Reading 6 - Nuclear Deterrence

The nuclear taboo: the US + Normative basis of nuclear non-use (2)

1. Since Nagasaki + Hiroshima non-use of nuclear weapons remains single most imp phenomenon of nuclear age -> wide explanation is deterrence but it is wrong or incomplete

   1. A normative element must be taken into account for the explanation

A normative element must be taken into account for the explanation (3)

1. Why?

   1. Non-use of nuclear weapons in cases where there was no fear of nuclear retaliation, that is, where the adversary could not retaliate in kind.

   2. Nuclear weapons, supposedly fearsome deterrent weapons, have not deterred attacks by nonnuclear states against nuclear states

   3. Security situation of small, non-nuclear states has not been rendered as risky in the nuclear age

The Nuclear taboo (3)

1. Widespread popular revulsion against nuclear weapons + widely held inhibitions on their use

2. Norm = shared expectation about behaviour, a standard of right / wrong 

3. Taboo = concerned with protection of individuals + societies from behavior defined/perceived to be dangerous + typically refers to something that is not done, said, or touched

Three normative effects of the role of the taboo (5)

1. Regulative (constraining)

   1. Effect of taboo is injunction against nuclear weapons first 

2. Constitutive 

   1. Taboo creates categories actors use to understand weapons + on the identity of a ‘‘civilized’’state

      1. Unacceptable weapons of mass destruction 

      2. One of the requirements for being a ‘‘civilized’’ state is participation in regulation of warfare

3. Permissive 

   1. Secondary, indirect, or ‘‘shadow’’ effects, often unintended consequences of operation of a norm

Alternative Explanations: Materialism vs Taboo (5)

1. Materialist explanations for non-use of nuclear weapons

   1. Most widely accepted = rational deterrence 

      1. rational self interest—fear of nuclear retaliation—of why superpowers did not use nuclear weapons against each other after late 1950s or so

   2. Set of material factors that would account for non-use, incl:

      1. Fear of long-term consequences, certain kinds of public opinion constraints, + array of domestic / internal considerations: lack of organizational readiness, shortage of bombs, shortage of delivery vehicles, + so on

Role of taboo in 4 cases

• Hiroshima and Nagasaki

• Korean War: Emerging Taboo

• Vietnam War: Hard test for the Taboo

• Gulf War 1991: Taboo in Post Cold war world

Hiroshima and Nagasaki (2)

• Atomic bombings were simply extension of strategic bombing during a war that had substantially elevated scale of destruction, fattening great cities in EU+ Japan

• Atomic weapons posed no great moral problems for decision makers cuz accumulated barbarities of WWII had already swept away traditional moral codes + laws of war

• → NO ROLE FOR TABOO

Korean War: Emerging Taboo (5)

1. Truman + his gov, given threat of North Korea + China on its ally South Korea discussed use of atomic weapons

2. BUT public horror of atomic weapons presente serious pol + moral obstacle

3. Nuclear weapons were acquiring a special status that encouraged pol leaders to view them as weapons of last resort.

4. The regulative / constraining effect of the taboo was most prominent at this point. But pol debate over the categorization of nuclear weapons as ‘‘unordinary’’ weapons, + implications of such weapons for American values + identity, suggests early development of constitutive effects

5. Taboo operated instrumentally, as policymakers calculated that violating it would result in pol costs + moral opprobrium for the US

Vietnam War: Hard test for the Taboo (3)

1. One material constraint on using nuclear weapons was the risk of a wider war with China

2. U.S. leaders worried that they would be forced to use nuclear weapons first with unpredictable consequences—evidence for a long-term consequences argument

3. Nuclear taboo was becoming more entrenched 

Gulf War 1991: Taboo in Post Cold war world (4)

1. In 1991 war to overturn Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. leaders ruled out using nuclear weapons even though Iraq was a non-nuclear adversary

2. Key material constraining factors = uncertain long-term consequences of nuclear use 

3. Both official = civilian analysts made numerous explicit references to a nuclear taboo

4. Gulf War also provides an esp clear example of permissive / secondary effects of the taboo → legitimization of other forms of destruction

Norms and Causal mechanisms (7)

1. Causal mechanisms of the taboo 

   1. Domestic public opinion

   2. World option 

   3. Personal conviction informed by beliefs about American values + conceptions of appropriate behavior of civilized nation

2. Norms work through three pathways 

   1. Force

   2. Self-interest

   3. Legitimacy 

3. Taboo operated both by appearing as a constraint on self-interested decision makers + in a more substantive or principled fashion as reflected in beliefs about growing illegitimacy of nuclear use

A nuclear Iran: Promoting stability or courting disaster (2)

• Waltz

• 2 paradoxes

Waltz (4)

1. Nuclear proliferation not a problems as proliferation means spread like wildfire + if only one country gets nuclear weapons it is not of great worry

2. It doesn't matter who has nuclear weapons 

3. Why would Iran want to have nuclear weapons 

   1. Boarders - Pakistan + Afghanistan might make it feel uneasy

   2. US invades Iraq one of three countries from an axis of the evil, Iran is another one so might be worried 

2 paradoxes

1. Vulnerability-invulnerability paradox = For nuclear weapons to have a deterrent effect they must be invulnerable to a first strike from an adversary to allow for the possibility of retaliation  

2. Stability-instability paradox = possibility that individual countries would be more aggressive with nuclear capabilities

How do we determine whether these new nuclear powers share the commitment to avoid the use of these weapons (3)

1. US Perspective 

   1. Comprehensive test ban treaty if ratified could have served a purpose by further avoiding the use of nuclear weapons 

   2. Institutions formed by US Scientists + pol leaders have taught Indians + Pakistanis about dangers with use of nuclear weapons