P17 - The extent of détente up to 1979

détente

the easing of hostility or strained relations, usually between countries

Strategic Arms limitation Talks (SALT)

talks between of limiting the development + use of nuclear weapons in 1960s:

• 1963 Moscow Test Ban

• 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) aims to stop the spread of nuclear weapons

Czech incident stalled the agreement, but resumed in 1969 and reached agreement in MAY 1972 

-lead to greater stability and prosperity of international peace, opening a way for an era of negotiation 

-non-confrontational relationship

SALT I - Anti-Ballistic missile treaty 1972

26 May 1972 - limited both USSR and US production of ABM - not having more than 100 interceptor missiles

could have 2 sites -one can be located around capital city, while other was to protect ICBM 

no further comp to develop ABM defence + slowed down race to develop offensive weapons

The Interim Agreement on The limitation of Strategic Offensive arms 

26 MAY 1972 -  freeze on strategic missile, complementing the ABM treaty

froze at:

-1054 ICBM US vs 1618 for USSR

-656 SLBMs US vs 740 USSR

-450 strategic bombers US vs 140 USSR

-no provisions on MIRVs or cruise missile systems

valid for 5 years 

Moscow Summit May 1972

set -”the basic principles of Relations between USA and USSR”

12 principles but 3 important:

Peaceful Coexistence:
Both sides agreed to work to avoid military confrontation and pursue peaceful relations despite ideological differences.

Non-Interference & Sovereignty:
Each nation agreed to respect the sovereignty, equality, and territorial integrity of the other, and not interfere in internal affairs.

Commitment to Negotiation & Cooperation:
“special responsibility”  to settle issues through negotiation, not force but cooperation in areas like arms control, science, trade, and culture was encouraged.

-depended on both sides following - USSR more in favour

-showed desire for more reaching lasting agreement

Vladivostok Summit - NOV 1974

-FORD president + Kissinger met prior in MOSCOW in October and spoke about strategic missile launchers and MIRVs numbers

at Vlad summit - agreed to 10 yr plan (moves to SALT II)

-USSR agree to equal levels of ICBM and SLBM launchers + US congress supported in FEB 1975 despite opposition

Summit Clarification issues

disagreements on clarification

unsmooth transition of SALT II due to US arguing limit applied only to ballistic missiles, while USSR it included cruise missiles 

still far from final agreement as other issues appeared in Geneva

Opposition

likes of SEC of defence (Donald Rumsfeld) and chairmen of staff (General George Brown) + others opposed

also presidential election year, with Carter replacing FORD as president, who aimed to establish more ambitious arms reductions than VLAD agreement

clear SALT won’t be achieved by 1976 

Jimmy Carter

under pressure to adopt firm approach on arms reduction 

March 1977 - considering to substantially reduce levels of heavy ICBMs

-told the Soviets on 28th March 1977:

• strategic systems from 2400 to 1800-2000

• launchers with MIRVs from 1320 - 1100

• ICBM to 150 and ICBM launchers and MIRVS to 550 

• only heavy bombers could have air-launched cruise missiles with range 600-2500km

Brezhnev felt Carter pushing luck + demanding so rejected these

-feeling Carter was moving away from détente with need for co operation 

Vienna Summit - June 1979

despite delays SALT II announced on 9th May 1979, being signed and finalised at Vienna summit

-ment Soviet and US leadership could communicate directly rather and intermediaries

Ostpolitik + development of EU détente

foreign policy of West GER to improve EU East-West relations

OCT 1969- 74 Willy Brandt as chancellor of West GER triggered new approach .Won 1972 Noble peace price for hid efforts

-he chose to abandon Hallstein doctrine - now willing to recognise East GER

aimed to negotiate with USSR, recognise territory loss of Oder-Neisse border between East GER and Poland to ease tension and negotiate with East GER (GDR)

Brandt

Aug 1970 - Treaty of Moscow - talks with USSR led to Non-Aggression pact signed

7 DEC 1970 - Treaty of Warsaw - West GER signed treaty with Poland to recognise Oder-Neisse border

May 1971 - mutual recognition of both GER - when Communist chief is East (Walter Ulbricht - regarded as last Stalinist) resigned and replaced by Erich Honecker

steps towards establishing Ostpolitik 

The basic treaty

21st DEC 1972 - signed in East Berlin where FRG and GDR signed to formally recognised each other

settled relations

also provide route for other Eu nations to establish relations with GDR

led to both being members of UN by Sep 1973 + laid the groundwork for further EU détente

-Kissinger realisation that US must develop détente with SU to stop GER détente marginalising USA influence in EU

Helsinki Accords / Helsinki Final act

35 states - all major east and west EU nations + USA and Canada  - could veto

discussions began in 1972 and final conference on Security and coop in EU (CSCE) in 1975

Accords had 3 baskets 

Basket 1 – Security in Europe

10 principles

Recognition of existing borders in Europe.

Commitment to communicate and non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Strengthened East–West trust and détente.

Basket 2 – Cooperation in Economics, Science, Technology, and Environment

Promoted trade, tourism, scientific, technological, transport, environment, migration of labour, industrial cooperation

Basket 3 – Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

Respect for human rights, freedom of thought, religion, and movement.

Provided a framework to monitor civil liberties, especially in Eastern Europe.

Soviet Position

3 main interest in CSCE

-expand Ostpolitik + develop acceptance of status quo in EU

-decrease barriers between states to improve trade activity

-furthering détente 

USA position

-not fully committed to accepting the status quo in East EU 

-felt agreeing meant accepting a divided GER 

-if West felt more secure then they may not support military programmes in NATO member states 

both welcomed relaxing confrontation

Arms Race

Kissinger Believed if SALT II not signed by 1977 there would be nuclear expansion + fear of USSR nuclear force 

1978 - Carter faced USSR refusal to end deployment of SS-20 missiles in EU or reduce heavy missile stocks.

-Carter activated Deployment of new weapons programme to produce stealth bombers 

-also convinced USA NATO allies to increase military expenditure by 3% + deploy 572 perishing II + cruise missiles

USSR continue to deploy missiles through Warsaw Pact allies - seen by US as a threat 

mainly USSR invasion of Afghanistan shifted East-West détente 

relations with China

Mao priority in 1970s was economic development, rather than revolution - . Mao’s Death (1976)

closer links with US would help

-Nixon visit in 1972 didn’t lead to diplomatic relations

-Carter was influenced by Brzezinski (security advisor), taking view that China to be central element of USA global strat(containing USSR)

Ping-Pong Diplomacy (1971)

• US table tennis team invited to visit China

• Served as a symbolic thaw in relations after decades of hostility.

• Led directly to high-level US–China talks and eventually Nixon’s 1972 visit.

• Early step in normalising dialogue between East and West, easing Cold War tensions in Asia.

Deng Xiaoping

replaced MAO in 1976

he emphasised centrality of economics rather than revolution also

Taiwan

obstacle of “normalisation” of Sino-American relations, with US lasting support of it

DEC 1978 - China and USA agree on it

• Deng been granted demand for USA to stop military aid to Taiwan 

formal diplomatic relations agreed and take effect on 1st Jan 1979

29th Jan - 4th Feb 1979

Xiaoping Deng visit US

Deng - established relations gave access to global markets 

Carter - improve US ability to manage USSR threat 

Angola and Ethiopia events seen as increasing pressure on US vital strategic interests