Midterm Steal Elections

Schmitter & Karl Question

what democracy actually is and what it is not, 

arguing that the concept has been misused and overly simplified

Schmitter & Karl say what Others Say

regular elections, majority rule, economic efficiency, or the presence of a particular civic culture. 

Holding elections alone is sufficient for democratic electoralism.

What does Schmitter & Karl say

A system of governance in which rulers are held accountable to citizens through competition and cooperation 

Democracy is procedural, not outcome-based 

Cannot be reduced to elections alone.

What are Schmitter & Karl theory

views democracy as a regime type defined by rules and procedures rather than specific institutions or results. 

Accountability, citizenship, competition, cooperation, and civil society 

Take multiple institutional forms.

what is Schmitter & Karl Hypotheses

necessary but not sufficient for democracy, that democracy does not guarantee economic growth, stability, or efficiency, 

Civilian control over unelected actors and political autonomy are essential for democratic rule

Schmitter & Karl Data and Tests

Comparative historical analysis 

different political regimes across regions and time to evaluate how democratic procedures function in practice

Schmitter & Karl Results

Democracy is best understood as a procedural system based on contingent consent and bounded uncertainty 

It does not automatically produce desirable economic or political outcomes, and multiple forms of democracy can coexist as long as accountability and democratic rules are preserved.

Lindberg question

Whether multiparty elections in Africa, specifically in Ghana, 

Counteract neo-patrimonialism or reinforce patron–client politics, thereby undermining democratic consolidation.

what does Lindberg say others say

Repeated, competitive elections—especially peaceful turnovers—signal democratic consolidation in Africa. 

Ghana's democracy has become “the only game in town.” 

Critiques this view as a form of electoralism that privileges procedures while ignoring how power is exercised in practice.

What does Lindberg say

Elections in neo-patrimonial contexts can intensify patronage politics rather than weaken them.

In Ghana, democratic competition has increased the demand for personalized material rewards (“chop-money”), reinforcing patron-client relationships and eroding both vertical and horizontal accountability

What is Lindbergs theory

Theories of neo-patrimonialism, where political authority is personalized and sustained through material distribution and loyalty rather than impersonal rules.

Combines with liberal democratic theory, particularly Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, emphasizing accountability, rule of law, and institutional constraints on power.

What is Lindbergs hypotheses

• Elections may increase patronage demands in neo-patrimonial systems

• Patron–client relations undermine democratic accountability

• Campaign financing pressures push MPs toward corruption and personal distribution

• Democratic procedures can coexist with anti-democratic practices

• These patterns threaten the consolidation of liberal democracy even when elections are free and fair

Lindbergs data and tests

Uses mixed empirical methods including:

• A survey of Ghanaian Members of Parliament

• Semi-structured interviews

• Observational fieldwork

• Comparative analysis across multiple election cycles
  

• The data focus on campaign spending, funding sources, and the use of resources for personal patronage.

Lindbergs Results

Campaign costs and personalized patronage increase over time with democratization

MPs devote growing shares of resources and time to sustaining clientelistic networks, weakening policy-based accountability, legislative oversight, and the rule of law.

concludes that without confronting neo-patrimonial practices, elections may hollow out democracy from within.

What is Barbara Geddes ‘ “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” question

asks why authoritarian regimes create political parties and hold elections even though elections do not determine leadership or policy and citizens cannot meaningfully hold rulers accountable

What does Geedes say other say

Traditional democratic theory argues that parties and elections exist to represent citizens’ interests and allow voters to remove poor leaders.

Other scholars emphasize elections as tools for cooptation or limited bargaining with the opposition.

argues that these explanations do not fully explain why authoritarian rulers consistently invest in elections and parties.

what does Geedes say

Argues that parties and elections in authoritarian regimes serve regime survival, not democratization.

They primarily serve to deter threats from regime insiders, especially the military and elite rivals, by signaling strength, mobilizing support, and discouraging challenges to the dictator.

What is Geddes theory

Rooted in intra-elite politics rather than mass accountability.

The main threat to authoritarian rulers comes from former allies, not citizens. Parties and elections function as strategic institutions that help dictators manage elite competition, counterbalance the military, and reduce the likelihood of coups.

Geddes Hypotheses

• Dictators create parties to deter military coups

• Elections signal popular acquiescence to elite rivals

• Regimes that hold elections last longer than those that do not

• Supermajoritarian victories discourage elite defection

• Parties and elections increase authoritarian durability despite their risks

Geddes Data and tests

Uses comparative historical data on approximately 170 authoritarian regimes since World War II.

analyzes regime type, party creation, election timing, and regime duration to assess whether parties and elections are associated with longer authoritarian survival.

Geedes Results

that authoritarian regimes with parties and regular elections survive significantly longer.

Elections and parties deter coups by demonstrating regime strength, mobilizing loyal supporters, and signaling to elites that opposition is unlikely to succeed.

These institutions stabilize authoritarian rule rather than democratize it.

What is Lisa Blaydes,‘ “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt” question

Asks why authoritarian regimes, specifically Egypt hold competitive parliamentary elections even though these elections do not determine policy or constrain executive power

How these elections contribute to regime stability through elite management.

What does Blaydes say others say

Authoritarian elections exist primarily to generate domestic or international legitimacy,

Create a democratic façade or signal regime strength.

Emphasize elections as symbolic acts or as mechanisms to balance the military.

she argues these explanations are incomplete for understanding the Egyptian case

What does Blaydes say

Competitive parliamentary elections in Egypt function as the regime’s primary mechanism for managing political elites.

Elections distribute access to rents, promotions, parliamentary immunity, and future economic opportunities, thereby stabilizing elite coalitions and discouraging challenges to the regime.

Blaydes Theory

Builds on authoritarian survival and elite politics, drawing on Geddes while shifting the focus from the military to economic and political elites.

Elections operate as a market-like mechanism that allocates scarce resources and signals competence and loyalty within the regime’s electorate.

Blaydes Hypotheses

• Elections allocate access to state rents and immunity

• Competitive elections reduce elite conflict by appearing fair

• Economic liberalization increases the value of parliamentary seats

• Higher competition leads to higher turnover among elites

• Election performance determines promotions and demotions of party officials

Blaydes Data and Tests

• Historical analysis of Egyptian parliamentary elections

• Election returns and incumbency rates over time

• Interviews with political elites

• Statistical analysis of turnover among governors and party officials
  

• She shows how election outcomes correlate with promotions, demotions, and elite circulation.

Blaydes Results

Elections in Egypt strengthen authoritarian rule by structuring elite competition, distributing rents, and shifting mobilization costs onto elites.

Elections also serve as informational tools, allowing the regime to identify loyal and competent officials while preventing the consolidation of rival power centers.