Chapter 10 - Visual Imagery

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Mental imagery

  • Our ability to mentally recreate perceptual experience in the absence of a sensory stimulus.”

  • You can also create mental images of stimuli that you have never experienced.

    • e.g “‘Imagine a sidewalk covered in chocolate sauce.

<ul><li><p>Our ability to mentally recreate perceptual experience in the absence of a sensory stimulus.”</p></li><li><p>You can also create mental images of stimuli that you have never experienced.</p><ul><li><p>e.g “‘Imagine a sidewalk covered in chocolate sauce.</p></li></ul></li></ul><p></p>
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Dual-Coding Theory (Paivio, 1971)

  • Human knowledge is stored in two systems:
    Verbal system: abstract, symbolic, language-based
    Non-verbal system: modality-specific, sensory-motor based

  • Images function as analog codes, meaning they resemble the things they represent.

  • Because images preserve perceptual features, they provide a second code that supports memory.

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The Imagery Debate Overview

We know that imagery clearly exists and influences cognition (memory, language, decision making).

  • The debate focuses on how mental images are represented. What format/code does imagery take in our minds?

  • Kosslyn (1994): Images are depictive—they preserve spatial and perceptual properties.

  • Pylyshyn (1973): Images are descriptive—symbolic, conceptual codes that do not resemble the real object.

  • The question: Does the mind store images like pictures, or like statements?

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Depictive vs Descriptive Representations (Details)

  • Depictive representations preserve spatial layout and perceptual information.

  • Descriptive representations store only conceptual relationships, not perceptual features.

  • Some argue images are epiphenomena: by-products of deeper cognitive processes, not functional representations.

<ul><li><p><strong>Depictive representations</strong> preserve spatial layout and perceptual information.</p></li><li><p><strong>Descriptive representations</strong> store only conceptual relationships, not perceptual features.</p></li><li><p>Some argue images are <strong>epiphenomena</strong>: by-products of deeper cognitive processes, not functional representations.</p></li></ul><p></p>
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Propositional Codes (Pylyshyn)

  • Pylyshyn argued cognitive processing relies on propositions, not pictures.

  • Propositions are statements that express relationships and can be judged as true or false.

  • Example: “The lamp is to the left of the books” is a proposition.

  • According to him, propositional codes are sufficient to explain imagery, so picture-like representations are unnecessary.

<ul><li><p>Pylyshyn argued cognitive processing relies on <strong>propositions</strong>, not pictures.</p></li><li><p>Propositions are statements that express relationships and can be judged as true or false.</p></li><li><p>Example: “The lamp is to the left of the books” is a proposition.</p></li><li><p>According to him, propositional codes are sufficient to explain imagery, so picture-like representations are unnecessary.</p></li></ul><p></p>
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Evidence used in the Imagery debate

Researchers have conducted experiments to resolve the imagery debate.

  • Do people press mental images in the same way they process real stimuli?

    • If images are depictive (maintain perceptual and spatial characteristics) then people should process images and physical stimuli similarly.

    • If images are descriptive, then mental processing would depend on the number of propositions instead of perceptual and spatial characteristics of stimuli.

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Mental Scanning (Kosslyn, 1973 & 1978)

  • Asked the question, do mental images keep the same spatial characteristics of physical stimuli?

  • Kosslyn predicted that if imagery works like a real picture, scanning across a longer mental distance should take longer than a short one.

  • Participants memorized simple line drawings with clear structure (top/bottom or left/right).

  • During the task they imagined the picture, focused on one part (for example the roots of a flower), then mentally moved to another part and pressed a button when they “reached” it.

  • Reaction time increased when the target feature was farther away in the image.

  • This pattern supports the idea that mental images preserve spatial relationships.

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Kosslyn: Addressing alternative explanations

  • The results could also be explained if participants memorized a list of features instead of a spatial image.

  • In that case, longer reaction times might reflect searching through a list, not scanning across space.

  • This alternative supports the descriptive/propositional view of imagery rather than the depictive view.

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Mental Scanning Map Study (Kosslyn, 1978)

  • To respond to the “feature list” criticism, Kosslyn used a map with several landmarks.

  • Participants memorized the map, then imagined it and mentally traveled from one landmark to another.

  • Travel time increased as the real distance between landmarks increased.

  • The number of “features” between landmarks was kept constant, so list-searching could not explain the results.

  • This provided stronger evidence that mental images preserve spatial distance, supporting depictive imagery.

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Mental Rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 1971)

  • Shepard & Metzler tested whether people mentally rotate images the same way they rotate real objects.

  • Participants saw two 3-D block shapes and decided whether they were the same shape or different.

  • When the shapes were the same, one was rotated to different angles before being shown.

  • Reaction time increased as the rotation angle increased.

  • This produced a linear relationship: the more rotation needed, the slower the response.

  • People mentally rotated images at about 60° per second, supporting the idea that imagery uses spatial, depictive processing.

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Mental Scaling (Kosslyn, 1975/1978): Size Affects What You “See”

  • How much detail you can access in a mental image depends on the imagined object’s size.

  • Example: imagine a cat next to an elephant vs a cat next to a butterfly.

  • When the cat is imagined beside an elephant (making the cat “small”), participants took longer to answer questions like “Does a cat have claws?”

  • They needed to mentally zoom in on the smaller image.

  • This shows mental images behave like real perceptual objects — smaller images contain less accessible detail.

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Mental Scaling (continued): Kosslyn 1975, 1978

  • Participants imagined:

    • an elephant-sized butterfly,

    • a butterfly-sized elephant.

  • When the “target animal” was imagined as smaller, reaction times increased.

  • This effect depended on the relative size of the objects, not their real size.

  • Again, this supports depictive imagery because image size affects how quickly features can be accessed.

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Imagery & Perception: Interaction (Perky, 1910)

  • If mental images function like internal pictures, imagery and perception should rely on similar mechanisms.

  • Perky asked participants to imagine a lemon while a dim, faint image of a lemon was projected on the screen without their awareness.

  • Participants described their mental images in ways that matched the projected image.

  • This suggests imagery and perception can interfere with each other because they draw on shared processes.

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Imagery Interferes With Perception (Segal & Fusella, 1970)

  • Participants either imagined a visual stimulus (a tree) or an auditory one (a phone ringing).

  • While imagining, they tried to detect a very faint real visual or auditory signal.

  • Detection of the visual signal dropped when participants were imagining a visual image.

  • Detection of the auditory signal dropped when imagining an auditory image.

  • This selective interference suggests imagery uses the same resources as perception in that modality.

<ul><li><p>Participants either imagined a visual stimulus (a tree) or an auditory one (a phone ringing).</p></li><li><p>While imagining, they tried to detect a <strong>very faint</strong> real visual or auditory signal.</p></li><li><p>Detection of the <strong>visual</strong> signal dropped when participants were imagining a <strong>visual</strong> image.</p></li><li><p>Detection of the <strong>auditory</strong> signal dropped when imagining an <strong>auditory</strong> image.</p></li><li><p>This selective interference suggests imagery uses the <strong>same resources</strong> as perception in that modality.</p></li></ul><p></p>
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Imagery Facilitates Perception (Farah, 1985)

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Imagery and Motion Aftereffects (Winawer et al., 2010)

  • Normally, staring at motion in one direction causes a motion aftereffect in the opposite direction.

  • Winawer showed that simply imagining motion for 60 seconds could bias later motion perception.

  • This demonstrates that imagery can activate motion-sensitive visual areas strongly enough to alter perception, reinforcing overlap between imagery and perceptual neural mechanisms.

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Challenges to Depictive Imagery: Shape Identification (Reed, 1974)

  • Reed tested whether people can easily extract new shapes from a mental image.

  • Participants memorized a complex figure, then judged whether new shapes were part of the original picture.

  • In some cases they were accurate, but in many cases accuracy was low.

  • Reed argued this is because people were not storing a detailed spatial image.

  • Instead, they may have stored verbal labels or descriptions of the picture’s components, which do not support detailed shape extraction.

<ul><li><p>Reed tested whether people can easily extract new shapes from a mental image.</p></li><li><p>Participants memorized a complex figure, then judged whether new shapes were part of the original picture.</p></li><li><p>In some cases they were accurate, but in many cases accuracy was <strong>low</strong>.</p></li><li><p>Reed argued this is because people were not storing a detailed spatial image.</p></li><li><p>Instead, they may have stored <strong>verbal labels</strong> or descriptions of the picture’s components, which do not support detailed shape extraction.</p></li></ul><p></p>
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Challenges to Depiction: Demand Characteristics & Expectancy Effects

  • Research on imagery may be influenced by experimenter expectancy.

    • Subtle cues from the researcher can unintentionally signal the “expected” pattern of results to participants.

  • Demand characteristics can also affect performance when participants form an idea of the experiment’s purpose and adjust behavior accordingly.

  • Pylyshyn argued that some support for depictive imagery may come from these effects rather than from true picture-like mental representations.

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arguments against depictive representations continued

  • Studies show that experimenter expectations can influence participant behavior in imagery experiments (e.g., Intons-Peterson, 1983).

  • These issues do not invalidate all of Kosslyn’s findings.

  • Instead, they highlight that both depictive and descriptive theories still have valid arguments.

  • Advances in neuroscience allow researchers to study imagery using brain activity, which may help clarify how imagery is represented.

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Studying Imagery in the Brain: Patients & Neuroimaging

  • Early imagery research examined patients with localized brain damage to infer which brain areas were involved in imagery.

  • New imaging techniques (PET, fMRI) allow researchers to directly compare brain activity during imagery and perception in healthy individuals.

  • These tools help reveal the structure and function of mental imagery processes.

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Patient TC: Loss of Perception and Imagery

  • Patient TC suffered cardiac arrest and had damage in the occipital and temporal lobes, resulting in cortical blindness.

  • TC was unable to distinguish light from dark, did not blink or move the head in response to moving objects, and had lost conscious vision.

  • TC also showed a loss of mental imagery ability, unable to describe familiar objects, places, or tasks from memory.

  • This case suggests that imagery and perception share neural systems, because damage affected both abilities.

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Patient PB: Loss of Vision but Preserved Imagery (Zago et al)

  • Patient PB experienced a stroke that caused occipital lobe damage and cortical blindness, similar to TC.

  • However, unlike TC, PB could still perform visual imagery tasks.

  • This shows that imagery and perception can sometimes dissociate, meaning they rely on overlapping but not identical neural systems.

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Madame D: Impaired Perception but Preserved Imagery. Bartolomeo et al

  • Madame D had multiple strokes affecting the area between the occipital and temporal lobes.

  • She had partial visual ability but suffered color blindness and struggled to recognize faces, objects, or read.

  • She could copy drawings (basic perception intact) but not identify what she copied.

  • Despite this, she retained mental imagery and used it to help identify objects at home.

  • Her case shows imagery can sometimes support perception, and again suggests partial overlap but not full equivalence between the two systems.

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Imagery Lost but Perception Intact

  • Some patients with closed-head injuries lost the ability to form mental images while keeping normal performance on tests of visual perception, memory, and language.

  • They could not draw animals or objects from memory even though they could see normally.

  • These cases show the reverse dissociation: perception without imagery.

  • Taken together, patient studies reveal that imagery and perception rely on related but not identical brain systems.

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Neuroimaging Supports Shared Mechanisms (Kosslyn, 1999)

  • Neuroimaging studies generally show that imagery and perception use overlapping brain systems, though not perfectly identical.

  • Kosslyn used PET to measure brain activity while people viewed and imagined black-and-white stripes.

  • Both viewing and imagining the stripes activated primary visual cortex (V1).

  • Using TMS to disrupt V1 made people less accurate during imagery tasks.

  • This provides causal evidence that V1 contributes to visual imagery, not just perception.

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Specialized Brain Areas Activate in Both Imagery and Perception (O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000)

  • Researchers tested whether imagery activates the same specialized regions that perception activates.

  • When participants viewed or imagined faces, the fusiform face area (FFA) showed higher activity.

  • When participants viewed or imagined buildings, the parahippocampal place area (PPA) showed higher activity.

  • Brain activity patterns were strong enough to classify what category a person was imagining.

  • suggests shared areas of perception and imagery

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Imagery vs Perception: Overlap and Differences (Ganis et al., 2004)

  • Used newer neuroimaging techniques to re-examine brain activity in imagery vs perception.

  • Front of brain (planning, cognitive control, attention, memory) showed strong similarity for both imagery and perception tasks.

  • There was limited similarity in V1 because imagery happens with no actual visual stimulus.

  • Perception: stimulus hits receptor cells and travels up to early visual areas.

  • Imagery: a re-enacted perceptual experience where the same neurons are driven from frontal brain areas, not from input at the eyes.

<ul><li><p>Used newer neuroimaging techniques to re-examine brain activity in imagery vs perception.</p></li><li><p><strong>Front of brain</strong> (planning, cognitive control, attention, memory) showed <strong>strong similarity</strong> for both imagery and perception tasks.</p></li><li><p>There was <strong>limited similarity in V1</strong> because imagery happens with <strong>no actual visual stimulus</strong>.</p></li><li><p><strong>Perception:</strong> stimulus hits receptor cells and travels <strong>up</strong> to early visual areas.</p></li><li><p><strong>Imagery:</strong> a <strong>re-enacted perceptual experience</strong> where the <strong>same neurons</strong> are driven <strong>from frontal brain areas</strong>, not from input at the eyes.</p></li></ul><p></p>
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Amedi et al., 2005 (Imagery is fragile)

  • During visual imagery, other nonvisual sensory areas (like auditory cortex) are deactivated.

  • During perception, these other sensory areas are not turned down.

  • Interpretation: imagery is more fragile than perception, so the brain “turns down” other senses to reduce interference with visual imagery.

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Hub-and-Spoke Model: Neural Representation of Knowledge

  • Neuroimaging research shows that knowledge is represented through both general and modality-specific systems.

  • The anterior temporal lobe (ATL) acts as a semantic memory hub that stores generalized, abstract knowledge.

  • Modality-specific “spokes” store context-dependent sensory and motor details across the cortex.

  • This model helps explain why imagery studies sometimes show overlap and sometimes differences between imagery and perception.

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MVPA (Multivoxel Pattern Analysis): Mind-Reading Imagery. Ragni et al. (2020)

  • Ragni et al. (2020) tested whether brain activity patterns during imagery can reveal what a person is imagining.

  • Participants viewed line drawings of lowercase letters, simple shapes, and objects.

  • Later, they imagined these same stimuli.

  • MVPA successfully identified which object people were imagining based on patterns of brain activity from both imagery and perception trials.

  • Shows that imagery produces distinctive and decodable neural patterns.

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GANs (Generative Adversarial Networks)

  • GANs are a type of artificial neural network consisting of two competing parts:

    • Generator: trained to create new images that match presented examples.

    • Discriminator: trained to distinguish between real images and generated ones.

  • The two networks improve by competing with each other, leading the generator to create highly realistic images.

  • Goal: produce images that are indistinguishable from real ones to the point that they can fool human observers

  • “Deepfakes” use GAN-based systems to impersonate people in videos.

  • These videos can depict people doing or saying things they never actually did, raising ethical and social concerns.

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Imagery Impacts Cognition and Behavior

  • The imagery debate is not fully resolved, but most researchers agree imagery is not stored only as propositions.

  • Imagery arises from brain mechanisms that overlap with perception.

  • Regardless of format, imagery influences cognitive functions and behaviors.

  • Examples include memory improvements such as the Picture Superiority Effect.

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Picture Superiority Effect & Imagery Benefits for Memory

  • Imagery improves memory compared to verbal processing alone.

  • People remember pictures better than words.

  • This effect is especially strong when images are interactive, as shown by Bower (1970).

  • In Paivio & Csapo (1973), participants either:

    • read words or named pictures (verbal condition), or

    • formed visual images of words and pictures (imagery condition).

  • After a surprise memory test, performance was higher in the imagery condition than the verbal condition.

  • This demonstrates that imagery enhances encoding and recall.

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Dual-Coding Explanation for Picture Superiority

  • Pictures automatically generate both an image code and a verbal label, giving two memory traces.

  • Words usually create only a verbal code, giving just one trace.

  • More memory codes → better recall.

  • Example from the slide: seeing a picture of mountains, clouds, and a hot air balloon produces both imagery and verbal labeling.

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Concreteness Effect: Concrete Words Are Remembered Better

  • Concrete words (e.g., “apple”) are easier to remember than abstract words (e.g., “justice”).

  • Concrete words naturally elicit mental images, providing both image and verbal codes.

  • Abstract words are harder to visualize, so memory relies mostly on verbal encoding.

  • Parker & Dagnall (2009): participants heard lists of abstract and concrete words and were told they would later be tested on them.

  • Memory performance showed the concreteness effect under normal conditions.

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Dynamic Visual Noise (DVN) Disrupts Imagery

  • Parker & Dagnall also tested memory while participants viewed either:

    • static visual noise, or

    • dynamic visual noise (DVN), which disrupts mental image formation.

  • DVN interfered with participants’ ability to create mental images.

  • Under DVN, the concreteness effect disappeared → concrete and abstract words were remembered equally well.

  • This supports the idea that imagery contributes to the memory advantage for concrete words.

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Imagery and Mental Health (Holmes et al., 2005–2008)

  • Participants listened to short descriptions of events with either positive or negative outcomes.

  • Two groups:

    • Imagery group: created vivid visual images of the scenario.

    • Meaning group: focused on the meaning of the words only.

  • The imagery group reported stronger emotional reactions, including both higher anxiety for negative events and more positive emotion for positive events.

  • This shows imagery intensifies emotional experience because imagining an event engages perceptual-like systems.

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Imagery and PTSD: Intrusive Negative Images

  • People with PTSD often experience involuntary, intrusive mental imagery of traumatic events.

  • Flashbacks include vivid visual and auditory imagery and can feel like the event is happening again.

  • These episodes trigger changes in the autonomic nervous system (e.g., heart rate increases, sweating).

  • Individuals with more vivid mental imagery are more likely to experience intrusive images after negative events.

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Anxiety Disorders and Imagery

  • Anxiety disorders involve persistent and intense worrying that interferes with daily functioning.

  • People with anxiety often experience increased negative imagery of future events.

  • They believe these feared events are more likely to occur, which increases anxiety.

  • Excessive worrying is sometimes used as a coping strategy to reduce unwanted intrusive images.

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Depression and Imagery

  • Depression includes persistent sadness and loss of interest.

  • Depressed individuals experience more negative imagery, especially imagery linked to suicidal thoughts.

  • They also experience reduced positive imagery, which may contribute to low mood.

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Imagery Rescripting: Treating PTSD, Anxiety, and Depression

  • Imagery rescripting is a therapeutic technique for disorders involving harmful or intrusive mental imagery.

  • Patients revisit distressing memories and imagine acting differently, such as protecting their younger selves or changing the outcome.

  • The goal is to replace negative emotional responses with more adaptive ones.

  • Imagery-focused treatments have some of the highest success rates for PTSD and also help with anxiety and depression.

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Individual Differences: Imagery Ability Varies Widely

  • People differ greatly in how vivid or detailed their mental images are.

  • Galton (1880) showed that some individuals describe vivid imagery while others report almost none.

  • Imagery ability can be measured using:

    • Self-report questionnaires (e.g., VVIQ),

    • Objective tasks like the Paper Folding Test (PFT), which tests spatial imagery.

  • The PFT requires mentally unfolding paper with holes punched in it to determine hole placement.

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Aphantasia: Little or No Visual Imagery

  • Some individuals, such as patient MX, report no mental imagery at all following brain injury.

  • MX scored at the lowest level on imagery vividness tests, and fMRI showed inhibited activity in visual cortex regions.

  • After MX’s case was publicized, others reported lifelong absence of imagery, known as congenital aphantasia.

  • Aphantasia affects about 1–3% of the population.

  • Despite low imagery vividness, individuals with aphantasia often perform normally on spatial tasks, suggesting imagery vividness and spatial reasoning rely on different processes.

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Hyperphantasia: Extremely Vivid Imagery

  • Hyperphantasia refers to extremely vivid and intense visual imagery.

  • It is likely much rarer than aphantasia.

  • Occupational trends:

    • Individuals with aphantasia are more likely to enter fields like mathematics or science.

    • Individuals with hyperphantasia are more likely to pursue creative professions.