Taylor, Wolf, Vitrano

What question about the meaning of life is Taylor interested in?

Taylor is interested in whether life has any objective meaning or purpose beyond our own feelings and activities, and whether our lives might be “meaningless” in the same way that a repetitive, pointless task is, even when we feel content doing it.

How does Taylor use the myth of Sisyphus to illustrate meaninglessness?

Taylor describes Sisyphus endlessly rolling a rock up a hill only for it to roll back down, arguing this is the perfect image of futile, meaningless activity: it goes nowhere, achieves nothing lasting, and has no final point, no matter how long it continues.

How is Sisyphus’s task similar to many ordinary human lives, according to Taylor?

Taylor suggests that many lives resemble Sisyphus’s task because they cycle through repetitive routines, working, consuming, reproducing, and starting again, without producing anything of enduring significance. From a cosmic perspective, human projects eventually vanish and thus seem as pointless as rolling the stone.

According to Taylor, what would give Sisyphus’s life meaning?

Taylor imagines that if Sisyphus were given a drug or change of character such that he deeply loved pushing the rock and found it endlessly fulfilling, then his life would become meaningful to him, even though the external pattern of his activity remains unchanged.

What is Taylor’s view of meaning in life?

Taylor defends a subjective theory of meaning: a life is meaningful if it contains activities that the person subjectively enjoys, cares about, and is fulfilled by, regardless of whether these activities have any objective or lasting value by cosmic standards.

How does Taylor connect “inner fulfillment” to the meaning of ordinary lives?

Taylor argues that even though our projects disappear in the long run, they are meaningful because we desire, pursue, and enjoy them now. Meaning is found in the subjective experience of striving and satisfaction, not in some external, everlasting achievement.

Does Taylor think appeal to God solves the problem of meaning?

Taylor argues that even if God existed and gave us a role in a divine plan, that plan itself might look like another “rock” to push; if we didn’t care about it, it would still feel meaningless. He concludes that meaning cannot come solely from God’s external purposes but from our own engagement and desire.

Give one criticism of Taylor’s theory of meaning. (Claim → Explanation → Reason)

Claim: Taylor’s purely subjective account makes almost any life meaningful as long as the person feels fulfilled, even if the projects are morally trivial or harmful.
Explanation: On his view, a person obsessed with pointless or destructive activities could have a “meaningful” life merely by enjoying them intensely.
Reason: This seems counterintuitive because we ordinarily think meaning should involve some standard beyond mere enjoyment, so Taylor’s theory may be too permissive.

How might Taylor respond to the objection that his view is too permissive?

Taylor could reply that his project is descriptive, not moral: he is explaining what makes a life feel meaningful to the one living it, not which lives are morally good. On this view, meaning and morality are separate questions, and meaning is fundamentally about subjective fulfillment.

What problem does Wolf see with purely subjective theories like Taylor’s?

Wolf argues that purely subjective theories cannot distinguish between a meaningful life and the life of someone who is happily engaged in worthless or delusional projects, such as counting blades of grass or obsessively collecting trivial items. Intuitively, we want to say such lives lack meaning despite high subjective satisfaction.

What is Wolf’s central idea about meaning in life?

Wolf proposes that a meaningful life arises when a person is actively and lovingly engaged in projects of worth—activities that are subjectively fulfilling and have objective value beyond the person’s feelings.

What are “projects of worth” in Wolf’s theory?

Projects of worth are activities, commitments, or pursuits that have genuine objective value, such as contributing to art, science, relationships, community, or justice, rather than trivial or self-absorbed hobbies. They are the kinds of things we can honestly admire or respect from a third-person perspective.

Why does Wolf insist on both subjective engagement and objective worth?

Wolf thinks subjective engagement without worth (e.g., grass-counting) is empty, while objective worth without engagement (e.g., being forced into valuable work you don’t care about) is alienating. Meaning requires the intersection: caring about something that is genuinely worthwhile.

Does Wolf think a life can be meaningful if the person is unhappy?

Wolf suggests that ongoing misery or deep alienation undermines meaning because active, loving engagement is part of her definition. There might be tragic cases where someone does something objectively important despite great suffering, but paradigm meaningful lives involve a kind of fitting fulfillment in worthwhile projects.

How does Wolf use the “Blob” example?

The Blob is someone who spends life in passive, unstructured consumption (e.g., endless TV on the couch). Wolf uses this example to show that mere pleasure or absence of pain does not amount to meaning; meaning requires activity, structure, and engagement, not just comfort.

How does Wolf use the case of a corporate executive or “housewife” to clarify meaning?

Wolf notes that someone can be busy and successful yet feel empty if their work lacks connection to things of worth or if they don’t care deeply about what they do. This highlights that meaning requires more than productivity or social approval; it requires a match between values, engagement, and genuine worth.

Does Wolf’s account of meaning depend on God or religion?

No. Wolf thinks there are objectively worthwhile projects and values (like art, knowledge, love, justice) that do not depend on a divine lawgiver. Meaning in life, for her, arises within a secular but value-laden world, not from a supernatural plan.

Criticism 1 of Wolf: Who decides what counts as a “project of worth”? (Claim → Explanation → Reason)

Claim: Wolf’s theory risks being elitist or vague about what is objectively worthwhile.
Explanation: Different cultures and individuals deeply disagree about the value of activities such as video games, fanfiction, or competitive sports, yet Wolf seems to require some shared, objective standard of worth.
Reason: If we cannot clearly specify which projects “really” have worth without imposing controversial judgments, then Wolf’s criterion may be unclear or biased, making her view difficult to apply fairly.

Criticism 2 of Wolf: Can small, private joys be meaningful? (Claim → Explanation → Reason)

Claim: Wolf might undervalue modest, everyday projects that lack obvious “objective worth” on a grand scale.
Explanation: Many people find meaning in caring for pets, small hobbies, or simple relationships that don’t obviously contribute to art, science, or justice.
Reason: If Wolf’s emphasis on “projects of worth” excludes these, her theory may not match how meaning actually appears in ordinary lives, suggesting it is too demanding or narrow.

How might Wolf respond to the worry about elitism?

Wolf could argue that “worth” is not limited to prestigious activities; it includes any activity that makes a genuine positive contribution, even on a small scale, like nurturing children, maintaining friendships, or improving one’s community. She might say we should refine, not abandon, the idea that some activities are truly more meaningful than others.

What is Vitrano’s main project regarding meaning in life?

Vitrano critically examines both subjective accounts (like Taylor’s) and objective/hybrid accounts (like Wolf’s), arguing that we should not separate “meaning in life” from happiness and overall life satisfaction. For her, a meaningful life is simply one that the person is, on the whole, satisfied with.

How does Vitrano critique Taylor’s purely subjective view?

Vitrano notes that Taylor comes close to her own view but talks as if “meaning” is something over and above happiness. She argues that if a person deeply enjoys their life and feels satisfied, we don’t need a separate metaphysical notion of “meaning”—their life is already going well, and that’s enough.

According to Vitrano, what is missing or misleading in Taylor’s discussion of cosmic meaninglessness?

She thinks his focus on the cosmic perspective (everything eventually fading) is misleading because it ignores what actually matters to us as humans: our experiences, relationships, and satisfactions here and now. Whether the universe has an ultimate purpose is irrelevant to whether a person’s life goes well.

How does Vitrano criticize Wolf’s requirement of “objective worth”?

Vitrano argues that insisting on objective worth adds an unnecessary and problematic layer: it risks saying a fulfilled, kind person with unconventional projects has a “less meaningful” life simply because philosophers or society don’t classify their activities as objectively valuable. She thinks meaning should track the person’s own satisfaction and happiness, not an external ranking of projects.

What role does disagreement about values play in Vitrano’s critique of Wolf?

Vitrano points out that people disagree deeply about what counts as “worthwhile,” which makes it doubtful that we can define a clear objective standard. Because of this, she prefers to focus on subjective life satisfaction rather than controversial claims about objective value.

What is Vitrano’s positive account of a meaningful life?

Vitrano argues that a meaningful life is simply a happy, satisfying life, one where the person’s desires are largely fulfilled, they experience pleasure and contentment, and they are not tormented by regret or deep dissatisfaction. There is no extra “meaning ingredient” beyond overall well-being.

How does Vitrano handle cases where someone is satisfied but engaged in morally bad projects?

Vitrano distinguishes between a life that is meaningful (i.e., satisfying) and one that is morally good. She admits a cruel or selfish person might be satisfied but morally bad; in that case their life is meaningful in the sense of going well for them, but we still rightly criticize them morally. Meaning and morality are not the same concept.

Criticism 1 of Vitrano: Is meaning really nothing more than happiness? (Claim → Explanation → Reason)

Claim: Reducing meaning to happiness or satisfaction overlooks important intuitions about lives that seem empty or shallow despite comfort.
Explanation: Someone could be content with a narrow, insulated existence that contributes nothing to others or ignores deep questions, yet still report high satisfaction.
Reason: Many people feel such lives lack something we want to call “meaning,” suggesting that meaning might require engagement with value, challenge, or contribution beyond subjective comfort, which Vitrano’s view may not capture.

Criticism 2 of Vitrano: How does she handle temporary illusions of happiness?

Claim: Vitrano’s account has difficulty dealing with cases where someone is satisfied because of ignorance or illusion.
Explanation: For example, a person might be happy in a fake virtual world or because everyone lies to them about their life; their satisfaction is based on false beliefs.
Reason: If we still hesitate to call such a life meaningful, this suggests that truth and reality matter for meaning, not just how satisfied we feel, challenging Vitrano’s reduction.

How might Vitrano respond to the “illusion” objection?

She might argue that if we fully knew about the deception, we would no longer be satisfied, so enduring, reflective satisfaction normally includes contact with reality. Thus, many illusion cases are unstable and do not threaten her view once we consider how people respond when they learn the truth.

How do Taylor, Wolf, and Vitrano differ on whether meaning is subjective or objective?

Taylor treats meaning as purely subjective, based on inner fulfillment in one’s activities. Wolf defends a hybrid view: meaning requires both subjective engagement and objective worth of projects. Vitrano largely collapses meaning into happiness, focusing on subjective life satisfaction and rejecting the need for an extra objective ingredient.

How would each philosopher likely judge a happily obsessed but trivial hobbyist?

Taylor would likely say their life is meaningful if they truly enjoy the hobby. Wolf would say it lacks meaning if the hobby has little objective worth. Vitrano would focus on whether the person is satisfied overall; if they are, she would count the life as meaningful regardless of outside judgments.

How do the three philosophers treat the relation between meaning and morality?

Taylor and Vitrano both separate meaning from morality, allowing for meaningful-but-morally-bad lives, while recognizing we may criticize them ethically. Wolf, by insisting on projects of worth and contribution, ties meaning more closely to values that often overlap with morality, though she doesn’t reduce meaning to being morally perfect.

How do they each respond to the worry that life is meaningless from a cosmic perspective?

Taylor accepts that objectively our projects are insignificant, but thinks meaning survives through subjective fulfillment. Wolf pays less attention to cosmic scale and more to whether our lives connect with value here and now. Vitrano argues the cosmic perspective is a distraction: what matters is whether we are satisfied, not the universe’s long-term fate. None of them think we must appeal to God to have meaning.

Give an exam-style comparison criticism of all three views. (Claim → Explanation → Reason)

Claim: Each account captures an important aspect of meaning but is incomplete on its own.
Explanation: Taylor correctly emphasizes inner fulfillment, Wolf highlights the importance of objective value and contribution, and Vitrano reminds us that overall happiness and satisfaction matter. Yet Taylor risks permitting trivial or harmful projects, Wolf struggles to define objective worth without elitism, and Vitrano may collapse meaning into happiness too quickly.
Reason: A plausible conclusion is that a fully adequate theory of meaning might need to integrate all three dimensions—subjective engagement, connection to genuine values, and overall life satisfaction—rather than favoring only one