Flashcards for Philosophy 116: Special Topics in Political Philosophy Fall 2025

Flashcards covering key concepts from lectures on Paternalism, Free Speech, and Public Bioethics, including Mill's principles, Dworkin's definitions, Conly's critiques of utilitarianism, Quong's judgmental definition of paternalism, Flanigan's argument for anti-paternalism in public health, Scanlon's theory of free expression, and Howard's analysis of dangerous speech.

When is state interference with individual liberty justified, according to Mill's "simple principle"?

The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection, specifically to prevent harm to others. An individual's own good, physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.

What are Mill's two maxims regulating state interference in an individual's life?

First, the individual is not accountable to society for actions that concern only his own interests. Second, for actions prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable and may be subjected to social or legal punishment if society deems it necessary for its protection.

What are Mill's exceptions to the harm principle/anti-paternalism?

The principle only applies to human beings in the maturity of their faculties (not children), and intervention may be justified when a choice is uninformed (like crossing an unsafe bridge where there's no time to warn) or when it involves voluntary servitude (selling oneself into slavery).

How does Mill instrumentally justify the anti-paternalism principle?

Mill justifies it by arguing that nobody is better placed than the individual to know what is good for her or to pursue it impartially, and that freedom makes it more likely that individuals will lead happy lives.

How does Mill intrinsically justify the anti-paternalism principle?

Mill believes that leading one's own life (being part-author of one's own life) is good in itself, and protecting individuals from interference is crucial for this intrinsic good.

According to Conly, why does Mill's utilitarian opposition to paternalism not always make sense for a consequentialist aiming to maximize well-being?

Conly argues that if liberty is construed as purely instrumental, something good only for its consequences on welfare, then it ceases to be good when it fails to produce the best consequences. Denial of liberty could increase welfare, in which case there is no cost to losing that liberty.

What are Conly's three types of consequentialism?

Hedonistic Consequentialism (maximizing happiness), Preference-Satisfaction Consequentialism (satisfying preferences for well-being), and Eudaimonistic Consequentialism (engaging in valuable activities and abilities for welfare).

What is Conly's objection to the hedonistic consequentialism argument against paternalism?

Conly argues that individuals may not know what they truly want, what they want may not lead to happiness, or they may be bad at choosing appropriate means for happiness. Also, the process of choice often doesn't make us happier in the long run, and we adjust quickly to limitations on choices.

What is Conly's objection to the preference-satisfaction consequentialism argument against paternalism?

Conly states that actual choices don't always reflect preferences because individuals can be mistaken about their own preferences or how choices will affect them due to lack of information or cognitive biases.

What is Conly's objection to the eudaimonistic consequentialism argument against paternalism?

Conly challenges the claim that more personal liberty always leads to better choosers. She asserts there's no evidence for this, and often people favor inertia and short-term pleasures over refining their abilities to make decisions, even when they know they should do otherwise.

How does Dworkin define paternalism generally?

Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced.

What is the difference between pure and impure paternalism, according to Dworkin?

Pure paternalism restricts the freedom of the same class of persons whose benefit is intended. Impure paternalism restricts the freedom of other persons besides those who are benefited, as the harm could be avoided by those affected if they chose otherwise.

What is Dworkin's redefined concept of paternalism?

Dworkin redefines paternalism as the use of coercion to achieve a good which is not recognized as such by those persons for whom the good is intended.

Why does Dworkin argue that Mill's absolute defense of anti-paternalism on utilitarian grounds fails?

Dworkin claims Mill's defense relies on the assumption that compulsion cannot advance individual interests or that attempts to do so involve outweighing evils, which Dworkin believes is not always true.

What is Dworkin's non-utilitarian argument for anti-paternalism, based on Mill?

Dworkin interprets Mill as emphasizing that coercing a person for their own good denies their status as an independent, autonomous agent, and that the ability to choose is a good independent of the wisdom of the choice.

How does Dworkin use the example of selling oneself into slavery to justify paternalism?

Dworkin argues that paternalism is justified in such a case to preserve a wider range of future freedom for the individual, as selling oneself into slavery abdicates all future liberty.

How does Dworkin justify paternalistic treatment of children?

Children lack the emotional and cognitive capacities for fully rational choices and have difficulty deferring gratification. Dworkin emphasizes "future-oriented consent," where the intervention is justified if the child will later come to welcome its correctness.

What is Dworkin looking for regarding consent and limitations on freedom?

Dworkin seeks conditions that would make it plausible for rational individuals to agree to limit their liberty for their own good, even when others' interests are not affected, such as through 'social insurance policies' against irrational propensities.

What kinds of paternalistic interferences would rational individuals likely consent to, according to Dworkin?

Rational individuals would likely consent to paternalistic restrictions that (1) are irreversible decisions, (2) decisions made under extreme psychological and sociological pressure (enforced waiting periods), and (3) decisions involving dangers not sufficiently understood or appreciated, especially if such paternalism 'preserves and enhances the individual's ability to rationally consider and carry out their own decisions'.

What is political perfectionism, as discussed by Quong?

Political perfectionism is the view that the state's proper role includes advancing the good by compelling or encouraging people to live in worthy ways, beyond simply protecting them from injustice.

What is the intuitive misgiving about political perfectionism in a pluralistic society?

The intuitive misgiving is that there is disagreement about what constitutes a good life. In a pluralistic society, respecting individuals means respecting their various conceptions of a good life, thus the state should remain neutral between them. (Similar to religious toleration).

What is Quong's "judgmental definition" of paternalism?

An agent A acts paternalistically towards agent B if A attempts to improve B's welfare regarding a particular decision or situation, and A's act is motivated by a negative judgment about B's ability (assuming B has relevant information) to make the right decision or manage the situation effectively to advance B's welfare.

What specific abilities are relevant to Quong's judgmental definition of paternalism?

The main relevant abilities are practical reasoning, willpower, and emotion management, but not physical abilities or informational deficits (unless the lack of information itself stems from a failure of practical reason).

How does Quong's judgmental definition achieve 'extensional adequacy'?

It covers cases like a father incentivizing piano practice (not under-inclusive) and excludes merely providing information (not over-inclusive), correctly labeling actions based on the motivation of a negative judgment about another's ability.

How does Quong's judgmental definition achieve 'intensional adequacy' and explain the moral problem of paternalism?

It captures the sense that treating someone paternalistically is like treating them as a child, by suggesting they lack the capacity to form, revise, and rationally pursue their own conception of the good, which is inconsistent with their status as free and equal persons.

What is Wilson's central claim about discussing public health policies?

Wilson argues it is a mistake to frame discussions of public health policies in terms of paternalism, leading to a qualified defense of policies that override or interfere with autonomously held choices.

According to Wilson, what are the three features of paternalism?

Paternalism involves: (1) interference with a person’s liberty or autonomy, (2) without the consent of the person interfered with, and (3) undertaken to benefit the person interfered with.

What is the difference between soft and hard paternalism (Wilson)?

Soft paternalism interferes with choices reasonably believed to be less than adequately voluntary (e.g., an addict's drug use). Hard paternalism interferes with choices known to be adequately voluntary (e.g., preventing a suicidal person from taking their life after careful consideration).

Why does Wilson argue that the concept of "paternalistic policies" is problematic?

He claims that public policies usually have multiple motivations and justifications (not solely paternalistic) and that it's difficult to define when a mix of psychological intentions or normative justifications makes a policy paternalistic. Also, public policy interventions are inherently blunt instruments that often involve coercion without individual consent, similar to what makes individual paternalism problematic.

What dilemma does Wilson pose for anti-paternalists regarding non-paternalistic interference?

Either anti-paternalists must argue that non-paternalistic interference with personal sovereignty is never legitimate (which leads to government paralysis), or admit it's sometimes legitimate, in which case anti-paternalism does little to rule out interventionist public health policies justified by other means.

What is Flanigan's basic argument against paternalistic public health policies?

Flanigan argues that the same considerations justifying the strong rejection of paternalism in bioethics (patients' rights to bodily integrity and informed consent) also call for the rejection of paternalistic public health policies, because public health choices are not morally different from private health choices and thus merit similar institutional protection.

What is the "doctrine of informed consent" (DIC) in medical ethics, according to Flanigan?

DIC requires competence, adequate information, and the absence of coercion for a patient to give valid consent to treatment, even if medically inadvisable or risking their health without medical benefits.

What are the justifications for anti-paternalism in bioethics, according to Flanigan?

Reasons include: (1) causing better health outcomes by fostering trust, (2) achieving higher overall well-being for patients (even if medical outcomes are worse), and (3) upholding patients’ normative authority to make self-regarding decisions about their own bodies.

Flanigan argues against Wilson's claim that not all decisions are significant enough to merit protection. What is her reasoning?

She points out that many medical decisions, though not objectively 'significant' (like choosing between two types of knee replacements), are still placed in the patient's hands by DIC, implying significance shouldn't solely determine protection.

What is Mill's

If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing the one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.

What are Mill's three arguments for freedom of speech and thought?

(1) Argument from Fallibility: We could be wrong, and silencing dissenting opinions might suppress the truth. (2) Argument from Shared Truth: Truth is often shared between conflicting beliefs, and collision of adverse opinions can supply the remainder of the truth. (3) Argument from 'Living Truth': Even if we are completely right, vigorously and earnestly contesting true beliefs helps us understand their rational grounds and prevents them becoming dead dogmas.

What is Mill's argument from fallibility?

By silencing an opinion, we implicitly assume our own infallibility, denying the possibility that the suppressed opinion might be true or that there's anything valuable in its defense.

What is Scanlon's view on the nature and status of rights in relation to freedom of expression?

Rights place limits on what individuals or the state can do, even for good reasons. Freedom of expression, like other rights, is justified by fundamental interests (participant, audience, bystander) and imposes limits on policy decisions to prevent unacceptable outcomes. The definition of a right depends on necessity and feasibility in a given social setting.

What are the three levels of argument in Scanlon's theory of freedom of expression?

(1) Policy level: overall desirability of an action or policy affecting expression. (2) Foundational level: identifying ultimate sources of justification (participant, audience, bystander interests, and distributive justice). (3) Rights level: what limitations on policy decisions are necessary and feasible to avoid unacceptable results, while protecting interests at a tolerable cost.

What are Scanlon's three types of interests relevant to freedom of expression?

(1) Participant interests: ability to call something to the attention of a wide audience for various specific purposes. (2) Audience interests: having a good environment for the formation of beliefs and desires, access to information for decision-making. (3) Bystander interests: avoiding undesirable side effects of expression, both direct (traffic jams) and indirect (harmful changes in audience behavior).

Why did Scanlon criticize his earlier "Millian Principle" regarding harms and legal restrictions on expression?

His earlier principle (ruling out harms from false beliefs or subsequent harmful acts arising from expression as justifications for restrictions) led to implausible consequences, such as conflicting with laws against deceptive advertising. He realized it constituted too strong and sweeping a rejection of paternalism and gave too much weight to certain audience interests.

What is Shiffrin's "thinker-based approach" to freedom of speech?

It centers on the individual agent's interest in the protection of the free development and operation of her mind, based on the assumption that our rational, emotional, and perceptual capacities are core to what we value about ourselves.

What are the desiderata for a good theory of freedom of speech, according to Shiffrin?

It should provide a strong and coherent foundation for important protections (political, religious, art, personal communication), avoid lexical hierarchy, offer a non-contingent and direct foundation, explain why commercial/corporate speech may be weaker, and justify why speech is special.

How does Shiffrin's thinker-based approach explain why speech is special?

Speech is the only precise avenue for mental contents to be known by others, allowing for complex social life and the development of moral agency. Externalizing thoughts through speech also aids in their formation, evaluation, and distinction, and compensates for human memory frailties, thus playing a unique foundational role for thinkers.

How does Shiffrin's approach differentiate corporate commercial speech from other forms of expression?

Non-press, business corporate, and commercial speech do not directly reveal individuals' mental contents. Their design often discourages authentic expression of individual judgment due to competitive market structures and narrowly defined aims, making strong presumptions against their regulation less applicable.

According to Howard, why do speakers generally not have a moral right to incite clear violations of others' moral rights?

Speakers have a moral duty to refrain from such incitement, which is a specific instance of the general moral duty not to risk causally contributing to incontrovertible rights violations without sufficient justification. Standard arguments for free speech (moral powers, mental access, democracy, listener autonomy) do not provide this justification, as either the interests aren't realized in incitement or are too weak compared to the victim's interests.

What does Howard mean by "incontrovertible violation of others' moral rights"?

It refers to violations of rights that are beyond reasonable disagreement, such as murder (as opposed to physician-assisted suicide, where reasonable disagreement exists). Speech that incites such violations is wrong.

What does Howard mean by "dangerous incitement"?

Speech that dangerously incites refers to incitement with foreseeable effects on susceptible listeners, not 'inert incitement' that poses no risk of inspiring harm. The wrongfulness of this speech stems from its dangerousness.

If there's no moral right to incite, on what basis can arguments for protecting such speech still be made, according to Howard?

Arguments for protecting such speech must be based on the interests of others (non-speakers) that weigh against the legal enforcement of the speaker's duty not to incite. These interests must be balanced against the victim's interests through a 'morally weighted cost-benefit calculation'.

What is the difference between "narrow proportionality" and "wide proportionality" in Howard's argument?

Narrow proportionality concerns whether the target (the inciter) is morally liable to suffer a certain amount of harm to prevent wrongdoing. Wide proportionality factors in the effects of imposing that harm on non-liable people (e.g., innocent bystanders affected by enforcement).

What is the "necessity condition" in Howard's argument for enforcing duties against dangerous speech?

The necessity condition dictates that no more force or harm than necessary should be used to defuse a threat. If counter-speech can defuse the danger, then coercive suppression may be gratuitously harmful and unnecessary.

What are some practical concerns that might make enforcement of the moral duty not to incite problematic, according to Howard (wide proportionality)?

Concerns include driving dangerous speech underground (making it harder to monitor or persuade speakers), suppressing legitimate speech (through overinclusive statutes or 'chilling effects' on legitimate criticism), and the risk of government abuse of power to suppress political adversaries.