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What is direct realism?
Direct realism is the common sense intuitive view
we think of physical objects as existing objectively in space and time
Eg, objects remain the same if you leave a room unless theyâre undergoing some sort of physical process like burning
claims that our senses perceive those physical objects and their properties
when perceiving the physical object of table, I perceive itâs properties such as colour, shape, size, smell and texture
Direct realism therefore claims that sense data is veridical â coinciding with reality
What is the perceptual variation issue for direct realism?
Bertrand Russell argued that what we perceive is not the same as what is in reality and so direct realism is false
example of a shiny, brown table:
argues that the colour of the table actually depends on where you stand in relation to it
light falling on the table making a part of it shiny and therefore white in colour in a certain spot
if another person were to stand at a different place to you, the white spot would appear differently
where one person sees the table to be white, another might see it to be brown
particular spot on an object cannot be two colours at once, therefore colour cannot be a property of the table
Russell argues this can apply to texture too
the table at macroscopic level has indentations and grooves
Shape is also perceptually variable since it depends on the angle
P1. Our perception of an object can vary without any corresponding change in the object.
C1. Therefore, there is a difference between the properties that physical objects appear to have and the properties they really have.
C2. Therefore, what we perceive and what exists mind-independently are different.
C2. Therefore, the immediate objects of perception and their properties are different to what exists mind-independently.
C3. Therefore, direct realism is false.
How do direct realists respond to the issue of perceptual variation?
They respond by arguing that perceptual variation is the result of perceiving relational properties of mind-independent physical objects
two types of relational properties:
relational properties,
between objects
properties that objects have in virtue of their relation to other objects
Perceptual perceptual relational properties
properties that objects have due to to being perceived
The property of âlooking squareâ or âlooking rectangularâ
second type of relational property that explains perceptual variation
since the relation of an object to a perceiver can change, so too can the perceptual relational properties that the object has
An object could have the relational property of âlooking rectangularâ while also having the intrinsic property of âbeing squareâ
How do indirect realists respond to the response made by direct realists in reference to the problem of perceptual variation?
perceptual relational properties are mind-dependent
without a mind perceiving them, they would not exist
relational properties are dependent on minds
contra direct realism:
when perceiving relational properties we cannot be perceiving properties âofâ mind-independent objects or properties that they âhaveâ
Relational properties are properties which an object is only perceived to have
not properties intrinsic to the object
properties must be of sense data; mind-dependent representations
follows that in cases of perceptual variation, a direct realist cannot claim that they are perceiving mind-independent objects and âtheirâ properties
direct realism is false
How do direct realists respond to the indirect realist response entailing perceptual rational properties being mind independent (3 points)?
there are two ways a perceptual relational property can be mind-dependent:
Mind dependent due to being a property of sense data
Mind dependent due to requiring a mind to exist
indirect realists are trying to argue that relational properties are mind-dependent in the first way
direct realists can respond that they are only mind-dependent in the second way
second way does not conflict with direct realism
objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties
we perceive properties of mind-independent objects
perceptual relational properties may depend on minds
nonetheless they are still properties that objects have due to their relation to a perceiver
nonetheless they are still properties that objects have due to their relation to a perceiver
It is only from a particular angle that a square object could have the relational property of âlooking rectangularâ
indirect realists cannot say that the relational properties are mind-dependent in the way of being a property of sense data
It seems they actually belong to the objective relation between a subjective mind and an objective object
Ultimately, it seems that perceptual relational properties belong both to an object and its perceiver
direct realism can be defended in its claim that perceptual variation can be explained through perceptual relational properties that are properties of mind-dependent objects. A mind-independent object can have relational properties that depend on a mind to exist.
What is the illusion issue for direct realism (1 point)?
P1. During an illusion, I observe an object p with property y. \n P2. According to direct realism, if I perceive property y, then property y exists mind-independently. \n P3. During an illusion, there is no property y. \n C1. Therefore, our perception of the property y of object p must be mind-dependent sense data. \n P4. Illusions can be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions. \n C2. Therefore, in all cases, the objects of perception and their properties are mind-dependent sense data \n C3. Therefore, direct realism is false
pencil in water example:
light-refracting properties of water make it look bent
illusion occurs when an object (the stick) appears to have a property (of bentness) yet in reality it does not have that property (It isnât bent)
perceived illusory property is sense data which exists in the mind, not reality
Illusions appear just as real as normal veridical perceptions â they are subjectively indistinguishable
How do direct realists respond to the illusion issue?
appealing to relational properties
relational property is one that a thing has by virtue of its relation to something else
pencil looking bent can be a relational property to a certain observer under certain conditions (ie, through a glass of water)
observing a stick bent in water does involve observing a mind-independent object and its properties
therefore direct realism isnât deemed false by illusions
What is the issue for hallucination?
Hallucination occurs when perceiving an object that doesnât exist. Therefore, what we perceived must be mind-dependent sense data
P1. During a hallucination I observe an object p. \n P2. According to direct realism, if I perceive object p, then object p exists mind-independently. \n P3. During a hallucination there is no physical object p. \n C1. Therefore, the object of perception p must be mind-dependent sense data. \n P4. Hallucinations can be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception. \n C2. Therefore, in all cases, the objects of perception are mind-dependent sense data. \n C3. Therefore, direct realism is false
How do direct realists respond to the argument for hallucination?
disjunctive theory of perception:
disjunctive theory of perception shows the possibility that that when hallucinating we are experiencing the product of our imagination
We experience object p but there is no object p. Direct realists can thereby deny P1 and P2, that when we perceive an object p that there is something that is p
Therefore this case is disjunctive as it must be either/or â it cannot be both â the mind is either connected to reality or separated
what we perceive is either
hallucination from our imagination
a veridical perception of reality
since they are disjunctive, they cannot be the same
just because hallucinatory cases are of mind-dependent sense data, it doesnât follow that all perceptions are mind-dependent sense data too
What is the time lag argument?
it takes time for light to reach us from an object we perceive
light from the stars we see in the sky may have taken billions of years to reach earth
we see those stars as they were billions of years ago, not as they are now
although the objects of perception we more regularly see are much closer, like a table or chair, the light still takes some time to reach us
herefore, we are not seeing the objects of perception directly, we are seeing them as they were in the past. Therefore, direct realism is false
What is indirect realism?
the view that the objects of perception are a mind-dependent representation which is caused by external mind-independent physical objects
Sense-data is perceived immediately (directly) whereas physical objects are perceived indirectly
representation can be different from the object it represents
The argument from perceptual variation, illusion and hallucination, which try to show that what we see isnât necessarily the reality, argue for indirect realism
What does Russel define sense data as?
Russell defines sense-data as the âcontentâ of our immediate sensory perception
What is John Lockeâs primary/secondary quality distinction?
objects of perception have primary qualities which are âintrinsicâ to the object and secondary qualities which are just in our mind
Primary qualities are:
shape
extension
number
movement
Secondary qualities are:
colour
taste
smell
touch
Locke argues for this distinction by pointing to the case of a grain of wheat:
If you continually divide a grain of wheat, eventually it will become insensible
having no colour, taste, smell or touch
However, it will still have a shape, extension, number or movement
shows that secondary qualities are separable from an object, whereas primary qualities are not
What is the indirect realism issue in relation to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects?
Indirect realism claims that the objects of perception are mind-dependent
sense data that represents and is caused by mind-independent objects
if all we perceive directly are sense-data
then we never perceive the mind-independent objects which Indirect realists claim are giving rise to and being represented by that sense-data
there is a âveil of perceptionâ between our sense data and the external world which we cannot perceive
therefore, we canât actually know that mind-independent objects exist at all, let alone whether sense data represents them
Eg, solipsism could be true; that only my mind exists and my perceptual experience is caused by my imagination
first claim of indirect realism
the objects of perception are mind- dependent sense data
undermines our ability to justifiably know the second claim
sense data is caused by and represents mind-independent objects
direct realism is epistemologically self-defeating and we can never be justified in believing it
What is Russellâs best hypothesis response to the issue of scepticism?
we can neither:
prove nor disprove either the claim that the external world exists and causes my sense data
claim that the external world does not exist and so does not cause my sense data
Since we cannot prove for certain either claim, we are left with making a hypothesis.
Russell argues the question then becomes:
whether or not the external world exists or does not
the best hypothesis
Cat example:
you look at a cat in the corner of a room
you turn away for five minutes
the cat has moved to a couch
the cat is independent of the mind, since it moved when it wasnât being perceived
therefore, there is an external world which continues existing when unperceived by our minds
Since this hypothesis actually explains our experience, it is the better explanation and so, Russell concludes it is the best hypothesis
What is the response to Russellâs best hypothesis response to the issue of scepticism?
wthus no way to say which explanation is better, so Russellâs âbest hypothesisâ argument fails
hy is the cat having its own mind-independent existence really a âbetterâ explanation of our experience?
what criteria is Russell using to judge that?
makes more sense âto usâ, but that could just be because of our habit of thinking that there is an external world.
if we discount that, itâs hard to see what possible reason we could have to prefer Russellâs explanation to the explanation of solipsism
both explanations are equally consistent with any and all experience
no justification to prefer either
thus no way to say which explanation is better, so Russellâs âbest hypothesisâ argument fails
What is solipsism?
the sceptical view that only our mind exists and the physical world does not
What is John Lockeâs argument from the involuntary nature of our experience?
argues that perceptions from sense experience have a key difference to perceptions from memory or imagination
we have no choice over what we perceive in sense-data
we can choose what to remember or imagine
if there really were no external world causing our sense-data, then everything must be in our mind
we should expect to have choice over perceptions from sense experience
however we do not â if we look at a bottle of water we have no choice but to see one
yet if we want to imagine a bottle of water filled with gold or remember the last time we drank from one, we can
Since we have choice over perceptions which originate from our mind, but have no choice from those from sense experience:
sense experience does not originate from our mind but from an external world
What is the argument from coherence of various kinds of experience (Locke and Cockburne)?
Locke also argues that sense-data from different senses back each other up:
eg, an apple
I can touch it to see if it also feels like one
taste it to see if it also tastes like one
Locke combines these two arguments in the example of changing how paper looks by writing on it:
sight and the sense of your hand moving cohere
you cannot cause the words to appear on the paper by mere imagination
once it is written, it cannot be changed except by further writing
if someone else read out what you had written, there would be coherence between your auditory (hearing) sense-data
Lock argues this âleaves little reason for doubtâ that there is an external world
Catherine Cockburn also responds to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects with an argument from experiential coherence
first points to the radical difference between experiences gained from different senses
the sound a waterfall makes is not just different to but of a very different sort than the visual experience of it
we learn to pair visual and auditory experiences together
we are able to make an inference from one to the other
we can infer and accurately predict what it looks like; and vice versa
The fact that we can accurately infer and predict our experiences suggests that there is some mind-independent object which both senses perceive yet is independent of any particular sense
What are the responses to the argument from the coherence of various kinds of experience (Locke & Cockburne)?
Locke hasnât proven that there is an external world of physical objects, he has merely given some reasons as to how it makes sense of our sense-data for there to be one
assumes all parts of our mind are under our control
might be some reason unknown to us why sense-data originating from our mind isnât under our control
might also be some reason why we get the same information from different senses, despite them also potentially originating from our mind
indirect realism can still be justified by Lockeâs arguments if we use Russellâs notion that it is the best hypothesis
The existence of the external world is the best explanation of lack of choice over perceptions and the coherence of various senses
What is the argument from Berkeley that we cannot know the nature of mind-independent objects because mind-dependent objects cannot be like mind-independent objects?
indirect realism relies on the claim that our perceptions are mind-dependent sense data which represents mind-independent objects
Berkeley attacks this claim with the likeness principle:
that to justifiably say that two things to be alike, they must be comparable
ideas (mind-dependent) can only be compared to other ideas
no way to compare ideas to mind-independent objects
so resemblance between them cannot be justifiably claimed
this issue attacks the claim of indirect realism that the objects of perception represent mind-independent objects
How does an indirect realist respond to Berkeleyâs use of the likeness principle?
Berkeley assumes that representation requires resemblance
there are other methods of representation
eg, the symbols we use in language are completely arbitrary
they have no resemblance to the objects they refer to
the word âchairâ does not resemble a chair but nonetheless can represent it
mind-dependent objects can be âlikeâ mind-independent objects if we take âlikeâ to involve representation without resemblance
How can Berkeleyâs argument be defended from the indirect realist response to his use of the likeness principle?
we could defend Berkeley by taking his argument to not be attacking whether an idea could be like a mind-independent object, but whether we could ever be in a position to know that it does
Berkeley seems to be saying that:
in order for a person to know that an idea is like a mind-independent object, they would have to compare them
that cannot be done since we have no direct perception of mind-independent objects
no one can justifiably claim that ideas represent mind-independent objects
therefore indirect realism cannot be justified
Even if we restrict âlikenessâ to representation, our perceptions might not even represent the mind-independent world, and could be totally unlike our perceptions in any respect
we just cannot know whether our perceptions represent mind-independent objects
Indirect realism leads to this sceptical issue
What is idealism?
claims we perceive ideas directly as they are because to be is to be perceived
What is idealismâs issue of illusions?
when we perceive an object like a stick in water appearing bent that it really is bent
If we reach into the glass to feel that the stick is straight, while also looking at the stick appearing bent, then we perceive two inconstant properties at the same time
cannot be the case that the stick is both bent and straight
At most one of those properties can be the reality and the other must therefore be an appearance, i.e., sense data
follows that there is a distinction between appearance and reality
so, it is not the case that to be is to be perceived and therefore Berkeleyâs Idealism is false.
idealism fails in its claim that to be is to be perceived, which means it is not the case that the objects of perception are mind-dependent ideas
How does Berkeley respond to idealismâs issue of illusions?
this is a mistake in the language we use to talk about the situation
when we say âthe stick is bentâ what Berkeley argues we really mean is that it would look bent under normal conditions, clearly false
Berkeley suggests instead saying âthe stick looks bentâ, which is clearly true
An indirect realist would want to insist that although the stick âlooksâ bent, it isnât âreallyâ bent
this argument however, presupposes a distinction between appearance and reality, which Berkeley has already denied in his attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction
Illusion is only a problem for a theory if it claims that the stick looks bent but is really straight
For Berkeley:
there is no way a thing âreally isâ aside from how it is perceived.
Itâs not that he denies that it is âreallyâ straight, itâs that he denies there is any way the stick âreally isâ aside from how it âlooksâ; how it is perceived.
Berkeley denies the inference from the stick looking bent to the claim that the stick really is straight
confusion over what Berkeley meant by âto be is to be perceived
to be bent is merely to look bent, not to possess a quality of bentness
The argument from illusion against idealism begs the question by assuming that there is a distinction between appearance and reality
What is idealism and the issue of hallucination?
a hallucination is the perception of an object which doesnât exist.
the possibility of hallucinations pose a problem for idealism because they are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions
for Berkeley, a veridical perception is when we perceive an idea that is in the mind of God
yet hallucinations according to Berkeley come from our imagination, not from Godâs mind
the imagination normally produces voluntary and relatively dim perceptions which are not vivid
Berkeley argues that at times it can produce involuntary and vivid perceptions
The problem is:
if some perceptions are hallucinations from our imagination and they are subjectively indistinguishable from other perceptions, then we canât tell the difference between hallucination and reality (reality being an idea in the mind of God)
Berkeley has an epistemological issue:
an issue with scepticism
problem for Berkeley as he claimed that defeating scepticism was a reason to accept his theory over indirect realism
How does Berkeley respond to idealismâs issue of hallucination and why does it fail?
Berkeley responds that hallucinations lack logical connection to the rest of our experience
However, this response is unsuccessful because:
hallucinations might be logically connected to the rest of our experience however
someone with a fever might look out a window and hallucinate a person walking down the street
there is nothing illogical about that and so no way to tell
What is idealismâs issue of solipsism?
Berkeleyâs arguments for Idealism conclude that the the objects of perception are mind dependent ideas
When we perceive a mountain or a tree, they have no mind-independent existence as they are just ideas in my mind
The problem is that itâs difficult to see how this would not apply to other people too
follows that other people are therefore just ideas in my mind
this issue does not suggest that Idealism is false
it only shows that Idealism leads to this sceptical issue
somewhat undermines Berkeleyâs claim that his theory is superior to the realist theories because it solves issues of epistemological scepticism
However:
Berkeley thinks that Idealism provides an argument for Godâs existence which would show that solipsism is false since God also exists, not just my mind
How does Berkeley respond to idealismâs issue with solipsism?
Berkeley argues that God must exist because our ideas must exist in God when not perceived by us
the complexity and regularity of the ideas we perceive shows that they come from Godâs mind
Idealism faces the issue of explaining the regularity of our perceptions
this includes their apparent continued existence when unperceived
If I throw a lit match into an empty room, leave it and come back later, the room will have changed
According to Berkeley however, âto be is to be perceivedâ:
Since the room is unperceived it does not exist, yet Idealism is then left with the problem of explaining how it could have undergone change.
Berkeley solves this problem by claiming that God perceives the room and indeed everything other idea, thereby keeping them in existence regardless of whether any human is observing them.
In the Principles, Berkeley argues that once Idealism is established to be true, an argument for God follows as the required causal explanation of our ideas.
If Idealism is true, our ideas cannot be caused by mind-independent objects
the only other options are that they are caused by:
other ideas
our own minds
another mind.
Ideas are:
perceived to be passive
to have no causal power
since to be is to be perceived
ideas have no causal power.
I can cause some ideas through imagination, but others are involuntary and therefore cannot come from my mind, so the third option must be true
The involuntary ideas we experience must come from another mind
Berkeley argues that the immeasurable complexity and regularity of the ideas we experience shows that this other mind must be far greater than our own, i.e., God.
This alone counters Solipsism since if Godâs mind exists then my mind is not the only mind
However, Berkeley also argues we at least have some evidence to justify thinking other people have minds too. We can infer that on the basis of our own experience of them.
What is the consequence if Berkeleyâs attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction and master argument fail to establish idealism/if some other argument proves idealism false?
his inference of God would likewise fail
Berkeleyâs defence against solipsism relies on his proof of God:, which relies on his arguments for idealism
itâs only if Idealism is true that Godâs existence is required to explain the regularity of our perceptions and that therefore my mind is not the only one which exists
In Berkeleyâs Idealism, God plays the role of perceiving all ideas and causing our ideas
this involves those ideas being in Godâs mind
this leads to an issue
The idea that God could have the same ideas as us is problematic for the traditional view of God
God could experience pain, for example
God cannot suffer
Godâs ideas are eternal yet ours are transient
God also has ideas of all possible objects, not just the ones that we experience
it cannot be the case that our ideas originate from Godâs mind
Berkeley is therefore left with the sceptical issues of solipsism and accounting for the origin and regularity of our ideas, including their changing when unperceived
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