Quiz 4 Monitoring and Mobilization

Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics- Keck and Sikkink- Transnational advocacy network

Actors (1) working internationally on an issue, (2) who are bound together by shared values, (3) a common discourse, (4) and dense exchanges of information and services. Multiply channels of access to the international system. Promote new norms and norm implementation

Transnational advocacy network members

International and domestic NGOs, local social movements, foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, intellectuals, parts of regional and international organizations

Campaigns

Sets of strategically linked activities in which members of a diffuse principled network develop explicit, visible ties, and mutually recognized roles in pursuit of a common goal

When are transnational advocacy networks most likely to emerge?

1. Channels between domestic society and government are blocked

2. Activists believe networking will further their missions

3. Conferences and international contact create opportunities to form and strengthen networks 

What tactics to transnational advocacy networks use

1. Information politics

2. symbolic politics

3. leverage politics

4. accountability politics

How are transnational advocacy networks effective?

1. Issue creation and agenda setting

2. Influence on discursive positions (states or IO’s)

3. Influence on institutional procedures

4. Influence on policy change

Transnational advocacy networks issue characteristics 

Issues that involve ideas about right and wrong. Generate strong emotions. Attract interest of volunteers and activists. Problems whose causes can be assigned to the deliberate (intentional) actions of identifiable individuals

What two issues within transnational advocacy networks are usually most effective? 

1. Issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially if there’s a short and clear causal chain assigning responsibility

2. Issues involving legal equality of opportunity

Network actors

dense, with many actors, strong connections, and reliable information

Target actors

vulnerable to material incentives or social pressure

Domestic monitoring

Human rights change requires domestic monitoring. There is power from transnational advocacy networks pushing from the outside (boomerang pattern). But there are domestic actors inside the apparatus.

What Works in Human Rights Institutions- Katerina Linos and Tom Pegram main questions:

When do National Human Rights Institutions work? What is the role of formal design?

What is an NHRI?

• A state-created, semi-autonomous body established by a national government to promote and protect human rights locally.

• It is NOT an NGO (it’s funded by the state).

• It is NOT a court (it usually can’t issue binding judgements).

• It is NOT just another ministry (it’s supposed to be independent)

Core functions of an NHRI

1. Investigating individual complaints

2. Advising the government on law and policy

3. Public education and awareness

4. Monitoring compliance with international treaties

What are NHRI’s key for?

NHRIs are a key domestic intermediary. They act as a formal link between the state, civil society and international law

What are the two prerequisites for effectiveness

1. Independence: guaranteed autonomy from the executive branch (e.g., stable budgets, fixed terms for commissioners/ombudsperson)

2. Pluralism: diverse membership, ensuring representation of civil society

What two principles are NHRI’s peer reviewed against?

1. Reputational incentives

2. International legitimacy 

What Works in Human Rights Institutions: Linos and Pergam argument

formal institutional safeguards are the key to an NHRI’s efficacy, even in authoritarian or transition regimes

What is a formal safeguard 

Specific rules codified in the NHRI’s founding legislation that structurally protect it from political interference

Examples of formal safeguards

• Financial autonomy: guaranteed, non-discretionary budget

• Selection process: transparent, merit-based process for selecting leaders 

• Term limits: fixed non-renewable terms, making them immune to easy firing

What do rules for NHRI’s do?

insulate the NHRI, raising the political cost for the government if it tries to undermine or politicize the institution

What Works in Human Rights Institutions: Linos and Pergam complaint handling findings

NHRIs with a strong, active complaint-handling mandate (power to investigate individual rights violations) are the most effective overall. This is due to constituency building, data generation, and procedural legitimacy

What Works in Human Rights Institutions: Linos and Pergam Conclusions

• Domestic actors benefit from international allies. Especially in contexts where society-state channels are blocked 

• TANs transmit information and generate pressure that lead to change 

• When designing institutions, formal rules can protect them from political capture 

• IOs can have significant influence over domestic governance suing soft tools 

• NHRIs show how legal design is inherently political, enabling domestic actors to survive hostility

Boomerang Model

• Explains how TANs affect states’ human rights policies

  • Network of domestic NGOs, INGOs, IOs, and foreign/like-minded states

• Mobilization of information and shame

• But no clear if there are actors that matter more than others

IO’s selective adoption of NGO information- Mintao Nie Focus and Question

Which NGOs are more likely to influence IOs? Study of the reported prepared by the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights for the UPR session.

IO’s selective adoption of NGO information- Mintao Nie Findings 

IO staff prioritizes information provided by NGOs that:

• Have high reputation (ECOSOC consultative status)

• Use neutral language in referring to states’ human rights practices

• Work with other NGOs (joint statements)

Boomerang Model Roles

1. Put issues on the international community’s agenda

2. Assist domestic advocacy groups in their own struggle against human rights violations 

3. Pressure other states and international organizations to join in advocacy attempts through naming and shaming 

what is naming and shaming?

Strategy to publicly expose violations of human rights norms by states, organizations, or individuals to pressure compliance

Naming and Shaming characteristics

• Relies on publicity as a tool for accountability

• Often involves NGOs, international organizations, or states

• Targets reputational damage to compel behavioral change

tools to publicize wrongdoings

• public statements

• reports

• resolutions

• media campaigns

• social media activism 

What naming and shaming is NOT

• not a legal sanction, doesn’t involve penalties

• not a substitute for other types of enforcement 

• not always evidence based

• not inherently impartial 

Why do NGOs name and shame?

• mission driven

• Collect evidence, analyze it, and think public pressure could work

Why do states name and shame?

• Believe it is the right thing to do 

• Reputation as a human rights promoter 

• Domestic pressure (voters, interest groups, NGOs) 

• Weaponization of rights

Why do international organizations name and shame?

• Follow mandate 

• Pressure by member states 

• Access to high-quality data (local NGOs)

Why does the media name and shame?

• There’s a demand from consumers/readers/viewers

• Sensational stories

Shaming and Blaming- Amanda Murdie and David R Davis main ideas and questions

Boomerang model generates multiple expectations about the role of transnational activist network. But multiple actors involved (local NGOs, international NGOs, states, IOs…) Who matters? Does public condemnation change a repressive government’s actions?

Shaming and Blaming- Amanda Murdie and David R Davis research methods

• Empirical study of the boomerang model 

• Analysis of 13 years of data (1992-2004) 

• CIRI and PTS as dependent variables 

• Study of shaming by INGOs and states

Shaming and Blaming- Amanda Murdie and David R Davis Argument

HRO shaming only leads to improvements in human rights practices when it interacts with one of two domestic/international forces: domestic pull, or international push

What is a domestic pull

a large presence of local HROs within the targeted state. They provide ground truth, sustained pressure, and a pathway for international information to reach domestic audiences

What is an international push

simultaneous pressure from third party actors (other states, IOs, other major INGOs). This creates powerful, unified diplomatic front

Shaming and Blaming- Amanda Murdie and David R Davis findings

HRO Shaming: Number of times a human rights organization criticized a country for their human rights record. HRO Shaming does not affect human rights practices alone. Needs backing from states: mentions of HRO Shaming

Shaming and Blaming- Amanda Murdie and David R Davis Conclusions 

• Monitoring is conditional, not automatic

• Bureaucracy matters