Meta-ethics

Key terms

Reductionism

The claim that moral properties such as good and evil can be reduced to natural properties such as pleasure and pain, or to psychological or social experiences.

Intuitionism

The theory that some moral judgements are self-evident, I.e their truth can be known just by rational reflection upon the judgement itself. Moral intuitions are a type of synthetic a priori knowledge.

Moral Realism

The view that moral properties are objectively real in the world.

Moral Anti-realism

The view that moral properties do not objectively exist in the world.

Cognitivism

The view that moral judgements are propositions which are fact stating or 'truth-apt' (they can be considered true or false).

Non-cognitivism

The view that moral judgements do not express propositions that are truth-apt.

Naturalism

The claim that moral properties are just natural properties and can be examined as such. They relate to something we can examine through sense experience and science.

Non-naturalism

The claim that moral properties are a distinct kind of property. Whilst they are definitely part of the world we cannot easily examine them through experience and science.

AJ Ayer’s Verification principle

Ayer said that for a statement to be meaningful, it must fit into one of these two categories:

Analytic Statements (True by Definition) - You don't need evidence to prove true or false.

Synthetic Statements (True by Experience) - You need evidence to prove true or false.

If a statement does not fit into either category, it is deemed meaningless.

Hume’s Fork

Hume says there are 2 ways of knowing things:

Relations of ideas - These are things that are true just by definition or logic like "2 + 2 = 4". You don’t need to look at the world to check if they’re true – they just are. 

Matters of Fact - These are things we learn by observing the world like "The sun will rise tomorrow".  You have to go out and check if they’re true. 

 

Hume says if something doesn’t fit into one of these two categories, it’s nonsense.  

Moore's 'open question argument'

P1. If good really was a natural property like pleasure, then it would not make sense to ask whether pleasure really is good. This is a closed question.

P2. It does make sense to ask whether pleasure really is good (it is in fact an open question).

P3. Therefore good is not the same as pleasure.

P4. The same is true for any definition of good we give.

C1. Therefore, good is indefinable.

Hume’s is-ought gap

You cannot equate what is with what ought to be. We cannot infer from a description of how the world is (a natural property) to how the world ought (a moral property) to be.

Mackie’s Error Theory

The theory that moral judgements make claims about objective moral properties, but that no such properties exist. Thus moral judgements are cognitive, but are all false. Moral language as we mean to use it, rests on a mistake.

Emotivism

The idea that moral statements express our emotions or feelings rather than objective facts. Saying 'murder is wrong' is like saying 'boo murder' - it expresses disapproval. Saying 'helping others is good' is like saying 'hurrah for helping others' it expresses approval. Moral language functions more like an emotional ejaculation than a factual claim.

Prescriptivism

The claim that moral judgements provide commands and recommendations about how to act. The idea that when we make moral judgments, we're not just stating facts, but giving advice or instructions.

Nihilism

The belief that traditional moral values and beliefs are unfounded and that life is ultimately meaningless. Nihilism rejects the notion of objective moral truths, asserting that existence lacks inherent purpose.

Mackie’s argument from queerness

The claim that if objective moral values existed, they would be strange and unlike anything else in the world. They would have to be special entities or forces that influence us, which seems odd. Since no such "moral facts" are observable, Mackie argued, we have reason to doubt their existence.

Mackie’s argument from relativity

If objective moral values existed, we'd expect universal agreement on basic moral principles, but this is not the case. The variation in moral systems suggests that morals are shaped by cultural or personal perspectives, not objective truths.

The problem of moral progress

If morals are just opinions or based on culture, how can we say society’s morals are getting better? Realists say moral progress only makes sense if some moral truths are really objective but also that some moral systems are better than others.