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What is the question of the Binding problem?
How can we explain that we experience conscious experiences and perceptions as unity, when the related brain processes are complex, multi-part, and out of sync?
What are the 4 thought experiments regarding Phenomenology of the Self?
The brain-swapping alien scientist
The teletransporter
The ship of Theseus
Intuitions about the Self
What does the argument of the Brain-swapping alien scientist entail?
Imagine that your brain is swapped with the brain of a friend of yours. Then comes the question: Who is the real “you”?
Are you the person that now contains your friend’s brain or are you now your friend’s body, because your brain is in that body?
Or maybe you are neither person anymore.
What does the argument The teletransporter entail?
Star Trek assumption: your body is broken down into individual particles by a transporter and rebuilt somewhere else. Then comes the question: Is the old version of yourself still the same as the rebuilt version of yourself?
Another version is when the transporter does not break down the old/original version of your body, but does build up the new version. Are there then two versions of yourself? Who is then the “real you”?
What does the argument The ship of Theseus entail?
A ship that was used for a long time had to be repaired very often. Then comes the question: When all of the parts have been changed, is it still the same ship?
We can ask this question about a human being too: When a person loses their right arm, is it still the same person?
What are 3 Intuitions about the Self that people have?
Are you your body or are you your soul? → Do you identify your self with (part of) your body or with something immaterial?
You think you are your body (material)
You think you are your soul (immaterial)
Perhaps there is no self, at all (there is nothing that persists over the duration of our lives)
When you see yourself as matter (material), what view of the self do you have? What is then your opinion on the Star Trek transporter?
You think that your “self” is something material and thus identify yourself with your material body.
You might say you don’t mind the Star Trek transporter, because it rebuilds the material structure of your body exactly from scratch.
Or, on the contrary, you don’t want to use it, because your “self” will be built with different atoms.
You can make further distinctions here:
are you your whole body or just your brain?
is your hand a part of yourself or more like something you own?
What is your opinion on the Star Trek transporter when you see yourself as soul?
You don’t want to use the Star Trek transporter because it only copies material information and not your soul (immaterial mind).
It might be that there is no “self” at all; but if this is so, why do we still feel that we are one continuous and united self with conscious experiences?
What are the 2 ways to answer this question according to Derek Parfit?
An ego theory.
A bundle theory.
What does the Ego theory entail?
We feel like a “self”, because there really is a “self”.
Ego theorists are interested in the thought experiments about the self: they discuss whether the self is lost in the teletransporter and whether the alien swaps the “self” of two people when changing their brains (how we can identify the “self” with respect to brain regions).
What does the Bundle theory entail?
It may feel like we are or have a “self”, but that is just an illusion. The “self’ does not really exist, so the feeling that we are a “self” must be explained in some other way.
Bundle theorists find thought experiments meaningless, because they ask questions about the real “self” when it does not exist at all.
What does the Ego theory entail?
This theory states that we feel like a “self” because there is actually a continuous, unified self. This self may change a little throughout our lives, but it is an enduring entity that is the author of our actions and decisions, and the subject of our experiences.
This theory is intuitive: it goes in line with our phenomenology.
There is a dualist and a materialist version of this theory.
What does the view The self is immaterial / The self is a soul entail?
Ego theories often assume substance dualism: the self is an immaterial soul.
Dualism about the self is popular; many people have indicated that they identify the self as something immaterial.
Many religions assume that your “self” is a soul and therefore assume that your soul (and thus your “self”) will go to heaven after you die.
Children often think dualistically about the self.
What are the 2 problems that arise when we think of the Self as an Immaterial thing?
Dualism isn’t sustainable because it is not compatible with scientific research.
it is unclear what exactly this immaterial mind is and where it comes from.
The interaction problem arises: how could the self be the author of our actions?
Note Kai: The first problem is the difficulty in explaining how an immaterial self interacts with a material body, raising questions about the nature of consciousness. The second problem concerns the challenge of defining the self's identity over time, as an immaterial entity may not have clear continuity or change.
What does the view the Self is material (materialism and the ego theory) entail?
An ego theory can also be formulated as a materialist theory.
The self is our body or part of our body.
your brain or part of it.
a certain material structure (the organization of neurons).
But this view is problematic.
Why is the view of the Self as material problematic?
According to Richard Double, empirical evidence tells us that there is no material thing in us that remains the same; we constantly renew the cells in our body (like Theseus’ ship).
There is no material basis that is persistent and continuous.
Based on this, we could argue that the ‘self’ is not so much our atoms or cells that we have now, but rather a certain material structure. But if we were to argue this, we could ask again which structure then is the ‘self’.
So both seeing the ‘self’ as material and immaterial leads to problems. What would then be a possible alternative?
To say that there is no self at all: the Bundle theory.
What does the Bundle theory entail?
The self is an illusion; all there really is, is a collection or bundle of experiences, but there is no subject who has these experiences.
Bundle theorists do admit that we have a phenomenology of the self, but argue that this feeling must be explained in a different way.
Who was the first Bundle theorist?
Buddha (he was a follower): he assumed Anatta: non-self. The self is just a term by which we refer to a bundle of qualities and experiences (a set of elements).
Actions exist, but the person that acts does not.
It is better to give up on the idea of the self.
What was David Hume’s argument regarding the Bundle theory?
We are just a bundle of successive perceptions and experiences. Our memory creates the idea of continuity and personal identity, but actually there is no such thing.
When we engage in introspection, we find new experiences, perceptions, sensations, BUT we do not find a “self”.
According to bundle theorists, it is a category mistake to ask what the “self” is, independent of the collection of mental states: the “self” IS our perceptions, sensations, experiences, etc.
there is no underlying self.
What was Thomas Reid’s response to Hume’s position regarding the Bundle Theory?
Reid disagreed with what Hume was saying: he argued there must be a self that has the experiences and sensations, because that’s simply how it appears to us.
Reid emphasized our phenomenology.
BUT this is just an intuition: and our intuitions about our consciousness can often be mistaken; there is no evidence for the existence of a self.
Nonetheless, Reid was right about the fact that a good Bundle theory does need to be able to explain our phenomenology (why does it feel to us that we are a ‘self’?).
What problem does the Ego theory face?
It cannot really point at one specific thing that is the self.
A good theory should be able to explain what exactly the persistent self could be.
What problem does the Bundle theory face?
The problem that it is very counterintuitive: we feel as though we have a self.
A good theory should be able to explain why we feel as if there is one conscious self for every person that exists.
What question arises regarding the “Self” when looking at Split-brain patients?
We can ask whether the person has one self or two selves: one in each hemisphere of the brain.
Finding the answer to this question is difficult, since these patients act in fragmented ways (only left hemisphere is in charge of speech production and gives interpretations of performed actions) but speak as one person.
The first form of Deviant ‘selves’ are Split-brain patients. Who are another form of a deviant self?
Dissociative identity disorder (aka. multiple personality disorder): people with this disorder experience discontinuity in their sense of self.
Mrs. Beauchamp: she was treated for insomnia, headaches, and physical pain through hypnosis, but during this treatment, several personalities arose (e.g. Sally, who constantly teased Mrs.).
This case raised questions such as: Did Mrs. have multiple ‘selves’ or was she simply a problematic self?
Mrs. seemed to have multiple personalities, but critics point out that Sally may have simply been an illusion created by the Dr.’s hypnosis.
But if Sally was an illusion, why can’t we say that Mrs. “real self” is also just an illusion?
What are the 3 reasons why the Ego Theory is problematic? What should a good theory contain?
Not everyone seems to be one conscious self, or feel that way.
Ego theorist can say in these cases that there are actually multiple selves, but it is difficult to then determine how many more.
We cannot even properly define what the self is.
A good theory must be clear in what the self is.
What are 3 things in which the Bundle Theory differs from the Ego theory? What should a good theory contain?
Bundle theorists do not have the problem of [ not everyone seems to be one conscious self, or feel that way ] ; they simply state that these patients are just like us → they do not have more selves, for all we have non, because the self does not exist.
Bundle theorists say there are multiple streams of consciousness in these cases, but that’s all. There is no self.
Still the question remains as to why then there is a sense of ‘self’ (and how can we distinguish sally from beauchamp?)
A good theory should be clear in where the sense of the self comes from.
What are the 4 Theories of the Self?
Neuroscientific models of the self
Enactive theories of the self
Narrative theories of the self
Metzinger’s phenomenal self-model
What does the Neuroscientific models of the self entail? Whose view is this?
Michael Gazzaniga : the self is physically present in our brain. This brain region he calls the interpreter.
The self is a functional region that is identified with the left hemisphere’s language area (aka. bullshit generator) and different parts of the prefrontal cortex which generate and evaluate different explanations and interpretations of our own actions (confabulation: remember chicken coop experiment).
Is Gazzaniga’s view an ego theory or a bundle theory?
An Ego theory: there is one interpreter, therefore one self.
The self is physical and exists as a continuous neural structure in the brain.
This theory can also form the basis of a bundle theory: the self is self confabulation and the interpreter is then what provides the illusion of being a self.
Gazzinga’s view belongs in the Neuroscientific models of the self — What is the other view that also belongs in here?
Donald MacKay’s view: The self consists of self-controlling / self-suppressing brain processes. He distinguishes between two levels of brain function:
Executive function: these brain processes drive goal-directed activities, often unconsciously, and evaluate them based on current criteria and priorities.
Self-monitoring function: brain processes that determine and update the criteria and priorities used by lower-level brain processes.
MacKay is convinced that the self can be found in this function.
Is the Self-monitoring functions an ego theory or bundle theory?
This is an Ego theory: the self exists physically in our brain as a brain process (sustained by a permanent, neural structure) that drives other brain processes.
The feeling of being a self is explained here by the real existence of the self, which is deniable as a material structure in our brain.
What is Enactivism? What is the idea in this view?
aka. Comprehensive interpretations of the self.
The self is not located only in our brain or body. Enactivists believe that the brain, like consciousness, is created in interaction with our environment.
Similar of the self: our self emerges in the interaction with our environment.
Our interactions with the world precede and give rise to our sense of a self. So, we don’t have experiences because we are a self, instead:
We have the sense of being a self because we have experiences!
What does Gallagher say as an alternative to Enactive / Expansive interpretations of the self?
He argues that the self arises in our embodied interaction with the world.
It’s a strange question to ask ““whether our body belongs to ourself” → the fact that our body is ours is already built into our experience of the world and precedes it.
Our body is not experienced by a self that exists independently of this body.
Our sense of being a self is (at least partly) caused by the fact that we experience the world from our personal, embodied perspective.
What are the two types of Enactivism?
Interactions with the world
The self as a social construct
What is one problem with Gallagher’s view?
It’s not entirely clear whether this theory describes that we have a self or whether we only have the sense of a self.
Another view is the Self as a social construct; what does this view entail?
The self arises in our relationship with others.
Our (sense of) self can only arise in the larger, social context in which we find ourselves.
The self doesn’t come together in relationships but arises in these and from specific roles within social institutions and groups.
We are a self because others think of us.
Is Enactivism an ego theory or a bundle theory?
It can be a version of both an ego theory or a bundle theory; this depends on the purpose of the theory.
Ego theory = the purpose of the theory is to define what the self is.
it is committed with the existence of the self and tries to explain why there is one unified, continuous self.
Bundle theory = the purpose of the theory is to explain where our sense of self comes from.
Blackmore argues that the theories of Enactivism are both ego theories. What does she say with this statement?
The boundaries of “self” are blurring → the distinction between self and world and self and others is disappearing.
This makes it difficult to say where the self begins and ends.
This brings out the concept of the “expanded self”: the self extends beyond one’s own consciousness / body.
The boundaries of the self and the world, and the self and other become blurry. What is Andy Clark’s view on this and what is Alva Noe’s?
Clark: the information on our phone is part of our identity.
Noe: our self is scattered in our actions that connect us to the world.
What does Daniel Dennett argue about the self? What theory [ego/bundle] does he defend?
He argues that the self arises in our practice of storytelling: Narrative theories of the self.
He defends a bundle theory that holds that the self is an illusion.
According to him, defenders of ego theories think of the self as the audience in the theater of the mind.
BUT we should give up on the self being somethign physical and even give up on the self existing at all.
The self is a useful abstraction; the self does not really exist, but it arises in the way we tell stories.
What do Narrative theories entail?
Narrative theories of the self generally say that our (sense of) self comes from the stories we tell about ourselves.
These theories make no statement about whether the self exists or not.
Your self-narrative refers to your interests, desires, goals, etc. You have a coherent life story of yourself, and your “self” is the protagonist of that autobiographical life story.
Dennett’s specific theory of the self is a bundle theory that holds that the self is the […]
Center of narrative gravity.
Dennett sees the self like the center of gravity we use in physics; this is a theoretical construct (i.e. it doesn’t exist), but helps us perform calculations.
The self works in the same way.
Our language spins stories about ourselves. We come to believe that there is a single, inner self, that has consciousness, makes decisions, and holds opinions.
But the self is a fiction that arises because our brain wants to make everything consistent.
What does Metzinger’s Phenomenal self-model entail? Which theory [ego/bundle] does he defend?
He defends a bundle theory: our sense of being a self arises from our phenomenal model of self.
He asks the question: “Why does the feeling of self arise?”.
His theory attempts to explain our consciousness experience and the phenomenology of the self.
Our phenomenology is a result of the way we represent the world and ourselves (Metzinger is a representationalist).
Metzinger is a representationalist? What views of the world does he have?
We experience and know the world through representations of the world that we create in our brain.
We will never know the world as it is, but only how it appears to us in our experiences.
There are many things we cannot experience because our senses cannot register them. These are not part of the conscious model of the world that our brain generates.
Our representations of the world are transparent: we don’t realize at all that our representations are bad models of the stimuli.
What is Naive realism (coined by Metzinger)?
When we think we experience the world directly, but actually we don’t have access to that; we only have our models and representations.
Our representations of the world are transparent: we don’t realize that our representations are actually bad models of the stimuli.
The question remains: Where does our sense come from that the world is experienced by a self? What is Metzinger’s response?
He does not believe in a self; not only do we create a model of the world when we experience it, but it also contains an integrated representation of ourselves; the center of that world.
This self-model is anchored in our embodied experiences and with the perspective from which we experience the world.
the experience itself may also not correspond to reality (ex. rubber hand illusion).
The phenomenal self-model and the sense that we are a self has an evolutionary function; it is advantageous to think of ourselves as continuous and enduring selves.
Lecture 11 Summary
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