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Brie Gertler's disembodied pain argument for dualism posits that pain can be conceived without a physical body, challenging physicalist claims of mental-physical identity. Through a thought experiment of experiencing pain while disembodied, Gertler argues that this conceivability implies metaphysical possibility, thus demonstrating pain's non-physical essence and supporting dualism
why might a dualist prefer epiphenomenalism over descartes’ own view of mental causation, interactionism?
Dualists may favor epiphenomenalism over Descartes’ interactionism to preserve physics’ causal closure, avoiding the problem of explaining how non-physical minds influence bodies. By restricting causation to physical-to-mental, epiphenomenalism sidesteps interactionism’s incoherence, even if it renders mental states causally inert, to uphold the existence of non-physical qualia.
what role does occam’s razor play in the debate between dualism and materialism?
Materialists use Occam’s Razor to favor materialism over dualism, arguing that a purely physical ontology is simpler and aligns with scientific causal closure. However, dualists counter that simplicity is insufficient to resolve the "hard problem" of consciousness, as materialism fails to explain subjective experience, rendering Occam’s Razor inconclusive in this metaphysical debate.
sensations can be known through introspection
brain processes cannot be known through introspection
therefore, sensations are not identical to brain processes
how might an identity theorist defend against this objection?
An identity theorist might defend against the objection by arguing that differences in how sensations and brain processes are known do not imply they are distinct entities, as introspection and neuroscience provide different modes of access to the same reality. This defense hinges on distinguishing between epistemological differences (how we know things) and ontological identity (what things are), thereby reconciling subjective experience with physical basis.
opponents of type materialism often charge that the theory is too exclusive. explain this objection and then briefly discuss how the type materialist might respond.
Opponents of type materialism argue that the theory is too exclusive because it fails to account for the subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience, reducing all mental states to physical brain states. This objection contends that type materialism cannot explain the "what it's like" aspect of consciousness, potentially leaving out essential features of our mental lives. In response, type materialists might argue that advancements in neuroscience and cognitive science will eventually bridge the explanatory gap, providing a complete account of consciousness in physical terms.
how might a physicalist respond to hempel’s dilemma?
they would respond with an argument surrounding the basis of occam’s razor. arguing that even though the laws of physics are not complete or certain, they provide us a valuable explanation for the phenomena in the world around us.
functionalists claim that their theory improves upon predecessors such as behaviorism and type materialism. how does it do so?
Functionalism improves upon behaviorism by recognizing the reality of internal mental states and avoiding behaviorism’s overly simplistic or circular explanations, as it allows mental states to be defined by their causal roles rather than solely by observable behaviors. It also improves upon type materialism by addressing the multiple realizability objection, allowing mental states to be realized in different physical systems as long as they perform the same functional role, making it more inclusive and flexible.
explain block's example of the blockhead (the homunculi headed robot). how does this example pose a problem to functionalism?
Ned Block's homunculi-headed robot thought experiment imagines a human-like body whose brain is replaced by tiny people (homunculi) performing mechanical operations to mimic human behavior. This example challenges functionalism by showing that a system could exhibit functionally equivalent behaviors without possessing consciousness or qualia, thus exposing functionalism’s "liberalism" in attributing mental states to entities lacking genuine mentality.
explain schwitzgebel's argument for the conclusion that the truth of materialism implies that the united states is conscious
Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if materialism is true, the United States could be conscious because its functional and behavioral complexity meets the criteria materialists use to ascribe consciousness to entities like animals. He challenges anti-nesting principles, which deny consciousness to wholes composed of conscious parts, by showing they are arbitrary and fail to address the functional organization that could support a unified stream of phenomenal consciousness in group entities like the United States.
why does the split-brain phenomenon pose a problem for the unity of consciousness? why might someone think that the phenomenon shows that split brain patients have two minds.
The split-brain phenomenon poses a problem for the unity of consciousness because it demonstrates that when the corpus callosum is severed, the two hemispheres of the brain can operate independently, potentially leading to separate streams of information processing and behavior. Some argue that this shows split-brain patients have two minds, as each hemisphere can exhibit distinct cognitive processes and self-awareness, functioning as separate conscious entities within the same cranium.
