property dualism key terms

property dualism

the theory of mind that claims there is only one kind of substance - physical substance - and two fundamentally different kinds of properties - mental and physical properties

Jackson’s knowledge argument (standard form)

1. Mary knows all the physical facts about seeing colour whilst in a black and white room

2. on being released, Mary learns a new fact about seeing in colour

3. therefore, not all facts are physical facts (i.e. facts about phenomenal properties)

4. therefore, physicalism is false and phenomenal properties are non-physical

objections for knowledge argument

1. Mary gains ability knowledge

2. Mary gains acquaintance knowledge

3. she gains new knowledge about a fact she already knew

first objection (Mary gains ability knowledge)

she does not gain propositional knowledge, she gains ability knowledge; how to discriminate between colours and recognise these colours by sight

second objection

Mary knows everything that happens with brains when they experience colour but her brain has never been in that state, so when she sees red she becomes acquainted with the experience

third objection (new knowledge old fact)

when Mary leaves the room she gains some new concepts (phenomenal concepts), and she can apply these new concepts to her mind in a way that she could not before

but that phenomenal concept is metaphysically identical to her brain states (which Mary already has knowledge of)

chalmer’s zombie argument

masked man fallacy

i believe a masked man robbed the bank and i believe that that man is not my father

so it is conceivable that my father and the masked man are not the same

but imagine im wrong and my father is the masked man, then it is metaphysically impossible that the masked man and my father are not the same

so conceivability tells us nothing about metaphysical possibility

logical possibility

logical possibility does not infer metaphysical possibility

metaphysical possibility

something is metaphysically possible if it is logically possible

it is constrained by identity and the essential nature of things

arguments against dualism

1. problems of other minds

2. interaction problem; conceptual and empirical

3. the category mistake

interaction problem

how do changes in physical properties cause, or relate to, changes in mental properties when they are so fundamnetally different

Chalmer’s response to the interaction problem (interactionist response)

he notes that even though the two properties are fundamentally different they have a causal relationship similar to mass and space which are also fundamentally different

epiphenomenalism response

claims that mental properties have no causal power instead changes in mental properties occur as a by-product of physical processes

so we are mistaken in our belief that mental properties cause behaviour these behaviours are in fact being caused by underlying physical processes