CPO4731 Midterm Vocab/Concepts:

Democracy

• Contested Concept

• Almost all definitions of democracy can fit into one of the 6 overlapping models of democracy: Liberal, Socioeconomic, Deliberate, Representative, People´s, Participatory

• Can be defined as: A political system in which leaders are chosen through contested elections, but thicker maximalist definitions also emphasize rights, freedoms, equality, and citizenship participation. 

6 Models of Democracy:

S- some, L- liberal, D - doesn’t, R - respect, P - peoples, P - participation

1. Socioeconomic- equalization of wealth, income, and status (prerequisite for political economy)

2. Liberal: Limit the power of majority (guarantee individuals rights, checks and balances)

3. Deliberate: All about the public interest (´representative´ samples of the public decide)

4. Representative: what the people want, the people get (majority rules)

5. People’s - (Communist regimes) Falls within the socioeconomic where the derivation of power does NOT come from voting

6. Participatory - citizen involvement; participation in referenda and civil society (more than just elections)

Thick vs. Thin Concepts:

• Minimalist (thin) - focus narrowly on elections

• Maximalist (thick) - go beyond elections and include civil liberties, equality, rights, and participation 

Measuring Democracy Dichotomously or Distinguishing Degrees of Democracy (Continuum): 

• Dichotomously- A country is either Democratic or not Democratic, there is no in between. 

  • Pros: clear, simple, reliable

  • Cons: Over simplifies- ¨ grey zones¨

• Distinguishing Degrees of Democracy (Continuum)- Measuring democracy on a scale

  • There is an in between

  • Pros: tracks gradual change, enables detailed comparison

  • Cons: More subjective and harder to categorize

Validity vs. Reliability: 

• Validity - the extent to which an indicator measures what it claims to measure 

  • Are we measuring democracy, or something else?

• Reliability - the degree to which a measurement procedure produces the same results every time, regardless of who is doing the measure.

  • Can the measurement be done again and again and produce the same outcome? (constant and replicable)

Key difference:

• Validity= are we measuring the right thing?

• Reliability = are we measuring it consistently?

Dictatorship: 

• A regime that is not democratic where power is concentrated in one ruler that was not where power is concentrated in the hands of one person or a small group, and citizens have little or no role in choosing their leaders or influencing government decisions.

Totalitarian Regime:

• A dictatorship where the ruler´s main goal is to transform human nature and society (dominate all aspects of life: political, social, cultural, even private) through ideology and mass mobilization. 

  • Total control over mass communications, social, and economic organizations

  • Strong role of ideology aimed at transforming human nature

    • Ex: Nazi Germany, USSR under Stalin, China under Mao

Authoritarian Regime:

• A regime where the ruler is most interested in maintaining power and stability, not transform human nature. Therefore, there is little to no ideology, low mobilization where citizens are not expected to be politically active and politics are kept at arms length, and high political control but allows some social/economic freedoms as long as it doesn’t threaten the regime. 

  • Characterized by a mentality rather than an elaborate ideology

  • Goal= political demobilization and depoliticization

  • Limited degrees of political pluralism (no variety of political parties) and don´t seek to homogenize society

  • Example: Spain under Franco (1939-1975), Chile under Pinochet (1973-1990)

What are the different types of Authoritarian Regimes:

• Single party, military, personalist, monarchies, and hybrid 

Single-Party Regime:

• A system where one political party controls the government and holds real power, while other parties exist but have little or no influence.

Military Regime:

A system where the armed forces control the government, usually after a coup, and military officers make key leadership and policy decisions.

Personalist Regime:

A system where one leader holds all power and rules through personal loyalty instead of formal institutions like the military or a political party.

Monarchies:

A person of royal descent inherits the head of state position and exercises real political power, not merely a ceremonial role.

Hybrid Dictatorships:

Regimes that blend characteristics of two or more types (e.g., personalist/single-party, or a "triple threat" sharing all three)

Continuous (Indices) Approach:

• Dictatorships are measured on a scale or continuum, often resulting in a numerical index, distinguishing regimes based on HOW ¨authoritarian¨ or ¨democratic¨ they are, placing them along a scale. 

  • Ex: -10 to 10 (Polity Scores) or coded as 0-1 (Binary)

Categorical (Typologies) Approach: 

• Classifies dictatorships into different ¨ types/dimensions¨ based on their structure, strategy, and institutions. Instead of treating all dictatorships the same, they highlight complexity and differences by putting regimes into distinct categories, called typologies.

Selectorate Theory:

• Categorical (typologies) approach to classifying governments by looking at two key institutions — who gets to choose leaders (the selectorate) and whose support leaders need to stay in power (the winning coalition). This explains differences between democracies and dictatorships.

Core Tenets of Selectorate Theory:

• Selectorate (S): People who have a say in choosing leaders (large in democracies, small in dictatorships).

• Winning Coalition (W): Subset of the selectorate whose support is essential for leaders to stay in power.

• Key Idea: Size of S and W explains regime outcomes (leader survival, economy, conflict).

• Resource distribution:

  • Democracies (large W) → provide public goods to many.

  • Dictatorships (small W) → provide private goods to elites.

• Leader survival: Strongest when S is large and W is small (easy to replace defectors).

• Weakness: Hard to identify selectorates in some dictatorships.

Three Waves of Democracy:

1. First Wave (1828-1926): Inspired by the American and French Revolutions in the late 18th century. Expanded during the 19th century with the spread of elections and broader suffrage (actual emergence of elections and broader suffrage during 19th century) Ended after World War I, with setbacks during the Great Depression and the rise of fascist regimes in Europe (reverse wave).  In a period of about 100 yrs, over 30 countries established at least minimal national democratic institutions 

2. Second Wave (1943-1962): Triggered towards the end of World War II and the defeat of fascism. During this time there was re-democratization in Europe, the discrediting of old regimes, decolonization in Asia and Africa, and we also saw democratization in parts of Latin America, often influenced by the United States.

   • Followed by a second reverse wave, marked by military coups and authoritarian rule, especially in Latin America (with U.S. involvement).

3. Third Wave (1974-1990): Began in Portugal, spread widely through Europe, Latin America, Asia, and the Soviet bloc.

Why the Wave Analogy Works: 

• It highlights common patterns in democratization: periods where multiple countries shift to democracy around the same time (e.g., after WWII, or after Portugal in 1974).

• The “wave” framing helps show regional contagion / snowball effects, where one transition inspires others.

• It emphasizes that democratization is not linear — there are surges forward and reversals backward.

Limits/Problems with the Wave Analogy (Empirical validity issues):

• Definition issues: Huntington’s definition of democracy (free, fair elections & participation) is criticized as too narrow or inconsistently applied.

• Inclusion: Many early cases (like the U.S. and France in the 1800s) excluded large parts of the population from voting, so it’s debatable whether they should “count” as democracies.

• Classification problems: Huntington wasn’t always transparent in how he counted democracies, interruptions, or new states.

• Percentages problem: The number of countries in the world changes over time (through decolonization, state breakup, etc.), so percentages of democracies can be misleading.

• Over-simplification: The “wave” metaphor may suggest too much uniformity — in reality, each country’s transition had unique causes.

What is Venezuela´s Regime?

• Hybrid Regime called ¨ Electoral Autocracy¨ - Dominance of a single ruling party that operates primarily to sustain the power and policy preferences of a strong personalist ruler (blend of single party/personalist)

• Venezuela blends democratic features (elections, opposition, some civil society) with authoritarian practices (repression, control, clientelism, control of media, manipulation of electoral rules).

  • Not a single-party regime bc it still has opposition parties and competitive elections have continued, even if manipulated. Unlike other countries like Cuba and Mexico during PRI, one party doesn’t have complete dominance, instead the ruling party (Chavismo) tilts the playing field.

  • Not a military regime because the military is not the ruling institution.

  • Personalist elements: Chávez concentrated power in himself through charisma, popularity, and dismantling of institutional checks (hyperpresidentialism, enabling laws, rewriting the constitution). Maduro has tried to follow this model, but without Chávez’s charisma or mass appeal.

  • (Early Chávez relied on popularity and elections; over time, especially under Maduro, the system shifted more toward outright authoritarianism (stacked courts, fraudulent elections, repression of protests)

Undemocratic ways that opposition forces tried to stop Hugo Chavez:

• Coup Attempt (2002): Groups within the opposition, linked to the business community and traditional parties (Business leaders, civic organizations, traditional parties, and parts of the media) supported demonstrations that escalated into a coup. Chávez was briefly removed but returned after mass mobilization and military support.

  • Undemocratic bc they tried to remove him using force and violence instead of through elections 

• Boycott of 2005 National Assembly/Legislative elections: Leaders of opposition parties decided to boycott elections claiming that the ¨ deck was stacked¨ (vote secrecy concerns, excessive government spending, tilted institutions). This backfired and handed Chavez complete control of the legislature. 

  • Abandoning the electoral arena is seen as undemocratic  

Democratic Ways opposition forces tried to stop Hugo Chavez:

• Recall Referendum (2004): Following disruptive actions (strikes), the opposition chose the electoral path by pursuing a recall referendum against Chávez. They managed to collect enough valid signatures but the government manipulated the process: invalidating signatures, publicizing the “Tascón list” of signers, and using clientelism and spending to influence outcomes.

• Strikes and Economic Pressure:

  • Oil Strike: Leaders of the state oil company went on strike, leading to economic depression.

What was the Punto Fijo Pact: 

• Series of agreements signed in 1958 by the leading democratic political forces in Venezuela. The agreements were established to set the terms of democratic political competition in Venezuela following years of dictatorship. 

  • When Chávez came to power, he explicitly promised to radically dismantle this system and the traditional parties that founded it, such as Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente)

How was Chavez able to consolidate power?

1. Centralization of Authority: He weakened checks and balances by concentrating decision making in the Presidency, making loyalty to him more important than loyalty to institutions. 

2. Control over elections: Venezuela still held elections but Chavez used fraud, harassment of opponents, campaign advantages, manipulation of the economy, vote buying, etc. to tilt the playing field int heir favor. 

3. Co-opting Elites and Citizens- Chavez bribed people; He provided benefits, jobs, subsidies, to supporters. 

4. Used Political Parties and Mass Mobilization to show strength, gather information, and suppress opposition

5. Gain Legitimacy through Popular Appeal: Chávez built legitimacy through his populist rhetoric, presenting himself as the defender of the poor and framing opposition as corrupt elites.

Summary: Chavez consolidated power by undermining institutional checks, manipulating elections, distributing resources to allies, and relying on populist legitimacy, all of which ensured his survival in power.

According to each theory/framework, what drives democracy?

1. Modernization theory = Development

2. Transitions Paradigm = Elite Actors

3. Social Forces = Masses

4. New Economic Approach = Democracy as a concessio

Modernization Theory (Lipset):

• As countries become more economically and socially modern—through rising income, industrialization, urbanization, and education— they are more likely to become democratic

Modernization Theory: Advantages, Disadvantages, and Implications: 

Advantages: 

• Very general, so it can be tested empirically across countries

Disadvantages:

• Lists many factors but doesn’t clearly explain how they lead to democracy

• Provides a “black box”: we know modern societies tend to be democratic, but not the mechanisms connecting wealth/industrialization to democracy (theory shows a pattern but doesn’t explain WHY it happens, just that it does)

Implications:

• Less modern countries are doomed to authoritarianism until they develop economically and socially 

• Rich countries are generally destined to be democracies according to this theory 

Transition Paradigm Framework: 

The transition paradigm, first formulated by Rustow and later expanded by O’Donnell and Schmitter, argues that democratization occurs through the strategic choices and negotiations of elites, rather than through social or economic development. It claims that democracy can emerge even in poor countries when reformers and moderates negotiate pacts and bargains that gradually open the political system. In this view, democratization is primarily a political process, not a direct outcome of socioeconomic modernization. However, the theory’s main limitation is its intense focus on elites, overlooking the broader role of civil society and popular movements. Examples such as Chile and Argentinaillustrate this process, where elite negotiations with the opposition facilitated transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy.

Implications about the Transition Paradigm: 

Social Forces Approach (Barrington Moore):

• Argues that democracy (or authoritarianism) results from the struggles and alignments of social classes, not just elites (contrast to Transition Paradigm) and economic modernization (contrary to modernization theory)

  • Core Idea: ¨ No bourgeois, no democracy¨ —> the emergence of democracy depends on the presence and strength of certain social classes, particularly the bourgeoisie (middle/upper-middle class)

  • The balance of power between the working class, landowners, and the bourgeoisie determines whether a society becomes democratic or authoritarian. The interaction of these 3 actors is what shapes the political path.

    • Strong landowners → push authoritarianism.

    • Strong working class and bourgeoisie → more likely to push democracy.

Social Forces Key Points and Weaknesses:

Main Actors:

• Working Class: A larger and more organized working class increases pressure for democracy.

• Large Landowners: When powerful, they tend to resist democracy, since they benefit from authoritarian systems that protect their privileges.

• Bourgeoisie (middle/upper-middle class): Considered essential for democracy because they push for rights and institutions that protect their property and business interests.

Contributions:

• Connects structural conditions (like class size, power, and organization) with actors motives, showing how social and economic forces set the stage for either democracy or authoritarianism 

Weaknesses:

• Been tested less systematically

• Focuses narrowly on class actors, only looking at economic classes, not giving much attention to other classes like international influences, elites or leaders, ethnic or religious groups, etc. 

  • Often overlooks non-class actors (like social movements, identity groups, or international influences

The New Economic Approach:

• Democratization happens when elites and the masses, acting mainly out of economic self-interest, reach a compromise shaped by how wealth is distributed, whether assets can be moved, and whether they can trust each other to stick to agreements.

• Democracy emerges when it’s in the self-interest of elites and the masses, depending on inequality, whether the rich can protect/move their wealth, and whether both sides can trust each other.

New Economic Approach (Boix, 2003): Formal Model 

Main Point: People evaluate politics in terms of income, inequality, and redistribution (who pays taxes, who benefits)

Median Voter theory: 

• If the median (middle) voter in the income distribution is poor, they will prefer higher redistribution. The wealthy may fear this and resist democracy. 

• Thus, the rich might prefer dictatorship so they can control tax rates and avoid redistribution 

2 Key Intervening Variables: 

• Income Inequality: If income inequality is LOW → wealthy doesn’t fear democracy because the median voter isn’t very different from them. If inequality is HIGH → wealthy resists democracy bc they fear massive redistribution.

• Capital Mobility: If capital is MOBILE (wealth can be moved), elites are less afraid of democracy since they can protect assets. If capital is FIXED (like land), elites are more resistant to democracy bc they can´t escape redistribution.

New Economic Approach (Acemaglu & Robinson, 2006): Commitment Problem

• Same actors & preferences but they ask: why would elites/authoritarians grant democracy instead of just offering temporary redistribution under dictatorship 

  • Answer: Commitment Problem 

    • Poor citizens don´t trust elites to keep promises of redistribution under dictatorship 

    • democracy becomes a way for elites to credibly commit to future redistribution by tying their own hands with democratic institutions. 

New Economic Approach Strength and Weaknesses:

Strengths:

• Integrates structural and strategic elements→ looks at both conditions (inequality, mobility) and actors decisions

Weaknesses: 

• Assumes people are fully informed and make choices only on material interests (income, taxes, redistribution)

• Ignores non-economic factors like identity, ideology, culture, or external pressures 

• Needs stronger empirical testing (testing whether theory or idea actually matches the real-world evidence)

Large N, Cross-National Studies:

Research using data from many countries (large N) to analyze statistical relationships between variables (e.g., GDP, inequality, religion) and democratization

• Quantitative research comparing many countries to find patterns in democratization.

• Statistical tools (like regression analysis) to examine relationships between variables such as GDP, inequality, religion, colonial heritage, or country size and the emergence of democratic regimes

Large N, Cross-National Studies Strengths:

• Finds big patterns: Can spot broad trends across many countries (ex: small countries democratize more easily).

• Data-driven: Uses statistics to test many factors at once, instead of relying on single examples.

  • Quantitative approach allows for testing multiple variables simultaneously.

• Compares explanations: Lets us see which factors matter more (colonial history, religion, size, ethnic diversity, etc.)

• Identifies non-findings: Can show that some presumed relationships (e.g., Islam → less democracy) may be conditional or spurious.

• Overall: They are powerful for finding general statistical relationships across countries.

Large N, Cross-National Studies Weaknesses: 

• Slow Change/outcomes: Democracy often evolves gradually, making patterns hard to detect.

• Correlation does not = causation: Shows relationships (correlations), but harder to prove causal mechanisms (the “how” and “why” behind democratization)

• Oversimplifies: Lumps diverse groups/countries together, which can hide important differences.

• Unclear meaning: Even if the result is ¨significant¨ it is not always clear why a variable matters (structural vs. cultural vs. elite choices).

• Data quality/issues: Cross-national datasets may be unreliable or incomplete

• Overall: They may oversimplify, struggle with causality, and sometimes produce ambiguous or non-findings

Relationship between Socioeconomic Development and Democracy:

• Social, cultural, and institutional factors—like diversity, size, and historical context—shape whether wealth and modernization actually produce democratic outcomes. Economic development helps, but it is not sufficient on its own.

Endogenous Explanation (Cause comes from within the process) for the Relationship between Economic Development and Democratization:

• Modernization Theory: As countries modernize, their economic development produces the social and economic transformations that make democracy more likely to emerge.

  • Democracy becomes possible through the progressive accumulation of social and economic structures.

Exogenous Explanation (Cause comes from outside factors) for the Relationship between Economic Development and Democratization:

• Survival Explanation: Economic development does NOT cause democracy, but it makes existing democracies more likely to survive once they emerge

  • Argues that wealth is more critical for sustaining an already established democracy

• Przeworski et al. found: While income does not strongly predict the emergence of democracy, it is a powerful predictor of it´s survival, with democracies in rich countries

Economic Factors that affect the EMERGENCE (transition) and survival of Democracy: 

1. Economic Income and Development (Modernization Theory): Higher income, education, industrialization, and urbanization causes middle class and society to push for democracy

   • BUT Przeworski et al. (2000) found no level of income predicts transitions so development alone does not guarantee democratization 

2. Economic Crisis: Factor that can potentially lead to democratic upturns because it reduces resources, causing consumer subsidies to diminish.

3. Natural Resources: The presence of specific resources, like oil, is linked to a decreased likelihood of democratization

   • Testing finds that the presence of oil diminishes democratization

4. Income Inequality:

   • Boix 2003: Found that lower income inequality makes democracy more likely to emerge bc elites feel less threatened by redistribution

   • Empirical Finding: However, when Teorell retested the inequality arguments (including those put forward by Boix as well as Acemoglu and Robinson) using a bigger sample and a graded measure of democracy, he found Null Effects

5. Inflation: Tested and found to have no impact on democratization. 

Economic Factors that affect the SURVIVAL of Democracy: 

1. Income/Development (Survival Theory):

   • Democracies in wealthy countries almost never die

   • Once income passes ~$6,000 per capita, democracies are extremely stable

2. Economic Crises: 

   • Even rich democracies can destabilize if hit by severe crises, but poor democracies are most vulnerable

   • It’s not rapid growth that threatens democracy, but sharp downturns

Inequality Argument by Boix:

• Main Argument: Income Inequality Affects democratization

• When inequality is low, elites are less afraid of redistribution → they are more willing to accept democracy 

• When inequality is high, elites fear losing too much wealth under majority rule → they resist democracy and cling to authoritarianism

• Simply put: Low inequality = democracy more likely (inequality is key)

Inequality Arguments by Acemogul & Robinson: 

• Main Argument: Inequality plays a role, but it doesn’t solely determine democracy. Other factors such as elite-citizen conflict and threat of revolution can shape the outcome too. 

  • Citizens push for democracy when inequality and repression are high 

  • Elites grant democracy only when the threat of revolution is credible but repression is too costly

  • Inequality matters indirectly through bargaining, repression, and revolutionary threats - not as a simple ¨ low inequality = democracy¨ relationship. 

Teorell´s Retest of Inequality Arguments: 

• Using a larger dataset and a graded democracy measure, Teorell found null effects → inequality did not strongly predict democratization outcomes

• Basically, teorell suggests inequality may not have a strong independent effect.

Roles that Elites play in driving Democracy:

• Push for Reform: Elites often control political and economic resources, so their decisions to allow reforms or negotiate transitions is crucial

  • They may liberalize (erase restrictions) when:

    • Repression becomes too costly 

    • They face internal divisions 

    • They need to maintain legitimacy 

Roles that Masses Play in Driving Democracy:

• Drive democratization through protests, strikes, and demonstrations

• Peaceful protest are especially effective: 

  • They are accessible (no special training or resources needed),

  • Brutal state repression against peaceful demonstrators can backfire, creating sympathy and mobilizing more people (paradox of repression).

  • Peaceful protests retain the moral high ground and avoid alienating potential supporters

• Impact: Mass mobilization can weaken authoritarian “bargains” by withdrawing support from key sectors (oil workers in Venezuela, teachers, transportation, military) → undermining the regime’s ability to rule 

Forms of Popular Mobilization: 

1. Peaceful Demonstrations: Any peaceful gathering of 100+ ppl opposing gov policies or authority 

   • The MOST effective and common form of mobilization 

   • They are accessible to broad groups (no training or gear needed), maintain moral legitimacy, and invite wide participation. 

   • Examples: Third Wave, Color Revolutions, Arab Spring, “Wall of Moms” in Portland or peaceful uprisings in Eastern Europe.

2. Riots: Violent demonstrations or clashes involving more than 100 citizens using physical force.

   • They can create disruption but often justify state repression or alienate potential supporters

3. Strikes: Strikes of 1,000 or more workers across multiple employers aimed at government policies.

   • Can disrupt economic activity and weaken authoritarian “bargains,” but on their own, they do not consistently lead to democratization.

How Mobilization Affects Democracy:

1. Peaceful protests can spark democratic transition: 

   • They challenge authoritarian regimes without provoking overwhelming repression.

   • Brutal crackdowns on peaceful demonstrators may backfire, mobilizing even more citizens, creating sympathy, and drawing third party mediation (ex: international pressure)

   • They erode authoritarian bargains, since regimes rely on citizens’ cooperation (e.x.: oil workers in Venezuela, teachers, transport workers).

   • Persistent peaceful mobilization makes dictatorship costly to maintain, pushing elites to liberalize or negotiate democratic reforms.

2. Riots (violent clashes) have no significant impact on democratization:

   • Violence limits participation, allows regimes to claim protesters are “extremists,” and often strengthens elite or alienate potential supporters

3. Strikes (peaceful but targeted labor action) also show no consistent democratizing effect in statistical analyses 

   • While important in some individual cases, they don’t reliably cause transitions unless combined with wider peaceful movements that undermine authoritarian dependence on key sectors.

Why Peaceful Protests are most conducive to democracy:

• Peaceful, large-scale demonstrations are most conducive to democracy bc they mobilize broad participation, delegitimize authoritarian regimes, and make repression counterproductive, often leading to elite divisions and democratic openings. 

1. Maximize Participation & Accessibility

   • No special training, gear, or physical strength required → ordinary citizens can join

   • Allows the "maximum degree of active participation" by a large proportion of the population

   • Larger mobilization is harder for the regime to repress

2. Paradox of Repression / Exacerbating Elite Divisions

   • Brutal state force against unarmed protesters often backfires

   • Can increase sympathy for the movement, mobilize more citizens, and raise moral outrage

   • May spawn elite divisions → hardliners vs softliners within regime

   • Can lead to defections or mutinies in military/security forces

3. Maintaining Moral High Ground & Legitimacy

   • Avoids being labeled "violent extremists" → retains domestic and international support

   • Violence alienates potential allies

4. Undermining Authoritarian Bargains / Disrupting Regime Support

   • Shows that key societal sectors are withdrawing support (e.g., workers, teachers, military)

   • Threatens the regime's dependence relations → withholding essential services or cooperation

   • Weakens the material and institutional bases that authoritarian governments rely on

5. Increase International Involvement

   • Peaceful protests highlight reliance on force rather than consent

   • Raises likelihood of external support, condemnation, sanctions, or pressure from third parties (e.g., foreign governments, international organizations, transnational social movements)

Preference Falsification: 

• When individuals hide their true private preferences and instead publicly express support for a regime they privately oppose. 

  • happens bc of fear from repression or desire for rewards/benefits

How Preference Falsification contributes to Resilience of authoritarian regimes:

• People pretend to be loyal (like the grocer putting up a pro-regime sign), so the regime appears stronger than it really is.

• Neither the regime nor other citizens can tell how much genuine opposition exists.

• This discourages dissent because individuals assume they are isolated

How preference falsification contributes to sudden collapse of authoritarian regimes:

• If an event reduces fear of repression (e.g., USSR signaling it won’t intervene, Gorbachev’s reforms), some individuals publicly defect.

• This can trigger a bandwagon effect: once people see others defect, they realize the regime is weaker than it appeared.

• Hidden opposition comes into the open quickly, making collapse look sudden and inevitable in hindsight. 

Rational Choice Theory:

• People are strategic actors who make decisions by comparing the expected costs and expected benefits of different actions 

Application of Rational Choice theory to individual protest participation decisions: 

• In the case of protest decisions, people use rational choice theory to weight costs and benefits before deciding to join a protest

1. Individuals Calculate expected payoffs

• If repression is strong and few others protest, the cost of dissent is high → rational choice is not to protest

• If many others protest and repression is weakening, the perceived cost falls and potential benefits rise

2. Uncertainty Matters

• People People do not know others’ private preferences—how many secretly oppose the regime.

• This uncertainty leads to preference falsification (pretending to support the regime to avoid punishment).

3. Threshold Models (Kuran):

• As the size of public opposition (S) increases, the risk of repression decreases, and the benefits of joining grow

• Each person has a revolutionary threshold (T) — the point where benefits outweigh costs. When enough people cross their thresholds, participation cascades, creating a bandwagon effect

4. Information and Repression Shape Participation:

• High repression and low transparency → fewer people join (fear and ignorance).

• Visible opposition and reduced repression → more join (cascade effect).

Summary: Rational choice theory explains protest participation as a strategic decision where individuals act only when the expected benefits of joining outweigh the personal costs, often depending on their perceptions of others’ actions and the regime’s capacity for repression.

Examples:

• Once repression weakened (e.g., Gorbachev’s reforms), people saw others protesting and realized opposition was widespread—causing a rapid shift in public behavior (the “bandwagon revolution” of 1989

Strategic Use of Digital Censorship in authoritarian regimes (King, Pan, & Roberts 2013), with particular attention to how governments suppress collective action while permitting limited dissent:

Strategic use of digital censorship in authoritarian regimes (especially in China) is not simply about silencing criticism of the government. Instead it is a targeted strategy designed to prevent collective action that could threaten regime stability.

Authoritarian regimes strategically use digital censorship to suppress collective action while permitting limited dissent. This prevents coordination among citizens while allowing the regime to gather information and appear open — maintaining control without total repression.

How authoritarian governments suppress collective action while limiting dissent (China Case; King, Pan, Roberts 2013):

1. Main Argument:

   • The Chinese government does not uniformly censor all criticism or negative commentary. Instead, censorship is selective to posts or online content with ¨ collective action potential.¨

   • this means that the state suppresses anything that could help organize, coordinate, or mobilize people for protests, strikes, or other forms of public demonstration - regardless of whether those actions support or oppose the regime.

2. What gets censored? :

   • Protests, strikes, and riots - any content suggesting collective expression outside government control (No matter if it’s pro government or anti government!! ) Threat = collective mobilization, not opinion

   • Examples: Announcements of demonstrations, calls to organize gatherings, shared experience of group dissent 

3. What does not get censored

   • Harsh criticisms of leaders made by an individual

   • Why? Because such criticisms:

     • Allow citizens to vent frustrations safely, which can reduce pressure for real-world protest.

     • Provide the government with information about public sentiment.

     • Create the appearance of openness and responsiveness.

   • Lesson learned from East Germany: total suppression of criticism left the regime blind to public discontent, leading to sudden collapse

4. How the censorship works:

   • Enforced through an extensive bureaucratic system:

     • Individual websites may employ up to 1,000 censors.

     • 20,000–50,000 internet police and monitors.

     • 250,000–300,000 Party monitors.

   • Includes keyword blocking, manual review, and automated filtering (the “Great Firewall”).

   Citizens often respond creatively with homographs, code words, or slang to evade detection — creating a cat-and-mouse dynamic.

5. Censorship serves as a strategic, preventative role: 

   • Maintains the status quo by stopping collective coordination before it starts.

   • Reduces the likelihood of mass mobilization and revolutionary cascades (as seen in Kuran’s model).

   • Ensures the regime avoids the kind of information vacuum and sudden collapse that doomed Eastern European communist regimes.

How access to information influence the emergence, scale (how widespread), and success of mass mobilization:

Reveal Hidden Preferences:

• Information increases the emergence and scale of mobilization by reducing uncertainty and fear.

• In authoritarian regimes, information is scarce and unreliable

• Citizens often do not know others’ true preferences because of preference falsification 

• As a result, few are willing to protest first — making mobilization unlikely to emerge.

• When information becomes more available (through reforms, leaks, or digital communication), people learn that others also oppose the regime, lowering their revolutionary thresholds and triggering cascades of participation.

• Ex: In Eastern Europe (1989), new information (e.g., Gorbachev’s policies and signs of weakening repression) revealed widespread dissent, leading to rapid mass mobilization.

How levels of organization capacity influence the emergence, scale, and success of mass mobilization: 

• Organization is crucial for scale and success, turning spontaneous protests into sustained movements

• Organization capacity- the presence of networks, institutions, or leadership structures that can coordinate and sustain collective action (ex: unions, parties, churches, student groups)

• When organizations are strong, they:

  • Distribute information efficiently, even under censorship.

  • Coordinate strategy and timing.

  • Sustain mobilization when repression increases.

• The slides contrast this with the Arab Spring (Weyland, 2011):

  • Citizens were “inspired but ignorant.”

  • They had weak organizational structures and relied on individual decision-making.

  • This led to disorganized protests that initially spread quickly (due to social media) but collapsed without leadership or planning.

How BOTH access to info and organization influence the emergence, scale, and success of mass mobilization: 

• These two factors reinforce each other:

  • Access to information can spark initial mobilization, but without organization, movements often fizzle.

  • Strong organizations can compensate for limited information by building trust and communication networks underground.

• Mass mobilization succeeds when both information and organization are present.

• Information = shapes whether people believe mobilization is possible.

• Organization determines whether mobilization can scale and endure.

• When both are weak (as in much of the Arab Spring), uprisings may erupt suddenly but are unlikely to sustain success.

• Access to information determines whether citizens realize the potential for change, while organizational capacity determines whether they can act on it.

How Personalist Regimes Collapse:

Collapse can occur when: 

• Leader fights ¨ tooth and nail to stay in power (do everything possible to hold onto power, no matter what)

  • Instead of negotiating an exit, dictator goes down fighting 

• Rents/resources diminish and elites no longer benefit.

• **They lose control of the security forces is key— since security forces are the ¨first movers¨ (main actors who can turn against the leader) in abandoning the leader 

• Dictator dies 

Outcomes: 

• Likely to end in violence, rebellion, or civil war

• Does not transition naturally to democracy and can cause renewed authoritarianism- those that overthrow the regime consolidate power.

How Military Regimes Collapse:

• Military values the survival and unity of the armed forces above staying in government 

• Collapse tends to come through internal splits and coups

  • Coordination problems (who defects first?) drive coup outcomes

• Because civil war is the worst outcome, militaries sometimes step down voluntarily or negotiate transitions rather than fight each other

Outcomes: 

• Lower survival rates than other regime types.

• More likely to negotiate transitions or hand power back to civilians.

• Collapse often follows internal divisions and coups rather than violence against society

How Single-Party Regimes Collapse:

• Longest lasting authoritarian regime 

• Collapse can occur when: 

  • **Economic crisis (regimes can’t keep rewarding loyalty).

    • Single party regimes survive by distributing rewards 

  • Factional (team/group) splits within the party if groups are persistently excluded.

• In competitive authoritarian contexts, citizens may also withdraw support if opposition looks credible

Outcomes:

• Tend to collapse more gradually than personalist or military regimes.

• Economic crisis is the biggest weakness or vulnerability 

Factors that contribute to the durability of authoritarian regimes:

1. Structure of the regime: different internal structures and interests affect how long they survive

2. Elite Actor Interests: 

   1. Single Party: Factions within the party value staying unified because all benefit from power-sharing. → Unity = longevity

   2. Personalist: Everything revolves around the leader; when loyalty or resources weaken, collapse follows. → Concentration of power = instability.

   3. Military: The military values its institutional survival over ruling; divisions and fear of civil war make them more likely to step down. → Fragile stability

3. Access to Resources (Rents): 

   1. Regimes use rents (money, benefits, patronage) to buy loyalty from elites and security forces.

   2. When resources decline (e.g., due to economic crisis, sanctions, or oil price drops), elites and security forces may defect.

   3. Loss of rents = loss of control = higher risk of collapse.

4. Economic Conditions: Economic crises repeatedly appear as a trigger for collapse (especially in single-party regimes). When the economy falters, regimes cannot “reward loyalty and punish defection,” undermining elite cohesion and citizen support.

5. Coordination Problems and Divisions

• Especially in military regimes, internal splits and coordination issues lead to coups or negotiated exits.

• Once divisions appear within the elite or security apparatus, the regime becomes vulnerable.

Survival and vulnerability to breakdown of Personalist Regimes:

Survival:

• Centered entirely around one leader 

• Leaders personal power replaces strong instituions

• The regime survives as long as the leader maintains control over security forces and resources (rents) to reward loyal elites

Vulnerability to breakdown: 

• Extremely vulnerable when the leader loses control of the military or runs out of resources.

• When collapse happens, it’s often violent — through rebellion, invasion, or civil war.

• Because power is so personalized, once the leader falls, the whole regime usually falls too.

• Rarely leads to democracy; typically replaced by renewed authoritarianism.

Survival and vulnerability to breakdown of Military Regimes:

Survival: 

• As long as the military remains cohesive and perceives ruling as beneficial, the regime can survive.

  • The military rules collectively and values the unity and reputation of the armed forces above all.

Vulnerability to Breakdown: 

• When there are internal divisions within the armed forces

• When institutions survival is threatened (ex: by protests, potential civil war, or losing legitimacy), military will often choose to withdraw from power 

• Usually short-lived bc the military prefers to ¨ go back to the barracks¨

Survival and vulnerability to breakdown of Single-Party Regimes:

Survival:

• Most durable authoritarian type.

• Power is shared among factions inside the ruling party, which encourages cooperation and compromise.

• The party rewards loyalty and punishes defection — maintaining elite unity and control over voters.

Vulnerability to breakdown: 

• The Achilles heel is economic crisis — when the regime can no longer distribute material benefits.

• When economic performance collapses, loyalty erodes and factions may defect or split off.

• Still, these regimes tend to collapse gradually, not violently.

Pacted Transitons:

• Negotiated agreements between authoritarian elites (reformers) and opposition actors (moderates) that enable a transition away from dictatorship

  • Requires mutual guarantees so no side feels like it has lost completely

  • They are not revolutions but compromises designed to avoid instability and protect elite interests.

  • Each side grants assurances or guarantees: limits on policy change, sharing of benefits, and restricting participation of outsiders (masses/radicals)

Do Pacted Transitions promote democratic outcomes?

• Not really, they produce only partially genuine democracies. 

• How/why?

  • Short-term stability vs. Long-Term Fragility:  

    • Pacted transitions often achieve short-term stability because elites on both sides agree to rules that prevent immediate retaliation or radical reform.

    • However, they become unstable once the original pact signers lose power, since successors often challenge or overturn guarantees, creating new tensions

    • The removal of military guarantees (e.g., repealing amnesty) frequently triggers backlash, showing that these transitions only partially civilianize power.

  • Limited Democratic Quality (¨Original Sin¨)

    • O’Donnell and Schmitter, pacts carry an “original sin” because pacted transitions are not fully democratic at the start because they restrict participation and protect authoritarian actors 

    • Early democracies born out of pacts tend to be elite-driven rather than popular, limiting accountability and inclusiveness.

    • The democratic opposition and the military often agree to avoid “drastic changes,” which constrains reforms and keeps authoritarian legacies alive.

    • Example: 

      • In Chile, the military secured amnesty, appointed senators, and control over copper revenues, meaning the new democracy was highly constrained by the authoritarian past.

      • In Argentina, similar amnesty guarantees were granted, though later repealed — leading to military revolts (Carapintada uprisings)

    • Persistence of Military or Elite Power: 

      • Even after democratization, the military often remains a “shadow force”, exercising conditional subordination and tutelage over civilians

      • This undermines genuine democracy by limiting civilian control and perpetuating informal veto powers over politics, especially on issues like security and justice.

Democratic Transition in Argentina:

• Transition: Pacted transition where the military was the key negotiator 

• Guarantees/Negotiation; To ensure the military’s cooperation, the new democratic government granted amnesty for past human rights violations as its main guarantee 

• Aftermath: After the transition, civilians later repealed amnesty laws, triggering Carapintada revolts (uprisings by sectors of the armed forces demanding protection for former officers). This led to the “Law of Due Obedience,” which excused lower-ranking officers who had “just followed orders”

• Nature of the New Democracy: So while Argentina transitioned, Argentina’s democracy initially faced limited civilian authority and weak accountability, showing how pacted transitions carry an “original sin” (compromised justice and inclusion to ensure stability). Over time, Argentina’s democracy became more genuine as later leaders challenged those pacts and strengthened civilian institutions, but the transition itself was elite-negotiated and cautious, not fully participatory.

• Summary: The democratic transition in Argentina was a pacted negotiation between civilian reformers and the military, centered on granting amnesty and avoiding confrontation. While it produced short-term stability and ended military rule, it left behind enduring tensions, limited accountability, and a military that remained a “shadow force” in politics.

Democratic Transition in Chile:

• Type of transition: Pacted and Highly Controlled by the Military

  • The military negotiated far more extensive guarantees than in Argentina.

  • The process was not a full rupture from dictatorship but a negotiated reform (reforma) designed to maintain continuity and stability while limiting change. 

• Guarantees/Negotiations: Military, under Pinochet, received far more guarantees than in Argentina. Including: 

  • Amnesty for crimes, reserved senate seats (9 senators), permanent office for Pinochet (commander in chief), control over 10% of copper revenues, and other privileges  

• Nature of the transition: The transition was negotiated through a referendum and constitutional reforms, not through collapse or violent overthrow. Because the military’s power remained intact, the new democracy had limited autonomy- civilian leaders were constrained by the pacts that had been made.

• Outcome and democratic quality: Short term stability and prevented violent rupture, but left deep authoritarian legacies, such as: restricted civilian control over the armed forces, institutionalized limits on political reform, and lack of accountability for human rights violations. This meant Chile’s democracy was born with deep authoritarian enclaves, giving the military ongoing political power.

Over time, some of these prerogatives were rolled back, but the transition was far more constrained than Argentina’s.

Regime Actors and Opposition Actors in the Pacted Transitions Model:

1. Regime/Elite Actors (authoritarian side):

   • Hardliners - individuals that want to maintain dictatorship

   • Reformers - individuals that are willing to negotiate

2. Opposition Actors:

   • Radicals - individuals that demand immediate change (revolutionaries)

   • Moderates- open to compromise

Pacted Transitions Model (O’Donnell & Schmitter): 

• Core Idea: Democracy emerges when reformers and moderates negotiation pacts. Both sides trade guarantees to each other while excluding hardliners and radicals.

• Key assumptions:  

  • Stalemates (when no side is stronger) between equally strong sides force compromise → stable democracy

  • Guarantees protect both sides, preventing collapse

  • Masses/radicals excluded → negotiations remain elite-led

• Outcome: 

  • Produces short term stability but not genuine democracies (¨ original sin¨)

  • Democracies that emerge are elite driven, limited, and often exclude the masses 

  • Over time, pacts may unravel as new leaders reject the guarantees made to former elites.

  • Therefore, pacted transitions produce procedural democracy but not full, inclusive democracy

McFaul´s Findings - Post Communist Transitions:

• Critique of the Pacted Transitions Model: 

  • Power is rarely evenly distributed - no real stalemates 

  • Agendas couldn't be limited → politics and economics were deeply intertwined 

  • Benefits couldn't be shared → hard to divide state assets and authority

  • Mass actors were decisive → transitions weren't just elite negotiations 

• Core Argument: Democratization depends on the balance of power among actors

  • If democrats (moderates) hold more power → democracy emerges.

  • If old regime (hardliners/reformers) remain dominant → authoritarianism persists.

  • If power is evenly distributed → stalemates and unstable/partial democracies result.

• Key Finding: 

  • Democracy does not emerge through compromise but through asymmetric power favoring democratic forces. The stronger side imposes its preferred system.

  • Protracted compromises do not produce democracy — instead, outcomes reflect the relative strength of each side: the stronger side imposes its preferred system.

• Example: 

  • Latin America (Chile, Argentina): moderates + reformers negotiated peaceful pacts; radicals excluded.

  • Post-Communist Europe: power imbalances & mass mobilization made pacts harder → mixed democratic results.

How does the balance of power between reformers, hardliners, and opposition actors influence the prospects for democratization in post-communist countries?

According to McFaul, the balance of power between regime actors (reformers and hardliners) and the democratic opposition determines whether a transition results in democracy, dictatorship, or instability. When the democratic opposition holds greater power, democracy is more likely to emerge because democratic forces can shape new institutions and limit the influence of former elites. When regime elites (hardliners and reformers) retain control, they block or weaken reforms, leading to continued authoritarianism. When power is evenly distributed, neither side can impose its vision, creating stalemates that often result in partial or unstable democracies. McFaul rejects O’Donnell and Schmitter’s idea that democracy arises through negotiated compromise. Instead, he argues that in post-communist transitions, democratization depends on asymmetry of power — the stronger side imposes its preferred system, meaning strength, not stalemate, drives democracy.

Differences in the longevity of authoritarian regimes:

Authoritarian regimes vary in how long they survive, depending on how well they maintain elite loyalty, mass support, and control over opposition

• Critical Factors Influencing Longevity:

1. Mass support – Regimes that can maintain widespread support, whether through ideology, benefits distribution, or manipulation of elections, tend to last longer. If the population perceives the regime as legitimate or fears instability without it, the system is more resilient. 

   • Even if support is not genuine, the appearance of loyalty discourages rebellion. 

2. Elite loyalty – Stability depends heavily on whether the elites (political leaders, military, business elites) remain loyal to the regime. If elites fracture or defect, authoritarian systems are much more vulnerable to collapse.

   • Loyalty is sustained through material benefits and political protection

3. Weak or Fractured Opposition– Regimes survive longer when opposition forces are weak, divided, or repressed. A fractured or ineffective opposition makes it difficult to mobilize challenges that can threaten the regime’s survival.

How Regime Type Affects Regime Survival:

Different types of authoritarian regimes survive for different lengths of time because of how they are organized and how they manage power:

1. Single Party Regimes = Most Durable 

• Parties allow regime to:

  • Co-opt elites and citizens by distributing positions, resources, and benefits.

  • Gather and disseminate information about support and opposition.

  • Mobilize citizens in demonstrations and elections, showing strength.

  • Provide a counterbalance to the military, reducing coup threats.
    → Example: The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, which lasted over 70 years.

2. Personalist = Less Durable

• Depend on Charisma and control of one single leader

• They can consolidate power (as Hugo Chávez did in Venezuela), but they are vulnerable to collapse if the leader dies, loses legitimacy, or faces elite defection

• Survival is tied to one individual, making them less stable long term

3. Military Regime = Least Durable

• Militaries are often more interested in preserving their institution’s reputation and cohesion than in holding power indefinitely

• They are more likely to step down or negotiate exits if repression becomes too costly.