Tragedy of the Commons

2 features of goods

Excludability and rivalry

Excludability

Relates to the difficult of restricting someone who benefits from the provision of a good or service

Rivalry

Refers to the extent to which one individual’s use subtracts from the availability of a good or service for the consumption by others

4 types of goods

1. Private goods: High excludability, high rivalry

2. Common goods/common pool resources: Low excludability, high rivalry

3. Club/toll goods: High excludability, non-rivalry

4. Public goods: Low excludability, low rivalry

What types of environmental goods/natural resources are more susceptible to the tragedy of the commons?

Common goods

Tragedy of the Commons

The concept that if many people enjoy unfettered access to a finite, valuable resource, they will tend to overuse it and may end up destroying its value altogether

Fundamental arguments made by Hardin (1968) with respect to why tragedy of the commons occurs

1. A finite world can support only a finite population

   - The planet cannot support unrestrained population growth - overpopulation

2. Individually reached decisions will not be best for society in the long term

3. Conscience or altruism is not sufficient for utilizing the common goods well

4. Anyone who tires to be responsible with resource will eventually be self-eliminated

   - Having fewer offspring, access to fewer resources, crowded out)

Underlying assumptions made by Hardin (1968) with respect to why tragedy of the commons occurs

1. Rational self interest

   - Individuals are assumed to be rational actors who prioritize personal gain over collective well-being

2. Open-access resource

   - The good is assumed to be non-excludable (no one can be prevented from using it) and rivalrous (one person's use diminishes another's).

3. Absence of Regulation or Social Norms

   - Hardin assumes no external governance (laws, privatization, or community rules) exists to limit exploitation

4. Finite Resource Capacity

5. No Altruism or Cooperation

Describe Hardin’s solutions to the tragedy of the commons, and discuss the weaknesses of these solutions

1. Property rights (government or private ownership of goods

   - Acquiring land is a huge and expensive undertaking

   - Enforcing property rights can be difficult, especially with large expansive resources

   - Requires large scale buy-in from the public

2. Regulations on waste, pollution, production, and reproduction

   - Requires heavy monitoring → big government is expensive and risky

   - Requires a non-corrupt authority and wise political decision making

Four types of common pool resource (CPR) users

1. Free riders

2. Unwilling cooperators

3. Cooperation initiators

4. Altruists

Free-riders

Those who always behave in narrow, self-interested ways and never cooperate in dilemma situations

Unwilling cooperators

Those who are unwilling to cooperate with others unless assured that they will not be exploited by free-riders

Cooperation initiators

Those who are willing to initiate reciprocal cooperation in the hopes that others will return their trust

Altruists

Those who always try to achieve higher returns for a group

Four types of property rights

1. Government property

2. Individual/private property

3. Group property

4. Open access

Government property

Rights held by a government that can regulate or subsidize

Individual/private property

Rights held by individuals who can exclude others

Group property

Rights held by a group of users who can exclude others

Open access

Absence of enforced rights

Explain how the composition of CPR users within a community may influence the type of property rights appropriate for effectively managing CPRs in that community

• Small, tight knit vs large, heterogenous groups

  • More trust and reciprocity in smaller groups, so property rights may be shared and self-governed

  • Larger groups have more anonymity and less trust, so property rights may need to be more regulated

• High dependence vs low dependence on CPR

  • Subsistence users depend on the resource, so long term sustainability is vital

  • Commercial/external users have less connection to CPR, so enforcement may be necessary to deter free-riders

Describe Ostrom’s eight principles for designing effective CPR institutions

1. Clear boundaries of the resource and of the user group

2. Rules should fit local circumstances

3. Participatory decision-making is vital: Those are are effected by the rules can participate in modifying them

4. Commons need the right to organize: The rule-making rights of community must be respected by outside authorities

5. Commons must be monitored and involve resource users

6. Sanctions for those who abuse the commons should be graduated.

7. Conflict resolution should be easily accessible

8. Commons work best when nested within larger networks

Concept of K’ax K’ol

Yucatec Maya term that translates roughly to "the destruction of the shared forest" or "the ruin of the common land."

• K’ax K’ol emerges from Mayan communalism, where the "tragedy" is seen as a failure of collective responsibility rather than just individual greed.

Challenges of the Global Commons

Global commons are shared resources beyond national jurisdiction, such as the atmosphere, oceans, biodiversity, and outer space

• Governance is complicated by transboundary use, lack of clear ownership, and conflicting national interests,

• Leads to overexploitation and degradation.