tragedy of the commons

garrett hardin

economist who coined the tragedy of the commons in 1968 based on open ecosystems

focused on enviro degradation, population growth, limited resources and land rights

describes the problem of a pasture open to all

tragedy of the commons

resource is held in common, so owned by no one or by a group meaning all have access to the resource

no technical solution due to overpopulation and competition for resources - needed to be political - so introduced malthus.

ex resources includes air, water, fish and wildlife, lumber, crown land, ground water

econ explanation of tragedy of the commons

individuals are motivated to add their flocks to increase personal wealth

so dominated by those who add the most cattle, gain in wealth per cow is higher than degradation of each cow

but the loss from degradation is shared so everyone has the incentive to MAX the number of cattle to gain the most

but this leads to overgrazing and loss of communal trust

thomas malthus

predicted population grows exponentially and food supply can only increase arithmetically so eventually we will all starve or die with the political outcome of the latter

how to manage tragedy of the commons

centralized government or private property

south tasman rise trawl fishery example

orange roughy severly overfished, needed management plan

cooperation between aus and nz reached in 1997 but the official start date was march 1998 so in this gap people were incentivized overfish until the date

aus harvested entire total allowable trust before the start date, then the next year nz overfished in response

in 2000 they reached a more reasonable agreement but it was too late, harvest were low and it was a long rebuild due to late maturity for the fish. still not really bounced back from this

top down management

governed by national and international interests and agreements

ex Montreal protocol 1986 - banning aerosols to protect the ozone

ex int commission on the protection of the rhine for massive pollution

failures: kyoto agreement and climate change, rio protocol for biodiversity

• havent come to fruitition

bottom up management

governed by local agencies and users

knowledge base is strongest with small scale ecologies and institutions

hard to assess failures

top down vs bottom up struggle

hard decisions with today vs tomorrow, large uncertainty and complexity

effective governance is co-evolutionary race - conditions erode as developments increase threats

people devise ways to evade the government

successful governance needs to adapt

effective commons governance

1) when the resources and use can be monitored

2) rates of change in resources, use, tech, economic and social conditions are moderate

3) social capital/networks are high

4) outsiders can be excluded at low cost (individual complex when foreign)

5) users support effective monitoring and enforcement

institutional arrangements can help establish these

tragedy of the commons global problem

global market places are tightly linked

contemporary environmental challenges are global - climate change, land use change and population size

local places are strongly influenced by global dynamics

lake caohai example

large, shallow, hypereutropic lake with local agriculture and fisheries industry, bird watching

poor area, lake is used for sustenance and economy - lives at stake so complicated tragedy of the commons

dikes and canals allow for agriculture on the surrounding wetlands - rice

all size classes of fish are utilized, as well as water vegetation

so catch is declining and management efforts are opposed - no govt trust

lake caohai problem

local knowledge and stakeholders included, fisheries biologist role

• lake is heavily overfished even in closed season, reductions in biomass, max fish size and catch per unit of effort (from 20kg per day to <1kg)

better management required to improve

lake caohai objectives

education program of benefits of reduced fishing (more fish)

involve locals in decision making efforts

develop grass roots (bottom up) support for self policing management/co management

start small to demonstrate success

develop alternative income for displaced fishermen

reduce total fishing to increase yield and catch per unit effort

lake caohai management options

1) limit days fished or nets used enforced by fishermans cooperative

2) rotating fish bans on sections of the lake to provide refuge and reduce impacts on locals

3) fence off sections of lake to be protected - possible stocking

4) consider grass carp stocking to convert macrophytes to fish protein

5) small scale culture ponds to replace fish and income loss

6) education programs for kids and next generation