class 11 collective action

1. Collective Action

• why bother to do collective action if you will also benefit from it?

• for example you dont need to pay the cost of attending a protest

• not protesting is the best response if others protest

  • problem in societies

• but if no one protests you get nothing

Definition: Free-Riding

• definition: Each person can benefit without contributing

  • "The maximization of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off"

  • Rationally, no-one contributes!

  • Free-riding prevents cooperation

1. Collective Action

• Public goods always generate free-riding problems

  • By definition, the benefits are non-excludable

    • also non rival

  • Each person can benefit without contributing

• Defence, infrastructure, public health, property rights

• Climate change mitigation

  • ppl want to free ride

• Electoral Accountability

  • millions need to vote against them

  • what if they are handing out money? we have to pout aside our short term interests

• Social Accountability

Collective Action: rational behavior

• Rational behaviour: DO NOT cooperate

• The paradox of collective action: People are too cooperative in practice!

  • people are way too irrationally cooperative

  • we achieve collective action problem despite the free rider problem

    • In lab experiments, cooperation rates are 20-50%, not 0% (Sally 1995)

    • People do protest in large numbers(sometimes)

    • Voters do kick out bad leaders (sometimes

Definition: Collective Action

• Multiple people coordinating their actions to overcome a free-riding problem and secure a collective benefit

how do we override the free rider problem?

• Collective action is easier where:

• 1. The group is smaller

  • Communication and monitoring is easier

• 2. Coercion is used

  • Taxation solves many public goods problems

  • thats how we pay for public goods

• 3. Selective incentives are used

  • Handing out t-shirts, food, money to participants

  • Entertainment

  • you get the benefit if you put in the work

• 4. Informal Institutions: Social norms

  • Where there are repeated interactions

  • And social costs to not participating

  • Voting as a duty

  • Community clean-up day

  • most common*

2. Improving Accountability with Collective Action

• Anti-corruption projects try to increase accountability

  • Most African countries have 'very strong' anti-corruption laws (Global Integrity 2008)

• But increased monitoring, or stricter punishment does not increase enforcement

  • the problem isnt the written rules- its alrdy there its abt the enforcement of these rules

  • the problem is the principle to hold ppl accountable

    • anti corruption methods wont work if the principle doesnt have a incentive

• Because each Principal does not do their job:

  • Bureaucrats look the other way to protect their job

  • Politicians steal to finance elections

  • Voters prioritize ethnicity, clientelism over voting out bad leader

    • voters say they dont want it but rlly sometimes arent prioritizing accountability because they also want the benefit

Question: Accountability projects often fail to stop corruption. How might a collective action approach to tackling corruption work?

• donor western liberal response

  • to monitor people and punish them

    • (doesn’t rlly work)

• Free-riding in reporting and punishing corruption

  • Monitoring and reporting is costly

    • bcuz you deny or undermine the system

    • you’ll get judged

  • Less corruption benefits everyone in society (a public good, making investment safer)

• Stricter enforcement does not help because corruption is the norm

  • An informal institution ('culture') of corruption:

    • “Well, if everybody seems corrupt, why shouldn’t I be corrupt.” (Myrdal 1968)

    • "If I don’t take it, it is going to be taken by somebody else" (Persson et al 2012)

• Even worse, being honest can bring social punishment and shaming

  • "If you have an office but have not stolen—if you have not helped your family—they are actuallygoing to curse you

  • " (Persson et al 2012)"[People do not report because]... they fear losing their jobs...The reporting system is corrupt itself.(Persson et al 2012)

• Failed anti-corruption reforms just create more cynicism and stronger expectations that corruption willcontinue (Collier 2000)26 / 65

2. Improving Accountability with Collective Action

• John Githongo, Permanent Secretary in charge of

  • Governance and Ethics, Kenya, 2003-2005

  • Reported the Anglo-Leasing corruption scandal

  • Allegedly received death threats from the head of Kenya's Anti-Corruption Commission

• Fled the country

• Everyone wants a less corrupt society

  • But no individual's action can take us there

  • Being corrupt is rational when everyone elseis corrupt

• What's the alternative?

  • We need to change social norms and expectations

  • Informal Institutions!

  • So people want to sanction others for wrong-doing

2. Improving Accountability with Collective Action

• Norms against corruption strengthen accountability

  • Bureaucrats get respect for blowing the whistle

  • Judges reject bribes to maintain social status as 'clean'

  • Voters see their role as punishing corrupt politicians (Brazil, not India)

  • Citizens collectively protest against badservices to be a part of the communit

How do we get accountability under authoritarianism - where judges are not independent, there are no elections and citizens have few social rights? Eg. China?

• Informal Accountability': Local elites face social sanctions if they fail to deliver public goods (Tsai 2007)

  • not through formal structures but through pre-existing social groups

    • And 'moral standing' rewards where they perform well

      • socially judged

    • Eg. Party Secretary named on the donor wall in the temple

• Where there are village temples, investment rises from 61 to 99 yuan per person

• Solidary groups are civil society groups that are:

  • 1. Embedding - politicians and bureaucrats are members

    • So politicians can be rewarded

  • 2. Encompassing - the group covers the whole political community

    • So politicians are incentivized to provide public goods to all

= village temples means politicians and everybody is a member

• in the absence of democracy they still manage to extract performance and hold them accountable at the village temple

3. Development as Collective Action

• Why is maternal mortality improving faster in Rwanda than in Malawi, Uganda or Niger?

• The institutional rules and policies are the same across countries

• Rwanda

• All four countries tried to improve accountability using the Principal-Agent model:

  • Making Traditional Birth Attendants illegal

  • Performance bonuses for health workers

  • 'Health monitoring' units

  • Fines for failing to give birth at a clinic'

  • Voluntary Health Committees' to supervise clinics

    • These accountability mechanisms only worked in Rwanda

  • 1) 'Imihigo' public pledges by the President and Mayors

    • Breaking a pledge lets down your community

    • Checking on progress is a citizen's obligation

      • embedded in the social practices they were used too

      • western accountability mechanisms were ignored

  • 2) 'Ubudehe' self-help to solve local problems

    • Reliance on outsiders is lazy

  • 3) 'Umuganda' communal work

    • Rude not to participate

    • You expect others to participate

• niger

  • The state provided ambulances but still no fuel or drivers

  • Nurses still unmotivated as they were appointed by patronage

  • Nobody cleans up the clinics

  • NO Collective Action for development

3. Development as Collective Action

• Rwanda used collective action to make accountability mechanisms work

  • Traditional informal institutions and social norms stopped free-riding

• Development as a Principal-Agent Problem

  • The objectives of actors are in conflict

  • We have to incentivize some people to change their behaviour

  • We need to generate accountability

    • strong men holding ppl accountable

• Development as a Collective Action Problem

  • The objectives of actors are the same

  • The context prevents them realizing these objectives - they are stuck in a trap

  • We need to help people coordinate

    • were all trapped and under pressure to be corrupt

    • how do we coordinate to get out to change at the same time?

4. Shifting Equilibria

• From a Prisoner's Dilemma to an Assurance

  • what do your choices depend on?

    • your expectations on how ppl coordinate

    • the challenge is to get social norms to move us out of this bad equilibrium

  • How do we encourage people to pay taxes without just threatening more punishment?

    • Nigerian cities have very different levels of 'taxmorale'

      • they don’t pay for taxes

        • Different equilibriua

      • how did this change?

        • they wanted more revenue from there own domestic industry and not only oil

    • Lagos state government started delivering public services first

      • Raising trust in government

      • Raising expectations others are paying taxes

      • Public service delivery created a norm of tax payment'

      • Policy feedback': Creating a social contract

        • ex: lagos starts putting flower and cleaning waste so ppl starting paying taxes

How can we shift equilibria?

• Build on latent social norms and traditional institutions, eg. 'Imihigo' in Rwanda

  • 'Deliver first' to build a new social contract

    • you need to change norms

  • Lead from the top to change expectations

    • Use shocks/events as opportunities

• More than just sharing factual information with individuals:

  • Make information public and common knowledge

  • Information about what others' think/expect, eg. in Saudi Arabia attitudes to women are more progressive than people think others' attitudes are

    • you need to change peoples expectations and make them think the rest of society is also changing

    • we can do this by making ingo public.. people who see these adverts know others are also paying it

Conclusion

• 1. Collective Action

  • Achieving collective gains means overcoming free-riding

  • By selective incentives, coercion or social norms

• 2. Improving Accountability with Collective Action

  • Corruption persists because everyone else is corrupt; it's costly and futile to be honest

  • Reporting and punishing corruption as a social normInformal accountability through solidary groups increases investment

• 3. Development as Collective Action

  • Traditional social norms can encourage collective action for investment, eg. 'Imihigo' in Rwanda

• 4. Shifting Equilibria

  • Switching to a 'pro-development' equilibrium means changing expectations and social norm