percent of human‑rights compliance effects come from reputational, not coercive, pressures.” (Simmons 2009, p. 156).

24
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Provide Kingsbury’s line on uneven judicialization.

“International courts face varied acceptance; their influence is curtailed in regions where local frameworks do not align with global judicial standards.” (Kingsbury 2009, p. 112).

25
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Summarise Shany’s goal‑based definition of court effectiveness

“Effective international courts attain, within time, the goals set by their mandate providers.” (Shany 2014, p. 54).

26
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How does the UN Security Council influence the ICC’s ability to act in non-signatory states like Syria or Myanmar?

The ICC’s jurisdiction over non-member states depends entirely on the willingness of the UN Security Council to act—which gives the five permanent members veto power over international justice.”
Clark, 2018

27
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When did Russia and China veto the referral of Syria to the ICC, and why is it significant?

In May 2014, Russia and China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution to refer Syria to the ICC. This illustrates how powerful states can block international legal accountability and shows that international legal norms are not universally binding, especially for non-signatories.

28
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What was the outcome of the Nicaragua v. United States case in 1986?

In 1986, the ICJ ruled that the U.S. had violated international law by supporting the Contras in Nicaragua. The U.S. ignored the ruling and withdrew from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, demonstrating the ability of powerful states to reject judicial mechanisms when rulings conflict with national interest.

29
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When did Obama attempt to close Guantánamo Bay, and what prompted this action?

In January 2009, President Obama signed an executive order to close Guantánamo and ban torture practices. This was a response to international legal and reputational pressure from the UN, ECHR, and civil society, showing how symbolic condemnation can constrain even powerful states.

30
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When did Palestine join the ICC, and why was this legally and politically significant?

In April 2015, Palestine joined the ICC. This move allowed it to legally challenge Israeli actions despite lacking full UN membership, showing how weaker actors use international law strategically to gain symbolic and institutional power.