Week 10 - Investigating Censorship, Surveillance, and Digital Repression

Deiber 2023 - Spyware as an Authoritarian Tool

Advanced spyware has become the digital surveillance tool of choice for repressive regimes and is increasingly used by both authoritarian and democratic states in ways which violate human rights and public acocuntability.

Deiber 2023 - The Transformation of Espionage

This technology, which can covertly infiltrate even up-to-date smartphones (like "zero click" Pegasus), has transformed surveillance by allowing operators near-total access to a target's personal data.

It exploits the inherent insecurity of the digital ecosystem and allows security agencies to circumvent end-to-end encryption.

Deibert 2023 - Fueling the Industry

The spyware market's extraordinary growth is driven by several factors:

1. Exploiting the always-on, always-connected global digital culture.

2. Offering a way to read communications before encryption or after decryption, circumventing the barrier of end-to-end encryption.

3. Providing a powerful tool to monitor and neutralize dissent and activist networks.

4. The growing privatization of national security, where governments outsource controversial surveillance to less visible, revenue-driven private actors ("mercenary spyware")

Deibert 2023 - Transnational Repression

Spyware allows authoritarian regimes to extend their repression far beyond their own border, targeting political exiles and dissidents without the risks and costs of conventional international espionage.

Deibert 2023 - Need for Regulation

To curb this threat, a comprehensive approach is required, including: technology companies devoting more resources to security, developing digital forensic science as a formal discipline, and governments adopting a robust regulatory framework.

Deibert 2023 - Targeted Political Oppositions/Dissidents

Paul Rusesabagina's family (prominent critic of Rwanda's President Paul Kagame) had their phones hacked around the time of his kidnapping and trial.

Officials in the UK's Foreign Office and a device were infiltrated.

In Spain, a large cross-section of Catalan civil society and government, including all pro-independence Catalan members of the European Parliament, were targeted.

Exiled Egyptian opposition politician Ayman Nour was simultaneously infected with two different spyware programs.

Deibert 2023 - Targeted Journalists

Mexican journalist Carmen Aristegui was targeted while investigating a corruption involving the then-President.

A Hungarian journalist investigating President Viktor Orban's innerc circle was hacked.

New York Times correspondent Ben Hubbard's phone was infected while he worked in a book about Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Deibert 2023 - Targeted Lawyers/Judicial Officials

Argentine anticorruption prosecutor Alberto Nisman was targeted with spyware before his suspicious death, which was later ruled a homocide.

Attorney-client privilege was violated when lawyers for prominent Catalans and the legal counsel for Poland's main opposition leader, Roman Giertych, were hacked or targeted.

Deibert 2023 - Targeted Human Rights Organizations

Groups tracking potential government cover-ups of the disappearance and murder of 43 students in Iguala, Mexico, were target.

Deibert 2023 - Geopolitical Targets

US embassy staff in Uganda had their iPhones hacked. Spyware was used against geopolitical rivals, such as the infiltration of UK officials' devices.

Deibert 2023 - Forced Entry

The most sophisticated form of spyware is a zero-day, zero-click exploit operator which can surreptitiously intercept texts, turn on the microphone and camera, track GPS movements, and even acquire digital tokens to continue surveillance after the spyware has been removed.

Deibert 2023 - The Victim Experience

People who have experienced this technology undergo a "psychological and emotional war" causing "endless fear and anxiety".

This is caused by knowing that their every move is being watched, and that friends and family are put at risk.

Deibert 2023 - US Action

The Commerce Department placed NSO Group and Candiru on an export restriction list, limiting their access to US products and technology.

Deibert 2023 - Tech Platform Actions

Companies like Meta and Apple have sued NSO Group, notified victims of infections, and worked to support civil society watchdogs. Apple also pledged $10m to cybersurveillance research.

Deibert 2023 - Ideal Governmental Framework

Should include:

1. Requiring domestic spyware companies to make public disclosures about exports.

2. Strengthening export rules to prevent sales to governments likely to violate human rights law.

3. Establishing clear oversight and legislation addressing the zero-day market.

4. Giving victims the right to sue both foreign governments and spyware vendors.

Deibert 2023 - International Cooperation

The ultimate goal is to establish a global spyware control regime, similar to those for military activities, which would require the buy-in of a significant number of countries.

Dobson and Stremlau 2024 - Internet Shutdowns as an Accessible Form of Content Control

This reading explores the increasing use of internet shutdowns by governments as an accessible form of controlling content within their borders.

Particularly occurs in contexts of heightened tensions, like elections and violent protests.

While shutdowns are often condemned as authoritarian censorship, they also reflect situations where governments face limited options in dealing with real concerns of online violence, disinformation, and the failures of global social media companies to moderate content effectively.

Dobson and Stremlau 2024 - The Accessibility Factor

Shutdowns are so appealing to governments as they allow officials to bypass messy conversations with internet engineers, international institutions, and legal systems.

The technique has also become more attractive due to the growing use of encryption by platforms, which makes targeted surveillance and interception of messages more difficult.

Dobson and Stremlau 2024 - Justifications for Shutdowns

While shutdowns are often used for political manipulation, they are commonly justified in terms of national security or public safety to pre-empt violence or reduce election interference.

Misinformation is the second most cited reason, often linked to the potential for heightening protests and violence.

Dobson and Stremlau 2024 - Shift to Targeted Censorship

Although the number of shutdowns may be decreasing, censorship is becoming more targeted.

Governments are weaponizing shutdowns, moving from general blackouts to disconnecting a specific group which has been deemed a threat.

Dobson and Stremlau 2024 - A Response to "Big Tech" Failures

A significant driver of shutdowns is the perceived failure of online content moderation by global social media companies (in different local languages and with the necessary cultural nuance).

Poorer countries in the GS are often not priorities for these companies to invest in rigorous content moderation.

Dobson and Stremlau 2024 - Ethiopia and the Conflict of Online Speech and Offline Violence

Facebooks internal report on "Coordinated Social Harm" from 2021 cited concerns about online speech inciting offline violence in Ethiopia.

Whistleblower Frances Haugen argued that these explicit calls to violence are only exacerbated by the company's inaction.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed imposed an internet shutdown in 2019 to pre-empt expected violence, later stating that the internet would be shut down for national security as any other threat should.

Some residents viewed the shutdown as justified, particularly following ethnically-targeted harassment and threats online.

Dobson and Stremlau 2024 - Elections and Political Instability

In 2020, 122/155 shutdowns were attributed to elections or political instability.

Governments with a firm grip on power (e.g., Rwanda) or those with free and fair elections (e.g., South Africa) are less likely to use shutdowns.

Countries that hold competitive elections are more likely to use them.

Dobson and Stremlau 2019 - Obscuring Human Rights Abuses

Shutdowns make it difficult for people to amplify human rights abuses or hide casualties from government security forces to social media users.

Iran (November 2019): Amnesty International recorded and verified the deaths of 323 people killed during a shutdown.

Myanmar (February 2021): During the military coup, the blackout prevented demonstrators from sharing the violent police response, including the use of water cannons and live ammunition.

Dobson and Stremlau 2019 - Accountability Gap Limit of Law and Policy

Governments often provide vague or no justifications for shutdowns, leading to little accountability.

Dobson and Stremlau 2019 - Failed Legal Challenges Limit of Law and Policy

Lawsuits brought against governments over shutdowns have generally struggled to have a lasting impact.

Countries often ignore or push cases into lengthy review processes, and positive rulings have not set precedents for other countries.

Dobson and Stremlau 2019 - Lack of Dialogue Limit of Law and Policy

There is minimal dialogue between African governments and the large, North America -based social media corporations.

Dobson and Stremlau 2019 - International Bodies' Limits of Law and Policy

A proposal by the African Network Information Centre (AFRINIC to deactivate delinquent governments' online platforms as a punishment was dismissed by its members.

They argued that it would be difficult to implement and could antagonize governments.

Dobson and Stremlau 2019 - Importance of Discussion on Shutdowns

Highlights a difficult balance for governments to strike between upholding freedoms and the need for protection from violence.

This chapter reframes the discussion by moving beyond viewing them as merely a crude reflection of authoritarian motivations.