CPO4731 Midterm Vocab/Concepts:

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72 Terms

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Democracy

  • Contested Concept

  • Almost all definitions of democracy can fit into one of the 6 overlapping models of democracy: 1. Liberal, Socioeconomic, Deliberate, Representative, People´s, Participatory

  • Can be defined as: A political system in which leaders are chosen through contested elections, but thicker maximalist definitions also emphasize rights, freedoms, equality, and citizenship participation. 

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6 Models of Democracy:

  1. Socioeconomic- equalization of wealth, income, and status (prerequisite for political economy)

  2. People’s - (Communist regimes) Falls within the socioeconomic where the derivation of power does NOT come from voting

  3. Participatory - citizen involvement; participation in referenda and civil society (more than just elections)

  4. Representative: what the people want, the people get (majority rules)

  5. Liberal: Limit the power of majority (guarantee individuals rights, checks and balances)

  6. Deliberate: All about the public interest (´representative´ samples of the public decide)

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Thick vs. Thin Concepts:

  • Minimalist (thin) - focus narrowly on elections

  • Maximalist (thick) - go beyond elections and include civil liberties, equality, rights, and participation 

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Measuring Democracy Dichotomously or Distinguishing Degrees of Democracy (Continuum): 

  • Measuring Democracy Dichotomously- A country is either Democratic or not Democratic, there is no in between. 

  • Distinguishing Degrees of Democracy (Continuum)- Measuring democracy on a scale

    • There is an in between

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Validity vs. Reliability: 

  • Validity - the extent to which an indicator measures what it claims to measure 

    • Are we measuring democracy, or something else?

  • Reliability - the degree to which a measurement procedure produces the same results every time, regardless of who is doing the measure.

    • Can the measurement be done again and again and produce the same outcome? (constant and replicable)

Key difference:

  • Validity= are we measuring the right thing?

  • Reliability = are we measuring it consistently?

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Dictatorship: 

  • A regime that is not democratic where power is concentrated in one ruler that was not chosen through contested elections and governments represent only a narrow part of society.

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Totalitarian Regime:

  • A dictatorship where the ruler´s main goal is to transform human nature and society (dominate all aspects of life: political, social, cultural, even private) through ideology and mass mobilization. 

    • Total control over mass communications, social, and economic organizations

    • Strong role of ideology aimed at transforming human nature

      • Ex: Nazi Germany, USSR under Stalin, China under Mao

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Authoritarian Regime:

  • A regime where the ruler is most interested in maintaining power and stability, not transform human nature. Therefore, there is little to no ideology, low mobilization where citizens are not expected to be politically active and politics are kept at arms length, and high political control but allows some social/economic freedoms as long as it doesn’t threaten the regime. 

    • Characterized by a mentality rather than an elaborate ideology

    • Goal= political demobilization and depoliticization

    • Limited degrees of political pluralism (no variety of political parties) and don´t seek to homogenize society

    • Example: Spain under Franco (1939-1975), Chile under Pinochet (1973-1990)

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What are the different types of Authoritarian Regimes:

  • Single party, military, personalist, monarchies, and hybrid 

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Single-Party Regime:

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Military Regime:

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Personalist Regime:

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Monarchies:

A person of royal descent inherits the head of state position and exercises real political power, not merely a ceremonial role.

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Hybrid Dictatorships:

Regimes that blend characteristics of two or more types (e.g., personalist/single-party, or a "triple threat" sharing all three)

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Continuous (Indices) Approach:

  • Dictatorships are measured on a scale or continuum, often resulting in a numerical index, distinguishing regimes based on HOW ¨authoritarian¨ or ¨democratic¨ they are, placing them along a scale. 

    • Ex: -10 to 10 (Polity Scores) or coded as 0-1 (Binary)

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Categorical (Typologies) Approach: 

  • Classifies dictatorships into different ¨ types/dimensions¨ based on their structure, strategy, and institutions. Instead of treating all dictatorships the same, they highlight complexity and differences by putting regimes into distinct categories, called typologies.

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Selectorate Theory:

  • Categorical (typologies) approach to classifying governments by looking at two key institutions — who gets to choose leaders (the selectorate) and whose support leaders need to stay in power (the winning coalition). This explains differences between democracies and dictatorships.

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Core Tenets of Selectorate Theory:

  • Selectorate (S): People who have a say in choosing leaders (large in democracies, small in dictatorships).

  • Winning Coalition (W): Subset of the selectorate whose support is essential for leaders to stay in power.

  • Key Idea: Size of S and W explains regime outcomes (leader survival, economy, conflict).

  • Resource distribution:

    • Democracies (large W) → provide public goods to many.

    • Dictatorships (small W) → provide private goods to elites.

  • Leader survival: Strongest when S is large and W is small (easy to replace defectors).

  • Weakness: Hard to identify selectorates in some dictatorships.

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Three Waves of Democracy:

  1. First Wave (1828-1926): Inspired by the American and French Revolutions in the late 18th century. Expanded during the 19th century with the spread of elections and broader suffrage (actual emergence of elections and broader suffrage during 19th century) Ended after World War I, with setbacks during the Great Depression and the rise of fascist regimes in Europe (reverse wave).  In a period of about 100 yrs, over 30 countries established at least minimal national democratic institutions 

  2. Second Wave (1943-1962): Triggered towards the end of World War II and the defeat of fascism. During this time there was re-democratization in Europe, the discrediting of old regimes, decolonization in Asia and Africa, and we also saw democratization in parts of Latin America, often influenced by the United States.

    • Followed by a second reverse wave, marked by military coups and authoritarian rule, especially in Latin America (with U.S. involvement).

  3. Third Wave (1974-1990): Began in Portugal, spread widely through Europe, Latin America, Asia, and the Soviet bloc.

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Why the Wave Analogy Works: 

  • It highlights common patterns in democratization: periods where multiple countries shift to democracy around the same time (e.g., after WWII, or after Portugal in 1974).

  • The “wave” framing helps show regional contagion / snowball effects, where one transition inspires others.

  • It emphasizes that democratization is not linear — there are surges forward and reversals backward.

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Limits/Problems with the Wave Analogy (Empirical validity issues):

  • Definition issues: Huntington’s definition of democracy (free, fair elections & participation) is criticized as too narrow or inconsistently applied.

  • Inclusion: Many early cases (like the U.S. and France in the 1800s) excluded large parts of the population from voting, so it’s debatable whether they should “count” as democracies.

  • Classification problems: Huntington wasn’t always transparent in how he counted democracies, interruptions, or new states.

  • Percentages problem: The number of countries in the world changes over time (through decolonization, state breakup, etc.), so percentages of democracies can be misleading.

  • Over-simplification: The “wave” metaphor may suggest too much uniformity — in reality, each country’s transition had unique causes.

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What is Venezuela´s Regime?

  • Hybrid Regime called ¨ Electoral Autocracy¨ - Dominance of a single ruling party that operates primarily to sustain the power and policy preferences of a strong personalist ruler (blend of single party/personalist)

  • Venezuela blends democratic features (elections, opposition, some civil society) with authoritarian practices (repression, control, clientelism, control of media, manipulation of electoral rules).

    • Not a single-party regime bc it still has opposition parties and competitive elections have continued, even if manipulated. Unlike other countries like Cuba and Mexico during PRI, one party doesn’t have complete dominance, instead the ruling party (Chavismo) tilts the playing field.

    • Not a military regime because the military is not the ruling institution.

    • Personalist elements: Chávez concentrated power in himself through charisma, popularity, and dismantling of institutional checks (hyperpresidentialism, enabling laws, rewriting the constitution). Maduro has tried to follow this model, but without Chávez’s charisma or mass appeal.

    • (Early Chávez relied on popularity and elections; over time, especially under Maduro, the system shifted more toward outright authoritarianism (stacked courts, fraudulent elections, repression of protests)

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Undemocratic ways that opposition forces tried to stop Hugo Chavez:

  • Coup Attempt (2002): Groups within the opposition, linked to the business community and traditional parties (Business leaders, civic organizations, traditional parties, and parts of the media) supported demonstrations that escalated into a coup. Chávez was briefly removed but returned after mass mobilization and military support.

    • Undemocratic bc they tried to remove him using force and violence instead of through elections 

  • Boycott of 2005 National Assembly/Legislative elections: Leaders of opposition parties decided to boycott elections claiming that the ¨ deck was stacked¨ (vote secrecy concerns, excessive government spending, tilted institutions). This backfired and handed Chavez complete control of the legislature. 

    • Abandoning the electoral arena is seen as undemocratic  

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Democratic Ways opposition forces tried to stop Hugo Chavez:

  • Recall Referendum (2004): Following disruptive actions (strikes), the opposition chose the electoral path by pursuing a recall referendum against Chávez. They managed to collect enough valid signatures but the government manipulated the process: invalidating signatures, publicizing the “Tascón list” of signers, and using clientelism and spending to influence outcomes.

  • Strikes and Economic Pressure:

    • Oil Strike: Leaders of the state oil company went on strike, leading to economic depression.

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What was the Punto Fijo Pact: 

  • Series of agreements signed in 1958 by the leading democratic political forces in Venezuela. The agreements were established to set the terms of democratic political competition in Venezuela following years of dictatorship. 

    • When Chávez came to power, he explicitly promised to radically dismantle this system and the traditional parties that founded it, such as Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente)

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How was Chavez able to consolidate power?

  1. Centralization of Authority: He weakened checks and balances by concentrating decision making in the Presidency, making loyalty to him more important than loyalty to institutions. 

  2. Control over elections: Venezuela still held elections but Chavez used fraud, harassment of opponents, campaign advantages, manipulation of the economy, vote buying, etc. to tilt the playing field int heir favor. 

  3. Co-opting Elites and Citizens- Chavez bribed people; He provided benefits, jobs, subsidies, to supporters. 

  4. Used Political Parties and Mass Mobilization to show strength, gather information, and suppress opposition

  5. Gain Legitimacy through Popular Appeal: Chávez built legitimacy through his populist rhetoric, presenting himself as the defender of the poor and framing opposition as corrupt elites.

Summary: Chavez consolidated power by undermining institutional checks, manipulating elections, distributing resources to allies, and relying on populist legitimacy, all of which ensured his survival in power.

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According to each theory/framework, what drives democracy?

  1. Modernization theory = Development

  2. Transitions Paradigm = Elite Actors

  3. Social Forces = Masses

  4. New Economic Approach = Democracy as a concessio

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Modernization Theory (Lipset):

  • As countries modernize economically and socially, they are more likely to become democratic

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Modernization Theory: Advantages, Disadvantages, and Implications: 

Advantages: 

  • Very general, so it can be tested empirically across countries

Disadvantages:

  • Lists many factors but doesn’t clearly explain how they lead to democracy

  • Provides a “black box”: we know modern societies tend to be democratic, but not the mechanisms connecting wealth/industrialization to democracy (theory shows a pattern but doesn’t explain WHY it happens, just that it does)

Implications:

  • Less modern countries are doomed to authoritarianism until they develop economically and socially 

  • Rich countries are generally destined to be democracies according to this theory 

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Transition Paradigm Framework: 

  • Democracy emerges not because of social or economic development but because of the choices and strategies of elites.

    • Says democracy depends on elite decisions and negotiations, not on wealth or social structures.

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Implications about the Transition Paradigm: 

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Social Forces Approach (Barrington Moore):

  • Argues that democracy (or authoritarianism) results from the struggles and alignments of social classes, not just elites (contrast to Transition Paradigm) and economic modernization (contrary to modernization theory)

    • Core Idea: ¨ No bourgeois, no democracy¨ —> the emergence of democracy depends on the presence and strength of certain social classes, particularly the bourgeoisie (middle/upper-middle class)

    • The balance of power between the working class, landowners, and the bourgeoisie determines whether a society becomes democratic or authoritarian. The interaction of these 3 actors is what shapes the political path.

      • Strong landowners → push authoritarianism.

      • Strong working class and bourgeoisie → more likely to push democracy.

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Social Forces Key Points and Weaknesses:

Main Actors:

  • Working Class: A larger and more organized working class increases pressure for democracy.

  • Large Landowners: When powerful, they tend to resist democracy, since they benefit from authoritarian systems that protect their privileges.

  • Bourgeoisie (middle/upper-middle class): Considered essential for democracy because they push for rights and institutions that protect their property and business interests.

Contributions:

  • Connects structural conditions (like class size, power, and organization) with actors motives, showing how social and economic forces set the stage for either democracy or authoritarianism 

Weaknesses:

  • Been tested less systematically

  • Focuses narrowly on class actors, only looking at economic classes, not giving much attention to other classes like international influences, elites or leaders, ethnic or religious groups, etc. 

    • Often overlooks non-class actors (like social movements, identity groups, or international influences

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The New Economic Approach:

  • Democratization happens when elites and the masses, acting mainly out of economic self-interest, reach a compromise shaped by how wealth is distributed, whether assets can be moved, and whether they can trust each other to stick to agreements.

  • Democracy emerges when it’s in the self-interest of elites and the masses, depending on inequality, whether the rich can protect/move their wealth, and whether both sides can trust each other.

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New Economic Approach (Boix, 2003): Formal Model 

Main Point: People evaluate politics in terms of income, inequality, and redistribution (who pays taxes, who benefits)

Median Voter theory: 

  • If the median (middle) voter in the income distribution is poor, they will prefer higher redistribution. The wealthy may fear this and resist democracy. 

  • Thus, the rich might prefer dictatorship so they can control tax rates and avoid redistribution 

2 Key Intervening Variables: 

  • Income Inequality: If income inequality is LOW → wealthy doesn’t fear democracy because the median voter isn’t very different from them. If inequality is HIGH → wealthy resists democracy bc they fear massive redistribution.

  • Capital Mobility: If capital is MOBILE (wealth can be moved), elites are less afraid of democracy since they can protect assets. If capital is FIXED (like land), elites are more resistant to democracy bc they can´t escape redistribution.

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New Economic Approach (Acemaglu & Robinson, 2006): Commitment Problem

  • Same actors & preferences but they ask: why would elites/authoritarians grant democracy instead of just offering temporary redistribution under dictatorship 

    • Answer: Commitment Problem 

      • Poor citizens don´t trust elites to keep promises of redistribution under dictatorship 

      • democracy becomes a way for elites to credibly commit to future redistribution by tying their own hands with democratic institutions. 

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New Economic Approach Strength and Weaknesses:

Strengths:

  • Integrates structural and strategic elements→ looks at both conditions (inequality, mobility) and actors decisions

Weaknesses: 

  • Assumes people are fully informed and make choices only on material interests (income, taxes, redistribution)

  • Ignores non-economic factors like identity, ideology, culture, or external pressures 

  • Needs stronger empirical testing (testing whether theory or idea actually matches the real-world evidence)

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Large N, Cross-National Studies:

Research using data from many countries (large N) to analyze statistical relationships between variables (e.g., GDP, inequality, religion) and democratization

  • Quantitative research comparing many countries to find patterns in democratization.

  • Statistical tools (like regression analysis) to examine relationships between variables such as GDP, inequality, religion, colonial heritage, or country size and the emergence of democratic regimes

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Large N, Cross-National Studies Strengths:

  • Finds big patterns: Can spot broad trends across many countries (ex: small countries democratize more easily).

  • Data-driven: Uses statistics to test many factors at once, instead of relying on single examples.

    • Quantitative approach allows for testing multiple variables simultaneously.

  • Compares explanations: Lets us see which factors matter more (colonial history, religion, size, ethnic diversity, etc.)

  • Identifies non-findings: Can show that some presumed relationships (e.g., Islam → less democracy) may be conditional or spurious.

  • Overall: They are powerful for finding general statistical relationships across countries.

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Large N, Cross-National Studies Weaknesses: 

  • Slow Change/outcomes: Democracy often evolves gradually, making patterns hard to detect.

  • Correlation does not = causation: Shows relationships (correlations), but harder to prove causal mechanisms (the “how” and “why” behind democratization)

  • Oversimplifies: Lumps diverse groups/countries together, which can hide important differences.

  • Unclear meaning: Even if the result is ¨significant¨ it is not always clear why a variable matters (structural vs. cultural vs. elite choices).

  • Data quality/issues: Cross-national datasets may be unreliable or incomplete

  • Overall: They may oversimplify, struggle with causality, and sometimes produce ambiguous or non-findings

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Relationship between Socioeconomic Development and Democracy:

  • Social, cultural, and institutional factors—like diversity, size, and historical context—shape whether wealth and modernization actually produce democratic outcomes. Economic development helps, but it is not sufficient on its own.

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Endogenous Explanation (Cause comes from within the process) for the Relationship between Economic Development and Democratization:

  • Modernization Theory: As countries modernize, their economic development produces the social and economic transformations that make democracy more likely to emerge.

    • Democracy becomes possible through the progressive accumulation of social and economic structures.

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Exogenous Explanation (Cause comes from outside factors) for the Relationship between Economic Development and Democratization:

  • Survival Explanation: Economic development does NOT cause democracy, but it makes existing democracies more likely to survive once they emerge

    • Argues that wealth is more critical for sustaining an already established democracy

  • Przeworski et al. found: While income does not strongly predict the emergence of democracy, it is a powerful predictor of it´s survival, with democracies in rich countries

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Economic Factors that affect the EMERGENCE (transition) and survival of Democracy: 

  1. Economic Income and Development (Modernization Theory): Higher income, education, industrialization, and urbanization causes middle class and society to push for democracy

    • BUT Przeworski et al. (2000) found no level of income predicts transitions so development alone does not guarantee democratization 

  2. Economic Crisis: Factor that can potentially lead to democratic upturns because it reduces resources, causing consumer subsidies to diminish.

  3. Natural Resources: The presence of specific resources, like oil, is linked to a decreased likelihood of democratization

    • Testing finds that the presence of oil diminishes democratization

  4. Income Inequality:

    • Boix 2003: Found that lower income inequality makes democracy more likely to emerge bc elites feel less threatened by redistribution

    • Empirical Finding: However, when Teorell retested the inequality arguments (including those put forward by Boix as well as Acemoglu and Robinson) using a bigger sample and a graded measure of democracy, he found Null Effects

  5. Inflation: Tested and found to have no impact on democratization. 

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Economic Factors that affect the SURVIVAL of Democracy: 

  1. Income/Development (Survival Theory):

    • Democracies in wealthy countries almost never die

    • Once income passes ~$6,000 per capita, democracies are extremely stable

  2. Economic Crises: 

    • Even rich democracies can destabilize if hit by severe crises, but poor democracies are most vulnerable

    • It’s not rapid growth that threatens democracy, but sharp downturns

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Inequality Argument by Boix:

  • Main Argument: Income Inequality Affects democratization

  • When inequality is low, elites are less afraid of redistribution → they are more willing to accept democracy 

  • When inequality is high, elites fear losing too much wealth under majority rule → they resist democracy and cling to authoritarianism

  • Simply put: Low inequality = democracy more likely (inequality is key)

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Inequality Arguments by Acemogul & Robinson: 

  • Main Argument: Inequality plays a role, but it doesn’t solely determine democracy. Other factors such as elite-citizen conflict and threat of revolution can shape the outcome too. 

    • Citizens push for democracy when inequality and repression are high 

    • Elites grant democracy only when the threat of revolution is credible but repression is too costly

    • Inequality matters indirectly through bargaining, repression, and revolutionary threats - not as a simple ¨ low inequality = democracy¨ relationship. 

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Teorell´s Retest of Inequality Arguments: 

  • Using a larger dataset and a graded democracy measure, Teorell found null effects → inequality did not strongly predict democratization outcomes

  • Basically, teorell suggests inequality may not have a strong independent effect.

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Roles that Elites play in driving Democracy:

  • Push for Reform: Elites often control political and economic resources, so their decisions to allow reforms or negotiate transitions is crucial

    • They may liberalize (erase restrictions) when:

      • Repression becomes too costly 

      • They face internal divisions 

      • They need to maintain legitimacy 

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Roles that Masses Play in Driving Democracy:

  • Drive democratization through protests, strikes, and demonstrations

  • Peaceful protest are especially effective: 

    • They are accessible (no special training or resources needed),

    • Brutal state repression against peaceful demonstrators can backfire, creating sympathy and mobilizing more people (paradox of repression).

    • Peaceful protests retain the moral high ground and avoid alienating potential supporters

  • Impact: Mass mobilization can weaken authoritarian “bargains” by withdrawing support from key sectors (oil workers in Venezuela, teachers, transportation, military) → undermining the regime’s ability to rule 

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Forms of Popular Mobilization: 

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How Mobilization Affects Democracy:

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Why Peaceful Protests are most conducive to democracy:

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Preference Falsification: 

  • When individuals hide their true private preferences and instead publicly express support for a regime they privately oppose. 

    • happens bc of fear from repression or desire for rewards/benefits

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How Preference Falsification contributes to Resilience of authoritarian regimes:

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How preference falsification contributes to sudden collapse of authoritarian regimes:

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Rational Choice Theory:

  • People are strategic actors who make decisions by comparing the expected costs and expected benefits of different actions 

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Application of Rational Choice theory to individual protest participation decisions: 

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Strategic Use of Digital Censorship (King, Pan, & Roberts):

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How Personalist Regimes Collapse:

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How Military Regimes Collapse:

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How Single-Party Regimes Collapse:

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Factors that contribute to the durability of authoritarian regimes:

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Survival and vulnerability to breakdown of Personalist Regimes:

  • Are vulnerable because survival depends on one leader; they often collapse violently.

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Survival and vulnerability to breakdown of Military Regimes:

  • Are vulnerable to elite splits but sometimes exit voluntarily to preserve the institution

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Survival and vulnerability to breakdown of Single-Party Regimes:

  • Survive the longest but are vulnerable when economic crises undermine elite cohesion.

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Pacted Transitons:

  • Negotiated agreements between authoritarian elites (reformers, moderates) and opposition actors (moderates, radicals) that enable a transition away from dictatorship

    • Requires mutual guarantees so no side feels like it has lost completely

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Democratic Transition in Argentina:

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Democratic Transition in Chile:

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Reformers, Hardliners, and Opposition Actors:

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Survival Lengths of Authoritarian Regimes and HOW they survive that long:

  1. Single-Party: Longest Lasting 

  2. Personalist Regimes: Somewhere in between, often unstable bc survival hinges on one person.  

  3. Military Regimes: Shortest Lasting

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