METAPHYSICS OF MIND: Property Dualism - The Zombie Argument

Zombie argument -david chalmers

philosophical zombies have no qualia, but are identical to humans in every other way
1) pz are conceivable

2) then they are possible

3) if they are possible then qualia are non physical and do not supervene on the physical

4) if qualia is non physical and do not supervene on the physical then then property dualism is true

5) therefore property dualism is true

zombies are not conceivable

- reject the first premise of the zombie argument, pz are not conceivable. can understand qualia in a type of physical term, inherent to the body

.- the only reason they seem conceivable is because there is not enough knowledge yet available to understand qualia in physical terms that can be conceptualised

- hence the PZ , someone without qualia is an illusion

- labouring under an illusion that qualia are non physical, ghostlike, supernatural things. once people are able to understand that qualia are a type of physical things, it will become inconceivable since it is a contradiction to imagine a physically identical being that lacks the physical features of qualia ( or a triangle without three sides)

- then become inconcievable for physically identical beings to not have qualia, so the zombie argument fails. they do supervene on the physical

response to zombie are not conceivable

- assumes that knowing all physical facts is sufficient to know what the corresponding qualia is like, eg, knowing every physical fact about red is sufficient to know what red qualia is like

-thus assumes that in knowing all the physical facts, this would prove qualia is inseparable, and indeed does supervene on physical things which renders pz inconceivable

- even if qualia is able to be understood in terms of physical knowledge, still could hold that it does not supervene on physical , hence zombie argument still holds true

zombie are metaphysically impossible

- premise 2 challenged, just because zombies are concievable does not mean that they are metaphysically possible

- saying qualia are essential properties of physical things, and then it is possible for the same physical thing to have different phenomenal properties, is not an analytic truth hence denial seems viable since it does not result in a contradiction

- though it is metaphysically impossible, to say that, in the same way denying water is h3o

- zombie argument fails yet again as zombies like this are impossible to exist

response to claim that zombies are metaphysically impossible

while the physical structure of water is, h2o is essential to what water is

- physical structure is not essential to what qualia is, so it is metaphysically possible to have qualia without physical structure, and so zombies are also metaphysically possible

- not all properties are essential properties

-essential characteristic of qualia is how it feels, not its physical structure,

- so it is metaphysically possible to have pain without any particular structure

what is possible tells us nothing about the actual world - zom

- REJECT PREMISE 3- even if pz are possible, does not prove qualia are non physical

- it is possible , but it does not show they are non physical, jus like jumping from earth to moon is logically possible

- does not show that property dualism is true, just shows it is possible

response to claim that what is possible tells us nothing about actual world

- misunderstands what property dualism is thus fails to defend physicalism-

- physicalism claims that everything is physical and supervenes on physical

- pd at least some mental properties that are neither reducable to nor supervene on physical properties

analogy:-god has just created the physical world, would he have to do more to add qualia into this purely physical universe

yes : means qualia non physical and pd is true , qualia depends on something more than physical facts

no : physicalism would have to say no since, physical facts alone can explain qualia so zombie is impossible

- qualia do not supervene on physical

- if zombies are possible then IT DOES TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT ACTUAL WORLD

- THAT QUALIA A RE NEITHER REDUCABLE NOR SUPERVENIENT ON PHYSICA

L- so even if they are simply just possible, property dualism is true

how are philosophical zombie inconceivable

- a physical thing without qualia is contradictory, to imagine 2 physically identical things without a physical thing

- qualia is a physical thing, inherent, and will eventually be understood in physical terms

why are pz metaphysically impossible

claims that qualia are essential property of physical things, and also saying that it is conceivable to imagine that pz exist, physical things without this essential thing

- like saying that water can be something besides h2o

what determines whether a state of affairs is concievable

a priori reflection of the concepts involved

what determines whether a state of affairs is metaphysically possible

the nature of the things involved

how can a gap between concievability and possibility open up (what is concievable may not be possible

if a priori reasoning cannot guarantee metaphysical actuality
- hence the concievabeility of pz would not entail that pz are impossible metaphysically.