Moral Philosophy - Metaethics

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40 Terms

1
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What is meant by moral principles originating in reason?

Moral truths are discovered through rational reflection and logical reasoning

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What is meant by moral principles originating in emotion or attitude?

Morality arises from our emotional responses or attitudes (e.g., approval/disapproval).

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What is meant by moral principles originating in society?

Moral values are created or shaped by social customs, norms, and cultural practices.

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What is cognitivism in ethics?

The view that moral statements express beliefs and can be true or false

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What is non-cognitivism in ethics?

The view that moral statements do not express beliefs, and are not truth-apt

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Give an example of a cognitivist interpretation of ‘Murder is wrong

It expresses a belief that can be true or false — e.g., “It is a fact that murder is wrong.”

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Give an example of a non-cognitivist interpretation of ‘Murder is wrong’.

It expresses emotion or a command — e.g., “Boo to murder!” or “Don’t murder!”

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What is moral realism?

The belief that there are mind-independent moral facts — morality exists objectively.

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How does moral realism relate to cognitivism?

Moral realists are always cognitivists — they believe moral claims describe objective truths.

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What is moral naturalism?

The view that moral properties are natural properties (e.g., pleasure, well-being).

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What type of theory is moral naturalism?

Cognitivist — moral claims are truth-apt and can be studied empirically.

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How does Bentham’s utilitarianism count as moral naturalism?

It identifies moral goodness with maximising pleasure, a measurable natural property.

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How can virtue ethics be a form of moral naturalism?

Virtue ethics sees moral traits as human flourishing or fulfilling natural functions.

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What is moral non-naturalism?

The view that moral properties are real but non-natural — not discoverable through science.

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What is intuitionism?

The belief that we have a direct, intuitive awareness of moral truths.

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Who argued for moral intuitionism?

Philosophers like G. E. Moore and H. A. Prichard.

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What is Moore’s ‘open question argument’?

If “good” is defined as a natural property (e.g. pleasure), it’s still an open question whether pleasure is good — showing the definition is inadequate.

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What is the naturalistic fallacy?

Moore’s claim that you can’t define a moral term (like “good”) in non-moral, natural terms.

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What is Hume’s is-ought gap?

You can’t derive an ‘ought’ (moral claim) from descriptive facts (‘is’ statements) alone.

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What is Hume’s Fork?

All knowledge comes from either relations of ideas or matters of fact — and moral claims fit neither, so they’re not knowledge.

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What is A.J. Ayer’s verification principle?

A statement is only meaningful if it’s empirically verifiable or analytically true.

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Why does Ayer say moral claims are meaningless?

Moral statements can’t be verified by experience or logic — so they express only emotion.

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What is Hume’s argument that beliefs alone don’t motivate?

Moral beliefs can motivate action, but ordinary beliefs can’t — so moral judgments must involve desires or emotions.

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What is Mackie’s argument from relativity?

Because moral values vary widely between cultures, it’s likely they’re subjective, not objective.

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What is Mackie’s argument from queerness (ontological)?

Objective moral properties would be metaphysically strange — unlike anything else in the universe.

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What is Mackie’s argument from queerness (epistemological)?

We would need a special faculty to perceive these strange moral properties — which we don’t have evidence for.

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Does Mackie accept the existence of moral truth?

No — Mackie is an error theorist: moral claims try to report facts, but all such claims are false.

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What is the difference between moral realism and anti-realism?

Realism = mind-independent moral facts exist; Anti-realism = they don’t.

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Which metaethical views are cognitivist?

Moral realism, moral naturalism, moral non-naturalism (e.g., intuitionism).

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Which metaethical views are non-cognitivist?

Emotivism (Ayer), Prescriptivism (Hare), Quasi-realism.

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What is emotivism?

Ayer’s view that moral language expresses emotions (not beliefs).

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What is prescriptivism?

R.M. Hare’s view that moral statements are universal prescriptions (e.g. “You ought to…” = a command).

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How does prescriptivism differ from emotivism?

Emotivism is about expressing feelings; prescriptivism is about giving moral guidance or rules.

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What does it mean for a theory to be reductive in metaethics?

It attempts to explain moral terms using non-moral (e.g. natural/scientific) properties.

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Why does Moore oppose reductive definitions of ‘good’?

He claims they commit the naturalistic fallacy — good cannot be reduced.

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What is moral anti-realism?

The view that moral facts do not exist objectively (includes non-cognitivism and error theory).

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What is error theory?

The view that moral statements are truth-apt but always false because there are no moral facts (Mackie).

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How does prescriptivism improve on emotivism?

It adds rational guidance — moral statements act as universal prescriptions for action.

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How does the open question argument challenge moral naturalism?

It shows that defining moral terms with natural ones leaves the meaning still “open”, so the definition fails.

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Why does Hume’s is-ought gap challenge naturalist theories?

Because naturalists move from “is” (facts) to “ought” (moral claims), which Hume says is invalid without justification.